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National renewal in the discourse of neoliberal transition in Britain and Chile

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Abstract

The term neoliberalism became associated with processes of economic and social restructuring in various parts of the world during the latter years of the twentieth century. While the importance of these processes is undisputed, the extent to which neoliberalism constitutes a coherent and consistent ideology, or merely a contingent and contextual set of broadly related policies, remains a source of contention. In this article we will explore this question through a comparative analysis of the political discourse of neoliberal transition in Britain and Chile. Drawing on the model of historical comparison developed by Antonio Gramsci, we will argue that these two countries represent paradigm cases of the constitutional and authoritarian routes to neoliberalism. However, by focusing on the discourses of national renewal in the speeches and writings of Margaret Thatcher and Augusto Pinochet, we will argue that both cases rest on a particular articulation of the themes of coercion and consent. As such, we will suggest that while each paradigm articulates these themes in distinct ways, it is the relationship between the two that is essential to the political ideology of neoliberalism, as the coercive construction of consensus in Chile and the consensual construction of coercion in Britain.

Introduction

In the final three decades of the twentieth century much of the world became engaged in processes of economic restructuring associated with the term neoliberalism. There is no dispute about the social and political significance of these processes, however, there remains a good deal of dispute about the precise character of neoliberalism as an ideology.¹ The term was first used by Alexander Rüstow in 1938 (with both Friedrich von Hayek and Ludwig von Mises in attendance) as a response to the economic turmoil of the Depression.² Quite clearly the word neoliberalism is suggestive of an inheritance drawn from the classical liberal tradition of the nineteenth century. However, the renovation of this classical tradition is most closely associated with Hayek's seminal text *The Road to Serfdom*.³

In his text Hayek argues that the intervention of the state into economic affairs constitutes the first step along the path to totalitarianism, the submission of the individual to the collective, and the ultimate draining of the human spirit.⁴ The major political impetus for Hayek's critique was to tie together the Keynesian liberal economic model associated with the New Deal in the United States and the post-war consensus in much of western Europe, with the socialist economic model of state planning associated with the Soviet Union and the countries of the Warsaw Pact. As such the origins of neoliberalism can only be understood in the intellectual context of the Cold War, as a particularly combative assertion of the value of individual freedom against collectivist tyranny.⁵ While this critique remained almost entirely marginal during the 1950s and 1960s it did establish an important foothold

in the academic discipline of economics, most influentially at the University of Chicago. Even as late as the early 1970s, however, the influence of the new liberal doctrine was largely confined to a few idiosyncratic politicians,⁶ libertarian academics and generous business donors.⁷ And yet, only twenty years later, this marginal doctrine had not only entered the mainstream, it had come to stand as an unquestionable economic philosophy of human nature, to which Margaret Thatcher would famously suggest, there is no alternative.⁸

The economic application of the philosophical arguments developed by Hayek constituted a fairly coherent set of policies during the 1980s and 1990s: privatisation of nationalised industries, deregulation of financial markets, flexibilisation of labour markets, reductions to welfare budgets, elimination of state subsidies and a shift towards export-led growth. These core economic policies would appear to suggest a broadly coherent free market ideology; however, the project of neoliberalism was never confined to merely economic reforms, but rather, implied a total social transformation. In this context, scholars have analysed neoliberalism as a specific form of capitalism in crisis (Kotz),⁹ or as a class strategy for the upward redistribution of wealth (Duménil and Lévy).¹⁰ However, even beyond political economy, scholars have identified neoliberalism with a hollowing out of the political subject (Brown),¹¹ a process which embeds violence systematically within its "civilising" mission (Springer).¹² Sociologically, it has been seen as a form of punitive morality with regard to personal welfare (Wacquant)¹³ and even sexual health.¹⁴ In this sense, neoliberalism can be thought of as an

ideology which brings together both traditional cultural values, and liberal principles of personal responsibility, identified by Eagleton-Pierce as individualism, the universality of global markets, and meliorism - the idea that 'individuals have the potential to improve and remake themselves.'¹⁵

These studies have undoubtedly enriched our understanding of the meaning of neoliberalism, but they have also made it increasingly difficult to offer a precise definition of what neoliberalism is exactly. This conceptual problem is compounded by the fact that the term neoliberalism has been applied to so many different countries and regions around the world. It is applied to Wall Street during the era of Reaganomics in the United States in the 1980s,¹⁶ but also to the impoverished slums of Peru during the Fujimori regime in the 1990s;¹⁷ to the 'open door' policy instituted by the Communist Party of China from 1979,¹⁸ but also to the implementation of 'shock doctrine' reforms following the collapse of communism in Russia in 1991.¹⁹ If the same term can be applied to city-traders and slum-dwellers, communist states and post-communist transitions, then surely it has lost any degree of conceptual precision, even assuming it had such precision in the first place.²⁰ To understand neoliberalism, then, we need to acknowledge the complexity of the phenomenon, an assortment of social relations materialized through innumerable social, political, economic, cultural and geographical practices in order to construct neoliberal subjectivities and institutional structures.²¹

Indeed, in recent years there has developed something of a consensus amongst scholars seeking to understand neoliberalism, that the multiplicity of this ideology is inherent within its form; it is in a sense inherently contextual. As Adam Tickell and Jamie Peck argue, we cannot speak of any universal form of neoliberalism, instead we should speak of *neoliberalisation* as 'a contingently realised *process*, not ... an end-state or "condition"', paying attention 'both to its "local" mediations and institutional variants and to the "family resemblances" and causative connections that link these together.'²² We can say, then, that neoliberalism is inherently contextual; however, its particular articulations are always related. In this article we will offer an interpretation of neoliberalism as a global historical project involving logics of coercion and consent in the transformation of subjectivities, focused on the political discourse of two paradigm cases of neoliberal transition, Margaret Thatcher in Britain and Augusto Pinochet in Chile. However, we will also argue that the precise relationship of these logics of coercion and consent is distinct in the two cases – the consensual construction of coercion in Britain, and the coercive construction of consent in Chile.

