

The use of the political categories of Brexiter and Remainer in online comments about the EU referendum

Keywords: Brexit; EU referendum, membership categorisation analysis, discourse analysis, categories; political identity

Abstract

In June 2016, the UK held a referendum on EU membership; 52% of those who voted, voted to leave, and 48% voted to remain. During the referendum campaign two identities emerged: ‘Brexiters’ and ‘Remainers’, which remained salient post-referendum. This study explores how the categories of Brexiter and Remainer were deployed by posters online. Data comprises comment threads collected from four online newspapers both during the campaign and after the vote, which focus on the Brexit campaign promise: ‘We send £350m a week to the EU. Let’s fund our NHS instead’. We draw on membership categorisation analysis and discursive psychology to analyse when categories were made salient and what responses to the invocation of categories were. Analysis revealed that posters explicitly categorise the outgroup and in doing so implicitly define their group. Posters resisted other political identities when attributed to them in relation to the referendum. The analysis shows how Brexiter and Remainer are new, albeit contested, political categories and identities in their own right, with other political identities resisted when used. The paper highlights implications for the political system in the UK and for social divisions within UK society.

Introduction

1. Brexit

The referendum on the UK’s membership of the EU was held in June 2016, after an extensive period of campaigning by the formal campaign groups; supported by other political, industrial and civil society stakeholders. Over 45 million people voted, with a turnout of 72% which was the highest turnout for any vote in over 20 years in the UK. The final result (52% leave and 48% remain) highlighted a stark political division in the country, which still resonates as the UK negotiates leaving the EU.

The campaign was incredibly bitter at times, with Moore and Ramsey (2017) suggesting that it was the “most divisive, hostile, negative and fear-provoking of the 21st Century” (n.p). While this is arguable, it is true that some campaign claims were viciously contested. A key slogan, which we focus on in this paper, was ‘We send £350m a week to the EU. Let’s fund our NHS instead’. This claim was contested throughout the campaign and after the referendum as “it became evident that health care underfunding had very little to do with the European Union” (Costa-Font, 2017, p.783), and the costs of leaving the EU became evident (Begg, 2017).

During the campaign, the terms ‘Brexiters’ and ‘Remainer’ emerged to describe those who would vote leave or remain. Although taking a pro or anti-EU stance is not new (see, for example, Forster, 2002 for a discussion of the history of Euroscepticism), in the case of the EU referendum, these identities became particularly salient in political discourse in the UK.

2. Political identities and groups

Social identity theorists argue that ‘social identity’ underpins the ways in which groups behave (e.g., Tajfel & Turner, 1979); that is, a *group’s* norms and behaviour will influence the norms and behaviour of *individuals* who identify with that group. Individuals who identify as part of an ‘ingroup’ evaluate themselves positively compared to relevant ‘outgroups’ (Hornsey, 2008). However, social identity theory struggles to address how we come to identify with particular groups. Self-categorization theory (SCT; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) understands categorization as a psychological, cognitive process which then has an influence on our thoughts and behaviour (Edwards, 1998). It also suggests that we organize people into categories because this is how the ‘real-world’ functions. A particular category will become salient depending on the situation, including what comparisons can be made between particular groups, and what we expect the similarities and differences between individuals to be (Reicher, Spears & Haslam, 2010).

Potter and Wetherell (1987) argue that categories are not simply mental processes which are ‘switched on’ by particular events. Instead, categories are understood as practices which are deployed in interaction to manage interactional business (Edwards, 1998). Category use in interaction is “locally constructed, occasioned and rhetorically oriented in nature” (Edwards, 1998 p.30). Self-categorizations are not fixed but dynamic and fluid, even within a single interaction; and they are ‘worked up’ by those in the interaction (Antaki, Condor & Levine, 1996). We should not, therefore, understand categories as a fixed identity for any individual, but as constituting a range of interactional resources (Rapley, McCarthy & McHoul, 2003).

Previous research has aimed to understand how political categories and identities are discursively constructed. This research avoids approaching categories as merely mental representations, but instead focuses on categories as they are used *in situ*, and how categories are built up rhetorically through talk. A variety of topics, such as racism (Rapley, 1998), extremism (Hopkins & Kahani-Hopkins, 2009), prejudice (Tileaga, 2006) and politicians’ self-categories (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996) have been addressed, with the aim of exploring how these concepts are constructed through discursive practices. Research in this area aims to

use naturally-occurring data; that is, it focuses on language as it occurs in practice, without intervention from the researcher (Potter, 2004).

