Abstract
Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed.Citation
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2004, 58 (2): 96-105Publisher
American Psychological AssociationJournal
Canadian Journal of Experimental PsychologyDOI
10.1037/h0085800PubMed ID
15285599Additional Links
http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/h0085800Type
Journal articleLanguage
enISSN
1196-1961ae974a485f413a2113503eed53cd6c53
10.1037/h0085800
Scopus Count
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