These two cases have been chosen because they stand as paradigms for two models of neoliberal transition, the constitutional model in Britain and the authoritarian model in Chile. Quite clearly there are fundamental differences between the two countries. In Britain the Conservative Party government of Margaret Thatcher came to power in Britain democratically following the general election victory of 1979. It would go on to win three subsequent general elections

in 1983, 1987 and 1992.²³ In Chile, by contrast, the military regime headed by General Augusto Pinochet came to power through a coup d'état which involved the bombing of the presidential palace, the death of the democratically mandated president Salvador Allende, and the arrest, torture, disappearance and murder of many tens of thousands of political opponents.²⁴ Whereas Thatcherism has been described as a 'movement of intellectual reconstruction', which sought 'to articulate "retrenchment" through a full-blown ideology for national revival',²⁵ Chile's process of neoliberalisation resulted in the brutal construction of a 'dualist state' which combined the logics of economic freedom with a violent authoritarian state.²⁶

This is, therefore, not a standard comparative study of two countries at a similar level of economic development with broadly comparable political institutional arrangements.²⁷ It is, however, precisely the fundamental nature of the contextual differences between the two cases that will allow us to explore the structural parallels across the two paradigms. In particular, in this article we will focus on the discourse of national renewal in the speeches and writings of Thatcher and Pinochet.²⁸ The selection of key public speeches follows Fairclough in focusing on the discursive nature of the transition to 'new capitalism', and on the construction of the consent of a national-popular base, on the basis of a 'spurious and imaginary' solidarity with 'fictional "publics"'.²⁹ Clearly these speeches only reflect a particular dimension of the ideological project; however, they will be analysed here as acts of what Hall calls 'popular ventriloquism',³⁰ in which the speaker claims the right to articulate their own views as those of 'the people'.³¹ In both cases, we identify a

discourse of 'national renewal' through rhetorical appeals for the restoration of a glorious past associated with a unified and harmonious national community.³²

In Britain, we will demonstrate how the discourse of Thatcher serves as the basis for what Stuart Hall³³ suggests is the creation of popular consent for a politics of coercion against those social groups deemed to be sources of disruption and disorder. In Chile, by contrast, we will demonstrate how the discourse of Pinochet begins from an explicit affirmation of the coercive elimination of those elements deemed to have disrupted the unity of the national community.³⁴ We will then show how this served as the basis for a new national consensus based on the **de-politicisation** of **framing** the economy **as ostensibly beyond contentious politics** – creating a 'consumer's paradise but a citizens' wasteland'.³⁵ In Britain, therefore, we will suggest neoliberal restructuring is achieved constitutionally as the consensual construction of coercion, while in Chile the neoliberal transition develops as a coercive imposition of consensus. For the Chilean case, the analysis of the development of Pinochetism will necessarily cover only the decade following the seizure of power from 1973-1983,³⁶ while the British context will cover the ten years that constitute the formation of Thatcherism, from her election as Conservative Party leader in 1975 through to the conclusion of the UK Miners' Strike in 1985. Before beginning this empirical analysis, however, we will first set out the theoretical framework by which we intend to conduct the analysis, drawing on the historical comparative model developed by the Italian Marxist theorist Antonio Gramsci.

Coercion and consent in Antonio Gramsci's historical comparative method

In simple terms coercion and consent can be thought of as two distinct strategies by which people are compelled or convinced to undertake a particular course of action. In its pure form coercion will involve a deployment (or threat) of physical force by one party in order to compel another party to undertake some action against their own will, while consent will involve some deployment of intellectual force by one party to convince another party that they themselves will the action to be undertaken. In terms of politics, however, these pure forms of coercion and consent rarely if ever exist in isolation. As Machiavelli argued in the fifteenth century, the prudent prince in times of instability 'ought not to mind the reproach of cruelty' on the basis that 'it is better to be feared than loved' (*The Prince* XVII).³⁷ However, if the prince aspires to a long and successful rule, he should seek to avoid excessive cruelty, which might lead to resentment amongst the populace, but will instead survive and prosper by building consent for his rule 'by avoiding being hated and despised, and by keeping the people satisfied with him' (*The Prince* XIX).³⁸ Machiavelli offered a truly modern theory of politics, by moving beyond religious metaphysical claims of divine right, to a secular analysis of social power for thinking about the legitimisation of sovereignty.

Several centuries later Karl Marx would further radicalise this analysis by seeking to understand the material relations of production that constitute earthly social forces.

As Machiavelli had demystified politics, Marx demystified political economy in terms of class struggle. In the Marxian analysis, coercion and consent became dialectically connected, inter-related phenomena, as 'The class which has the means of material production at its disposal, has control at the same time over the means of mental production'.³⁹ This relationship is noted by Antonio Gramsci in the development of a reading of Machiavelli through Marx⁴⁰ as the basis for a materialist political science focused on 'establishing the dialectical position of political activity as a particular level of the superstructure'.⁴¹ This dialectical understanding is crucial to Gramsci's theory of politics. Indeed, as Perry Anderson⁴² has demonstrated, all of the most important concepts in Gramsci's thought are defined through dialectical relationships. As such, when Gramsci analyses historical phenomena, he does not view them in isolation, but in their relationality to other phenomena across space and time. Of particular importance here are the comparative historical studies of the French Revolution of 1789 and the Italian Risorgimento during the nineteenth century and Gramsci's contemporary comparative reflections on the successful Russian Revolution of 1917 and the failed uprisings in Italy during 1919-1920.

For Gramsci, as for Marx before him, the French Revolution stands as the paradigm of a 'rapid and vigorous'⁴³ process of social transformation, with the Jacobin party as the key actor. For Gramsci, the major achievement of the Jacobin movement was to move beyond its own narrow social interests, to act as the representative of 'the revolutionary movement as a whole, as an integral historical development... of

all the national groups which had to be assimilated to the existing fundamental group'.⁴⁴ In doing so, Gramsci concludes, the Jacobin party established itself in the leading role of the revolution 'as the hegemonic group of all the popular forces'⁴⁵ building consent amongst the popular masses for a political project of the progressive bourgeoisie against the old aristocracy of the *Ancien Regime*. The French Revolution is thus to be understood as a revolution of organic social forces, emerging from within French society.

In Gramsci's historical comparative method, ~~therefore~~, the analysis of particular national processes is understood always in dialectical relationship to the international system. As Adam Morton argues,⁴⁶ this method of 'historical analogy' reflects a deep sensitivity to the uneven and combined nature of global development in Gramsci's thought, based on a study of 'variations in the actual processes whereby the same historical developments... manifests itself in different countries... not only (due) to the different combinations of internal relations... but also to the differing international relations'.⁴⁷ As Morton suggests, Gramsci, therefore, sets himself the challenge 'to elucidate some comparative principles of political science, in which the history of modern states can be situated both in terms of general trajectories and historical specificities'.⁴⁸ The dialectical movement across historical time and geographical space is thus crucial to the dialectical understanding of the concepts, which can never be fixed, but must always be thought in process. **This can be seen even more clearly when Gramsci compares the successful Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 in Russia,**

and the failed uprisings of the *Biennio Rosso* in Italy, from 1919 to 1920. The Bolsheviks had been able to capture power through a rapid 'war of movement',⁴⁹ due to the fact that the Tsarist state had failed to undergo reform, and thus continued to rely on the coercive force of state repression; as Gramsci claims, 'the state was everything (while) civil society was weak and gelatinous'⁵⁰ This revolution inspired workers in Italy, however, here the reforms of the nineteenth century meant that the dominant social forces had achieved a large degree of consent within civil society, so that 'the state was only an outer ditch, behind which there stood a powerful system of fortresses and earthworks'.⁵¹ In such circumstances, a 'war of position' could not be successful, but instead a 'war of movement' would be required to create a level of revolutionary consciousness amongst the masses.