3. The internet as a site of political discourse

Social media has had an impact on how politicians campaign, and the referendum campaign was no different, with both Leave and Remain campaigns active on Twitter. During the referendum campaign Brexiters were more prominent on Twitter throughout most of the campaign, but in later stages, pro-Remain tweets became more frequent (Llewellyn & Cram, 2016). One site of much debate during the referendum campaign which, to our knowledge, has not yet been studied is online newspaper comments, which afford opportunities for ordinary people to engage in political discourse.

Many online newspapers allow comments below news or opinion articles, where any reader is able to respond to the article. In an online setting there can be multiple potential recipients: a *direct* recipient of a post; an *indirect* recipient who is part of the interaction but not the direct recipient of a message; and *overhearing* recipients, who are not ‘ratified’ participants in the interaction, but view the messages anyway (Goffman, 1981; Meredith, 2016). Online data has a number of perceived limitations for researchers, such as the inability to request clarification from participants, and the anonymity the online forum permits for its users (Jowett, 2015). However, these limitations are irrelevant for critical discursive research as it focuses only on what is posted, rather than on the motivations or veracity or otherwise of posts (Jowett, 2015). Using data from online sources allows for the analysis of how individuals discuss particular topics in a ‘naturalistic’ way, with no researcher influence on their interaction (Potter & Hepburn, 2005). As such, there has been a growing body of research which uses online data to study how ‘identity work’ is done online (e.g., Sneijder & te Molder, 2009; Horne & Wiggins, 2009; Coles & West, 2016).

This paper focuses on the new political identities of Brexiter and Remainer. Although these categories are used widely in the media, little is known about what these terms mean to those who use them in ordinary interaction, or how they relate to other political identities. Therefore, this paper examines the construction of these categories as they are constructed in and through online interaction as salient political identities.

Methods

1 Data collection

Four national newspaper websites were chosen, both tabloids and broadsheets, including both pro and anti-EU newspapers. The newspaper websites allowed comments on their news stories and were not behind a paywall so were considered to be in the public domain. The four newspaper sites chosen were: Daily Mail/Mail on Sunday; The Independent; The Guardian/The Observer; and The Express/Sunday Express. Of these, the Independent, Mail on Sunday and the Guardian/Observer backed remaining in the EU. The Express, Sunday Express and Daily Mail supported leaving the EU.

As the £350 million claim was so prominently contested (Corbett, 2016), we chose to focus on news items which related to this claim. Data collection took place in October 2016. We used the search terms ‘NHS’, ‘£350m’, ‘Brexit’, ‘EU’, and searched for any stories which related to the £350 million claim since the referendum was announced in February 2016, meaning that stories from before and after the vote were captured in the sample. We excluded any articles which did not relate directly to Brexit, live blogs which covered daily events in the campaign, and any items which did not allow comments. In total, we have a corpus of 34 newspaper items (see Appendix 1). The focus of our analysis was the comments not the newspaper items themselves. We sampled threads (a collection of posts, generally related to the same topic) rather than individual posts, as the interaction between posters is of analytic importance. In order to ensure relatively even representation from all newspapers, whilst maintaining a manageable data set, we chose to limit the number of threads sampled for each item to 100. This gave us a dataset of 2586 threads, comprising a total of 192661 words, inclusive of user name, which included a range of comments and views from across the newspapers, enabling us to attain saturation (Braun & Clarke, 2006). We used NVivo to collect the data, and then transferred it to Microsoft Word so it would be searchable. In accordance with the University of Salford ethics committee approval, and guided by the British Psychological Society guidelines for internet mediated research (BPS, 2017), we anonymised all posts by giving posters a pseudonym.

