This book combines Campaign 5: ‘Ardennes 1944’, Campaign 24: ‘Arnhem 1944’, Campaign 74: ‘The Rhineland 1945’ and Campaign 75: ‘Lorraine 1944’. In the aftermath of the German collapse in the west in the summer of 1944, Allied armies rampaged across France and Belgium. A German counter-attack was crushed by General Patton in Lorraine, and Allied armies closed on the borders of the Reich. The Allied plan to end the war at a stroke ended in bloody failure at Arnhem, but a German offensive in the Ardennes, Hitler's last roll of the dice on the western front, proved equally futile. With German forces bled white, the Allies hurled themselves across the River Rhine to bring the crumbling edifice of Hitler's 1,000-year Reich crashing in ruin.

A detailed analysis of the strategy undertaken by the British Army during WWI. In this collection of essays of incomparable scholarship, Stephen Badsey explores in individual detail how the British Army fought in the First World War, how politics and strategy affected its battles and the decisions of senior commanders such as Douglas Haig, and how these issues were intimately intertwined with the mass media portrayal of the Army to itself and to the British people. Informative, provocative, and often entertaining, based on more than a quarter-century of research, these essays on the British Army in the First World War range through topics from a trench raid to modern television comedy. As a contribution to progressive military history, The British Army in Battle and Its Image 1914-1918 proves that the way the British Army fought and its portrayal through the media cannot be separated. It is one of a growing number of studies which show that, far from being in opposition to each other, cultural history and the history of battle must be combined for the First World War to be properly understood.

'Market Garden' was one of the most audacious, and ultimately controversial, operations of the Second World War - a joint penetration, by an armoured column and a large-scale airborne drop, to punch a decisive hole in the German defences. If it had succeeeded, the war could have ended in 1944. Yet the two-pronged attack failed in its objectives. This book details how, instead of being relieved after 48 hours as expected, British paratroopers were cut off for nine days. Facing two unexpected SS Panzer divisions the Allies were eventually evacuated across the Rhine after putting up an incredible fight: of the 10,000 men involved less than 2,000 survived. Campaigns 5, 24, 74 and 75 are also available in a single volume special edition as ‘Into the Reich’.

This key title in the acclaimed Battle Zone Normandy series explores the Allies' struggle to take Caen and its significance for the campaign. The city of Caen was perhaps the greatest major obstacle in the path of the Allied advance inland after their landings in Normandy, 6 June 1944. Consequently it was a key objective for 3rd British Division, landing on Sword Beach. The Allies were unable to capture the strategically important city on D-Day, however, in the teeth of armoured counter-attacks from 21st Panzer Division. Renewed attempts by 3rd Canadian Division on 7-8 June were foiled by 12th SS Panzer Division 'Hitlerjugend', as were 7th British Armoured Division's thrusts towards the city on 11-14 June. On 25 June Operation 'Epsom' was launched to take Caen. Preceded by RAF Bomber Command attacks, further British and Canadian assaults on 4 July stalled before the whole of the city could be taken. On 7 July Operation 'Charnwood' forced the Germans to withdraw from northern Caen. A much heavier bombardment opened Operation 'Goodwood' on 18 July, in the course of which the Canadians finally managed to liberate the rest of Caen, by now largely demolished after five weeks of intensive fighting.

This key title in the acclaimed Battle Zone Normandy series explores the US attack on Omaha Beach at dawn on D-Day 1944 and its aftermath. At dawn on D-Day the US Army's most experienced, battle-tested infantry formation, 1st Division or 'The Big Red One' launched its attack on Omaha Beach. The assault wave was launched too far out to sea and the men suffered terribly from seasickness. All the amphibious tanks sank except two, depriving the infantry of armoured support against minefields, bunkers and other defences. Moreover, the Allied aircraft tasked with destroying the fortifications had dropped their loads on open country too far inland and the offshore bombardment was hampered by poor visibility. Of the first six landing craft, two sank while the remainder ran aground on a sandbank. The assaulting infantry were compelled to wade in shoulder-high water, many drowning or being shot as they struggled ashore. All cohesion was lost and following waves of infantry simply stumbled into the carnage on the beach, the piles of wreckage restricting movement. In these first harrowing hours of the invasion, Lieutenant-General Omar Bradley considered aborting the Omaha effort altogether. Despite these appalling difficulties, a vulnerable bridgehead some 1.5 km inland had been established by the evening of 6 June 1944.