Gramsci's historical comparative method, therefore, allows us to understand the forms of coercion and consent as particular articulations of dialectically related social processes across time and space. The Jacobin hegemonic project of transformative alliance with forces from below is compared and contrasted with the Moderate Party's passive revolutionary project of a restorative alliance with forces from above. However, both processes are understood in the context of the development of capitalism across Europe and the ascendancy of the European bourgeoisie. By contrast, **Gramsci analyses** the **coercive state** repression of the rising bourgeoisie in **nineteenth-century** Russia **as the basis for** the success of

the Bolshevik 'war of movement', to be contrasted with the need for a 'war of position' in Western Europe, based on the building of consent amongst the popular forces in civil society.

This opposition has not always been understood dialectically. The ideas of consent, hegemony, civil society and 'war of position' have often been associated with a specifically 'western Marxism', while the ideas of coercion, passive revolution, state and 'war of movement' have been associated with the non-western developing world. By the 1970s this meant that for many Marxists in Europe, while socialism could still be achieved through revolution in places like South Africa and Nicaragua, it could only be achieved through parliamentary processes in countries like France and Italy. These ideas were particularly associated with the Eurocommunist movement,⁵² which explicitly referred to Gramsci as a primary source of inspiration. However, this is a non-dialectical Gramsci, the spatial and temporal movement is lacking, the conceptual relationships lost, and thus the categories become static and essentialised, the West is consensus, civil society, war of position, while the non-West is coercion, state, war of movement. In this article, therefore, we seek to restore the dialectical character of Gramsci's concepts, through a historical comparative approach which explores the development of neoliberalism in two very different contexts within the global economy. In doing so we will demonstrate how both cases involve a complex articulation of the relationship between coercion and consent, which we will suggest is fundamental to the ascendancy of neoliberalism as a global ideology. However, we also seek to suggest that the articulation of this

relationship is distinct in each case, reflecting the contextual differences into which this neoliberal ideology is inserted, as the coercive construction of consensus in Chile and the consensual construction of coercion in Britain.

British constitutionalism and Chilean anti-constitutionalism in the discourse of national decline

The processes of neoliberal transformation in Britain and Chile both developed out of periods of heightened social conflict and ideologically polarized politics. While this arguably made both particularly prone to a more radical imposition of neoliberal ideology,⁵³ each is distinct in its particular trajectory. In Chile the period of socialist government between 1970 and 1973 had been marked by growing resistance from the middle class professional unions, including a long strike by truck drivers, small business, private media and in particular conservative sections of the military. An attempted coup in June of 1973 had failed to dislodge the elected government, however in September of the same year, with significant encouragement and logistical support from the United States, the rebellious sectors of the military seized power. The elected president Salvador Allende died during the bombing of the presidential palace, and in the days that followed many thousands of government supporters and leftist activists were rounded up, many were tortured and killed in the national stadium in Santiago, many thousands more

disappeared, the constitution was suspended and the country would be ruled by the military junta for the next 17 years.⁵⁴

In Britain, also, the 1970s had been a period of social conflict. In 1974 the Conservative government of Edward Heath had lost power, amidst a strike by coal miners, in an election dominated by the issue of trade union power, characterised by Heath's question to the electorate 'Who runs Britain?' The Labour government, which followed, was forced into negotiations with the IMF in 1976, leading to a string of austerity policies, most notably statutory constraints on pay and wages. Ultimately these policies led to the explosion of industrial struggles known as the Winter of Discontent in 1978. The election of Margaret Thatcher the following year initiated a period of Conservative government, which would involve three subsequent electoral victories over 18 years. The early discourse of the new governments reflects their divergent forms. In Britain, prior to the 1979 election, Thatcher strikes a conciliatory tone, positioning the Conservatives as seeking to 'heal the wounds of a divided nation'.⁵⁵ This tone is re-emphasised immediately after the election, in the famous allusion to St Francis of Assisi, in the promise to bring harmony where there has been discord.⁵⁶ By contrast, the early pronouncements of the military regime in Chile are marked by a dictatorial and combative tone, with references to the 'historical and responsible mission to fight for the liberation of the homeland from the Marxist yoke, and the restoration of order and institutions'.⁵⁷ At this point, the discourse of the two regimes would appear to be fundamentally different, with Thatcher suggesting harmonious

consensus while Pinochet suggests violent coercion, yet as both discourses develop, we find a much more complex relationship.

Thatcherism: Restoring national unity

The early imagery of the healing of wounds and the bringing of harmony is not characteristic of Thatcher's rhetorical style, yet it does reflect the central theme of the consensual discourse of Thatcherism, the restoration of the unity of the national community. This discourse is apparent from Thatcher's earliest speeches following her election as leader of the Conservative Party, in appeals to the true British national character, as constituted by a 'positive, vital, driving, individual incentive' which laid the grounds for 'the achievements of Elizabethan England... Incentive that has been snuffed out by the Socialist State.'⁵⁸ In this way the radicalism of neoliberal economics is articulated through a conservative ideological appeal to the restoration of continuity with a glorious national past. This is further established in the final Conference Speech prior to the 1979 election, in which Thatcher declares:

Our ancestors built a land of pride and hope and confidence in the future, a land whose influence grew out of all proportion to her size, whose constitution guaranteed a balance between freedom and order, which used to be the British hallmark and became a model for the world. That was the heritage they handed down to us.⁵⁹

However, it is also clear from the beginning that the consensual rhetoric of restoring national unity will involve a degree of political conflict, in which the re-establishment of the 'authentic' moral virtues of the British nation are set against the existent moral economies⁶⁰ of the British people, distorted by three decades of socialism. In a speech in 1977 to the Zurich Economic Society, Thatcher explicitly calls for a complete and radical 'change in ideology ... in people's beliefs and attitudes',⁶¹ later describing this as 'a wholly new attitude of mind'⁶² and even a reconstruction of economics in order to 'change the heart(s) and soul(s)' of the British people.⁶³ The evocation of this glorious and unified national past is thus dramatically opposed to the many problems besetting socialist Britain during the 1970s: 'We all know them. They go to the root of the hopes and fears of ordinary people—high inflation, high unemployment, high taxation, appalling industrial relations, the lowest productivity in the Western world.'⁶⁴

Socialism is thus accused not only of leading to economic crisis, but more profoundly of corrupting the moral character of the nation,⁶⁵ a corruption most strongly associated with a decline of constitutionality. Here the primary target is clearly the trade union movement. Only one year after Edward Heath's 'who runs Britain' speech, Thatcher once again alludes to the idea 'that Parliament, which ought to be in charge, is not in charge'.⁶⁶ However, Thatcher goes further than Heath, extending this critique to include elected (Labour) politicians, at both local and national levels, accused of forfeiting their ultimate responsibility as guardians of the law:

The first people to uphold the law should be governments. It is tragic that the Socialist Government, to its lasting shame, should have lost its nerve and shed its principles over the People's Republic of Clay Cross.⁶⁷ And that a group of the Labour Party should have tried to turn the Shrewsbury pickets into martyrs. On both occasions the law was broken. On one, violence was done. No decent society can live like that. No responsible party should condone it.⁶⁸

The allegation of anti-constitutionality even extends to schools under local authority control, which are identified as places of 'political indoctrination' and 'propaganda' against traditional British values, based on the corrupting influence of a 'small minority which believes the principal purpose of education is to instil contempt for democratic institutions ... these destroyers would also destroy respect for our laws and the order on which a civilised society is based'.⁶⁹ Thatcher's rhetoric, therefore, establishes an opposition between the glorious and unified nation of the past and the politicised discord and division of the present, the authentic British national tradition of constitutionality, corrupted during a period of 'socialist' national decline.

