Youth Culture and the Politics of Youth in 1960s Cuba

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Date.......................................................
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Abstract

The triple coordinates of youth, the Sixties and the Cuban Revolution intersect to create a rich but relatively unexplored field of historical research. Previous studies of youth in Cuba have assumed a separation between young people and the Revolution, and either objectify young people as units that could be mobilized by the Revolution, or look at how young people deviated from the perceived dominant ideology of the Revolution. This study contends that, rather than being passive in the face of social and material change, young people in 1960s Cuba were active agents in that change, and played a role in defining what the Revolution was and could become.

The model built here to understand young people in 1960s Cuba is based on identity theory, contending that youth identity was built at the point where young people experienced – and were responsible for forging – an emerging dominant culture of youth. The latter entered Cuban consciousness and became, over the course of the 1960s, a part of the dominant national-revolutionary identity. It was determined by three factors: firstly, leadership discourse, which laid out the view of what youth could, should or must be within the Revolution, and also helped to forge a direct relationship between the Revolution and young people; secondly, policy initiatives which linked all youth-related policy to education, therefore linking policy to the radical national tradition stemming from Martí; and thirdly, influence from outside Cuba and the ways in which external youth movements and youth cultures interplayed with Cuban culture. Through these three, youth was in the ascendancy, but, where young people challenged the positive picture of youth, moral panics ensued.

Young people were neither inherent saints nor accidental sinners in Cuba in the 1960s, and sought multiple ways in which to express themselves. Firstly, they played their role as activists through the youth organisations, the AJR and the UJC. These young people were at the cutting edge of the canonised vision of youth, and consequently felt burdened by a failure to live up to such an ideal. Secondly, through massive voluntary participation in building the Revolution, through the Literacy Campaign, the militias and the aficionados groups, many young people in the 1960s internalised the Revolution and developed a revolutionary consciousness that defines their generation today. Finally, at the margin of the definition of what was considered revolutionary sat young cultural producers – those associated with El Puente, Caimán Barbudo and the Nueva Trova, and their audience – who attempted to define and redefine what it meant to be young and revolutionary. These groups all fed the culture of youth, and through them we can start to understand the uncertainties of being young, revolutionary and Cuban in this effervescent and convulsive decade.
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My Dad, Tom Luke, did the vast majority of translations in the thesis. Not everyone is so lucky as to have a professional translator in the family, and I hope he did not find this particular bit of *pro bono* work too arduous!

The support my family have provided over the years of my research has been amazing. I would like to thank my Mum and Dad for continuing to give all sorts of support to a daughter who should have grown up years ago. My brother-in-law, Geraint Thomas, built me a computer just when I needed it, my beautiful little nephew Joseph has been a source of therapy when it has all got stressful, and my sister Nicola has patiently listened to endless tales of angst and worry.

Finally, my deepest debt of gratitude goes to Glyn Hambrook. He has read and critiqued the thesis in its many stages, and has given me a measure of the standard I would like, one day, to reach. *Gracias, mi querido. Eres un cielo.*
# Glossary of Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AJR</td>
<td>Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes [Association of Young Rebels]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJC</td>
<td>Columnas Juveniles Centenarios [Centenary Youth Columns]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DR</td>
<td>Directorio Revolucionario [Revolutionary Directorate]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EIR</td>
<td>Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria [Schools of Revolutionary Instruction]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOC</td>
<td>Educación Obrero-campesina [Worker-peasant educational scheme]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ER</td>
<td>Ejército Rebelde [Rebel Army]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAR</td>
<td>Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [Revolutionary Armed Forces]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FEU</td>
<td>Federación de Estudiantes Universitarios [Federation of University Students]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICAIC</td>
<td>Instituto Cubano de Artes e Industrias Cinematográficas [Cuban Institute of Cinematography]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INDER</td>
<td>Instituto Nacional de Deportes Educación Física y Recreación [Institute of Sport, Physical Education and Leisure]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JS</td>
<td>Juventud Socialista [Young Socialists]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LPV</td>
<td>Listos Para Vencer [Ready to Win]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MinFAR</td>
<td>Ministerio de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias [Ministry of Armed Forces]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>M-26-7</td>
<td>Movimiento de 26 de Julio [26th July Movement]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MNR</td>
<td>Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias [National Revolutionary Militias]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ORI</td>
<td>Organizaciones Revolucionarias Integradas [Integrated Revolutionary Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCC</td>
<td>Partido Comunista de Cuba [Cuban Communist Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSP</td>
<td>Partido Socialista Popular [Popular Socialist Party]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PURS</td>
<td>Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista de Cuba [United Party of the Cuban Socialist Revolution]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Organization Name</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMO</td>
<td>Servicio Militar Obligatorio</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UES</td>
<td>Unión de Estudiantes Secundarios</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UJC</td>
<td>Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UMAP</td>
<td>Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNEAC</td>
<td>Unión Nacional de Escritores y Artistas de Cuba</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPC</td>
<td>Unión de Pioneros Cubanos</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UPR</td>
<td>Unión de Pioneros Rebeldes</td>
</tr>
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Glossary of Cuban Terms

*alfabetización*: literacy, one of the key early aims of the revolutionary programme in Cuba, particularly put into practice in 1961 when Cuba attempted to eliminate illiteracy in less than a year.

*autocrítica*: self criticism, which organisations and individuals were encouraged to undergo to avoid all range of perceived errors in the revolutionary period.

*batistato*: period from 1952 to 1959, when Fulgencio Batista was the dictator of Cuba.

*conciencia*: revolutionary consciousness.

*Ejército Rebelde*: the Rebel Army, formed in the Sierra Maestra during the 1950s, which became the basis of Cuba’s standing army after the victory of the rebellion.

*Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias*: the new armed forces made up of the Ejército Rebelde and other arms of the national defence.

*Hombre Nuevo*: the New Man, part of Guevara’s conception of the development of a future generation of revolutionaries.

*moncada* generation: those identified with the 1950s struggle which had begun with the 1953 attack on the Moncada barracks in Santiago de Cuba. Hence *moncadista* to describe characteristics of this generation.

*las masas*: see *El Pueblo*

*lucha*: fight or struggle; used in the discourse to refer to particularly heroic action.

*llano*: Shorthand used for the focus of the urban battle against Batista in the 1950s in Havana.

*oriente*: the East of the island, which hosted the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, and which was sometimes associated with the idea of the noble peasant (*campesino*) or heroic guerrilla.

*patria*: homeland; affectionate name given to Cuba, connected with heroic nationalism and the struggle for independence.

*pueblo*: all the Cuban people, sometimes called *Las Masas*, linked to the concept of heroic nationalism and the fight against colonialist forces.

*rebelde*: adjective describing the ethos of the 1950s rebellion, based on the heroic guerrilla fighter.
sectarismo: sectarianism, an accusation levelled at those associated with the PSP in the power struggle of the early 1960s.

Sierra: shorthand used for focus of the rural guerrilla struggle against Batista, named after the Sierra Maestra in the East of the island where the rural battle began.

vanguardia: the vanguard; this group were seen as the leaders of the people, having a more developed revolutionary consciousness than others therefore fulfilling the role of setting an example to all; particularly associated in this study with a young vanguard.

zafra: sugar harvest; in particular used in reference to the 10 million tonne sugar harvest planned for 1970.
Note on References

Leadership texts: the exact dates of leadership speeches are included in the body of the text. Given such rapid change in the 1960s, a case of months or even days is relevant, so the author did not wish to lose clarity by citing only the year. The reader can find all leadership speeches in the section of the bibliography entitled Leadership Texts. Due to the trajectory of research, certain speeches that were unavailable in hard copy were sourced from the Cuban government website. In the cases where the website has been used as the source for the speeches there will be no page number cited.

Magazines and newspapers: the exact date and name of publication are cited in the text in order to direct the reader to the relevant part of the bibliography, entitled Magazines and Newspapers.

Interviews: these are identified as such in the textual reference followed by the exact date of the interview, directing the reader to that section of the bibliography.
Introduction

Todavía hoy hay una mayoría que apoya la Revolución a causa de los sesenta.  
*The Sixties explain why a majority of people still support the Revolution.*  
Pablo Pacheco, Havana, 27/05/03

Young people’s protests are easy to mock. But ignore them at your peril.  
Gary Younge, *The Guardian*, 12/06/06:29

Nearly fifty years since its inception, the Cuban Revolution continues to provoke strong reactions, constant comment and differing interpretations. The Sixties are similarly controversial, as former protagonists are confronted by researchers from a new generation, who have no memory of the period and are beginning to write about it as history. Nothing links Cuba and the Sixties as much as the issue of youth, and these triple coordinates are the focus of this study. The link between these three is often taken for granted, however, and little research has been carried out on how the connection between the Cuban Revolution and youth was forged in the early years of the Revolution. This work intends to fill that gap.

The aim is not to prioritise spectacular youth cultures, as has often been the case with research into youth. Neither is it to canonise youth as a kind of solution to all embedded difficulties in society. Instead, my aim is to demonstrate how young people in Cuba in the 1960s played a role in their own destiny and were agents of change in their own right, but also how they existed within an evolving culture. Over time their actions affected and changed that culture, making the evolution of the Revolution in the 1960s organic rather than imposed.

Perhaps because there are so many popularly held myths and assumptions about the Sixties, very little research into youth in the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s has been carried out. Much of the evidence available has not, prior to this study,
made its way into the the history books of the Revolution, and this work will begin to redress this, and to challenge popularly-held assumptions. Because of the wealth of evidence available, this thesis limits its scope to the island, and does not consider the Cuban culture in exile in Miami and elsewhere. Its focus within the island, furthermore, is foremost but not exclusively based around Havana, and the story of youth in the East of the island has yet to be explored.

A Necessarily Short Literature Review

The dearth of literature on Cuban youth accounts for the brevity of the literature review. Many texts that deal with significant sites of youth culture underplay or ignore the youth angle so that, for example, González’s 1999 volume on the history of baseball in Cuba, whilst being a significant addition to the cultural history of the Revolution, does not take into account the specific importance of sport (and leisure) to youth. Similarly, Moore (2006), while acknowledging the importance of the Nueva Trova movement to young people, both in the 1960s and subsequently, does not engage with the hypothesis that the relationship between youth and music is part of the centrality of music in the context of the 1960s both in Cuba and beyond. Sublette’s (2004) study of music ends its account in the 1950s. Roy (2002), also writing on the subject of music, similarly ignores the youth question and the issue of the Sixties as a cultural phenomenon all together, as does McManus (2000). A rationale for the failure of these texts to engage with the issue of youth may be related to the absence of an obvious (or celebrated) youth counter-culture in Cuba – in the Mexican case, Zolov (1999) stresses the centrality of music to La Onda, the Mexican counter-culture of the 1960s, because La Onda has entered Mexican history books. There was a counter-culture of sorts in Cuba, similar to La Onda insofar as it was related to the US counter-culture, but its existence and nature is much more contested than in the Mexican case. The Cuban case has more in common with Brazil (Dunn, 2001) where the impetus of the creation of a home-grown counter-culture was an artistic movement – Tropicalia – but although there were new artistic movements in Cuba, these have not been defined clearly in the history books of the Cuban Revolution.
The literature on youth in the Cuban revolution largely concerns participation. The most comprehensive attempt from outside Cuba to understand youth in the context of the Cuban Revolution is Fagen’s seminal 1969 text, *The Transformation of Political Culture in Cuba*, which explored how, through the building of new institutions and a new leadership culture and discourse that created a new form of participation, “Cuban man” could be transformed into “revolutionary man” (Fagen, 1969: 2). Fagen recognised the chasm between the Cuban understanding of youth, as an untainted ‘blank slate’, and Western concepts of youth culture (Fagen, 1969: 145-47). The weakness in his position was that he accepted the revolutionary Government’s espousal of the ‘blank slate’ thesis. He did not explore the uneasy relationship between the relatively simple concept of what young people *should be* in the Revolution, and uncertainty about what young people *were* in the early Revolution, including the fear that young people might not exist within the developing revolutionary-national identity. Neither did he see young people as playing a part in determining revolutionary definitions of youth, nor in stimulating moral panics, which, as we will see later, are highly relevant. As a result, although Fagen understood the influence of discourse on political culture in reference to youth more than any other commentator, the concepts of uncertainty, continuity and change in the experience of young Cubans were underemphasised in his work.

Domínguez (1978), while acknowledging his debt to Fagen, did engage with the concepts of change and continuity in the early Revolution. Like Fagen, his study examined how changes in political structures and institutions, in particular through the centralisation of power and mobilisation, shaped Cuba’s revolutionary history. He claimed that studies of young people in the early 1960s showed attitudes similar to the 1950s until structural changes became apparent in the mid-1960s. In this conclusion there was an implicit assumption that those structural changes in turn changed young people. This interpretation disempowers young people, inferring that they were inherent followers of a system rather than participants whose actions in part formulated that system (Domínguez, 1978: 474-78). Bunck’s (1994) work similarly sees young people as controlled by the system, and, although her contention that the government gradually increased its control of education and youth organisations over the first
three decades of the Revolution (Bunck, 1994: 84) stands up, what she fails to appreciate is the way in which those institutions were shaped by the actions of young people. There was certainly a perception of youth deviance in 1960s Cuba, as Bunck argues, but that does not mean that “youth remained largely resistant and hostile to Cuba’s leaders” (1994: 85), rather that the relationship between the Revolution and young people was and is contingent, changing and mutually dependent.

While some texts fail on the one hand to deal with the concept of youth, and on the other to deal with the effect of this changing concept on young people, Hochschild (1970) redressed this shortcoming. He wrote that “Young people in Cuba […] are celebrated as a ‘chosen people’” and went on to stress that “their ability to act as a shock absorber of change, their willingness to innovate, to be ideologically committed, make the youth a ready and trusted workforce” (Hochschild, 1970: 57-58). This line emphasised the importance of the concept of young people as agents of change. This position is corroborated by Kapcia who takes this further, arguing that young people were able to protest through recourse to the myths that were created within the Revolution, so that “by clinging to Che, the young can […] be revolutionary and still distance themselves from the present leadership” (Kapcia, 2000: 212). Kapcia’s perspective that the culture of the Revolution can be explained through such myths is closely related to Medin’s (1990) position that it was through the symbols of the Revolution that revolutionary consciousness was built. Medin highlighted symbols, in particular the construction of heroes and martyrs (1990: 34), which were certainly part of Kapcia’s myth associated with youth. But it is perhaps surprising that Medin does not see youth as part of his explanation of consciousness through symbols, in particular as he chooses to focus on Castro, who was in part responsible for the construction of the myth of youth, as a personification of the Revolution (1990: 36).