2 Analytic approach

We draw on discursive psychology (DP; Edwards & Potter, 1992) and membership categorisation analysis (MCA; Sacks, 1992) in our analysis. DP avoids treating language as a system of rules and categories, but rather conceives of talk “as a domain of situated action, rather than a set of conventions for the expression of intended messages” (Edwards, 2004, p.41). DP aims to identify shared normative practices that organize social interaction (Augoustinos & Tileaga, 2012) and to identify “the social and political consequences of

discursive patterning” (Wetherell, 1998, p. 405). DP also draws on MCA in its work and has a similar interest in how categories are built up in talk (e.g., Antaki & Widdicombe, 1998; Edwards, 1998). MCA aims to identify how categories are used in talk and provides a way for analysts to study categories as members’ concerns (Stokoe, 2012). Collections of particular uses of categories are built and then explored to see how categories are located within an interaction or text. MCA analyses the design and action orientation of the turn or text and “*look(s)* for evidence that and how recipients orient to the category” (Stokoe, 2012, p.280).

We manually collected all instances of the categories of Brexiter and Remainer along with any related terms (such as ‘Remoaner’ or ‘Brexiteer’). We created collections of where these terms were used explicitly (e.g., ‘the usual vapid comment from a Brexiter’), but also where the category characteristics were used to make these terms implicitly relevant (e.g., ‘the idiots voted out’) and where they were used alongside other political identities, such as political parties or positions. We examined each of these collections for how the categories were explicitly defined, which predicates were used implicitly, and how these categories were used and responded to.

Analysis

The analysis is divided into two sections: 1) Definitions of Brexiter and Remainer; 2) the use of other political categories. In the first section, we discuss the discourses which were used in relation to each of the categories, as well as providing more detailed analysis of typical posts. In the second section we demonstrate how existing political identities are resisted when discussing Brexit.

1. Definitions of Brexiter and Remainer

Across the data the categories of Brexiter and Remainer were often defined by the opposing group. Discourses used to describe the category of Brexiter relate to a lack of intelligence (‘basic reading comprehension is what leavers lack – along with IQ’ *Article 23*), gullibility (‘one gullible Brexiter from Sunderland’ *Article 23*) and general ignorance of the issues involved in the vote (‘you simply cannot argue with this level of ignorance’ *Article 16*). Brexiter were also described as focused on immigration (‘it is all about immigration now’ *Article 16*) as well as in terms of other categories, in particular their age. The following extract provides an example of a typical post that linked category predicates and an age category and shows how the term Brexiter was deployed in context.

Extract 1: Article 4

Weisemann44 > YeOldeBludgen

1 You have to remember that when you deal with Brexiers you are dealing with
2 fanatics who cannot accept reason and with feeble minded elderly people
3 who will vote for anybody who promises them to move the country back to
4 1933.

In this post, Weisemann44 is providing a direct response to a question posted earlier in the thread by YeOldeBludgen (denoted by the > between the two posters' names) which asked how Brexiters could believe that the EU is a greater threat to the NHS than the Conservative party. Weisemann44 provides an explicit definition of what the characteristics or predicates are of a person who belongs to the category of 'Brexiter'. Brexiters are 'fanatics' (line 2), which implies they are obsessive and irrational. They are also described as being unable to 'accept reason', which suggests that reasonable arguments are being made, but Brexiters simply cannot accept them. This post, therefore, fits within the broader discourses found in our dataset of Brexiters being unintelligent, ignorant and gullible (see also Corbett, 2016).

The categories of Brexiter and Remainder are part of a membership categorization device (MCD) 'voters in the referendum'. MCDs are collections of categories which are heard together; for example, mother, daughter, sister are categories of the MCD 'family' (Stokoe, 2012). Brexiter and Remainder are also *a standardized relational pair*, in that they sit together in a paired relationship (Stokoe, 2003). As these categories are related, the category of Remainder is also implicitly defined when the category of 'Brexiter' is and vice versa (Leudar, Marsland & Nekvapil, 2004). Therefore, when Weisemann44 attributes the predicate of 'being unreasonable' to Brexiters, this implicitly defines Remainders as being reasonable.

Brexiter are also defined as 'feeble minded elderly people', which constructs the category of Brexiter as being related to an age category, providing for multiple potential inferences depending on the context (Stokoe, 2009). However, the poster goes on to provide the exact inferences which any recipient should understand from the use of this category: that they want to 'move the country back to 1933'. This categorizes Brexiters as old fashioned, nostalgic and backward thinking (see Cobley, 2018) and can also be understood as part of the broader discourse found in our data of Brexiters being gullible.