As Norman Fairclough suggests, this is part of a complex 'authority/solidarity mix'⁷⁰ at the heart of Thatcherism, characterised by Stuart Hall⁷¹ as a combination of authoritarianism and populism. We draw here on Hall's observations that Thatcherism's project required more than simply consent at the ballot box (which in fact wavered both before the Falklands War and after the Miners' Strike, when

'National Unity' rhetoric rang hollow⁷²). Rather, consent to this new social order is constructed across numerous terrains by deploying a consensual, non-antagonistic discourse designed to reduce complex economic, social and political antagonisms into a simple morality tale: the resurgence of the 'British people'. However, as Jessop et al emphasise,⁷³ this appeal to national unity was always in part an antagonistic discourse, and, as we shall see below, serves as the basis for the legitimization of a coercive politics targeting those accused of sowing the politicised disunity that has led to national economic *and* moral decay.

Pinochetism: reconstructing the Chilean political culture

The rhetoric of the gradual decline of the national community in Thatcherism initially seems tepid when compared with the febrile language of the Chilean military junta. The armed seizure of state power came amidst a period of intense social conflict, in which the rhetoric of existential national crisis had become normalised. The claims of the military to **save the country from Marxist chaos** should thus be understood as part of a process that had developed through the final months of the Allende period, in various efforts to deem the elected *Unidad Popular* (UP)⁷⁴ government as illegitimate, in particular the Congressional declaration of the government as unconstitutional in early September 1973. This process of the de-legitimation of the constitutionally elected government served as the basis for the legitimisation of the anti-constitutional military seizure of

power. As a result, from the very beginning the discourse of Pinochetism sought to define the socialism of *Unidad Popular* as alien to the Chilean tradition, a 'foreign ideology' by which international powers (the Soviet Union, Cuba) were able to pursue their global ambitions in Chile.⁷⁵ Socialists, Communists and Leftists could thus be represented **as** not only **as** political opponents, but **as** enemies of the nation, intent on dividing and ultimately subverting the national community. On this basis, enemies of the nation could be stripped of the legal or civil rights of citizenship and become subject to murder and disappearance, as the regime sought to establish a binary division of Chilean society between loyal, patriotic *Pinochetistas* and subversive *Marxistas-Leninistas*, sowing fear and conflict among co-workers, neighbours and friends.⁷⁶

This binary division, however, served a much broader political project. While the rhetoric of the new regime was focused on eliminating the 'Marxist cancer and chaos'.⁷⁷ it offered a narrative that extended well beyond the *Unidad Popular*, by associating the Allende period with a broader theme of *partidismo*, or what might be characterised as the politicisation of Chilean society. Here we can see clear parallels with the discourse of Thatcherism, in particular in the hostility towards the trade unions and public services. Pinochet acknowledges the legitimate role of trade unions as part of the national community, while **emphasising the political linkages between trade unions** and Marxists political parties as a major cause of national decline. As Winn⁷⁸ suggests, the organised working class are thus explicitly identified as the primary agent of the division of the national community,

to the extent that they pursue their own sectoral interests above the national interests, leading ultimately to the social conflict of the Allende period. This can be seen when Pinochet reflects on the legitimate and illegitimate roles of trade unionism

The purpose of strengthening the bargaining power of workers justified the idea of a compulsory trade union unity and militancy in the labour movement. Unfortunately, union objectives were used by infiltrators, political activists, which usually make up bureaucratized union oligarchies. The final aim was to exercise control over productive activities, service, etc., and consequentially, to control the economic progress of the nation, transforming this labour power into political influences.⁷⁹

The role that party politics played inside the trade union movement is also paralleled by the role played in state bureaucracies and public services. In the early period following the Coup, Pinochet identifies this corruption with the system of *pega* or *peguita* (job post), by which positions in the bureaucracy would be allocated in accordance with party allegiances. This system, as Pinochet represents it, reflects the division of the national community through the influence of *partidismo*, corrupting the country from top to bottom. For state bureaucrats, it is suggested, everything depended on the capacity of their party to gain power, in which case a good *pega* was assured. *Partidismo* is thus associated with a political culture of corruption, by which each party group pursues its own interests rather

than the national interest. On this view, the role played by party politics within the society led to the development of inefficiencies, sectarianism and 'a lack of national doctrine' within the public services.⁸⁰ The Allende period is represented as the culmination of the destructive logics of party politics, which must be overcome, as Taylor has suggested, through the institutional transformation where society and state 'would be forced to limit individual and collective action within the parameters set by rational market forces'.⁸¹

The key to this discourse, therefore, is to construct the politicisation of society as 'paving the way for Marxist totalitarianism to come to power... in the service of a foreign imperialism that would abolish all forms of liberty in Chile, subverting personal safety and jeopardising national security'.⁸² The working class and the Left are thus marked out as the primary agents of social discord, to be physically liquidated, but it is clear that the entire constitutional system and political culture of the country are held responsible for allowing the crisis to happen. This is confirmed in a speech from 1978 in which Pinochet reflects back on the Coup, 'September 11 did not mean only the overthrow of an illegitimate and failed government, but rather the overthrow of a completely depleted political and institutional system, and the consequent imperative to build a new one'.⁸³ Pinochetism, as with Thatcherism, therefore, calls forth a unified and harmonious national community, in opposition to the existent culture of conflict in a politicised society, culminating in the ascendancy of the socialist government during the Allende period. However, it is clear that Pinochetism offers a much more radical break than Thatcherism, while Thatcher

aligns her project with the British tradition of constitutionality, against what she suggests is the anti-constitutional Left, Pinochet represents the Left as an inevitable result of the decadence of Chile's constitutional political culture. As such Pinochet is able to claim that if 'Chile (is) to fulfil its great destiny'⁸⁴ there must be a complete and necessarily violent break with the constitutional political culture. As we will outline below, the violently coercive reorganisation of collectively public life would allow Pinochet to pursue a transformation of Chilean political culture along technocratic lines and in accordance with market forces.