Rosendahl’s anthropological study puts forward the perspective that age and education made no difference in attitudes to the Revolution (1997: 165). This position reflects the time during which her research was carried out, and somewhat conflicts with her own perspective that memories of the hardship of
the 1950s and the improved opportunities which the Revolution heralded, are why the Revolution is still supported by so many Cubans (1997: 131). In the 1960s the sense of difference across time – and the emerging difference between those who had and had not experienced the 1950s – was naturally more acute than in the 1980s and 1990s when Rosendahl carried out her study. In many other ways, though, this study is indebted to Rosendahl, Medin and Kapcia’s perspective, namely that the language, symbols and myths of the Revolution impacted (and impact) upon everyday life in Cuba.

The power of different and various means of expression for young people is made explicit by Fernández (1993), who argues that both youth and the state are flexible. He concludes that:

> The state has […] resisted the youth through its repression of non-conformists, through control of youth organisations, and through a language and worldview that, by and large, closes the door to, at best, co-opts the ‘agenda’ of young Cubans. Yet the state has been unable to make Cuban youth think and act in official ways, which demonstrates, on the one hand, the limits of the state and, on the other, the latent pluralism of Cuban society (Fernández, 1993: 209).

Although Fernández does identify the two-way nature of the relationship between young people and society, the concept of conflict between young people and the state is overemphasised here and the some of subtleties of the symbiotic relationship are missed. Like Baloyra (1989), Fernández sees integration as the central aim of the government, but neither author examines the relationship between the theory of an idealised integrated youth and the realities of life. Although Fernández accepts the revolutionary government as pragmatic, he sees it as separate from youth and young people.

The paucity of evidence from the Cuban point of view on 1960s youth may reflect a discomfort with discussing that which is still perceived to exist at the cultural margin. In Kirk and Padula’s interviews with cultural producers, only Leo Brower referred to the controversial stance, in the 1960s, of the dual youth culture forms of expression of wearing long hair and listening to the Beatles (Kirk and Padula, 2001: 100 & 102). Of those sources published in Cuba, an
interest in youth participation is paramount. The Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud has focused on participation, with the publication of two volumes on the Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes, the first unity youth organisation in revolutionary Cuba. These (Rodriguez, 1989 and Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986) are both significant additions to the historiography of this organisation but serve to perpetuate the myth of the innate heroism of youth by canonising the organisation, albeit with reservations, and by ignoring the eventual folding of the mass organisation in favour of the highly selective Unión de Jóvenes Rebeldes. More recent work at the Centro, notably that of historian Luis Gomez (yet to be published) has a much broader perspective, looking at young people in the Revolution in terms of youth policy, focusing on the effects of changes in education, work and health and their impact upon young people, as well as continuing the earlier work of the Centro by developing notions of youth participationism (Gomez, no date b and e). The present study is indebted to this increasing breadth of perception of youth involvement in the Revolution, but hopes to redress the still limited scope of Gomez’s work, which does not engage how the concept of youth within the revolution developed and changed in the discourse of the Revolution.

This thesis will examine in greater depth the development of the concept of youth within the Revolution. As a result a much subtler picture emerges in which assumptions inherent in some previous analyses must be set aside. The separation between Revolution and youth comes to appear a construct rather than a reality. One commentator who understood this nuance was Benedetti (1974) who pointed out that, notwithstanding the age of the leadership, “en Cuba aún los veteranos actúan en un ritmo joven” [in Cuba even veterans are moving to a youthful beat] (Benedetti, 1974: 21). The concept of youth and society are here linked: by taking policymaking out of the equation, Benedetti was able to see what I will term a culture of youth pervading society.

**Methodology: Identity Theory**

This study is indebted to the move to notions of identity in Cultural Studies, which influences the way in which we view the past. Alain Blum writes,
“[w]hereas formerly the individual was characterised chiefly by his membership of a social class or group whose history could be reconstructed by a social historian, nowadays we prefer to stress the multiplicity, and especially the fluidity, of such groupings” (Blum, 2003: 213). The methodology of this thesis shares this perspective. Identities allow us to look at the relationship between the internal and the external, at the points of interaction between citizen and state, at the choices that an individual makes to express him/herself and to model that interaction. My analysis, therefore hinges on the issue of how the subject and the discourse interact and are mutually contingent.

A second debt that must be acknowledged is to the consideration given within Cultural Studies to a broad range of cultural sites through which young people express themselves. This has taken youth studies beyond just education and family, and has allowed us to consider sites such as music and fashion. This thesis acknowledges this and also redresses the limitations of these sites, in so far as they exclude issues such as political participation, but also uses them as a window into the lived experience of young people in 1960s Cuba. The contention is that by operating within, up to and outside the cultural margins, young people changed Cuba and changed their own lived experience.

**Methodology: Sources**

While there is relatively little written on Cuban youth, there is a wealth of literature covering the diverse sites of youth politics and culture (which were not necessarily youth specific). This literature is embedded in the thesis, so that secondary sources and primary sources converse and interact. This allows us to deal directly with the assumptions made about youth and young people that are inherent in much of that literature and therefore to fight the battle, on many fronts, for a new formulation of youth and young people in 1960s Cuba.

Given the theoretical base of the thesis, the primary sources used are of necessity diverse. Youth-specific publications such as *Mella, Alma Mater* and *Islas* aid understanding of youth activism or lack thereof. References to youth and young people in publications that were not aimed solely at young people are used for
the same purpose and also to examine youth political participation. Daily papers *Granma* and *Juventud Rebelde* are employed to trace specific mass trends, such as involvement in the Militias. Certain key texts from the 1960s, such as the Literacy Campaign teacher's primer are also examined to gain a more profound insight into the nature of policy and discourse. The speeches of the leadership, for their part, are used to build up the picture of a culture of youth, and to map how young people were perceived and what their role was perceived to be in the Revolution. In order to extract a view of youth culture in 1960s Cuba, a key text is the cultural magazine *Bohemia*. This was a magazine that survived from the pre-revolutionary period, and it was perceived as old-fashioned in the 1960s. The reason it has been chosen, however, is because it covers all sites of youth culture – from popular culture, such as music and fashion, to political involvement.

To trace those cultures at the margin, interview evidence with protagonists, as well as personal accounts, is important. Much evidence on these cultures remains unwritten and is absent from the history books of the Revolution. Using interviews, therefore, has been an important route to understanding youth cultures. These were open interviews, posing very few questions and allowing the interviewee to lead the interview, although they were focused specifically on the issue of youth. The interview evidence corroborates other evidence and fills the gaps in the written evidence where possible. In some cases, the focus was on particular events and movements in which the interviewee was involved, but in not a single case did this limit the scope of the interviews, and much information over and above what may have been expected was passed on, with remarkably little work on the part of the interviewer. Access was at times a problem with interviews, as well as the fact that some protagonists had either died or were in exile; consequently the number of interviews conducted is relatively small. Certain interview evidence is ‘second hand’. For example, I was told in interviews that hippie groups existed in Havana in the 1960s, but I did not find any members of these groups to interview, and was told on occasion (both in interviews and in social situations) that if I wanted to find such individuals, I would be more likely to be successful in Miami. On the other hand, while there was some reluctance to talk of *cultura juvenil*, as this phrase was associated with a negative view of youth, I found all interviewees keen and willing to discuss
youth culture in the sense the term acquires in this thesis, and the interviewees told me about everything from literacy brigades, schools and universities, music, fashion, and the arts to the sexual revolution, opinions on the Beatles, homophobia and the 1960s work camps (UMAPs). In fact, the view of youth culture put across in this thesis is influenced by the breadth of the Cuban perspective, in contrast to academic historical work on youth in Cuba which offers a narrower scope than this popular culture view of youth in Cuba.

For the most part, cultural text has been avoided, given that this study is concerned with actors rather than their cultural products. One exception is made to this. Silvio Rodríguez lyrics have been used because of they were so important to the broad youth culture in Cuba, and are unique as they were able to express to a mass audience both support for, and concern about, the direction of the Revolution. The other texts consulted have provided evidence of problematic youth cultures by expressing opposition and moral panic.

Thesis Structure

The thesis is divided into three sections. The first section deals with conceptual issues and identity formation in the Cuban Revolution in the 1960s. Chapter 1 examines theories of youth cultures since the 1960s and highlights their shortcomings as far as exploring the case of Cuba in the 1960s is concerned. To redress these insufficiencies, it brings in and elucidates theories of identity which enable us, by looking at the both the internal and the external which make up identity, to view Cuban youth through a different lens – neither spectacular, nor deviant; neither saviour, nor problem. Chapter 2 looks at a range of identities in 1960s Cuba, to argue that a new dominant identity was forged by merging the national and the revolutionary, represented as a hyphenated identity. It then examines ways in which the dominance of this identity influenced the formation of other identities. The contention is that alternate identities were formed but were inhibited in their expression because of the dominance of the new (and post-colonial) national-revolutionary identity.
The second section of the thesis makes up the ‘external’ in the identity dichotomy. Both the world in which young people in Cuba were living, and the new national-revolutionary identity, were in part constructed through a *culture of youth*. I contend that this consisted of a society-wide view that saw the notion of youth as dominant. The contention is supported by separate analyses of leadership discourse, policies and external influence, each of which is accorded its own chapter. Chapter 3 deals with the leadership discourse on youth, whereby youth was canonised and exalted, but which also expressed a moral panic where young people did not live up to that exalted vision. Chapter 4 looks at the plethora of policies which made up a youth policy, although it was not labelled as such by the parties responsible for its implementation. This policy was formulated so that young people would to be able to live up to the discursive construct with which they were faced. Certain policies were also put in place in tandem with the discursive moral panic in order to prevent young people falling outside the dominant culture. Chapter 5 examines external influence in the construction of this dominant culture, by detailing which forms of external expression were imported into Cuba. It examines whether they were seen as positive, that is, as functioning within the positive discourse and policy, or whether they were seen as negative, thus functioning as part of the moral panic.

Section three of the thesis looks at the ‘internal’ in the identity dichotomy. It examines how young people experienced *and were responsible for forging* the culture of youth. Chapter 6 focuses on young activists, who were members of the youth organisation in its various incarnations, and looks at the development of that organisation, its ethos and the problems it had. This was an identity that attempted to stay within the dominant discourse and was partly responsible for the discourse. But, through internal moral panic and through bitter self-criticism, and despite obvious successes of which members were proud, the organisation was problematic. Chapter 7 looks at young people who participated in the Revolution. They were in part responsible for the policy initiatives that made up the culture of youth. The participation of the masses of young people in revolutionary activities, which became revolutionary *because* young people were so successful, mapped out a generation that is still today defined by its activities in the decade in question, and that gained authority and revolutionary credentials
through them. Chapter 8 discusses those young people who questioned the very definition of revolutionary-national identity and who, in their turn, were in part responsible for its evolution. These groups of young people, made up largely of writers and musicians, similarly formed a generation that would stabilise the definition of what it meant to be young and revolutionary but that, unlike the other groups, would sit at the margin and were in a constant struggle to prove their revolutionary credentials.

The thesis argues that through the interaction of young people and the culture of youth, a youth identity was forged that did not consider itself a youth culture, but that was not unipolar. Rather, young people internalised the Revolution as they played a part in its construction, and thus took on the national-revolutionary identity and in so doing changed its meaning. Their role in the 1960s stabilised the Cuban concept of youth into a form that to this day is largely unchallenged, with young people continuing to operate both within, at the margins of, and outside the Revolution. Young people were neither the saviours nor the demons that much literature, from both within Cuba and outside, would have us believe. Rather they were agents of change in multiple ways. Young people were not separate from society, by being better, worse or different; instead they formed a part of society at large and were able to change not just their own social and material circumstances, but also the way in which they were viewed and in which they viewed themselves.
Section I Conceptual Issues

Chapter 1
Youth, Culture and Identity

1.1 Introduction

The prominence of youth in the post-war capitalist world is accounted for by Theodore Roszak, in his influential 1968 work *The Making of a Counter Culture*, in five ways. Youth was dissatisfied with the inaction of its parents. Society was getting younger, so youth was a much bigger group. The young were feeling the power of their numbers, in particular because increased youth income meant that there was a distinct youth market. Higher education was expanding so a group identity was developing. And finally, the young were reacting to the permissive attitudes of their parents, influenced by Dr Spock, which extended youthful irresponsibility to include school and beyond (Roszak, 1968: 27-31). This categorisation of youth led to a theorisation of the position, role and activities of youth and young people in the late 1960s and 1970s.

The plethora of competing theories, which attempt to find an explanation both for young people’s behaviour and for societal understanding of young people’s behaviour, confronts the researcher. Although youth increased in importance throughout the years preceding the timeframe in question, the ‘youthquake’ of the 1960s generated a wealth of literature on Western youth and youth culture, from a variety of disciplines. Two distinct models emerged to explain this development: accounts of youth counter-cultures, largely developed in the United States in response to historical change and the emergence of youth as a distinctive category; and the UK-based theories of sub-cultures emerging in response to – and as a criticism of – a moral panic surrounding the modes of behaviour developed by young people in the UK during the period under consideration.
Stanley Cohen, who popularised the phrase ‘moral panic’, linked moral panic to youth culture, stating that “[o]ne of the most recurrent types of moral panic in Britain since the war has been associated with the emergence of various forms of youth culture […] whose behaviour is deviant or delinquent” (Cohen, S., 1987: 9). Moral panic is conveyed through the mass media and the “moral barricades are manned by editors, bishops, politicians, and other right-thinking people” (Cohen, 1987: 9). His case study is UK-specific, certainly, but the creation of moral panic surrounding youth transcends nation, and is linked to imposed forms of behaviour deemed acceptable, so that young people are seen as inherent saints and accidental sinners.

Moral panic has become a contested term in sociology and cultural studies, and needs a further clarification at this stage. Thompson (1998) argues that despite an emphasis on different elements of moral panic, certain key features are common to all moral panics:

there should be a high level of concern over the behaviour of a certain group or category of people and [...] there is an increased level of hostility to the group or category regarded as a threat (Thompson, 1998: 9).

Thompson takes the position, influenced by Foucault, that whilst many discussions of moral panics are issue-specific, in general “moral panics [are] symptoms or signs of struggle over rival discourses and regulatory practices” (1998: 30).

A variety of factors can trigger moral panics. The common factor in many perspectives is the enduring centrality of youth to the phenomenon. Springhall (1998) traces twentieth-century British moral panics to a nineteenth-century concern with the adverse effect on the lower classes of popular culture (1998: 2), and the moral panics he discusses refer to urban youth (1998: 3). Thornton argues that a moral panic is not something that happens to young people, but that youth sub-cultures seek moral panics as the latter are “one of the few marketing strategies open to relatively anonymous instrumental dance music” (1994: 182).