We have, then, two groups of people categorized as ‘Brexiters’: those who are fanatical and unreasonable, and those who are feeble-minded and elderly. Categories are recurrently used and treated as inference-rich as “a great deal of the knowledge that members of a society have about the society is stored in terms of these categories” (Sacks, 1992, p. 90). We can use categories such as ‘mother’, ‘daughter’, ‘wife’ and so on to describe a ‘woman’ without having to explicitly define what the associated predicates of that category are (Stokoe, 2012). Where the predicates of a category are explicitly defined, as is the case in this extract, we would argue that the posters are treating these categories as emergent and therefore not ‘inference-rich’ (Sacks, 1992).

These discourses and examples demonstrate that Remainers tend to define Brexiters in wholly negative ways (see also Carl, 2018). However, in cases where Brexiters defined their own category predicates or characteristics these included more positive characteristics such as being ‘proud to support freedom’ (*Article 28*) and being ‘supporters of democracy’ (*Article 19*). As previously noted, Brexiters’ self-definitions also comprise implicit definitions of characteristics they perceive Remainers as not having.

Remainers were also explicitly defined by Brexiters. The discourses used in relation to Remainers related to how they were weak and ‘swayed by those with a special agenda’ (*Article 12*). They were also defined as out of touch with reality (‘the remainers should really now get back in touch with reality’ *Article 23*) or as ‘celebrity luvvies’ (*Article 17*). Considering that newspapers dubbed the Remain campaign ‘Project Fear’ (Green, 2016) it was perhaps unsurprising that Remainers were also seen as ‘scaremongers’ (*Article 12*) who were exaggerating the potential downsides of Brexit. As with Brexiters, being an incumbent of the category Remainer was seen as negative, when defined by the outgroup.

There were some discourses which were used in relation to both groups. Remainers were defined by Brexiters as being unintelligent (‘one cell remoaners’ *Article 23*), and there were often exchanges in the threads about which side could be defined as ‘liars’ (‘but then, I don’t expect honesty from Brexiteers’ *Article 23*). The following extract demonstrates how Remainers were explicitly defined as liars during one exchange.

Extract 2: Article 28

Neyra

[...]

- 1 The entire remain campaign was formulated and built on nothing but lies.
- 2 ALL of it!

3 I have asked frustrated [sic] remainers to name any other lie than the 350 million
4 figure misinterpretation. They can't. Yet they wilfully ignore the dozens and
5 dozens of blatant lies by the remain campaign. Remainers have shown
6 themselves to be fantasists, delusional idiots, xenophobic bigots and
7 hypocrites
8 Brexit told the truth. Brexit won, GET OVER IT!

Neyra's post (the final part of which is produced here, for reasons of space) focuses on whether the £350m claim was a lie. Neyra's post suggests that a category-bound activity (Sacks, 1992) of being a Remainer is ignoring the 'blatant lies' of the Remain campaign (line 5). Neyra's invoking of this activity as relevant to Remainers functions to resist the category-bound predicate of Brexiters being liars. Billig (1991) notes that any attitude taken towards any particular position is also implicitly a stance against the counter-position. Therefore, when Neyra downgrades the term 'lie' to '350 million figure misinterpretation' (line 3-4) they are implicitly denying the position that the £350 million claim was a 'lie'. They are also potentially denying this claim through attacking the credibility of their opponents (Byford, 2006); in other words, attributing particular characteristics to Remainers demonstrates they cannot be trusted and are engaged in lying or untruths.

The post then lists the predicates which Neyra attributes to Remainers (lines 6 and 7). Through using the phrase 'have shown themselves' Neyra implies that these predicates have been established through the actions of Remainers, although these activities are for recipients to infer. The list of terms that Neyra uses are, in some cases, over-defined; for example, 'xenophobic bigots' potentially describes the same predicate with similar words. The list construction suggests a completeness and comprehensiveness of the definition (Rapley, 1998). Neyra's final line refers to Brexit rather than Brexiters, suggesting that this is not about particular individuals but about the campaign as a whole. This is a three-part list (Jefferson, 1990), with the final part potentially aimed at overhearing recipients (and particularly Remainers) who have complained about the outcome. This highlights that the post potentially aims to mobilise support for their political position (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996).