Constructing social war in Britain; imposing social peace in Chile

Thatcherism: the enemy within

The basis of the consensual discourse of Thatcherism described above can be summarised as an appeal for the restoration of a unified national community, based on traditional British values of individual incentive and constitutionality. Yet as we have seen this restoration is acknowledged as being in antagonism with the existent moral economies of the British people. The consensual rhetoric of unity and harmony, therefore, is always premised on the necessity for a coercive politics of division and conflict. This latter strand finds expression in frequent references to historic battles, in particular the national struggle against totalitarianism during World War II. Throughout her early speeches Thatcher associates herself with the wartime leadership of Winston Churchill, for example in 1975:

You will understand, I know, the humility I feel at following in the footsteps of great men like our Leader ... Winston Churchill, a man called by destiny who raised the name of Britain to supreme heights in the history of the free world.⁸⁵

Churchill is here evoked as leading a patriotic struggle 'to raise the name of Britain to supreme heights' but also an ideological struggle for the 'free world'. In representing herself as following in the footsteps of Churchill, therefore, Thatcher seeks to position her own political project as transcending internal political divisions, as representative of the whole nation, a rhetorical theme which is elaborated in a conference speech the following year describing the Conservatives as:

above all a patriotic party, a national party; and so it is not we who have been obsessed this week with how to take party advantage of the present crisis. What we have been concerned with is how we can tackle this crisis, how we can ensure the prosperity, the freedom – yes - and the honour of Britain. The very survival of our laws, our institutions, our national character - that is what is at stake today.⁸⁶

If Thatcher seeks to represent herself in continuity with Churchill as the embodiment of a patriotic struggle for the restoration of national unity, then

those to whom she is opposed are represented as agents of discord who have put 'Britain...on its knees...(with) those old enough to remember the sacrifices of the war... now ask(ing) what ever happened to the fruits of victory'.⁸⁷ Here there are clear parallels with the discourse of *partidismo* in Pinochetism, in the representation of the Conservatives as the party of the whole nation, in opposition to the Labour Party as the representative of the sectarian interests of the organised working class.

As with Pinochet, this discourse represents socialism as an ideologically foreign subversion of the natural harmony of national community. If the British national character is defined by individual freedom and constitutionality, the collectivism and politics of popular protest associated with socialism must be inherently 'un-British'. On this basis, Thatcher declares: 'I will go on criticising Socialism, and opposing Socialism ... because it is bad for Britain—and Britain and Socialism are not the same thing.'⁸⁸ As with Pinochetism, the domestic democratic socialism of the Labour Party is thus associated with the foreign, totalitarian Communism of the Soviet Union, which seeks 'to destroy the free enterprise society and put a Marxist system in its place.'⁸⁹ Thatcher makes this association even more explicitly in a speech to conference in 1976, when she claims that:

The dividing line between the Labour Party programme and Communism is becoming harder and harder to detect. Indeed, in many respects Labour's

programme is more extreme than those of many Communist parties of Western Europe.⁹⁰

The consensual discourse of a unified national community, therefore, serves to legitimise the exclusion of those deemed as agents of a foreign ideology opposed to traditional British values. Thatcher thus appeals to 'all those men and women of goodwill who do not want a Marxist future ... This is not just a fight about national solvency. It is a fight about the very foundations of the social order.'⁹¹

The key agents in this context are once again the trade unions, who are cast as the enemies of the 'British people', because when workers go on strike, 'it would be the people that would suffer. It always is.' In such cases, it is 'the duty of the Government, any Government ... to act, through Parliament, on behalf of the nation as a whole'.⁹² As with Pinochetism, there is an effort to distinguish the party activists from the ordinary trade unionists 'who go in fear of union power... the trade unionists themselves. They want to escape from the rule of the militants'.⁹³ Democratically-elected Trade Union leaders are thus represented as enemies of constitutional democracy, engaged in 'a deliberate attack on our values, a deliberate attack on those who wish to promote merit and excellence, a deliberate attack on our heritage and great past'.⁹⁴

This violent and combative rhetoric culminates in the reference to the 'enemy within' during the 1984-5 Miners Strike, in which pickets are represented as anti-

constitutional and anti-British: 'out to destroy any properly elected government. They are out to bring down the framework of law'.⁹⁵ As with Pinochet, though clearly not on the same scale, the representation of political opponents as ideologically foreign enemies of the nation allows the suspension of legal protections and the introduction of openly coercive measures, including an unprecedented resort to police violence, manipulation of the law courts and deployment of the intelligence agencies in order to crush the strike.⁹⁶ The Miners' Strike does not, however, mark a radical break in the discourse of Thatcherism, a turn away from consensus towards coercion. Rather, as Ralph Miliband has argued, the presence of a 'frenzied appeal' to nationalism⁹⁷ associated with anti-communism and the restoration of law and order means coercion was always implicit in the consensual discourse of Thatcherism.⁹⁸ There was no military coup in Britain, yet as Miliband suggests, the prospect of a state of emergency is implicit 'in the name of democracy, freedom, law and order, the struggle against subversion and the defence of the Constitution.'⁹⁹ The consensual rhetoric of national unity is, therefore, inseparable from a coercive project premised on a 'single vertical cleavage'¹⁰⁰ – a division in society between the "productive" (patriotic) and the "parasitic" (alien), which is part of an existential struggle for the soul of the nation.¹⁰¹

Pinochet: protecting democracy from party politics

As we have suggested above, the brute violence, which characterised the Chilean Coup and its aftermath constituted an unprecedented national trauma, involving the physical liquidation of the Left, but also a rejection of the country's constitutional and democratic culture. The formation of neoliberalism in Chile, therefore, involved the construction of a definitively new political culture [ostensibly] premised on scientific and technocratic aims. This transformation involved a thorough project of the rationalisation of public administration designed to create a 'modern and functional' state purged of *partidismo*, so that efficiency and a renewed spirit of service ... are its distinctive features'.¹⁰² Despite the radical violence, which characterised the Chilean transition, there is a consistent effort in the discourse of Pinochetism to legitimise the military intervention as part of an effort to restore the spirit of service and efficiency in the public services by separating the state from organised sectional interests in civil society. In the new political culture, civil society will be the strict preserve of private interests mediated by the market, while the state will be run along meritocratic and patriotic lines, intervening 'only in those areas or sectors of the economy that are strategic from the point of view of national security'.¹⁰³

As Thatcher had evoked traditional British values of incentive and deference, so also Pinochet paints his project of renovation in the colours of a traditional Chilean 'morality of merit and personal effort'.¹⁰⁴ However, unlike Thatcher, as Pinochet rejects the constitutional tradition, his discourse is reliant on an authoritarian strand in the early Republic, represented by the figure of Diego Portales. In

Pinochet's construction, Diego Portales¹⁰⁵ articulated an authentic Chilean national philosophy of Positivism in which national development is achieved through authoritarian leadership. In this sense Pinochet represents his own project as inheriting the rationalist mantle of Chilean Positivism, by arguing that democracy cannot be successful until the adequate groundwork of law and order have been established.¹⁰⁶ Drawing legitimacy from the image of the early Republic, Pinochet thus sets out a model of *protected democracy*, embedded in the Chilean national experience, whereby party politics is stripped of collective contestation and sectional interests, in favour of technocratic management directed towards national development, in which the legal order assures the primacy of individual rights, property and the rule of law.¹⁰⁷