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command. In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

This publication considers the lessons to be gained for Britain, the British armed forces, and for NATO as a whole, from the Yugoslav wars of dissolution (1991-1999), with particular emphasis on the Kosovo crisis. The papers come from a diverse and high quality mixture of analysts, practitioners and policy-makers. The issues developed here represent a significant advance in the emerging debate on the lessons to be learnt from the Balkan experience, which will shape thinking on defence and international security far into the new millennium.

A prevalent view among historians is that both horsed cavalry and the cavalry charge became obviously obsolete in the second half of the nineteenth century in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower, and that officers of the cavalry clung to both for reasons of prestige and stupidity. It is this view, commonly held but rarely supported by sustained research, that this book challenges. It shows that the achievements of British and Empire cavalry in the First World War, although controversial, are sufficient to contradict the argument that belief in the cavalry was evidence of military incompetence. It offers a case study of how in reality a practical military doctrine for the cavalry was developed and modified over several decades, influenced by wider defence plans and spending, by the experience of combat, by Army politics, and by the rivalries of senior officers. Debate as to how the cavalry was to adjust its tactics in the face of increased infantry and artillery firepower began in the mid nineteenth century, when the increasing size of armies meant a greater need for mobile troops. The cavalry problem was how to deal with a gap in the evolution of warfare between the mass armies of the later nineteenth century and the motorised firepower of the mid twentieth century, an issue that is closely connected with the origins of the deadlock on the Western Front. Tracing this debate, this book shows how, despite serious attempts to ‘learn from history’, both European-style wars and colonial wars produced ambiguous or disputed evidence as to the future of cavalry, and doctrine was largely a matter of what appeared practical at the time. Contents: Preface; Doctrine and the cavalry 1880–1918; The Wolseley era 1880–1899; The Boer War 1899–1902; The Roberts era 1902–1905; The Haldane era 1905–1914; The First World War 1914–1918; Conclusion; Appendix; Bibliography; Index.

A fascinating new insight into the Falklands Conflict, covering every aspect of its origins and the political and diplomatic response to the Argentinean action as well as illuminating accounts of the military action to retake the islands, at every level of command. In June 2002, exactly twenty years after the cessation of hostilities between Britain and Argentina, many of the key participants came together at a major international conference. This conference, held at the Royal Military Academy, Sandhurst and organized jointly by RMA Sandhurst and her sister institution Britannia Royal Naval College, Dartmouth, aimed to re-examine the events of spring 1982 from the perspective that only twenty intervening years can bring. The Conference mixed those who had participated in the events of spring and early summer 1982, diplomats, politicians, civil servants, soldiers, sailors and airmen, with historians, political scientists and journalists. These accounts and interpretations of the conflict shed new light on one of the most interesting and controversial episodes in recent British history.

Unique among the D-Day landing beaches in its dangers, Utah Beach saw the US Army's greatest success, namely landing with the fewest casualties of any of the Allied invasion beaches The landing beach closest to Normandy’s largest port, Cherbourg, and regarded by the Germans as the most important Allied objective, Utah was isolated from the other D-Day beaches, meaning that that troops landing there would have to fight alone until a link-up could be achieved. Accordingly, the US First Army committed a powerful landing force, preceded by a night parachute and glider assault, part of the largest night drop ever mounted. Despite wide scattering, the airborne troops secured the critical communications centre of Ste Mere Eglise on D-Day, the first village in Normandy to be liberated. Supported by a devastating air and naval bombardment, although landing on the wrong beach in bad weather, 4th Infantry Division took only 197 casualties out of 23,000 troops that landed on D-Day, and by the early afternoon had begun to link up with the first of the paratroopers.