In summary, the predicates of the categories Brexiter and Remainer are often made explicit, whether through self-defining or through implicitly defining the ingroup through the definition of the outgroup. Based on the general discourses used we can see that the predicates for the outgroup tend to be defined in negative terms on both sides, which may

have social consequences in terms of entrenching social divisions in society (Corbett, 2016) These are emerging categories, with the potential inferences which could be associated with those categories yet to be established, and so posters define them. However, as similar predicates are used for both Brexiters and Remainers (e.g., liars, unintelligent) it can be seen that the precise nature of these categories is contested.

2. Use of other political categories

Posters used other political categories, which were treated by posters as inference-rich and so not needing explicit definition, as synonyms for the categories of Brexiter and Remainer.

Extract 3: Article 23

BigBirdPrey

1 The idiots voted out even though they didn't have a clue and the alleged
2 'benefits' of leaving were all lies.

Sam Lock

3 17.4m people - the most Britons who have every voted for anything - are
4 'idiots', are we?
5 But thanks anyway. The endless stream of sneering supercilious down-your
6 -nose put-downs from you lefties helped us win on 23rd June.

Alpha1025

7 why are you stupidly assuming he's a leftie? not all Remain voters
8 where left of Centre, there where [sic] plenty of Tory voters who voted
to
9 Remain as well

In this post, the categories of Brexiter and Remainer are not used explicitly but are implied through the category-bound activities of 'voted out' (line 1) and 'voted to Remain' (lines 8-9). However, other political categories are used. Sam states that put-down from 'lefties' helped 'us' win (line 6). The category of 'leftie' can be heard as being from the MCD of 'place on the political spectrum', along with other terms such as 'right-winger', 'centrist' and so on. This term is treated by the posters as a 'pre-existing' category, which is not in need of any definition, as it is presumably already 'inference-rich'. Sam's post, though, uses the term 'us' as contrastive to 'lefties', suggesting that 'lefties' can be understood as synonymous with Remainers. Alpha dismisses this use of the category 'leftie' because it is not the most relevant

or salient category in this context (Widdicombe, 1998). Alpha provides a basis for their rejection of the category by claiming ‘not all Remain voters were left of Centre’ invoking voter political affiliations, constructed as ‘common-knowledge’ (Potter, 1996). Thus, political party categories are rejected on the basis that this MCD is not relevant in this situation.

In the following post we see the introduction of a new category, ‘Remoaner’. Post-referendum, this category emerged in our data as a pejorative term to mean someone who voted ‘remain’ and is still vocally opposed to Brexit. In this extract, the use of the term Remoaner is contested.

Extract 4: Article 31

Booted58

1 So, if remoaners are saving up their "i told u so"
2 Can I state that in 2008 all the apparent due consequences of leaving the EU have
3 already happened and can i confirm that this was all your faults?

Foxhound

4 What the h@ll is a "remoaner"? Another made up word for the unintelligent
5 no doubt.

Bruce June

6 That's you that is!

PhiPho

7 I prefer remainiac to remoaner to be honest, but both fit the
8 bill...

Busclebend

9 I prefer leftist Remainiac.

Bantags

10 Leftist? ... and yet 62% of Labour voters backed
11 Remain!

In line 1 the term ‘remoaner’ is used alongside a category predicate of being the type of person who would say ‘I told you so’. It is not, though, the category predicate which is resisted here but the use of the term itself (line 4). Foxhound formulates the term ‘remoaner’ as a made-up term, highlighted by the quotation marks. They also explicitly categorise anyone who uses the term (including the original poster) as unintelligent (line 4).

In the rest of the thread, the posters draw attention to the emergent status of this category through debating the merits of categorizing in one way or another (Billig, 1996), and discussing what the appropriate or correct term is. In line 9 Busclebend includes the category of left-wing, which is then resisted by Bantags. In Bantags' post it is the term 'leftie' rather than the term 'Remaniac' which is now being resisted. We argue that at this point in the interaction, 'leftist' is resisted because it is not the most salient category here, whereas 'Remaniac' is at least salient in the interaction. Bantags provides evidence to support their argument that 'leftist' is not the most salient category, yet even here they switch from the MCD of 'political spectrum' to 'political party'.