Despite the fact that the Chilean Coup involved an anti-constitutional seizure of power and articulated a radically anti-democratic discourse, it is thus able to claim to be directed towards the establishment of constitutional democracy. Pinochet thus constructs his own model of authoritarianism as a form of 'soft dictatorship' (*dictablanda*) in opposition to the 'hard dictatorships' (*dicta-dura*) associated with the arbitrary tyranny of Communism.¹⁰⁸ While the Communist dictatorships involve a negation of the rights of the individual within the law, the Chilean military is concerned with the construction of law as the authoritative power in which true democracy could eventually develop through a culture of respect for individual 'liberty and the rule of law'.¹⁰⁹ Through this discourse, the violent liquidation of Chilean constitutional democracy is represented as an effort to save it, from the

threat of sectarianism and demagoguery that had characterised Chilean political culture prior to September 11.¹¹⁰ The new political culture would, therefore, be premised on authoritarian leadership towards a de-politicised democracy that would subordinate all **sectional interests** before the primacy of the national interest. The construction of consent within the project of Pinochetism thus involves three key pillars:

1. To reincorporate the traditional values of the Chilean society
2. To rebuild the nation based on the harmonious social and economic development
3. To satisfy the spiritual concerns of human beings

In defining this project, Pinochet argues that the new political culture should above all be focused on:

strengthen(ing) the fundamental doctrine of the State of Chile, the core content of our Declaration of Principles that replace the classic, naive and defenceless liberal state, with a new one that is committed to freedom and human dignity and the essential values of nationality.¹¹¹

This model of a **consensual, non-partisan protected democracy is of course,** always premised on the potential, and actual, deployment of coercive force to suppress sectional interests opposed to national unity, on the basis that 'any

attack against these principles, (is) contrary to the institutional order of the Republic. Freedom and democracy cannot survive if they do not defend themselves from those who seek to destroy them'.¹¹² The elimination of opposition is, therefore, represented as part of a consensual discourse of the restoration of national unity and a protected return to democracy at the point where the nation has been sufficiently reorganised in accordance with technocratic governance and market forces. As Pinochet frames it, the aim of his project is to restore the harmony of the great Chilean family, which had been systematically disintegrated due to sectarian class interests that should not exist.¹¹³ Chilean society is thus to be re-defined, away from social and political conflict, towards the harmony of the national family, in which the state will act to protect all collective organisations from political influences:

Given the relevance that the Government attaches to the organization of the community for social action, it will seek to promote, encourage and improve social organisation, introducing the legislative and other necessary measures to support it. At the same time, it will prevent the important contribution that these organizations can make to the process of local, regional and national development are frustrated by the work of politicization, which has no place in this type of activity, to which all citizens are called without distinctions.¹¹⁴

The authoritarian project of Pinochetism is thus articulated through a consensual appeal to the traditional moral values of the family and the national community,

protected from the divisive influences of sectarian politics by a benevolent authoritarian state. The brutal violence of the Coup which had murdered poets and musicians, tortured students and disappeared mothers and fathers is thus articulated through a consensual image of restoring the traditional national family. Once again, this should not be seen as a temporal break, an early period of coercive violence, which develops into a later period of consensual governance. On the contrary, the physical liquidation of the Left and the elimination of the constitutional political culture had always been understood in terms of the restoration of the unity of the national community through the **reorganisation of society**.

Conclusion

The cases of Britain and Chile clearly represent very distinct paths towards neoliberalism - a constitutional path in Britain marked by repeated electoral victories by the Conservative Party, and an authoritarian path in Chile marked by a brutal seizure of power by a military junta. In this article, however, we have sought to suggest that both processes are marked by the dialectical relationship between coercion and consent. In Britain, Thatcher offers a consensual discourse of the restoration of national unity, which implies a coercive project of repression of those who are accused of promoting division; this culminates in the rhetoric of the 'enemy within' during the Miners Strike of 1984-5. In Chile, Pinochet develops a coercive discourse directed at eliminating the 'Marxist cancer' of socialism,

however, this is also associated with a consensual project of reorganising Chilean society directed towards re-establishing the harmony of the national family.

In applying Gramsci's dialectical approach, therefore, we are able to move beyond the conventional understanding of these two processes of neoliberal transition, the one consensual and constitutional, the other coercive and authoritarian. Instead, we have sought to demonstrate that in the discourse of both Thatcherism and Pinochetism, consent and coercion are inseparably linked. In Britain, a consensus is created for coercive repression of the trade union movement, while in Chile, the coercive liquidation of the Left allows **the forging of a non-partisan national consensus**. In both cases, this combination of coercion and consent is thus deployed to define the organised working class and its representatives as sectarian agents inspired by a foreign ideology in a conspiracy to subvert the national community.

We can, therefore, speak of neoliberalism, in both its constitutional and authoritarian forms, as involving a combination of consent and coercion directed towards the **reorganisation of society** and ultimately the elimination of the organised working class as political agent. The precise balance and articulation of coercion and consent, will define the particularity of the form of neoliberalisation, dependent on the precise contextual conditions within any particular country, its institutional framework, political culture and position in the global economy. This is, however, an inherently contradictory project which over three decades, including

under Centre Left governments¹¹⁵, has embraced the rhetoric of conservative nationalism, even as its policies have championed global deregulation. We might even argue that more recent political upheavals in the form of resurgent protectionist populism should be thought of not as an aberration, but rather as the culmination of the inherent contradictions in the ideological project of nationalist-neoliberalism.

Notes and References

¹ See D. Stedman-Jones, *Masters of the Universe: Hayek, Friedman and the Birth of Neoliberal Politics*. (Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2012); J. Peck, *Constructions of Neoliberal Reason*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010); R.S. Turner, *Neoliberalism: History, Concepts, Policies*. (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2008); D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005).

² M. Eagleton-Pierce, *Neoliberalism: the Key Concepts*. (Abingdon: Routledge, 2016).

³ F.A. Hayek, *The Road to Serfdom*. (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1976). Hayek's preoccupation with the small state and the "sectarian" nature of much democratic collective choice was particularly influential on Thatcher.

⁴ Stedman-Jones, *op. cit.*, **Ref. 1**, pp. 57-73.

⁵ Stedman-Jones, *ibid.*, pp. 111-121; A. Burgin, *The Great Persuasion: Reinventing Free Markets since the Depression*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2012).

⁶ Particularly notable in the British context is Enoch Powell whose mixture of anti-immigrant populism and advocacy for laissez-faire free market capitalism constitutes a major political influence on the right-wing of the Conservative Party during the 1960s and 1970s, for an excellent general analysis of Powell's influence see C. Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).

⁷ Hayek's ideas were disseminated to UK elites by think tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (see B. Jackson, 'The think-tank archipelago: Thatcherism and neo-liberalism', in B. Jackson and B. Saunders (eds.) *Making Thatcher's Britain*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 43-61.

