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dc.contributor.authorWanklyn, Malcolm
dc.contributor.authorJones, Frank
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-20T20:18:55Z
dc.date.available2008-05-20T20:18:55Z
dc.date.issued2004
dc.identifier.isbn0582772818
dc.identifier.isbn978-0582772816
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2436/27206
dc.description.abstractA Military History of the English Civil War examines how the civil war was won, who fought for whom, and why it ended. With a straightforward style and clear chronology that enables readers to make their own judgements and pursue their own interests further, this original history provides a thorough critique of the reasons that have been cited for Parliament's victory and the King's defeat in 1645/46. It discusses the strategic options of the Parliamentary and Royalist commanders and councils of war and analyses the decisions they made, arguing that the King’s faulty command structure was more responsible for his defeat than Sir Thomas Fairfax's strategic flair. It also argues that the way that resources were used, rather than the resources themselves, explain why the war ended when it did. (Longman/Pearson)
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherLondon: Longman/Pearson Books
dc.relation.urlhttp://www.pearsoned.co.uk/Bookshop/detail.asp?item=100000000030936
dc.subjectBritish history
dc.subject17th century
dc.subjectMilitary history
dc.subjectEnglish Civil War
dc.titleA Military History of the English Civil War: 1642-1649
dc.typeAuthored book
html.description.abstractA Military History of the English Civil War examines how the civil war was won, who fought for whom, and why it ended. With a straightforward style and clear chronology that enables readers to make their own judgements and pursue their own interests further, this original history provides a thorough critique of the reasons that have been cited for Parliament's victory and the King's defeat in 1645/46. It discusses the strategic options of the Parliamentary and Royalist commanders and councils of war and analyses the decisions they made, arguing that the King’s faulty command structure was more responsible for his defeat than Sir Thomas Fairfax's strategic flair. It also argues that the way that resources were used, rather than the resources themselves, explain why the war ended when it did. (Longman/Pearson)


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