These bodies of writing will inform this thesis in different ways. The counter-culture is influential in so far as it was experienced in Cuba, although it was
‘Cubanised’, which led a re-conceptualisation thereof. The counter-culture, furthermore, rests on generational explanations of youth culture that can celebrate inherent qualities possessed by young people, meaning that they are important agents of change. Theories of youth sub-culture serve as precursors to identity politics and to the postulation that society can be understood through examining culture and identity. Young people can therefore be understood in terms of the ways they choose to express themselves, through a variety of sites of culture, and through an examination of the extent to which they were constrained in these ways of being. Sub-culture rescues young people from the media moral panic, by seeking explanations for youth culture that go beyond the idea of the moral.

For these reasons, moral panic should not be overstated, and Cohen admits that the weakest area of the theory is that which sees a direct causal link between the moral panic and the folk devil (2002: xxiv). Young people may variously seek moral panic, as Thornton (1994) argues, trigger moral panic through perceived deviance, as Cohen (2002) argues, or be representative of a rival discourse, as Thompson (1998) argues. They are, however, many other things as well as a media representation, and to that end the role ascribed to them by Thornton as agents in the media moral panic is the closest in perspective to this thesis. It will be argued that young people had many ways to express themselves which did not trigger moral panics, and were repeatedly not represented as folk devils. Overemphasising deviance or delinquency shows us only one part of the history of young people in Cuba in the 1960s. Furthermore, there are difficulties in appropriating these theories to explore the Cuban case, as they are based on the assumption of Western capitalism and the corresponding media. However, later in the thesis instances of sub-cultural behaviour and media moral panic will be highlighted. Regarding moral panics, in the Cuban case features of moral panics (concern and hostility) are highly visible, but the moral universe was not determined by class position, such as that to which Springhall refers. It was rather related both to an enduring anti-imperialism (and anti-yankee sentiment) in Cuban revolutionary culture perpetuated in the 1960s by a highly and increasingly state-controlled media (Lent, 1992: 8-10), and to a newer feature of revolutionary morality that dictated that work was a moral, rather than economic,
issue. In Cuba the speeches of Castro and other leaders were dominant in the media, and played a part in mapping the new revolutionary morality and were therefore at the centre of moral panics which, in the Cuban case, either receded or resulted in social change just as in the UK case (Thompson, 1998: 8).

1.2 Generation Theory

[A]dult society uses the whole idea of adolescence and the youth culture in particular, to neutralize any real generational conflict (Cohen, S., 1987: 180).

Cohen sought to situate moral panics that erupted in response to youth culture as an attempt to problematize certain youth groups in order to obscure genuine generational difference. Until Cohen’s generation of researchers, however, generation was a technique used to explain perceived problems inherent within, and perceived solutions found by, youth and young people.

Those discussing the counter-culture of the 1960s liked to use the generation gap, rather than class, as one of the sources of youth deviance largely using Karl Mannheim’s theory of ‘generation units’. He argued that the potential to form into a generation unit may be realised through the “participation in the common destiny of this historical and social unit” (Mannheim, 1952: 303; original emphasis). The realisation of this potential was contingent upon the “tempo of social change” (Mannheim, 1952: 309). Eisenstadt (1964) developed this further, arguing that generations emerge under certain social structures that ascribe a role to a particular cohort. By arguing that youth is ascribed a role by society he was to an extent disempowering the very youth groupings in which he was interested, as his argument assumed a stasis and under-emphasised the dynamic nature of Mannheim’s earlier theory. Despite this, and the fact that generation theory is out of vogue in the social sciences, it functions as a precursor to ideas that are still influential in identity theory; it fed into counter- and sub-cultural theory in several ways. Eisenstadt argued that age should be considered as a ‘category’ in a person’s life experience, stating that the “categorization of oneself as a member of a given age stage serves as an
important basis for one’s self-perception” (Eisenstadt, 1964: 28). This applied to
every age group, but Eisenstadt later emphasised youth, arguing that “in all
societies age groups are formed at the transitional stage between adolescence and
full adulthood, and are oriented towards the attainment and acknowledgement of
the full status of their members” (Eisenstadt, 1964: 183-84). The latter
argument, while providing us with the rationale for the existence of youth as a
category, deviates from Eisenstadt’s own assertion that non-European countries
embraced youth ideology as an attempt at rejuvenation of society as a whole
(Eisenstadt, 1964: 174).

Eisenstadt’s conceptualisation of generational foci is interesting with regards to
his reference to youth movements on the kibbutz, in the context of changing
social relations regarding land and the relationship between the rural and the
urban. He argued that the kibbutz fostered looser familial relations but stronger
community identification through which there developed a distinctive youth
‘ideology’.\(^1\) In other words, youth could be conceptualised as distinct from the
adult or the adolescent when the young person had a direct relationship with the
land that was not mediated through the family environment, even if it was in part
still related to schooling (Eisenstadt, 1964: 174-81).\(^2\) Despite the weaknesses of
this functionalist approach (the concept of specified roles within a given social
movement), Eisenstadt’s dual focus on the rural and on transformation in social
relations is of relevance to this study, given the changing social relations in
revolutionary Cuba, and in particular given the role of voluntarism; a useful
parallel between the Cuban case and the kibbutz exists.

The concept of generation remained a minor preoccupation of political
sociologists in the decades after Mannheim and Eisenstadt’s work. It is surprising
that so little attention was paid theoretically to the concept when it was in such
popular usage. Graubard (1979) prefaced his edition of essays on the topic with
the invocation that “the concept of generations has become one of the most
adaptable themes of contemporary discourse. Yet in trying to apply the concept

\(^1\) For the purposes of this study I will use the term ‘culture of youth’ to denote the combination of
youth ideology with discourses of rejuvenation.

\(^2\) To this leisure was later added: see theories of sub-cultures, below.
to these last two decades [...] one realises how elusive and difficult the idea of generations is, whether used as a tool of historical or intellectual analysis” (Graubard, 1979: vii). Yet, as one essay in the volume pointed out, “there is, of course, one piece of evidence that generations exist. People have always thought they did” (Annan, 1979: 81). The presence of generation in discourse has lent fixity to the concept, yet still does not explain its meaning. Kriegel made the apposite point that it is easy to describe as generational spirit (or even radicalism) what is, in effect, fashion, that is to say a more short-lived and less critical identity, or merely an overstatement of the importance of a particular movement (Kriegel, 1979: 30-33).

The common thread in generation theory is the focus on youth and youth movements. Kriegel posed the question “Generation or young generation?” (Kriegel, 1979: 26-27) in which she used societal and institutional changes to explain how generation came, in effect, to refer to the young generation. She, like Eisenstadt, argued that youth movements led to a distinctive youth ideology. This ideology, she claimed, came out of a schism between youth and the rest of society through the institutions of the school and the army, which allowed young people to capitalise on those “virtues which have been considered the essence of youth: its purity [...] and its enthusiasm” (Kriegel, 1979: 27; original emphasis). These concepts have been under-explored in theories of both youth and generation through the failure to analyse the way that the concept of youth is employed positively in dominant/hegemonic discourse. Yet it is exactly those concepts (purity and enthusiasm) that we can detect in the discourse of the Cuban Revolution. Generation theory, though limited in this regard, allows us to question how youth and history – particularly at moments of significant social change – are related. Hareven argued that “[a] sense of history does not depend on the depth of generational memory, but identity and consciousness do, because they rest on the lineage of the individual’s life history and family history with specific historical moments” (Hareven, 1979: 137). In the Cuban case, it will be argued that a generational identity emerged, encouraged by the discourse of the revolutionary leadership, and intimately related to national-revolutionary identity, but that this caused a perceived generation gap between the generation
of guerrillas fighters (the Moncada generation) of the 1950s, and those young people in the 1960s who did not have that experience.

1.3 The Counter-culture

The foundation of theories of the development of youth counter-culture was the analysis of youth centred either on youth as a social problem, i.e. delinquency (such as Cohen, A., 1997 [1955]) or later on the solution that youth could provide by resisting the ascendancy of the technocratic, anti-utopian society (Roszak, 1968: xiii). Roszak avoided a class analysis of youth in the context of a post-war consensus in the United States that class was no longer a relevant category. The concept of generation has often been used to refer to the counter-culture; for example, Roszak argued that “[i]n a historical emergency of absolutely unprecedented proportions, we are that strange, culture-bound animal whose biological drive for survival expresses itself generationally” (Roszak, 1968: 47; original emphasis). The youth counter-culture that developed in the 1960s was certainly a “loose expressive social movement” (Brake, 1980: 96), but essentially the impetus for its creation was the specific generational experience of the technocratic society, leading to the creation of a selection of mini-generation units whose means of expression was largely through the triple tropes of “dope”, “revolution” and “fucking in the street” (Green, 1999). Counter-culture theory veered away from the grand narrative and allowed the idea of specific and differentiated cultural expression within a generation. In the literature generally, counter-culture is often synonymous with hippie culture, so that “in much of the American literature hippies have been explained as a generational unit, seen as producing a counter-culture against what is defined as the main enemy, technocracy” (Brake, 1980: 92).

Outside the American literature on the counter-culture, the hippie culture is seen as a product of an “American moment” that allowed the hippie movement to develop, marked by convergence of political radicalism, expanded consumerism and mind-altering drugs (Hall, 1968), and particularly marked by radical change

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3 ‘Technocratic’ in Roszak’s work refers to modern capitalism driven by technology and consumption.
in the popular music scene (Gitlin, 1987: 195-214). Marwick argues that “the various counter-cultural movements and sub-cultures, being ineluctably implicated in and interrelated with mainstream society while all the time expanding and interacting with each other, did not confront that society but permeated and transformed it” (Marwick, 1998: 13; original emphasis). In other fields the counter-culture was hailed as an instrument of social change aiming to seek solutions to emerging societal contradictions (Roszak, 1968; Leech, 1973; Gitlin, 1987). What the counter-culture did, from these perspectives, was to give a space for expression, through style, lifestyle, music and psychedelic drugs, and to allow the first step, through ‘dropping out’, towards participation in a society transformed by the moment of dropping out.

Outside the United States, the counter-culture was criticised as an extension of middle-class values (Murdoch and McCron, 1976: 22), thereby not living up to its prefix ‘counter’. Later views on the 1960s counter-culture critique it on a different basis, for example, accusing it of fostering a “culture of narcissism in which traditional forms of community and authority had been undermined by the new communitarianism and cult of the self” (Hetherington, 1998: 8). The problem with views such as this is that they fail to explain the counter-culture within its own historical context and instead choose to blame it, with a type of retrospective moral panic, for all ills that followed it, particularly the shift to the right in US politics (Farber, 1994b: 309-10; Hijiya, 2003; Klatch, 2001; MacGirr, 2001). The counter-culture is interesting to this study in two ways: firstly, the existence and contemporary theorisation of the counter-culture within Cuba’s large neighbour itself influenced young people in Cuba; and secondly, it is indicative of the divergence of views of utopia between youth in Cuba and those in the United States, despite the apparently common utopian aim.

1.4 Sub-culture

US accounts of the counter-culture, though serving to attempt to explain a particular phenomenon, were criticised on a variety of fronts. From the UK, commentators’ criticisms of US-based theories on youth were based on the failure of those theories to take into account the class position of youth. This
balance was redressed in the UK with the development of theories of subcultures at the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies (CCCS), established at Birmingham University in the 1960s. Sub-cultural theory was Anglo-centric in its assumptions and must therefore be elucidated in such terms. In the UK, as in the United States, major social changes were taking place in the 1950s and 1960s that resulted in youth beginning to take a central position in discourse, in particular through the attention given to youth by the mass media. Albert Cohen’s 1955 analysis of causes of delinquency was to be influential on UK explanations of youth expression. Cohen’s theory was based on the idea that delinquency was a problem-solving action, a way to fill the gap between middle-class aspirations and working-class realities. Furthermore, Cohen’s analysis brought in the concept of a group (or sub-cultural) solution to a structural (or class) problem (Cohen, A., 1997). The ‘youth question’ in the UK moved away from delinquency – as Simon Frith noted, dying your hair green is not breaking the law (Frith, 1984: 39) – and brought in the concept of ‘deviance’ in order to explain the emergence of youth sub-cultures. It should be pointed out that the two sets of theories do not necessarily contradict each other as they seek to explain different, and local, phenomena.

In summary, UK theorists argued that sub-cultures arise in a subsection of the dominated class in order to resolve inherent contradictions in its class culture. These contradictions arise as a result of major social, economic and ideological change, and are experienced due to the relationship of the dominated class to the dominant, or hegemonic, one. Because young people experience these contradictions in a different space (school, work and leisure) to their parent culture their reactions will look different, but will have the same ends. The only space that youth can find as its own is leisure, and in this sphere sub-cultural styles are developed through a process of ‘bricolage’: taking styles from the hegemonic culture and giving them new meanings. These styles are then incorporated by the dominant culture in order to maintain its hegemonic status, and the sub-cultures thereby lose their impact, without any solution to the original contradictions which were the impetus to their creation. The solution that sub-cultures offer is therefore ‘magical’, or imaginary (Clarke et al., 1976;
Sub-cultures were not experienced as political movements, overtly challenging the structures and institutions of capitalism, but as expressions of resistance in the spheres available, without the organisation or will to become political. This is one of the ways in which sub-cultures differ from the counter-culture. The counter-culture was essentially created at the middle-class level in pursuit of middle-class goals and rather than acting out contradictions in the parent culture (in this case the dominant culture) it was reacting against the parent culture so that “the bourgeoisie, instead of discovering the class enemy in its factories, finds it across the breakfast table in the person of its own pampered children” (Roszak, 1968: 34). There were, however, similarities between counter-cultures and sub-cultures. While Phil Cohen contended that there are no middle-class sub-cultures because by definition a sub-culture derives from a dominated culture (Cohen, P., 1997a: 97), Brake pointed to the similarities (such as drug use) between the hippie sub-culture (as he termed it) and other more deviant sub-cultures (Brake, 1980: 7-8). The means of expression of sub-cultures and the counter-culture, operating largely in the leisure sphere through style and music, is another common thread.

The limitations of 1970s sub-cultural theory were acknowledged by the theorists themselves. Clarke et al. pointed out that most working class young people do not enter into a sub-culture and “for the majority, school and work are more structurally significant than style and music” (Clarke et al., 1976: 16). The focus on the ‘spectacular’ has been criticised as missing some of the essential elements of youth. As Stanley Cohen pointed out:

The problem arises from starting with groups who are already card-carrying members of a sub-culture and then working backwards to uncover their class base. If the procedure is reversed and one starts from the class base, rather than the cultural responses, it becomes obvious that an identical location generates a very wide range of responses and modes of accommodation (Cohen, S., 1997: 161; original emphasis).
This study aims to recognise this weakness in the theory, and therefore to look at young people in the specific Cuban context in a range of cultural expressions, few of which could be termed sub-cultures, but all of which examine young people’s ways of expressing themselves. This refers to leisure time, but in the Cuban case leisure time took on a different meaning for young people. Equally, since the experience of education informs youth cultures it too will be examined.

