Reliability of motivation and the moral value of actions

Abstract

Kant is often interpreted as meaning that (a) only actions performed out of duty have moral worth, while (b) actions in conformity with duty are evil or morally inadmissible. Furthermore, it is often claimed that c) having a good Gesinnung (that is, a virtuous character) is the necessary condition for the action of an agent has moral worth. This means that only deeds of duty performed by a virtuous agent can be considered to have moral value. This article argues that this influential interpretation is not correct, showing that Kant is committed to (a) but not to (b) or (c). It is shown that such actions can be right without having moral value, and actions can have moral value, even if the agent does not have a virtuous character. It follows from this that, in Kant's system, one can distinguish three forms of moral appreciation: (i) virtue that is reserved for agents who have good character, or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that belongs to action. actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correction which pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be willed to be universal laws. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that pertains to actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correctness that pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be expected to be laws universal. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. or Gesinnung, (ii) moral value that pertains to actions performed out of a conscience of duty, and (iii) correctness that pertains to actions performed on the basis of maxims that can be expected to be laws universal. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated. This means that Kantian ethics is not only concerned with the correctness or incorrectness of certain actions, nor that it is, above all, an ethics of virtue. Rather, Kant's system is complex and allows for different forms of moral appreciation, in which both an action-centered and an agent-centered perspective can be integrated.