In summary, posters resisted the use of other MCDs such as political spectrum or political party as these were not the most salient identity categories to be used. The analysis presented here suggests that the categories of Brexiter and Remainer/Remoaner are treated as new political identities in their own right.

Discussion

Our analysis has demonstrated how the categories of Brexiter and Remainer are used, defined and resisted in online comment threads. These categories do not simply refer to how someone voted but also include inferences and definitions about the type of person someone identifying with, or being identified with, that category might be. As expected based on social identity theory, members of ingroups defined themselves positively compared to outgroups (Hornsey, 1998). In defining the outgroup in a negative way, posters were also implicitly defining their own group, meaning that it could be inferred that their characteristics were positive. Our analysis also showed that traditional political categories were resisted and challenged when used as synonyms for Brexiter and Remainer.

Our findings have implications for the organization of political identities and the party political system in the UK. While some research has suggested that the divisions that have arisen around Brexit are emblematic of pre-existing divisions (Corbett, 2016; Ford & Goodwin, 2017), our data suggest that participants in these interactions treat the categories of Brexiter and Remainer as new identities, which are in need of definition, and which have become salient because of the situation (Reicher et al., 2010). Other political categories (e.g., Leftie, Tory, Labour) are not salient identities in these discussions, and their use is resisted by recipients. The traditional political dividing lines of left and right, Conservative and Labour are now cross-cut by the division of Brexiter and Remainer and this may lead to the

subsequent re-shaping of the party system in the UK in years to come (see Ford and Goodwin, 2017).

As well as the implications for the political system, the analysis has shown how toxic and divisive the discourses used around Brexit, Brexiters and Remainers are. As the nation moves forward with Brexit, there will be a need to manage these societal divisions. And yet, as our data has shown, Remainers often dismiss those who voted Leave as being uneducated, elderly, ignorant, or obsessed with immigration. Similarly, Brexiters see those who voted to remain as being part of the establishment, anti-democracy and anti-freedom. With these increasingly stereotypical views of the outgroup emerging, it seems that finding ways to bridge the societal divisions that Brexit appears to have opened, may pose as many challenges as Brexit itself.

Finally, our article has demonstrated the usefulness of using online data for analysing emergent categories. In using newspaper data we, firstly, have access to a ready-made archive which can be collected relatively easily and which can show how categories are used *in situ*. Secondly, this data is naturally-occurring (Potter, 2004), and so it is more ecologically valid. Studying naturally-occurring interaction using discursive methods allows us insight into how ordinary people use identity categories, develop arguments, demonstrate their own knowledge and challenge others in everyday interaction. Through analysing this data in-depth, we can see how small details may give us an insight into broader issues (Sacks, 1984). Thirdly, as the internet is where so much political debate around Brexit took place (Seaton, 2016), using data from online sources allows researchers to explore the many different facets of ordinary people's understandings of Brexit, and also of politics in general.

There are some limitations of our study. Firstly, we did not collect data from the earliest point when the terms Brexiter or Remainer were being used, so we did not see the origins of these terms. Secondly, we have not, at this stage, examined the differences between newspapers in how these categories are defined. Future research could seek to address these limitations. Finally, as the focus of our data was a contested claim, it may have meant that users focused much more on specific category predicates or activities, such as lying, because of the nature of the original news story.

Conclusion

This paper has offered an in-depth analysis of the categories of Brexiter and Remainer as used in online newspaper comment threads. The use of discursive methods has allowed for an in-depth analysis, which has demonstrated how micro-level interactions illuminate broader

societal concerns. The analysis has shown how each group was defined by the other in a negative way, which demonstrates the challenges involved in finding a way to heal the rifts brought to light by the referendum. The analysis has also demonstrated how the use of pre-existing political identities, such as political parties, was resisted and challenged by posters as not being salient identities. These findings highlight how the political system in the UK will need to adapt to find ways to manage this new cross-cutting division.

