The 1985 Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) was one of the major achievements of Anglo-Irish diplomacy during the course of the Troubles. Yet its importance has been misunderstood and often ignored in subsequent histories of the development of the conflict and the peace process. This article seeks to re-evaluate the AIA. It examines the purposes of the agreement, taking issue with a number of the existing explanations. It is argued that London and Dublin had conflicting analyses of what the AIA was designed to do, which led to disappointment in both states with its impact. These differences also made it difficult for academics to accurately characterize the accord. However, the AIA played a profound and imperative role in shaping the subsequent peace process, but this arose out of consequences of the Agreement that were, despite recent claims to the contrary, unanticipated, and indeed unintended, by those who drew up the document. (Palgrave Macmillan)

This new study reveals how British and Irish governments not only had different reasons for co-operating, but also had different prescriptions for ending the conflict in Northern Ireland. Eamonn O'Kane shows how and why the two states were subject to demands and expectations from their 'client' communities in the North had conflicting historical explanations for the problem and different domestic considerations to take into account. He argues that all of these factors must be examined in context and in doing so makes a significant contribution to our understanding of the Northern Ireland conflict and offers a new explanation for the emergence and development of the peace process. Based on extensive new interview data, this volume is an invaluable resource for students and researchers of British politics, Irish studies and conflict studies.

In the early 1990s the British and Irish governments moved away from the policy of attempting to marginalise the IRA and Sinn Féin to enticing republicanism into mainstream politics. This article examines why the two governments made this apparent shift in policy. The British and Irish governments were persuaded to change their policy on Northern Ireland due to a variety of factors, all of which need to be examined if the origins of the peace process are to be understood. The article questions existing explanations that portray the origins of the peace process and the Downing Street Declaration as simply a victory for Irish nationalism without taking account of the concessions secured by the British government from the Irish during the protracted negotiations. (Ingenta)