Not only does this emphasis on the spectacular lead to the neglect, in theoretical literature, of alternative responses, but it also means that divisions were ignored. As Chris Barker puts it, “[w]hatever we take youth to be, it is divided by class, race and gender as much as it is united by age, attitudes and style” (Barker, 2000: 28). Again, this gap in theory was recognised by the 1970s theorists. Murdoch and McCron admitted that sub-cultural analysis tended to ignore women and black culture (Murdoch and McCron, 1976: 26), and it is this gap that has allowed the space for theories of identity to develop. Once again, this study will take account of this gap, and consider the development of different youth identities in Cuba in the 1960s which were not necessarily considered sub-cultural, but that allowed young people a means of expression, and that brought certain groups of young people together whilst differentiating them from other young people.

The overwhelming focus on style, so central to sub-cultural theory, is also challenged. Gary Clarke asked: “How do we analytically leap from the desire for a solution to the adoption of a particular style?” (Clarke, 1997: 176); that is to say, how do we know that the use of style is in fact a response to the problems the sub-cultures in question are facing? In particular, style is used by young people who are not organised sub-culturally. Sub-cultural theory contends that it is at the moment of creation of a particular style that the sub-cultures are relevant, because the styles will then become incorporated. Perhaps, however, this is giving too much credit to sub-cultures; Stanley Cohen asserted: “I doubt whether these theories take seriously enough their own question about how the sub-culture makes sense to its members” (Cohen, S., 1997: 157). In other words, does the theory imbue the sub-cultures and styles with too much meaning, making them unrecognisable to themselves? While style is part of the way a
young person has of expressing him/herself, the meaning behind the appropriation of a particular style must – and will – be questioned. In Cuba, styles that were appropriated by young people overlapped with the concept of fashion.

A further criticism of the sub-cultural theory is its exclusive focus on the field of leisure, to the detriment of the study of youth operating in other sites of hegemony. Can youth really be described as acting counter-hegemonically if it is operating only in one sphere? Yet perhaps leisure, or more accurately leisure time, is the very element, missed by Roszak in his five-fold explanation, which explains how ‘youth’ as a category emerged. In other words, youth may not be using its leisure counter-hegemonically, but how youth uses its leisure is by necessity of interest to the researcher into youth.

Leisure time also has a different meaning in a Marxist context. Whilst British Cultural Studies sees the use of leisure time as a site of resistance available for young people (Clarke et al., 1976: 49), Cuban sociology has seen the use of leisure as political in a different sense, and has more in common with European socialist views of leisure of the 1930s. Cross (1989) argued that in the 1930s the Left, particularly in France, saw the organisation of leisure as an essential means to bind members – especially young people – to the leftist movement and to prepare them for struggle. He added that, with reference to young people, sport was used as a means to draw the control of leisure time away from the church, employers and commercial organisations (Cross, 1989: 603). The Cuban perspective on the use of leisure time has much in common with this, but has added an educational goal to leisure time. A sociological study of the late 1970s, as a case in point, argued that:

La sociología marxista del tiempo libre considera que en la recreación no sólo se obtiene la regeneración física o intelectual, sino que ésta vuelve a crear nuevas capacidades en el ser humano, para formar, en fin, su personalidad, mediante un proceso de socialización científicamente dirigido (Zamora, 1984: 21).

4 However, Paul Willis (1977) is applauded by critics for exploring youth in the institutions of school and work.
The Marxist sociology of free time argues that not only does recreation contribute to physical or intellectual revival but it gives people a new ability to form their personality through a scientifically directed process of socialisation.\(^5\)

In 1966 the link between leisure time and education was put across by Cuban psychologist Gustavo Torroella, in the first of several articles in Bohemia on the subject of education in revolutionary Cuba. He began by explaining that in socialist countries “el saber, la educación y la cultura deben estar al servicio del desarrollo pleno de la vida individual y social” \(\text{[knowledge, education and culture must be used for the full development of individual and social life]}\) (Torroella, Bohemia, 30/12/66: 40) and added that

\[\text{[e]l empleo del tiempo libre concebido en esta forma humanista o constructiva, puede hacer mucho para contrarrestar las tendencias anti-sociales o desviadas de la juventud y así sirve de prevención de la delincuencia juvenil y ayuda a la higiene mental y la promoción de la salud integral de la juventud. Es decir, además de completar la educación escolar, complementa la educación de la personalidad (Torroella, Bohemia, 30/12/66: 41; original emphasis).}\]

\[\text{[t]he use of free time viewed in this humanistic or constructive way can go a long way to combating anti-social or deviant behaviour on the part of young people, and thus serves to prevent juvenile delinquency and helps promote the mental hygiene and overall health of youth. In other words, in addition to rounding off school education, it also complements the development of the personality.}\]

Torroella was responding to a developing moral panic surrounding young people, particularly regarding school absenteeism and the use of leisure time by young

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\(^5\) This study was part of a larger study organised by the Instituto Cubano de Investigaciones y Orientación de la Demanda Interna, created in 1971. This was originally conceived as a project that would examine material needs of the population, but Zamora explained the inclusion of the sociological project on \textit{tiempo libre}, initiated in 1972, as follows: the study of leisure time “era lógico, debido a la creciente importancia que en los países socialistas se le da a la satisfacción de las necesidades recreativas de la población mediante el consumo […] de productos para el deporte, el turismo, etc. y la participación en determinados servicios de índole cultural” \(\text{[was logical, in view of the increasing importance accorded in socialist countries to satisfying the people’s need for leisure activities via the consumption […] of products for sport, tourism, etc., and participation in certain services of a cultural nature]}\) (Zamora, 1984: v).
people as a site of resistance, and was therefore developing a sociological solution to the perceived problem. He viewed education as more than merely schooling. Segre developed this, commenting on leisure time in the urban context in 1968:

> cada fragmento de terreno, de parque o plaza se convierte en un parque infantil, en una zona de participación deportiva, en un área de experimentación de jardinería, en un plácido y sombreado rincón de lectura y meditación [on the basis that] promover el uso activo del espacio urbano es promover la integración social de los individuos, es enriquecer la propia experiencia personal a través del contacto directo con la realidad social y la realidad física del medio ambiente (Segre, 1968: 33).

> each piece of land, park or open space becomes a children's park, a sports ground, an experimental allotment, a tranquil and shady corner for reading and meditation [on the basis that] to promote the active use of urban spaces means fostering individuals’ social integration, and enriching their personal experience through direct contact with social reality and with the physical reality of the environment.

Segre went on to make the point that under socialism the possibility of combining cultura and tiempo libre opens up because the Revolution “pulveriza los monopolios que controlaban los medios de comunicación de masas y crea una serie de organismos responsables de la política cultural y del esparcimiento de la población” [is smashing the monopolies controlling the mass media and is creating a series of bodies responsible for cultural policy and entertainment of the population] (Segre, 1968: 37).

Leisure time in a Cuban sense is therefore more inflected than the site of resistance attributed to it by British Cultural Studies. Those young people in Cuba who did not work or study – particularly in the late 1960s after opportunities had opened up – were using leisure time as a site of resistance, whereas those who conformed to the Marxist view of leisure time were using it as a means to develop their socialist, nationalist and revolutionary identity.
It is not only in the definition of leisure time that theories of sub-cultures are inadequate in the Cuban case. A further problem with sub-cultural theory is that it self-consciously fails to take account of changes across time. Whether or not explanations of youth behaviour take into account the historical moment they are studying, the moment at which the accounts are written affects the authors of the studies. Phil Cohen wrote that “[t]he fact is that the youth question has to be continually rethought in the light of the changing circumstances of the times” (Cohen, P., 1986: 4). Different issues emerge over time which occupy youth theorists, so that existing accounts look dated or incomplete in the new set of societal circumstances. Muggleton takes this further by arguing that “perhaps the very concept of sub-culture is becoming less applicable in postmodernity, for it only maintains its specificity with something to define it against” (Muggleton, 1997: 181). The result of this was a move in Cultural Studies from sub-culture to club culture, although the latter was very much the child of the former taking into account changing circumstances of the late 1980s compared to the early 1970s (Thornton, 1995; Redhead, 1997). Theories of club cultures considered that sites of culture – in Thornton and Redhead’s case, music – could be dispersed or atomized, but without necessarily inhibiting sub-cultural formation. Bennett moved away from sub-cultures by using Maffesoli’s concept of neo-tribes to develop a model to understand youth in late modernity (Bennett, 1999; Bennett and Kahn-Harris, 2004). These theories, like sub-cultural theory, are an attempt to explain young people in changing circumstances, but a temporal issue remains unresolved. While the move in Cultural Studies to club cultures and then neo-tribes reflected a new set of experiences, it was a-historical because it did not focus on the cause and effect of that change: i.e. how the move from sub-cultures to club cultures to neo-tribes happened, and what links them. The very recent nature of the phenomenon in question can obscure the past that created it, and theory that is written at a given moment in time begins to function as an historical primary source in its own right.

On that basis, the weakness, from the perspective of this study, of accounts of the counter-culture and theories of sub-cultures and their offspring is that one of their key assumptions is quintessentially ‘Western’: the assumption of technocratic consumer capitalism. Sub-cultures depend so heavily on the relationship of
parent culture to hegemonic culture that their end result ceases to exist conceptually without the latter. However, certain assumptions on which they rely can be posited in non-Western societies. Young people exist and operate within a dominant culture regardless of whether there is a capitalist or communist means of production. Young people’s lives are defined by work, study and leisure. Young people’s space for expression is bounded by this leisure time and is encapsulated in what they do with leisure, be it appropriating fashion, music or politics to fill that space. Furthermore, youth is talked about generationally, so is given its own marker of identity. Sub-cultural theory provided us with the sites of identity that later theory would embrace.

Theories of youth cultures and sub-cultures were created within a theoretical underpinning related to the meaning of culture, and to Cultural Studies as an academic movement. Culture, furthermore, is now inextricably linked to identities (via subjectivity) which are “constructed across different, often intersecting and antagonistic discourses, practices and positions. They are subject to a radical historicization and are constantly in the process of change and transformation” (Hall, 1996: 4). Within the writing of history, and given the historical perspective of this study, markers of identity, such as youth, are used to reinforce the dialogue of explanation for certain historical trends so that, according to Jocelyn Olcott, using the Latin American example, “the success of […] recent explorations of Latin American identities [...] hinges upon the examination of social markers as historically specific rather than essential and inherent” (Olcott, 2003:107).

These markers of identity will exist because of Hall’s ‘radical historicization’; in other words, the use and meaning of history:

Far from being grounded in a mere ‘recovery’ of the past, which is waiting to be found, and which, when found, will secure our sense of ourselves into eternity, identities are the names we give to the different

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6 Debates on the meaning of culture are complex and diverse and cause confusion due to the fact that “‘[c]ulture’ is said to be one of the two or three most complex words in the English language” (Eagleton, 2000: 1).
ways we are positioned by, and position ourselves within, the narratives of the past (Hall, 1990: 225).

This study takes the position that identities are multiple and flexible and that although national identity works in the same way as other identities, in the Cuban case it was of particular importance.

1.5 Conclusion

The West-centric nature of the theoretical trajectory discussed here poses a problem for the student of Cuba. By casting the Cuban experience in relation to the theory, however, it is possible to use the theory to help us understand the case of Cuban youth in the 1960s, while engaging with the weaknesses in the theory, discussed above, and attempting to theorise Cuban youth beyond the theoretical paradigms available. Identity is most useful here for two reasons: firstly, it allows us to work with Cuba’s first post-modern moment, between 1959 and 1962 (Davies, 2000: 104), and then to introduce the concept of identity and difference to explain the youth cultures that developed; and secondly it allows us to explore how internal youth cultures related to external youth cultures, and how the former can be understood in terms of external youth culture theory.

The next chapter will explore this first post-modern moment, and examine continuities and changes in social and material life in Cuba. Through conceptualising the experience of difference on the basis of radical change from the 1950s, the development of new identities can be understood. Cuban identities became framed by Cuba’s first period of freedom from a coloniser, resulting in the construction of a radical post-colonial national identity based both on narratives, and lived experience of the 1950s, and a fusion of national and revolutionary identities.
Chapter 2
Identity formation in 1960s Cuba

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine ways in which theories of culture and identity, discussed in Chapter 1, are pertinent to the Cuban case. To that end, it will explore how and why identities formed, and within this, to identify how a sense of difference was experienced in 1960s Cuba. The development of a dominant national-revolutionary identity impinged upon and inhibited the creation of other identities, yet it did not entirely suppress them. This chapter will examine the development of the national-revolutionary identity and will then explore gender, racial and sexual identities in the context of the former. The effect of continuity and change in identity formation on youth and youth cultures specifically will be explored later in the thesis. Youth cultures were created within the dominant national-revolutionary identity and challenged it. They also developed in relation to and fed into weaker and/or non-conformist identities. This chapter aims to elucidate this series of evolving identities that ranged from the embedded to the embryonic.

The way in which identities evolved, given radical changes (based on policy and demography, ideological shift, historical continuity, external influence and changing relations with the United States), is a crucial consideration. This chapter will explore the means of identity formation in light of the dilution of traditional post-colonial and capitalist structures that had generated a sense of alterity, which had in turn given rise to evolving identities under capitalism. What emerged in Cuba in the 1960s was a powerful dominant identity based on the fusion of national and revolutionary identities. This developed not only through the construction of a heroic heritage that can be traced back to radical ideologies and ideologues of the past, but also by further radicalising these through the incorporation of campesino and guerrilla ideologies of the 1950s, and later socialism and Marxism. Social change, however, was contingent rather than uniform, as a result of which other identities emerged, either on the margins
of the Revolution (such as gender and race), or perceptibly against it (notably homosexuality).

2.2 Dominant Identity: the Formation of National-revolutionary Identity

The development of a new national identity in Cuba was based on two elements: firstly, an exploration of the Revolution’s relationship to the past and secondly its projection of a virtual future, thereby bearing out the perspectives of both Hall (1990: 225) and Bauman (1996: 19) discussed in Chapter 1. The discursive means of doing this involved anthropomorphising the Revolution and fusing the notions of Nation and Revolution. The heroic past, found in the ideological trajectory of the Revolution, determined the heroic future that was demanded, whilst the shameful past, which the Revolution was attempting to overturn, became the key discursive bête noire through which the Revolution sought to establish its authority and of which the Cuban people were (and are) constantly reminded in order to strengthen the national-revolutionary identity. The substantial material and social change in Cuban life in the 1960s strengthened this and connected Cubans directly to the Revolution, while providing a sense of difference across time, as the new national project was projected in contrast to the profound social ills of the 1950s, in particular poverty, inequality and US dominance.