⁸ 'There's no easy popularity in what we are proposing, but it is fundamentally sound. Yet I believe people accept there is no real alternative'. *Daily Telegraph*, 22 May 1980. Thatcher took this idea from

Herbert Spencer, for whom economic liberalism and social Darwinism **as struggle** went hand in hand as fundamental “truths”.

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¹⁰ G. Duménil and D. Lévy, *The Crisis of Neoliberalism*. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2013).

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¹² S. Springer, ‘Violence sits in places? Cultural practice, neoliberal rationalism, and virulent imaginative geographies’, *Political Geography*, 30 (2011), pp. 90-98.

¹³ L. Wacquant, *Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity*. (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009).

¹⁴ J. Zigon, *HIV is God's Blessing: Rehabilitating Morality in Neoliberal Russia*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

¹⁵ M. Eagleton-Pierce, 'Historicizing The Neoliberal Spirit of Capitalism', in Springer, Birch and MacLeavy, *The Handbook of Neoliberalism*. (London: Routledge, 2016), p.19.

¹⁶ S. Rousseas, *The Political Economy of Reaganomics: A Critique*. (London: Routledge, 2015).

¹⁷ H. De Soto, *The other path: The economic answer to terrorism*. (New York: Basic Books, 2002).

¹⁸ D. Harvey, *A Brief History of Neoliberalism*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 120-152.

¹⁹ N. Klein, *The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism*. (London: Allen Lane, 2007), pp. 218-246; P. Rutland, ‘Neoliberalism and the Russian transition’, *Review of International Political Economy* 20/2 (2013), pp. 332-362.

²⁰ For criticisms of the “stretching” of neoliberalism, see J. Clarke ‘Living with/in and without Neoliberalism’, *Focaal*, 2008 (51) pp. 135–147. Also J. Laidlaw, ‘A Slur for All Seasons’, *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* (N.S.) 21 (2012), pp. 911-923 and R. Venugopal, ‘Neoliberalism as concept’, *Economy and Society*, 44:2 (2015), pp.165-187.

²¹ K. England and K. Ward (eds.), *Neoliberalization: States, Networks, Peoples*. (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), p. 58.

²² A. Tickell and J. Peck, ‘Making Global Rules: Globalisation or Neoliberalisation?’ in J. Peck and H. Wai-Chung Yeung, *Re-making the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives*. (London: Sage, 2003), p. 165.

²³This final Conservative victory was achieved under the leadership of John Major, following the resignation of Mrs Thatcher as leader of the Conservative Party amidst a leadership contest in 1990.

²⁴ P. Constable and A. Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies. Chile under Pinochet*. (New York-London: WW Norton & Company, 1991); J. Davila, *Dictatorship in South America*. (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2013).

²⁵ M. Fourcade-Gourinchas and S.L. Babb, 'The Rebirth of the Liberal Creed: Paths to Neoliberalism in Four Countries', *American Journal of Sociology* 108/3 (2002), p. 556.

²⁶ See A. Tickell and J. Peck, 'Making Global Rules: Globalisation or Neoliberalisation?' in J. Peck and H. Wai-Chung Yeung, *Re-making the Global Economy: Economic-Geographical Perspectives*. (London: Sage, 2003), pp.163-181 and H. Schamis, 'Latin American Authoritarianism in the 1970s: From Bureaucratic Authoritarianism to Neoconservatism', *Comparative Politics* 23/2 (1991), pp. 201-220.

²⁷ It should be noted, however, that the two leaders shared a personal relationship built around Chilean support for the British military recapture of the Falkland / Malvinas islands in 1982. During Pinochet's arrest in Britain in 1999, Thatcher praised him for building a 'prosperous, democratic order' which 'saved Chile and helped save South America' from communist dictatorship. (M. Thatcher, *Speech on Pinochet at the Conservative Party Conference*, 6 October 1999. Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 108383: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/108383>).

²⁸We explore the ideological function of "nation" here as Finlayson suggests, as produced in relation with wider political discourses, but as having a particular power: 'it may be the case that the most successful political ideologies are those that advance an expansion or alteration of the national community in the name of continuity (which was the achievement of Thatcherism).' See A. Finlayson, 'Ideology, Discourse and Nationalism', *Journal of Political Ideologies* 3/1 (1998), p. 115.

²⁹ N. Fairclough, *Language and Power* 2nd ed. (Harlow: Pearson, 2001), p. 159.

³⁰ S. Hall, 'The Great Moving Right Show', *Marxism Today*, Jan 1979, pp. 14-20.

³¹ In Pinochet's case, the forceful taking of power is enshrined, literally, in a *pronunciamento*, a claim to act on behalf of the whole country.

³²This is part of a neoconservative political narrative which both leaders used to underpin the fundamentally transformative nature of their projects (Schamis, *op. cit.*, Ref. 26).

³³ Hall, *op. cit.*, Ref. 30.

³⁴Pinochet went on to ban all political parties, including the previously supportive Christian Democracy Party.

³⁵ T. Moulián, *Chile actual: anatomía de un mito*. (Santiago: LOM/ARCIS, 1997).

³⁶Given the unconstitutional nature of the transition in Chile there are no textual resources to be drawn upon prior to the illegal seizure of power in September 1973.

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- ³⁸ Machiavelli, *ibid*, p. 102.
- ³⁹ K. Marx, *The German Ideology*. (New York: Prometheus Books, 1998), p. 67.
- ⁴⁰ A. Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks*. (London: Lawrence and Wishart, 1971), pp. 133-156.
- ⁴¹ Gramsci, *ibid.*, p. 137.
- ⁴² P. Anderson, 'The Antinomies of Antonio Gramsci', *New Left Review* 100 (1976), pp. 5-78.
- ⁴³ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 54.
- ⁴⁴ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 78.
- ⁴⁵ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 77.
- ⁴⁶ A. Morton, *Unravelling Gramsci: Hegemony or Passive Revolution in the Global Political Economy*. (London: Pluto, 2007), pp. 2-7, 67-69.
- ⁴⁷ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 84.
- ⁴⁸ Morton, *op. cit.*, Ref. 46, p. 68.
- ⁴⁹ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 239.
- ⁵⁰ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 238.
- ⁵¹ Gramsci, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40, p. 258.
- ⁵² For a fascinating discussion of the emergence of Eurocommunism in Italy see E. Hobsbawm and G. Napolitano, *The Italian Road to Socialism: An Interview by Eric Hobsbawm with Giorgio Napolitano of the Italian Communist Party*. (London: Lawrence & Hill Co, 1977).
- ⁵³ Fourcade-Gourinchas and Babb, *op. cit.*, Ref. 25, p. 547.
- ⁵⁴ The Junta was formed also by Gustavo Leigh, the head of the Air Force, Jose Toribio Merino, the head of the Navy; and Cesar Mendoza, representing Police forces (Carabineros).
- ⁵⁵ M. Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Party Conference* (13 October 1978). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 103764: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103764>
- ⁵⁶ M. Thatcher, *Remarks on becoming Prime Minister (St Francis's prayer)*, (4 May 1979). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 104078: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104078>

⁵⁷ Military Decree No. 1, 11 September 1973. Memoria Chilena Archives: <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-92134.html> .