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Appendix 1: Table of newspaper items

Article Number	Title of article	Newspaper	Type of item	Date of publication (all 2016)	Number of threads
1	Leaked Brexit email claims David Cameron has 'starved' NHS	Guardian	News article	2 nd April	100
2	Brexit won't save the NHS – because the real threat is closer to home	Guardian	Opinion piece	15 th April	71
3	Boris Johnson: Cash-starved NHS will receive BILLIONS if Britain leaves the European Union	Daily Express	News article	15 th April	57
4	Vote Leave 'save our NHS' leaflets found on London hospital's wards	Guardian	News article	15 th April	100
5	Boris Johnson accused of hypocrisy as Brexit tour bus is German	Daily Mail	News article	11 th May	79
6	Brexit campaign 'writing cheques they know will bounce', says Cameron	Guardian	News article	4 th June	100
7	Nigel Farage: £350 million pledge to fund the NHS was a 'big mistake'	Daily Express	News article	4 th June	30
8	Boris & Gove call for spending increase on the NHS	Daily Express	News article	4 th June	22
9	IFS slams Michael Gove's claim a Brexit would mean £8bn for NHS	Daily Mail	News article	6 th June	100
10	EU referendum - Respected Tory MP Sarah Wollaston quits Leave campaign over 'false' NHS claims	Independent	News article	9 th June	53
11	EU referendum: Sturgeon accuses Johnson of telling £350m 'whopper'	Guardian	News article	9 th June	100
12	Amber Rudd's jibe at Boris Johnson in nasty TV EU referendum debate	Daily Mail	News article	9 th June	100
13	Tory MP Sarah Wollaston switches from Leave to Remain over NHS claims	Daily Express	News article	9 th June	89

14	Why Vote Leave's £350m weekly EU cost claim is wrong	Guardian	'Fact check'	10 th June	100
15	Andrew Tyrie accuses Boris Johnson of trying to 'bribe' voters with NHS funding claims	Daily Mail	News article	13 th June	100
16	What would Brexit mean for the NHS, social care and disabled people?	Guardian	Opinion piece	14 th June	100
17	Brexit campaigners should not be trusted about NHS claim top doctors	Daily Mail	News article	14 th June	100
18	Question Time audience member puts down Diane Abbott as she attacks Farage for NHS 'lies'	Daily Express	News article	22 nd June	100
19	David Cameron got the 'maximum' from his EU renegotiation	Daily Mail	News article	22 nd June	100
20	The biggest political decision for a generation was based on a lie about £250m - the NHS will never see that	Independent	Opinion piece	24 th June	11
21	Video evidence emerges of Nigel Farage pledging EU millions for NHS weeks before Brexit vote	Independent	News article	25 th June	100
22	Brexit MEP 'rows back on claims that quitting the EU would cut immigration'	Daily Mail	News article	26 th June	100
23	Brexit_Vote leave camp abandon £350m-a-week NHS vows in Change Britain Plans	Independent	News article	27 th June	60
24	Brexit_Vote Leave camp wipes NHS £350m claim and rest of its website after EU referendum	Independent	News article	27 th June	79
25	Brexit_£350 million a week extra for the NHS only 'an aspiration' - says Vote Leave campaigner Chris Grayling	Independent	News article	27 th June	11
26	EU workers in the NHS: 'I've faced racial abuse and will head home'	Guardian	Reader contributions	6 th July	100
27	Please let's not send Europeans away – we need them for the NHS	Guardian	Opinion piece	1 st August	100
28	VOTE LEAVE VICTORY! Official figures reveal UK billed MORE than £350m each week by EU	Daily Express	New article	2 nd August	100
29	Post-Brexit Sunderland_ 'If this money doesn't go to the NHS, I will go mad'	Guardian	News article	9 th August	100

30	I will go mad!' Brexit voter DEMANDS money for the NHS as Britain waits for Article 50	Daily Express	News article	11 th August	100
31	Nigel Farage says ambitious promises made by Brexit campaigners were 'mildly irresponsible'	Independent	News article	14 th September	52
32	Ex-health secretary Andrew Lansley demands £5bn-a-year 'Brexit bonus' for NHS	Daily Express	News article	22 nd September	16
33	Brexit should give NHS an extra £5 billion EVERY YEAR, former health secretary claims	Daily Express	News article	22 nd September	25
34	Boris Johnson ambushed with '£350m for NHS cheque	Independent	News article	4 th October	31