The Ghost of the 1950s

Many Cubans internalised the Revolution, and identified with and supported it, because their situation was materially and socially better after 1959, and because this improvement was rapid. The inequalities experienced in the 1950s had a material base: a poor Cuban in the 1950s, particularly hailing from rural Cuba, was likely to have poorer health, housing, education, and employment opportunities. Redressing these inequalities became a central part of the revolutionary government’s early programme. Agrarian reform, which commenced in 1959 but was soon accelerated, moved agricultural property into state-owned collective farms, thereby ending seasonal unemployment. Educational reform, with the expansion of access to schooling and educational
materials, the 1961 Literacy Campaign, and the nationalisation of all schools, opened up the educational opportunities. Health care was improved in rural areas and made free for all. Through urban reform, the landowner class was dispossessed and rents were set at a proportion of income.

These initiatives also effected radical social change. Homes vacated by Cubans who went into exile were redistributed by the revolutionary government according to need. Working class, black and mulatto Cubans were moved into areas, such as Vedado in Havana, which had previously been home exclusively to the white middle classes. The nationalisation of all US-owned enterprises put an end to the neo-colonial domination of the USA, which had owned not just a large proportion of the agricultural means of production but also factories, power companies, the telephone system, banks and urban housing (Seers, 1964: 45). Although agrarian reform was essentially a socio-economic programme, aiming to break the dominance of latifundistas, it was also part of the focus on rural life. This saw attempts to urbanize the countryside while ‘ruralizing’ the urban population (Gugler, 1980: 520). 7

Furthermore, the exodus of many Cubans led to a change in class relations. The occupational composition of the refugee community displayed a high proportion of professional and semi-professional workers with a low proportion of less skilled and agricultural workers compared with the demographic make-up of the island (Fagen et al., 1968: 18-19). 8 Interestingly, Fagen et al. found that, among his sample, those exiles aged under thirty-five had been more sympathetic to the Revolution initially, perhaps reflecting the revolutionary focus on young people within the leadership discourse, and the successes of participation in the militias and literacy campaigns (Fagen et al., 1968: 37-38). Of course, the exodus was in part facilitated by the US policy of open access to Cuban migrants. This exodus, totalling 584,000 people between 1960 and 1974, with a concentration in the periods 1960-62 and 1966-71 (Domínguez, 1978: 140), effectively removed

7 Chapter 4 covers this further, considering initiatives to move schools to the countryside for a part of each year.
8 It should, however, be noted that Fagen’s study does not cover the entire exile community, but a sample of those who registered with the Cuban Refugee Centre in Miami (approx 55,000 by 1963)
many potential opponents of the new system, and diminished the numbers of the potentially powerful middle classes.\textsuperscript{9} There was a feeling that this was a Revolution for, of and by the Cuban masses, and anyone who did not support this was deemed an enemy of the new Cuba.\textsuperscript{10} Castro had spoken in 1953 of the “gran masa irredenta” [vast, unredeemed masses] (no date [1953]: 34) and it was these Cubans to whom the Revolution was appealing through social and material change. Cubans who had previously had no power had a sense of taking ownership, actually and spiritually, of their own nation.

The inequalities of the 1950s had also been symptomatic of a deeper malaise in Cuban society and redistribution was not enough in itself to bind Cubans to the Revolution. The incohesion of the social structure in pre-revolutionary Cuba made change potentially difficult to achieve. Certainly, eliminating inequalities was part of the story, but the central ideas of politicisation and involvement were also used to redress the alienation in the 1950s of the majority of Cubans from social life in general. The success in doing this, through mass organisations and direct democracy, is reflected in the fact that social change in the Revolution was genuine and far-reaching, and that the Revolution was welcomed by large sections of the Cuban populace. Castro still makes reference to the state of affairs in the 1950s today in his May Day speeches, so the 1950s has entered the historical memory of millions of Cubans who were never alive then. In the early 1960s, however, this difference was far more apparent having been experienced directly and recently by millions of Cubans. The high levels of support for the Revolution in the early years led to the development of a new identity that, through a sense of temporal difference and in combination with an evolving revolutionary ideology, would be powerful.

\textsuperscript{9} Although there is some debate over class structure prior to the Revolution, Kapcia argues that in the 1950s “Havana [...] had a large, self-confident middle-class, boosted by state employment, education and retailing” (Kapcia, 2005a: 91). This group, although mostly confined to Havana, was a potential opponent of the Revolution particularly when radicalisation of policy meant a levelling of class situation.

\textsuperscript{10} This sense of enmity is evident in the use of the term “gusano” [worm] to describe many in the exile community in Miami.
The formation of national-revolutionary identity emerged in relation to an evolving revolutionary ideology that focused on the link between revolutionary and national identity, and depended on historical continuity as well as change. The Revolution utilised and celebrated its heritage and national-revolutionary identity was therefore crafted from a combination of ideology (traced back to Martí and before, and linked to the move to Marxism) and the experience of social change.

The development of a national-revolutionary ideology was based on the concepts of authenticity and authority. These are most clearly expounded in Castro’s *Palabras a los intelectuales* in June 1961. This speech owes its prominence largely to the importance accorded to it by students of cultural history in the sense of high culture especially the literary history of the Revolution (see, for example, López 1980). Yet it is as a statement of ideology that this speech is of significance to this study. If we read on from the famous statement of what can exist within and against the Revolution – the focus of most comment on this speech – we can see that Castro meant this to be a *modus operandi* for all Cubans, not only artists and intellectuals:

> Esto significa que dentro de la Revolución, todo; contra la Revolución nada. Contra la Revolución nada, porque la Revolución tiene también sus derechos y el primer derecho de la Revolución es el derecho a existir y frente al derecho de la Revolución de ser y de existir, nadie. Por cuanto la Revolución comprende los intereses del pueblo, por cuanto la Revolución significa los intereses de la Nación entera, nadie puede alegar con razón un derecho contra ella. […] Y esto no sería ninguna ley de excepción para los artistas y para los escritores. *Este es un principio general para todos los ciudadanos.* Es un principio fundamental de la Revolución (Castro, 30/06/61; my emphasis).

> This means that within the Revolution, everything goes; against the Revolution, nothing. Nothing against the Revolution, because the

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11 ‘Ideology’ is a wide-ranging concept which has been defined and redefined. It is not the purpose of this study to add to this debate, but to draw on the Cuban definition of ideology.
Revolution also has its rights and the first right of the Revolution is the right to exist, and no one can oppose its right to be and to exist. As much as the Revolution understands the interests of the people, the Revolution signifies the interests of the whole nation; no one can rightfully claim the right to dispute it. [...] And this will not be a law just for artists and writers. This is a general principle for all citizens. It is a fundamental principle of the Revolution.

This statement gave the Revolution an anthropomorphistic quality, conferring upon it rights similar to human rights, and making it transcendental in the discourse of the years to come. This statement was a culmination of the development of a revolutionary ideology through the 1950s and in the first two years of the Revolution, and, although much debated, is still today important definitionally to the sense of Cuban nationhood.

Ideology as a concept is of exceptional importance within the Revolution. ‘Ideological education’ was one of the aims and objectives of the Revolution in the 1960s, and was a determinant in policy-making particularly in terms of the mass organisations. To that end, it is most telling to draw on the meaning of ideology in Cuba. Ruben Zardoya defines ideology as follows:

La ideología es poder. Poder espiritual y material. Es el poder de configurar el universo mental de los hombres, modelar sus esquemas de pensamiento, organizar su actividad psíquica con arreglo a determinados fines, establecer los límites de la experiencia e, incluso, de la percepción, conferir sentido a las nociones del bien y el mal, lo bello y lo feo, lo legal y lo ilegal, lo profano y lo sagrado. Lo permisible y lo impermisible. Es el poder de unir o desunir voluntades, desatar o inhibir la actividad social, legitimar o deslegitimar las formas existentes de producción y distribución de la riqueza, la organización de la dominación y la propiedad. Es el poder de consagrar la hegemonía de una clase o grupo social sobre los restantes, de manera tal que la realidad de esta hegemonía resulte incontestable, sea dada por sentada (repárese en esto: sea dada por sentada) para la conciencia, se presente como enraizada en el orden natural de los acontecimientos humanos; o bien el poder de desestabilizar y herir de muerte aquella hegemonía, subvertir los valores que se intenta
Ideology is power – material and spiritual power. It is the power to shape men’s intellectual sphere, to fashion their ways of thinking, to organise their mental activity to achieve certain ends, to establish the limits of experience and even of perception, to give meaning to notions of good and bad, beautiful and ugly, legal and illegal, profane and sacred, to what is ruled in and what is ruled out. It is the power to unite or divide people’s wills, to unleash or inhibit social activity, to ratify or challenge existing methods of wealth production and distribution, the organisation of control and ownership. It is the power to ratify the dominance of one social class or group over the others so that this hegemony becomes unquestionable and is taken for granted (note – taken for granted) in people’s consciousness, and appears as part of the natural order of human affairs; or alternatively the power to destabilise and inflict mortal wounds on that hegemony, to subvert values that people seek to have taken for granted and to provide a channel for action against that domination.

This comprehensive statement shows the key to ideology in the Cuban sense. Ideology may be positive or negative, but it is essential as it conveys power. The implication of Zardoya’s argument is that without ideology there can be no Revolution as there can be no other legitimate way to structure society. Yet, ideology is not a theory but is rather the dominant set of values and beliefs in a society, defining the political culture and feeding into concrete decisions on policy. It is different from a theory because it does not prescribe a set of pre-ordained policies; rather it is a reactive critique of what is deemed wrong in a given society (Valdés, 1975: 7). As such, ideology can shift across time and in response to altering material circumstances. The revolutionary ideology that evolved was partly in response to the experience of the 1950s.

During the 1950s, high levels of social incohesion and a weak common culture meant that the revolutionary project would need to be more than just egalitarian to bring about real changes in Cuban society; it would need, furthermore, to appeal to a broad national consensus. Ideological debate in the 1950s was
limited to radical groups, notably the PSP and the anti-corruption *Ortodoxo* party, but this debate did not influence the life experience of the majority of Cubans. Zardoya’s definition of ideology, as both spiritual and practical, is evidence of how the Revolution attempted to build a new consensus. The lack of stable class structure or powerful social groups led to the need to build a revolutionary ideology from radical forces in Cuban history prior to the 1950s.

Much research has been carried out to trace the ideological trajectory of the Cuban Revolution, from Castro’s humanism in the 1950s to the declaration of Marxism-Leninism in December 1961. Medin (1990 and 1997) argues that in the first years of the Revolution the Marxist message was effectively grafted on to existing signs and symbols, in order to develop revolutionary consciousness or conciencia:

> En la prensa, en la retórica y en las publicaciones revolucionarias se va creando una serie de equivalencias básicas que conducen a la identificación de nacionalismo con el marxismo y que son definitivas para la conformación de la nueva conciencia social. Por ejemplo, el nacionalismo verdadero es el revolucionario y sólo el nacionalismo revolucionario es el verdadero, pero la Revolución verdadera será la socialista y sólo la socialista, y el socialismo verdadero será pura y exclusivamente el marxista-leninista. De este modo, el único nacionalismo verdadero es el marxista-leninista, creándose un alto grado de equivalencia entre el nacionalismo, la Revolución y el marxismo-leninismo (Medin, 1997: 99).

> *In the press, in revolutionary rhetoric or publications, there is a process of creating a number of basic equivalences that lead to the identification of nationalism with Marxism, and that are crucial in defining the shape of the new social consciousness. For instance, true nationalism is revolutionary and only revolutionary nationalism is true, but the true Revolution will be the socialist Revolution and only the socialist Revolution while true socialism will be purely and exclusively Marxist-Leninist socialism. Therefore, the only true nationalism is Marxist-Leninist nationalism – and a high degree of equivalence is thereby established between nationalism, the Revolution and Marxism-Leninism.*
The problem with Medin’s theory of transition to Marxism-Leninism through changing meanings of existing symbols is that it diminishes the importance of what underlies those symbols, and why they were used. It does not assume that those symbols themselves were part of the revolutionary ethos, seeing them rather as a transitional vessel appropriated by Fidel Castro. Tondini (1972), on the other hand, sees the transition to Marxism-Leninism as a natural path via the specific link of anti-imperialism dating from Martí:

Certo Castro deve conoscere bene Martí e deve averlo meditato a lungo (quando era in prigione all’Isola dei Pini “studiava l’inglese e leggeva Martí”) perché da lui ha derivato, secondo me, l’unico elemento ideologico che in una fase successiva lo ha portato all’aggancio marxista-leninista: l’anti-imperialismo (Tondini, 1972: 18; original emphasis).

Of course Castro must know the work of Martí well and must have thought about it at length (when he was in prison on the Isle of Pines and was “studying English and reading Martí”) because from him he has derived, in my opinion, the single ideological element which at a later date brought him to Marxism-Leninism: anti-imperialism.

Cuba’s reaction to neo-colonialism was an essential ingredient of national identity; therefore Tondini’s argument that anti-imperialism would naturally lead to Marxism-Leninism is an interesting one. Castro’s biographers have repeatedly failed to trace Castro’s ‘conversion’ to communism back to the 1950s (Skierka, 2004) and their failure, for the most part, to do so is explained by Tondini’s position.\(^\text{12}\) His explanation, however, suffers from essentialism in its argument that Castro’s early political life would lead definitively or exclusively to Marxism-Leninism. Liss, in spite of this, corroborates Tondini’s position, arguing that 1930s radical Antonio Guiteras was influential on revolutionary ideology because he extracted anti-imperialism from Marxism and blamed Cuba’s difficulties on foreign dominance in economic and political matters (Liss, 1994: 32).

