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dc.contributor.authorSatne, P
dc.date.accessioned2020-09-15T10:25:33Z
dc.date.available2020-09-15T10:25:33Z
dc.date.issued2016-06-05
dc.identifier.citationSatne, P. (2016) Forgiveness and moral development. Philosophia 44, pp. 1029–1055 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9727-6en
dc.identifier.issn0048-3893en
dc.identifier.pmid30158731 (pubmed)
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-016-9727-6en
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2436/623638
dc.description© 2016 The Author. Published by Springer. This is an open access article available under a Creative Commons licence. The published version can be accessed at the following link on the publisher’s website: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11406-016-9727-6en
dc.description.abstract© 2016, The Author(s). Forgiveness is clearly an important aspect of our moral lives, yet surprisingly Kant, one of the most important authors in the history of Western ethics, seems to have very little to say about it. Some authors explain this omission by noting that forgiveness sits uncomfortably in Kant’s moral thought: forgiveness seems to have an ineluctably ‘elective’ aspect which makes it to a certain extent arbitrary; thus it stands in tension with Kant’s claim that agents are autonomous beings, capable of determining their own moral status through rational reflection and choice. Other authors recognise that forgiveness plays a role in Kant’s philosophy but fail to appreciate the nature of this duty and misrepresent the Kantian argument in support of it. This paper argues that there is space in Kant’s philosophy for a genuine theory of forgiveness and hopes to lay the grounds for a correct interpretation of this theory. I argue that from a Kantian perspective, forgiveness is not ‘elective’ but, at least in some cases, morally required. I claim that, for Kant, we have an imperfect duty of virtue to forgive repentant wrongdoers that have embarked on a project of self-reflection and self-reform. I develop a novel argument in support of this duty by drawing on Kant’s theory of rational agency, the thesis of radical evil, Kant’s theory of moral development, and the formula of humanity. However, it must be noted that this is a conditional duty and Kant’s position also entails that absence of repentance on the part of the wrongdoer should be taken as evidence of a lack of commitment to a project of self-reflection and self-reform. In such cases, Kant claims, we have a perfect duty to ourselves not to forgive unrepentant wrongdoers. I argue that this duty should be understood as one of the duties of self-esteem, which involves the duty to respect and recognise our own dignity as rational beings.en
dc.formatapplication/pdfen
dc.languageeng
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherSpringer Science and Business Media LLCen
dc.relation.urlhttps://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11406-016-9727-6en
dc.rightsLicence for published version: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
dc.rights.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/
dc.subjectforgivenessen
dc.subjectmoral developmenten
dc.subjectimperfect and perfect dutiesen
dc.subjectself-reformen
dc.subjecthumanityen
dc.subjectself-respecten
dc.titleForgiveness and moral developmenten
dc.typeJournal articleen
dc.identifier.eissn1574-9274
dc.identifier.journalPhilosophiaen
dc.date.updated2020-09-07T15:03:53Z
dc.contributor.institutionTeaching Fellow in Philosophy, University of Durham (UK), 50, Old Elvet, DH1 3HN Durham, UK.
pubs.place-of-publicationNetherlands
dc.date.accepted2016-05-20
rioxxterms.funderUniversity of Durhamen
rioxxterms.identifier.projectUOW15092020PSen
rioxxterms.versionVoRen
rioxxterms.licenseref.urihttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/en
rioxxterms.licenseref.startdate2020-09-15en
dc.source.volume44
dc.source.issue4
dc.source.beginpage1029
dc.source.endpage1055
dc.description.versionPublished version
refterms.dateFCD2020-09-15T10:24:23Z
refterms.versionFCDVoR
refterms.dateFOA2020-09-15T10:25:34Z


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Licence for published version: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International
Except where otherwise noted, this item's license is described as Licence for published version: Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International