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    Subclinical delusional ideation and a self-reference bias in everyday reasoning.

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    Authors
    Galbraith, Niall
    Manktelow, Ken I.
    Morris, Neil
    Issue Date
    2008
    
    Metadata
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    Abstract
    Previous studies (e.g. Moller & Husby, 2000; Blackwood et al., 2004) have revealed that delusional thinking is accompanied by an exaggerated focus upon the self and upon stimuli that are perceived to be related to the self. The objective was to examine whether those high in subclinical delusional ideation exhibit a heightened tendency for self-reference. Using a mixed design, healthy individuals, classified into high- and low-scoring groups on the Peters et al. Delusions Inventory (Peters, Day, & Garety, 1996), were compared on everyday reasoning tasks across three experiments. High-PDI scorers, in contrast to the low-PDI group, rated self-referent objections to everyday arguments as stronger than other-referent objections and formulated more self-referent assertion-based objections to everyday arguments. The findings support the notion that subclinical delusional ideation is linked to a self-reference bias, which is evident in the sort of everyday thinking that people engage in when forming or evaluating their beliefs and which may contribute to delusion formation.
    Citation
    British Journal of Psychology, 2008, 99 (Pt 1): 29-44
    Publisher
    British Psychological Society
    Journal
    British Journal of Psychology
    URI
    http://hdl.handle.net/2436/29442
    DOI
    10.1348/000712607X204317
    PubMed ID
    17535473
    Additional Links
    http://www.ingentaconnect.com/content/bpsoc/bjp/2008/00000099/00000001/art00002?token=00541f43350ac8ca93015517e2a46762c475f5d367646707b3a7b6d24673f7b2f27375f2a72752d70407
    Type
    Journal article
    Language
    en
    ISSN
    0007-1269
    ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
    10.1348/000712607X204317
    Scopus Count
    Collections
    Faculty of Education, Health and Wellbeing

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