\(^\text{12}\) Carlos Franqui argues that while the political leanings of Raúl and Che were well-known at the start of the Revolution, Castro’s political inclinations were unclear to the extent that: “What Fidel was thinking, no one knew” (Franqui, 1980: 21)
From this strand of anti-imperialism in Cuban ideology emerged the most important notion of difference in revolutionary Cuba. Hostility to US imperialism fostered a powerful sense of national identity and national vision. In 1959 the USA recognised the new government in Cuba, and Castro visited the USA in April 1959 to an enthusiastic reception, at least from the US public if not the political establishment. Relations deteriorated, however, particularly after the extensive nationalisations in 1960, leading to the lowering of the sugar quota in July 1960 and its suspension in December 1960, the start of the economic blockade in the final months of 1960, and the breaking off of diplomatic relations in January 1961. The experience of the 1960s, most crucially the attempted invasion at the Bay of Pigs, strengthened this identity through heightening the already powerful sense of difference based on the post-colonial experience. The attempted invasion, moreover, cemented an island identity as distinct from an exile identity; Cuban national identity was split down the middle between those who chose to take up arms to support the Revolution and those who would take up arms against it. Both sides claimed authenticity of nationhood but, like the two Chinas, could not (or could only uneasily) coexist as claimants to Cuban heritage. The view from the island of yanqui power, both in funding and training the exiles, and in exercising its might in other ways, was an important fomenter of island identity. Through proximity and power, in particular through the Platt Amendment, and through the experience of the 1950s, the USA had entirely supplanted Spain as the dominant foreign power, and memory of this – plus fear of a return to neo-colonial status – was and is an important part of Cuban consciousness. The Helms-Burton Act of 1996 again bolstered this powerful national identity. Anti-imperialism and anti-yanqui sentiment were the foundation stones of national-revolutionary identity and situated the Cuban sense of nationhood in firm contrast to the United States, which was the potentially dominant Other, and which had subjugated Cuba, and could do again.

Valdés (1975) takes this argument further, tracing the development of the revolutionary ideology not only through anti-imperialism and hostility to the USA, but also through populism (i.e. national unity notwithstanding class, race, political or generational differences) and through the belief in the inherent spirituality or even superiority of the life of the campesino (Valdés, 1975: 14-16).
These elements are clearly discernable in the early Revolution, with its focus on *Cubanidad* and Cuban sovereignty, and the early land reforms. Valdés proceeds to discuss the mystification of Martí in the 1930s, implying that Martí’s works were drawn upon on a somewhat piecemeal basis, ignoring the fundamental conservatism of Martí’s early works, and instead utilising and mythologizing the Martí message in terms of its relevance to the 1930s struggle (Valdés, 1975: 13). Valdés gives great importance to the 1930s struggle as a precursor to Castroism, calling Julio Antonio Mella the “Transition Ideologue”, between Martí and Marxism. Mella is important to this study in two ways: as one of the founder members of the Cuban Communist Party, and as one of the key hero/martyr figures with whom young Cubans were encouraged to identify after 1959. Analysis of the importance of Mella’s ideology varies according to degree. Valdés points out that to Castro’s 26th July Movement (M-26-7) he was merely a “minor symbol of radical resistance” (Valdés, 1975: 18). The extent of his influence on the revolutionaries is uncertain so that, for example, in Castro’s *La historia me absolverá* statement (1953) Mella is not mentioned while Martí merits fourteen mentions (six of these as *el Apóstol*). The central importance of Mella, it could be argued, was in fact his revival of Martí in the Cuban consciousness (Kapcia, 2000: 166), rather than his own policies and politics. While taking into account that Mella may have been an important influence, and in Cuban historiography he is certainly seen to be such (see, for example, Pérez Cruz, 1997), it is worth bearing in mind that his importance may have been resurrected in the early Revolution, at the very time when the new government was focusing on *historical continuity* as a legitimating factor of the Revolution and was aiming to legitimise the role of the PSP, of whom Mella’s communist party was a precursor.

Kapcia (1997 and 2000) develops the idea of the mythologisation of Martí, linking this to *Cubanía* as the essential element of the revolutionary ideology. To this he adds two other myths feeding into a sense of *Cubanía*: frustrated independence due to the Platt Amendment, which served as the Cuban trigger to anti-imperialism; and generationalism, justifying both change and continuity thereby allowing new policy initiatives but legitimating them with a historical precursor, such as the *Mambises* in the wars against Spain (Kapcia, 1997: 90-91).
Kapcia claims that *Cubanía* was the definable ideology in 1959, based on equality, the liberating effect of culture, agrarianism, community, heroic nationalism, responsibility of a benevolent state and faith in nationalism (Kapcia, 1997: 83-84). Kapcia’s theory aims to encompass all the diverse influences feeding into the revolutionary ideology, accepting that historical circumstances are specific to Cuba – hence the term *Cubanía* – and also explaining that the ideological high ground (or, put another way, the right to hold the *Cubanista* ideology), was gained by the revolutionaries as a result of the lack of legitimacy of the Batista regime (Kapcia, 1997: 85). As noted above, those who stayed on the island after 1959 felt that they had a legitimate right to Cuban ideology. Kapcia’s view counters Medin’s view that existing signs and symbols were used as an ideological vessel, claiming instead that the signs and symbols themselves make up the ideology. Those very signs and symbols were the foundation upon which Cuban Marxism was built, which thereby explains the uniqueness of Cuban Marxism. This view is endorsed by Liss, for example, who points out that busts and statues of Martí, not Marx, were erected (Liss, 1994: 33).

From the Cuban perspective, the link between ideological development and national identity is clarified. Indeed, Kapcia’s thesis coincides with the views of Cuban intellectual Martínez Heredia\(^\text{13}\), who focuses on the historical development of identity (indeed, *defining* identity as national identity) and making the link between this and ideology:

\[\text{n}ational\ \text{id}entity\ \text{has\ been\ a\ basic\ determination\ in\ Cuban\ history\ for}\ \text{over\ a\ century.\ Like\ all\ forms\ of\ national\ identity,\ Cuban\ identity\ is\ the}\ \text{daughter\ of\ a\ very\ slow\ and\ protracted\ accumulation\ of\ characteristics}\ \text{taken,\ created,\ re-elaborated,\ or\ re-created\ from\ daily\ life,\ mythical}\ \text{material,\ beliefs,\ artistic\ expressions,\ and\ the\ forms\ of\ knowledge}\ \text{acquired\ by\ different\ ethnic\ groups,\ their\ clashes,\ relationships\ and}\ \text{fusions,\ from\ the\ local\ communities\ and\ regions\ that\ make\ up\ the\ country}\ (\text{Martínez\ Heredia,\ 2002:\ 140}).\]

He goes on to elaborate the role of these characteristics:

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\(^{13}\) Martínez Heredia was an editor of *Pensamiento Crítico* in the 1960s and is one of the interviewees for this thesis. One of the central themes of the article quoted was to explore the decoupling of socialism and ‘Cubanism’ apparent in 1990s Cuba.
[R]adical representations of popular armed national liberation struggle, and of the anti-imperialism associated with it, were the decisive ideology of the triumphant insurrection; but this type of national consciousness was rooted, became massive and permanent, only because it was intimately associated with the ideology of social justice expressed in socialism and because it became fused with that ideology in the course of the revolutionary process (Martínez Heredia, 2002: 141).

Hence, Martínez links ideology and identity with anti-imperialism, much as many of the above commentators have done, but develops this notion further. He points out that popular participation in the Revolution was what made this link both successful and sustainable, because the Cuban population was making its own history (Martínez Heredia, 2002: 141).

If we summarise what these studies identify as the essence of *moncadista* ideology in the early Revolution, we have the following elements: land, anti-imperialism, historical continuity, national unity and nationalism. Furthermore, the two common strands of ideology are as follows: firstly, early revolutionary ideology was based on anti-imperialism through hostility to the action of the USA prior to the Revolution and the profound sense of difference this fostered thus cementing a powerful national identity. Secondly, the ideology of the Revolution was not new; rather it was based on a suturing of what had come before with the present, so that revolutionary identity and national identity effectively became a single concept. The incohesions of the 1950s was conquered by the overturning (albeit partial) of the central tenets thereof, such as individualism, hierarchy, lack of participation and loathing of manual labour, thereby allowing existing but submerged elements of Cuban culture to surface. Soon after January 1959, the revolution had already been capitalised to become the Revolution, but Castro, in his *Palabras*, took this a step further, aligning the rights of the Revolution itself to the sum of the rights of Cuban citizens. In some ways this facilitated internalisation of the revolutionary ideology on an individual level, in so far as it allowed citizens to relate to the Revolution (and by extension the Cuban nation) and to forge an identity within this in opposition to a virtual and vaguely defined *contra*. The lack of clarity, however, in respect of what constituted action that could be considered *contra de la Revolución* caused
uncertainty in the 1960s, particularly with reference to homosexuality. So in terms of the construction of difference and its counterpoint, belonging, this period enabled the continuation of a strong national identity combined with the formation of a new revolutionary identity.

2.3 Competing Sites of Identity: Race and Gender

There were certainly other identities formed within the Revolution, which were developed, like other identities, through social change and the development of the over-riding national-revolutionary identity. That these identities are hard to distinguish is interesting in itself. The 1960s outside Cuba saw momentous changes in race relations and the birth of a women’s movement (although the latter would not really become highly developed until the second wave feminism of the 1970s). However, ingrained cultures of racism and sexism in Cuba that carried over from the 1950s (and before) were not really overturned by the Revolution despite attempts through policy to do so. There was an attempt to subsume race and gender issues under the umbrella of the new national-revolutionary identity, so that while the material circumstances of women and black Cubans did improve, attempts to assert their difference (from a male, white dominant culture) were largely unsuccessful, and therefore expressions of identity based on gender and race were problematic.

It is not clear that prior to the Revolution there was a defined ‘black movement’ in Cuba. As Alejandro de la Fuente states, the development of black power movements was less likely to happen in countries that were not formally segregated (de la Fuente, 1998: 58). Cuban philosophy on race can be traced back to José Martí (and before), who stated “Cubano es más que blanco, más que negro”\footnote{14 quoted in many sources, for example, Marshall (1988: 180).} and this attitude is reflected in the fact that in \textit{La historia me absolverá}, no reference was made to race. However, the counterpoint to this attitude was that where there was discrimination on racial lines prior to 1959 it went unacknowledged, and when an attempt was made to create a black political party in 1912 not only was it ruthlessly suppressed, it was also portrayed as racist and
unpatriotic (de la Fuente, 1998: 55). Black Cubans were not, however, without political representation, having high levels of participation in the labour movement and the Communist Party and PSP prior to the Revolution (Bray and Harding, 1974: 700).

Black poverty in the 1950s was based on black Cubans being, in general, at the bottom of the labour market, holding the lowest paid, menial jobs (Bray and Harding, 1974: 699; Amaro and Mesa-Lago, 1971: 347). Furthermore, discriminatory practices from the United States were carried over by US companies operating in Cuba, who discriminated against blacks particularly at more senior levels (Bray and Harding, 1974: 700). Illiteracy was highest among black Cubans and they tended to live in the poorer areas. Furthermore, although there was no official segregation in schools and transport, as was the case in the United States, there were areas where black Cubans were refused access, notably in the most ‘exclusive’ clubs, clinics, schools, beaches and parks (Moreno, 1971: 483).

As the rebellion in the 1950s involved small numbers of people who were revolutionaries rather than a mass movement, the level of black participation in the Sierra Maestra does not necessarily tell us about attitudes of Cuban society at the time. It may, however, be an indicator of the attitudes of the revolutionary government to the race issue. In the Sierra Maestra, there was only one black guerrilla leader, Juan Almeida, and perhaps the lack of black participation in the rebellion needs to be explained. Bray and Harding give three reasons for this. Firstly, the black population had their own radical tradition stemming from the slave revolts and later expressed through the Communist Party. Secondly, Batista rallied some black support by emphasising his own mestizo make-up and placing some black men in positions of power in the army and the police force. Thirdly, Castro had not mentioned race in *La historia me absolverá*, and the Sierra Maestra group did not make an issue of race (Bray and Harding, 1974:

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15 However, Amaro and Mesa-Lago point out that black Cubans were not ‘ghettoised’ – they lived alongside poor white Cubans – but richer neighbourhoods were almost exclusively white (1971: 348).
Any of these reasons may have explained the low level of black participation in the rebellion led by Castro.

Black Cubans, given their low economic and employment status prior to the Revolution, gained particular material and social benefit from the reforms of the early Revolution as attempts to end inequalities affected them more than those who had not suffered the same level of hardship. Possibly due to that, it appears that black support for the revolutionary government was stronger than white support (Domínguez, 1990: 481). Furthermore, the unofficial segregation of the 1950s came to an end as residential changes profoundly undermined segregation, with black families moving into housing vacated by Cubans who chose exile. Yet racial discrimination was not to be found merely in the socio-economic sphere, and much as there were material benefits, there were areas where race relations were not improved, notably in the distribution of jobs, which still saw Afro-Cubans making up the lowest segment, and cultural policy, which saw Afro-Cuban religions effectively ‘folklorized’ (Masferrer and Mesa-Lago, 1974: 376; Marshall, 1988: 184). Furthermore, as Nadine Fernández argues, racism, though eliminated institutionally was not eliminated in the lived experience of black Cubans, in so far as structural changes could be subject to interpretation on a local level causing a gulf between reality and discourse and allowing the persistence of racist attitudes (Fernández, 1996: 101). Black culture would also come under a more pervasive suppressive force, related to the national-revolutionary culture discussed above.

Afro-Cuban cultural expression was not explicitly suppressed by the Revolution, but, as Bray and Harding pointed out, the “government has not looked favourably upon the emergence of a black cultural nationalism movement and while women have an important national organisation, black people do not” (Bray and Harding, 1974: 701). The most convincing explanation of this state of affairs comes from Alejandro de la Fuente who argues that “Cubans have been trying to find unity and common ground for at least a century and have frequently perceived race as an obstacle to achieving this goal” (de la Fuente, 1998: 43). This was particularly significant within the ideology of unidad (unity) of the early Revolution. What happened, de la Fuente argues, was that the Revolution
would not look beyond its official outlawing of racial discrimination, and saw attempts to talk on race issues as potentially divisive (de la Fuente, 1998: 61). The view that racism was a structural problem inherent in capitalism and that, once changes had been made to redress the structural problems inherited from pre-revolutionary Cuba, race would no longer be a relevant discourse, held sway. Indeed, as Pérez Sarduy and Stubbs argue, “after 1959 the race question was almost entirely subsumed under a broadly redemptive nationalist, and subsequently socialist, umbrella” (Pérez Sarduy and Stubbs, 1993: 9). This prevailing view within Cuba is reflected in Serviat’s 1986 article, in which he claims that the new equalities under socialism (institutionalised in the 1976 constitution) and the removal of the bourgeoisie ended racial discrimination, thus solving the ‘black problem’ (Serviat, 1993: 86-90). The result was that black identity was created in reaction to inherent racist attitudes, but it could not express itself as such in a Revolution that denied that such attitudes existed. It is only in recent years that Cuba has begun to reconsider race, with journals such as Temas (July-September 1997, No.7) and La Gaceta de Cuba (Jan-Feb 2005) devoting whole issues to the question.