⁵⁸ M. Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Party Conference* (8 October 1976). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 103105: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103105>

⁵⁹ Thatcher, 13 October 1978 *op. cit.*, Ref. 55.

⁶⁰Thompson defines moral economy as a sense of legitimacy ‘grounded upon a consistent traditional view of social norms and obligations, of the proper economic functions of several parties within the community.’ See E.P. Thompson, ‘The Moral Economy of the English Crowd in the Eighteenth Century’, *Past and Present* 50 (1971), pp. 76-136.

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⁶² M. Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Party Conference* (12 October 1979). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 104147: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104147>

⁶³ R. Butt, ‘Mrs Thatcher: the first two years’, *Sunday Times*, 3 May 1981.

⁶⁴ Thatcher, 12 October 1979, *op. cit.*, Ref. 62.

⁶⁵ Thatcherism’s ideological power, as Hall argued, rests in this composite nature, in which the economism of neoliberalism - freedom to consume, to trade, to own property, and to ‘revolt’ against ‘excessive taxation’ (Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 61)— is often articulated as aligned with, or even secondary to, a conservative moral crusade (based in Methodism) to impose family and community as the only “natural” means of tempering individualism. See F. Sutcliffe-Braithwaite, ‘Neo-liberalism and Morality in the Making of Thatcherite Social Policy’, *The Historical Journal*, 55, 2 (2012), pp. 497–520, and M. Grimley, ‘Thatcherism, morality and religion’, in B. Jackson and B. Saunders (eds.) *Making Thatcher’s Britain*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), pp. 78-94.

⁶⁶ M. Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Party Conference* (10 October 1975). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 102777: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/102777>

⁶⁷Labour councillors in Clay Cross, North Derbyshire, refused to implement council house rent increases demanded by the Conservative Heath government under the ‘Fair Rents Act’ of 1972. For this, councillors felt the full force of the law, being subsequently prosecuted, surcharged and disqualified from office. *Socialist Appeal*, 27 July 2011: <http://www.socialist.net/clay-cross-a-stand-remembered.htm>

⁶⁸ Thatcher, 10 October 1975, *op. cit.*, Ref. 66.

⁶⁹ M. Thatcher, *Speech to Conservative Party Conference (“Confrontation with reality”, 14 October 1977)*. Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 103443: <http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/103443>

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- ⁷² B. Jackson and B. Saunders (eds.) *Making Thatcher's Britain*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 8.
- ⁷³ B. Jessop, K. Bonett, S. Bromley and T. Ling, *Thatcherism: A Tale of Two Nations*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988), p. 44.
- ⁷⁴ The Unidad Popular included the following parties: Chilean Socialist Party; Chilean Communist Party; MAPU and Radical Party.
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- ⁷⁶ P. Constable and A. Valenzuela, *A Nation of Enemies: Chile Under Pinochet*. (New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1991), p. 147.
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- ⁷⁹ A. Pinochet, *Politica, Politiqueria y Demagogia*. (Santiago de Chile: Renacimiento, 1983).
- ⁸⁰ A. Pinochet, *Un Ano de Construccion*. (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Andres Bello, 1974).
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- ⁸² Pinochet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 80.
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- ⁸⁴ Pinochet, *ibid.*
- ⁸⁵ Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 66.
- ⁸⁶ Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 58.
- ⁸⁷ Thatcher, *ibid.*
- ⁸⁸ Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 66.

⁸⁹ Thatcher, *ibid.*

⁹⁰ Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 58.

⁹¹ Thatcher, *ibid.*

⁹² Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 69.

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⁹⁴ Thatcher, *op. cit.*, Ref. 66.

⁹⁵ M. Thatcher, *Speech to the Conservative Party Conference* (12 October 1984). Margaret Thatcher Foundation document 105763: <http://www.margarethatcher.org/document/105763>

⁹⁶ S. Milne, *The Enemy Within: The Secret War Against the Miners*. (London: Verso, 1994).

⁹⁷ R. Miliband, 'The New Revisionism in Britain', *New Left Review*, Mar-Apr 1985, I/150, pp. 5-26 (quote from p. 17).

⁹⁸ Jessop, et al, *op. cit.*, Ref. 73, pp. 82-83.

⁹⁹ Miliband, *op. cit.*, Ref. 97, p. 17.

¹⁰⁰ Jessop, et al., *op. cit.*, Ref. 73, p. 88.

¹⁰¹ See for example G. Valentine and C. Harris, 'Strivers vs skivers: Class prejudice and the demonisation of dependency in everyday life', *Geoforum* 53 (2014), pp. 84-92.

¹⁰² Pinochet, 1974, *op. cit.*, Ref. 80.

¹⁰³ Pinochet, 1973, *op. cit.*, Ref. 77.

¹⁰⁴ Pinochet, 1973, *op. cit.*, Ref. 77.

¹⁰⁵ Diego Portales was the main ideologist of the Chilean state in the 19th Century. He introduced authoritarianism as a theme in the definition of power and authority in the new republic after the independence from Spain. These ideas have been maintained within the Chilean political culture.

¹⁰⁶ Portales, 1822, quoted in R. Castro, *Ideas y confesiones de Portales*. (Santiago: Edit. Del Pacifico, 1954).

¹⁰⁷ Pinochet, 1979, *op. cit.*, Ref. 83.

¹⁰⁸ ‘This has never been dictatorship, gentlemen, this is soft dictatorship, but if necessary, we will have to hand squeezing’ – A. Pinochet, *Esta no es una dictadura senores, esto es una dictablanda*, 1985 [online]. Available from: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zTlxKBpFA2c>. (Accessed 23 September 2016).

¹⁰⁹ A. Pinochet, *Speech on a new political institution*. (Chacarrillas Hill, 7 July 1977). Memoria Chilena Archive <http://www.memoriachilena.cl/602/w3-article-127202.html> .

¹¹⁰ Hayek himself endorsed Pinochet’s dictatorship (see A. Gamble, (2013) ‘Economic Libertarianism’, in: M. Freedon, L.T. Sargent and M. Stears (Eds.) *The Oxford Handbook of Political Ideologies*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), p. 418), stating in an interview in *El Mercurio*, 12 April 1981 that ‘I prefer a liberal dictator to democratic government lacking in liberalism’ (see also B. Caldwell and L. Montes, ‘Friedrich Hayek and his visits to Chile’, *The Review of Austrian Economics*, 28/3 (2015), pp. 261-309).

¹¹¹ Pinochet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 109.

¹¹² Pinochet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 109.

¹¹³ Pinochet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 83.

¹¹⁴ Pinochet, *op. cit.*, Ref. 80.

¹¹⁵ A further strand of this research project will be the exploration of the way that neoliberal ideology continued to contain the Left and their responses to it, even when in power.