Gender relations within the Revolution followed a similar track to race relations, with policies attempting to outlaw gender inequalities in the early years of the Revolution, followed by an attitude that there was little sense in raising the gender issue explicitly. The changes in the status of women can be identified by examining the subjugation of women in the years prior to the Revolution. Bengelsdorf and Hageman argue that “women in Cuba entered the Revolution as persons who had been doubly exploited: as workers and as women” (Bengelsdorf and Hageman, 1978: 365). Pérez-Stable argues that in the early years of the twentieth century, Cuba had an impressive feminist movement (Pérez-Stable, 1993: 32), but the position of women in the 1950s points to the patriarchal nature of society deriving from Cuba’s Hispanic history, as well as economic difficulties that were defining women’s roles at the time.

Particularly in wealthier and ‘higher-status’ society it was frowned upon for women to work, and only one in seven women worked outside the home, according to the 1953 census (Bengelsdorf and Hageman, 1978: 363). In
addition to the attitudinal obstacles, the barriers to women’s entry into the labour force were considerable. Padula and Smith sum these up well: there were high levels of male unemployment and underemployment (i.e. there were few employment opportunities at all); women had low levels of education;\textsuperscript{16} the economy was based on the production of sugar, which employed few women; and Cuba did not have the home-based artisan production that employed women in many other Latin American countries, particularly in rural areas (Padula and Smith, 1985: 80). Those women who were employed were largely in the low-paid service sector, often working as domestic servants for upper- or middle-class women.

The traditional roles as men and women, like in many post-colonial Hispanic societies, were based on the \textit{casa/calle} divide.\textsuperscript{17} Indeed, Moreno argues that “in traditional Cuban society, the place for the women was at home. […] Whereas boys were encouraged from early childhood to behave with \textit{machismo} […] girls were instilled from an early age with the joys of femininity” (Moreno, 1971: 479). However, as Leahy argues (1986: 95), by the 1950s a different social phenomenon was taking place, particularly in Havana, as a result of the increased tourist trade. Women were finding jobs in the clubs and casinos as hostesses, performers and prostitutes:

The image of the Cuban women that was portrayed by the tourist industry was not that of the “good” Cuban woman who stayed at home, nor that of the poorly paid, uneducated domestic servant. […] [T]he women of the \textit{calle} formed the tourist picture of Cuban women (Leahy, 1986: 95).

Although figures on prostitution vary, it is estimated that there were 40,000 prostitutes in Cuba prior to the Revolution (Padula and Smith, 1985: 81) and 270 brothels in Havana alone (Moreno, 1971: 480).

The same reasons for discussing the role of women in the rebellion are employed as with race, above. Accounts differ on the importance of women in the revolutionary struggle in the 1950s. Leahy writes:

\textsuperscript{16}Although more girls had a primary education than boys, at secondary level boys greatly outnumbered girls (Leahy, 1986: 94).

\textsuperscript{17}The equivalent of \textit{casa/calle} in Western feminism the private/public sphere.
Many women were involved in the Revolution. In the mountains, there was a special brigade of women who fought side by side with men. Women were present at the storming of the Moncada barracks in 1953 and afterwards were jailed along with men. Almost all accounts of the revolutionary struggle give mention to the role played by women (Leahy, 1986: 143n).

Haydée Santamaría was one of the most high profile of those women of the rebellion, and had an influential role in the 1960s, particularly in working with those people who situated themselves at the cultural margins (Díaz, C., 1994: 23). Despite this, Padula and Smith point out, there was almost no reference to women in La historia me absolverá and they consider the role of women in the rebellion to be much more limited (Padula and Smith, 1985: 81).

The Revolution effected significant changes to status, but policy and legislation did not on its own bring an end to gender inequalities, and even the existence of the a mass organisation for women did not really foster a strong female/feminist identity, serving rather as a reflection of national-revolutionary ideology. The most significant changes for women in the early Revolution were the ending of prostitution and the expansion of educational opportunities. With the exodus of large numbers of middle class Cubans, domestic service, one of the most gruelling jobs for women, effectively came to an end. Yet although women’s entry to the workforce was facilitated, problems of both policy and culture remained. In 1968 the Ministry of Labour passed Resolutions 47 and 48, which nominated 500 categories of job as exclusively female and the same number as exclusively male. While this may have been in part an attempt at positive discrimination to enable women to enter the workforce, Bengelsdorf and Hageman argue that this was in effect an official stamp of approval on what was perceived as a natural sexual division of labour, and in that sense ingrained further pre-revolutionary notions of what work was suitable for women (Bengelsdorf and Hageman, 1978: 367).

One of the most enlightening ways to look at the changing role of women in the first decade of the Revolution is to examine family life. Here we see a curious
anomaly: on the one hand, by the end of the 1960s, traditional family life was disintegrating, as Padula and Smith note:

The children of Cuban families increasingly spent their time away from home, first in day care centres and later in primary school. There they ate in school cafeterias, participated in government-sponsored recreational activities such as the Young Pioneers, and, having reached their teens, went off to live in boarding high schools in the countryside (Padula and Smith, 1985: 84).

Kaufman endorses this, writing that “under the leadership of the FMC, institutions and facilities have been established to transfer some of these traditionally female duties and responsibilities from the family to the school, workplace, community or state” (Kaufman, 1973: 265). Yet, on the other hand, while the removal of children from the home should have freed up women’s time so that they could work, women were also suffering from the ‘double day’ or ‘second shift’. Whilst women were now expected be part of the workforce, they also found themselves doing all the work in the home. By the 1970s childcare provision was still insufficient though increasing, and if there was a policy to move women into the workplace, the persistent casa/calle culture kept women at home. Indeed, Padula and Smith point out that in 1969, while 106,258 women joined the workforce, 80,781 women left, highlighting the problem of retention related to the second shift (Padula and Smith, 1985: 85). There was certainly a sensitivity to this on the part of the authorities, as is reflected in measures taken in the 1970s to redress this imbalance, including the exclusion of women from the terms of the 1971 anti-vagrancy law (Bunck, 1989: 452).

Therefore, although the first decade of the Revolution brought benefits to women, it raised problems of its own, the solution of which was the remit of the Federación de Mujeres Cubanas (FMC). This is an interesting organisation: Casal pointed out that at the time she was writing “the FMC sees itself as a

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18 This has been a problem that the Revolution has failed to overcome despite its attempts. Aguilar, (former managing editor of Mujeres magazine) and Chenard pointed out in 1994: “Women continue to carry the burdens consigned to them historically, which are nothing other than a social construction. They are responsible for housework, for bringing up the children, basically for all the cultural, educational and economic functions within the family where the entire workforce and life itself are reproduced. They have a double working day” (Aguilar and Chenard, 1994: 104).
feminine, not a feminist organisation” (Casal, 1980: 200), and it is for that reasons that this organisation has been criticised or disregarded by some Western feminists.19 On the other hand, US socialist feminist Margaret Randall praised the FMC in 1981, arguing that it “can be used as a model to clarify the Leninist concept of the need for a semi-autonomous woman’s organisation under the leadership of a central party” (Randall, 1981: 124). Overall, the significance of the FMC has probably been underestimated by commentators outside Cuba. The FMC was a mass organisation in the genuine sense of the term, numbering 1.34 million in 1970 (Kaufman and Purcell, 1973: 263). Despite Casal’s initial implied criticism of the lack of feminist credentials of the organisation, she went on to partially praise it, stating that the mass organisations served as the forum through which policy was both made and implemented (Casal, 1980: 200) thereby giving women a voice in the decision-making process and a mechanism through which to feed female voices through the system. Randall, moreover, adds that the FMC worked in all areas in which women either faced problems or could contribute to society (Randall, 1981: 133). What resulted, therefore, was a hyphenated identity, that is, a female-revolutionary position based on participation in the Revolution but in a particularly female way, through the FMC.

2.4 Identities Outside the Revolution: Gay Cuba

Non-conformism was diluted in 1960s Cuba due to the dominance of the national-revolutionary identity. This, however, does not necessarily indicate that it was absent. The very fact that temporal difference abated somewhat in the mid- to late 1960s led to the emergence of new identities that, though not anti-revolutionary, were non-conformist, notably homosexuals and hippies.20 The very subversiveness of these identities, along with their narrow focus and modest membership, gave rise to a degree of conformity within the groupings in so far as

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19 Feminism has gained ground since Casal’s article. Aguilar and Cheard states “I admit that until a few years ago we did have certain prejudices against feminism, no doubt also because feminism internationally is divided into so many different tendencies. […] [Now] we enjoy good relations with the feminist movement […] [but] we haven’t developed any theory like feminism has done” (Aguilar and Chenard, 1994: 108).
20 Cuban hippies will be dealt with in Chapter 5.
there was a clear sense of affiliation within, and, its counterpoint, alienation to what lay outside.

Homosexuality was a divisive issue in 1960s Cuba. Ian Lumsden terms the set of attitudes and policies “institutionalised homophobia”, arguing that “the growing US opposition to the Revolution, allied with anti-revolutionary forces within Cuba itself, tended to frame all issues, including those relating to gender “deviance”, in terms of identification with the Revolution” (Lumsden, 1996: 59).

This derived, according to Lumsden, from recent revolutionary heritage, notably the image of the masculine heroic guerrilla on the model of Castro and Camilo Cienfuegos, thereby tying masculinity to revolutionary identity for Cuban males, and to machismo inherited from Spanish culture (Lumsden, 1996: 37). While the reality of an institutionalised homophobia is common to all accounts of homosexuality in Cuba in the 1960s, the alternative interpretation as to why such attitudes were prevalent is that the influence of Stalinism was more significant than traditional machismo. Under Stalinist attitudes homosexuality was seen as a bourgeois indulgence, and furthermore Stalinism dictated that all dissent should be proscribed. Lekus (2004) follows this line, arguing that the exclusion of gay North Americans from the international Venceremos brigades in the early 1970s was not a policy (according to all evidence he could find) that originated in Cuba, but reflected the attitude of a particular segment of the New Left that organised the brigades. The implication is that it was an attitude more associated with the particular brand of socialism of the North American Left in the early 1970s than part of Cuba’s Hispanic heritage.

Although the reasons for the institutionalisation of homophobia in 1960s Cuba may be debated, it is clear that homophobic attitudes were ingrained within Cuban culture. It was certainly the case that heterosexuality was seen as the norm. Psychologist Torroella dealt with the issue by pointing out that although children may prefer the company of the same sex, the interest in the opposite sex develops with adolescence. He made no reference to those adolescents for whom  

21 The examples of this commonly cited are ‘The Night of the Three Ps’ in 1961 where ‘pimps, prostitutes and pederasts’ were rounded up and in some cases imprisoned including well-known playwright Virgilio Piñera, and the UMAP camps of the mid to late sixties (Ocasió, 2002: 79-82).
an attraction to the same sex persists beyond the childhood stage (Torroella, *Bohemia*, 17/03/67: 37). Yet these attitudes were more complex than a blanket hatred of gays; rather it was public espousal of homosexuality that offended some Cubans. Two quotes from Yglesias’s interviews can help us to understand this attitude. One man states “Artists, especially dancers, almost have to be homosexuals, I understand that, but why cannot they keep it to themselves?”, and another claims that “[homosexuals] are men who cannot, like other people, do things without publicity” (Yglesias, 1970: 271). Lumsden, deriving his opinion from Guillermo Cabrera Infante, confirms this attitude, stating that “the persecution of homosexuals was due more to their nonconformist *public* identity and refusal to endorse the political dogmas of the regime with appropriate enthusiasm than to their sexual orientation per se” (Lumsden, 1996: 72; my emphasis). Yet part of the reason that the public profile of homosexuals was high was because there were several well-known members of the artistic and intellectual community who were known to be homosexual, such as playwright Virgilio Piñera, who was already well-known in 1959, and others who came to prominence after the Revolution, such as the poet Reinaldo Arenas. The presence of homosexuals among the artistic community who expressed their sexuality through their art was a cornerstone of homosexual identity. Furthermore, attempts by homosexual artists to assert themselves through their art (the very kind of display that some other Cubans felt to be unacceptable) bear witness to a strong but officially repressed identity, marking a continuity between gay life before and after the Revolution.

The death knell for the public expression of homosexual identity came at the 1971 Congress of Education and Culture. Wilkinson, in his retrospective study of attitudes toward homosexuality, through the 1990s film *Fresa y chocolate* and novel *Máscaras*, both of which attempt to come to terms with the homophobia of the first two or three decades of the Revolution, argues that

> [t]he 1971 Congress of Education and Culture […] targeted intellectuals as possible counter-revolutionaries and homosexuals as undesirables. It therefore institutionalised homophobia to the extent that if one happened

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22 Wilkinson sees the function of the two texts to be the eradication of ‘national amnesia’ regarding the maltreatment of homosexuals in the first two decades of the Revolution (1998: 28)
to be both homosexual and an intellectual one would become the automatic target for a kind of witch hunt (Wilkinson, 1999: 25).

The key way in which homophobia was institutionalised at this Congress was through the decision that homosexuals should not be allowed to work with young people. This may tell us as much about the attitudes to youth as to homosexuals, an idea that will be explored elsewhere, but it demonstrates the culmination of a period of “terrifying times for homosexuals, particularly those in entertainment, culture, and education” (Lumsden, 1996: 70).

2.5 Conclusion

This leaves us with the question of where youth figured in this new world of identity formation through new forms of experience and new experience of difference. Certainly, the identities discussed can equally be applied to young Cubans: a young homosexual, for example, may wish to express himself as a homosexual as well as a young person, as well as a revolutionary and so on. All of the changes that this chapter has discussed were experienced by young people much as they were experienced by all Cubans on the island. Yet young people to an extent stand apart; they can be viewed as a type of exceptional case study, and there are two reasons why this is the case. Firstly, they would experience social change that was generationally specific, thanks to a youth policy that was all-encompassing, covering all aspects of life, in particular leisure time. This will be explored in Chapter 4. Secondly, and in part the catalyst for such a broad youth policy, ‘youth’ was in fact part of the national-revolutionary ideology that was developing at the time. In that sense, the policy towards young people was flawed, in so far as the ideological side of youth – the culture of youth – was, besides being an attempt to mobilise young people (which was unnecessary anyway as young people were the easiest group to mobilise), an attempt to mobilise all of society into the aspiration to reach ideal of the young revolutionary. What emerges from the interaction between policy, ideology and other identities is a fragmentation of youth identity that is surprising given the structural homogeneity conferred upon youth as a group.
Section II A Culture of Youth in 1960s Cuba

Chapter 3
The new framework for Cuban youth in the discourse of the Revolution

De todo lo más puro de la juventud cubana, emergió la vanguardia revolucionaria, la que caracterizó al régimen y fue guía del pueblo en la última etapa de liberación nacional (Caption for 1950s display, Museo de la Revolución, Havana, May 2003).

From the purest of Cuban youth came the revolutionary vanguard, which characterized the regime and guided the Cuban people in the last stage of national liberation.

[N]osotros sabemos que tenemos en nuestros jóvenes un extraordinario tesoro, y nosotros sabemos que tenemos en nuestros jóvenes la mayor riqueza de la patria (Castro, 06/07/62: 5).
We know that our young people are an extraordinary asset and represent the nation’s most valuable resource.

3.1 Introduction

In the early years of the Revolution, there was a clear category of youth; from a young Revolution led by young leaders to the ‘birth’ of a new form of nationhood, the adjective joven became inextricably linked with revolución (later Revolución). This is what I will term a ‘culture of youth’. The entire country felt rejuvenated, part of a young, new process, with los jóvenes being seen as the social category that not only had brought about the victory against Batista, but also as that comprising the architects and builders of the new society. This would lead to a veneration of youth that transcended the reality of what young people were doing.
In order to appreciate the complexity of how youth and young people were viewed by the state in the 1960s, an analysis of key texts by three leaders of the Revolution – Fidel Castro, Raúl Castro, and Che Guevara – will be undertaken. On a methodological point, the reason for choosing the three is as follows. Fidel Castro has been chosen not only because he was the leader of the Revolution, but also because his speeches had the widest audience. Here it is important to distinguish between live audience and wider audience. His speeches were often directed thematically towards the live audience; that is to say that his focus depended on who was present to hear the speech. Therefore we can distinguish between speeches in which he spoke directly to young people (such as at an AJR event), and speeches for a different live audience (such as a CDR event). The difference in the tone and content of these speeches makes it relatively easy to distinguish between ideological issues and mobilisation initiatives. However, as all Castro’s speeches were reprinted, often in full, in daily newspapers and weekly magazines, as well as being broadcast on the radio, the wider audience could incorporate all Cubans. Of course, not every citizen would have read all (or any) of the speeches, but Castro’s speeches invariably addressed a trans-generational mass audience. Therefore, even if some reference was made to issues specific to the live audience, the appeal was always to a mass audience.

Guevara’s speeches, though less frequent and less comprehensively broadcast than Castro’s, are also crucial to this analysis because of the close link between Guevara and young people. He was instrumental in establishing the first youth organisation (the AJR) and his worldview depended on young people playing a role in the building of a new Cuba. Given that he is now a hero to young people both inside and outside Cuba, it is important not to be beguiled into thinking that his importance in the early sixties was paramount. Kapcia argues that “the picture of Guevara is less one of influence by a radical ideologue on a largely untutored, unsuspecting, gullible group [referring to the leadership] than one of coincidence with Guevara being the rebel leader best able and most willing to articulate the new positions being adopted and place them within a clear ideological and thematic context” (Kapcia, 2000: 122). His key written texts became documents of the ideological polemic of the Cuban Revolution both when Guevara was a part of the revolutionary government and after his departure.
from Cuba. In addition to this, his proximity both to Castro and to young people and his propensity to talk directly to young people make Guevara’s texts essential to this analysis.

Raúl Castro’s texts are perhaps less important given a narrower audience, yet are worth including for two reasons. Firstly, Raúl’s military perspective, deriving from his position as head of the Ministry of Armed Forces (MinFAR), is crucial, the 1960s being a time when life in Cuba, particularly that of the young, became more militarised within a new definition of what the military was and should be. Secondly, Raúl’s speeches function as an echo of Fidel’s speeches, thereby providing a signal of consensus but also of changing discourse.23

Added to these texts is one other, the Manual de capacitación cívica, published in 1960. This was a text produced by the Ejército Rebelde that all branches of the burgeoning youth association (the AJR) were encouraged to have in their library. It included chapters on the history and geography of Cuba, as well as on the role of the Ejército Rebelde and the character of the Revolution. It functioned as a ‘state of the nation’ piece and also an instruction manual to enable Cubans to learn what the Revolution represented, and was authored by a selection of revolutionaries, most significantly Núñez Jiménez on history and geography and Ernesto Guevara on morale and discipline. A text aimed at the military would on first sight make this appear marginal, but bearing in mind that the new philosophy of the military future of Cuba was one in which each Cuban would take on the responsibility for the defence of the country, such a text becomes important.

It is worth making a short linguistic point here. All the texts under consideration use some or all of the terms juventud, jóvenes and joven in a variety of meanings. Often when Castro refers to los jóvenes he is actually meaning ‘youth’ as a concept rather than young people. The terms are therefore more meaningful if we look at the signified as opposed to the signifier. When making reference to a category, an idealised vision and a virtual future, the texts are referring to what I

23 To avoid confusion, in this chapter ‘Castro’ will denote Fidel Castro, and Raúl Castro will be referred to in his full name.
term ‘youth’, whereas when making reference to action that needs to be taken and alarm at weaknesses, the reference is to ‘young people’. This is not merely a linguistic point but also indicates the gulf between youth and young people conceptually. On a further point, La Juventud, often but not always capitalised, was increasingly used to refer specifically to the UJC. The distinction will be made clear throughout this chapter.

What emerges from the speeches of the leaders is an attempt to define youth and determine what young people represent as well as an attempt to express how young people should or must act based on this definition of youth. The concept of youth functioned as part of the dominant national-revolutionary identity through “radical historisization” (Hall, 1996: 4) in the leadership texts. This was combined with a fear that some young people did not or would not operate within the broad framework of the national-revolutionary consensus. What resulted was in part a moral panic on the part of the leadership, which is one explanation for the sidelining of youth in the revolutionary rhetoric after 1965, but, and perhaps more importantly, a fissure between those young people who sat within the revolutionary definition of youth and those who did not represent that definition. Furthermore, such a definition of youth was applicable to more than just young people, so that all Cubans who existed within the national-revolutionary sphere could espouse characteristics of this idealised youth. The culture of youth was therefore an integral part of the emerging national-revolutionary identity.

3.2 The Categorisation of Youth

Early in the Revolution los jóvenes were separated as a distinct category or group. This should not be taken as given, but rather needs expounding. With reference to identity formation, the fact that a category is brought into existence is significant even if the category itself is ‘empty’ because once the marker (youth) enters the discourse the subject will be affected (Rustin, 2000: 184). Raúl Castro, speaking in 1959 laid out those groups to which the Revolution was indebted and on which the Revolution depended:
Tenemos la confianza y la colaboración activa del pueblo de Cuba, especialmente de los trabajadores, de los campesinos, de las clases medias, de los estudiantes y de la juventud (Raúl Castro, 11/09/59: 15).

We have the trust and active cooperation of the Cuban nation, and in particular its workers, peasants, middle classes, students and young people.

Castro later reiterated this in a speech explaining why self-proclaimed representative democracy, using the examples of the USA and Venezuela, had failed to eliminate illiteracy:

¡Ah!, ¡no puede! Y, ¿por qué no puede?, ¿por qué no puede contar con la juventud, tan sana y tan generosa en cualquier parte del mundo? ¿Por qué no puede contar con los obreros? ¿Por qué no puede contar con el pueblo? ¡Ah!, ¡no puede contar con los jóvenes, no puede contar con los estudiantes, no puede contar con los obreros, no puede contar con el pueblo! ¿Qué democracia es esa? (Castro, 22/12/61)

Ah, it can’t! And why not? Why does it not have the support of youth – so universally pure and generous. Why does it not have the support of workers? Why does it not have the support of the people? It cannot rely on youth, on the students, on the workers or on the people! What sort of democracy is that?

The need to build a new consensus within Cuba and to both ensure and cement support for the Revolution necessitated a categorisation, so that each group (workers, students, peasants, middle classes, youth) was identified in the discourse and could thereby identify directly with the Revolution, rather than identification via a third party such as the leadership. This also signified that the Revolution was inclusive in so far as all Cubans, with the exception of children, were incorporated in one or more of those categories.

Perhaps the most telling case of the deliberate or conscious categorisation of youth occurred in the Manual de capacitación cívica. The sixth lesson of the manual was entitled ‘Fuerzas Revolucionarias y Contra Revolucionarias’ [Revolutionary and Counterrevolutionary Forces] and listed those groups upon which the Revolution depended. These were workers, peasants, students, professionals and owners of small businesses (MinFAR, 1960: 53). Youth is
notable by its absence from this list (as it was absent from a similar list in the lesson authored by Guevara in the same text (Guevara, 1960: 299), a curious oversight, yet:

[e]stos [groups] son, desde el punto de vista social y económico, los sectores revolucionarias o aliados de la Revolución. Dentro de todos ellos, la juventud jugó en la primera fase de la Revolución y juega ahora un papel muy destacado (MinFAR, 1960: 55; my emphasis).24

socially and economically, these are the revolutionary sectors, the allies of the Revolution. And, of all those sectors, it was youth that played a particularly significant role in the first phase of the Revolution – and is still playing it today.

This text indicates that although youth was not necessarily felt to be a category with which Cubans could identify, the MinFAR considered it important to build the category of youth. This was done by focussing on the key role of young people in the early Revolution, which referred here to the 1950s struggle as well as after January 1959. This merits a closer investigation of the reasons behind this categorisation and elevation.

The elevation of los jóvenes was in part due to the history of radical youth movements in Cuba. The Liga Juvenil Comunista (LJC), which was formed in 1928, was the first example of a radical youth organisation, formed as part of the labour union, the Confederación National Obrera de Cuba (CNOC). The LJC was largely clandestine and was not of great importance, except in being structurally organised as part of the communist movement (Vizcaíno et al, 1987: 4-9). Despite disbanding in 1938, it served as a model for, and a precursor to, the larger and more significant Juventud Socialista (JS), established in 1944 by the Partido Socialista Popular (PSP) (Martín Fadragas, 1998: 19). According to Martín Fadragas, the JS had over 55,000 members in 1945 (Martín Fadragas,

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24 Referring to the importance of youth in the struggle is echoed in Castro’s similar statement in 1962 “nuestra juventud ha tenido, tiene y tendrá, un papel de gran trascendencia en el proceso revolucionario Cubano. […] En nuestra juventud está lo mejor de nuestra patria, en nuestra juventud está el porvenir de la patria, en nuestra juventud está el mañana de la patria” [our young people played, are playing and will continue to play a leading role in the Cuban revolutionary process. […] Our youth represents all that is best in Cuba; it is the future of the nation, all the nation’s tomorrows] (Castro, 06/07/62: 5).
1998: 19) and it had its own publication, *Mella*. After 1952 the JS survived underground continuing to publish its magazine. Despite its struggle and survival under the *batistato*, its involvement in the rebellion mirrored that of the PSP. The JS was one means through which the young radicalism fostered by Julio Antonio Mella developed, but that radicalism cannot be understood completely without looking at the role of students.

Although this study contends that students became less important in the 1960s as a ‘youth group’, prior to the victory of January 1959 youth radicalism found its expression through students at the University of Havana via their organisation, the FEU. This radicalism was tainted, particularly in the 1950s, by *bonchismo*, violent gangsterism that co-opted this radicalism. Aguiar, in his study of these gangs makes both the distinction and the link between them and genuinely radical students:

> Es importante tener en cuenta las diferencias que existían entre las denominadas pandillas armadas y las diversas tendencias estudiantiles que existían en el seno de los institutos y en la Colina Universitaria, que aunque estaban penetradas por las primeras, eran integradas en su mayoría por estudiantes con aspiraciones de establecer reformas y de combatir los gobiernos corruptos (Aguiar, 2000: 2).

*It is important not to lose sight of the differences between the so-called armed gangs and the various student factions within the institutes and in the University that, although they had been penetrated by the former, mainly comprised students determined to introduce reforms and to oppose corrupt government.*

The students, rather than aligning themselves to the *bonches*, were key supporters of the anti-corruption movement through their support for Eddy Chibás and the Ortodoxos, reflected in the fact that, following Chibás’s suicide, his body was lain out at the University of Havana in order that his supporters could mourn his death (Suchlicki, 1969: 56).

This student radicalism, dating back to the 1920s, continued in the struggle against Batista with the formation of the Directorio Revolucionario (DR). This was founded in 1955 under the leadership of FEU president José Antonio
Echevarría, who would become an important martyr in the history books of the Revolution. It one of several organisations that young people in the 1950s could join in order to take part in the battle against Batista. Also of significance was the youth wing of the M-26-7. This is almost absent from the literature on the M-26-7, and the evidence of its existence comes from interviews (Guzmán, interview, 07/03/02; Martínez Heredia, interview, 19/05/03). It is probable that it was a loose arrangement as necessitated by the realities of the Sierra Rebellion, rather than an organisation with a structure such as the JS. The Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud argues that the M-26-7 was itself “una organización política integrada fundamentalmente por jóvenes” [a political organisation basically made up of young people] (Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 68n1) thereby effectively defining the whole organisation as youth-oriented. These two organisations were those that dominated the rebellion, and the incorporation of many young people, although figures are unavailable due to the clandestine nature of both, added to the radical tradition of young people since Mella.

Despite the radical youth tradition, the texts of the leadership reveal a degree of nervousness about the past leading to the dichotomy of past radicalism, on the one hand, and past decadence, on the other. Speaking to students in 1960, Castro forged the relationship between youth, past and future, stating that:

la herencia que recibirá la Cuba de mañana será ésta que estamos haciendo. […] lo que tenemos no es perfecto, hemos recibido la herencia del pasado, la herencia en muchos aspectos negativa del pasado. Pero, sin embargo, la generación presente reacciona, reaccionan los profesionales, y esos mismos profesionales, una gran parte de ellos que son productos del pasado, sin embargo, reaccionan, y reaccionan con la Revolución, reaccionan frente a los que abandonan la patria (Castro, 27/11/60).

the inheritance of the future will be what we are doing now. […] What we have is not perfect. We have received the inheritance of the past, with all its negative features. But the present generation is reacting and the professionals, most of whom are a product of the past, nevertheless react for the Revolution against those who leave the country.
In this case, some attention should be paid to the live audience Castro was addressing. This speech reflects a level of nervousness about the student body, given the problems within the universities at the time of speaking and a deep fear of counter-revolutionary elements within the bourgeois-based student population that continued from pre-revolutionary times. This was one of several reasons, covered further in Chapter 7, why there was a curious lack of a clear student identity in 1960s Cuba.

The thesis of past decadence soon translated into an expectation of youth based on the idea that they were less ‘tainted’ by the past than the older generation, whereas the thesis of past radicalism meant that the view of what youth should represent was already in part formulated by 1959. Castro’s *La historia me absolverá* marked the inception of the revolutionary definition of youth in the discourse, particularly with regard to Abel Santamaría, described as “el más generoso, querido y intrépido de nuestros jóvenes, cuyo gloriosa resistencia lo inmortaliza ante la historia de Cuba” [the most generous, beloved, and intrepid of our youth, whose glorious resistance will make him immortal in Cuban history] (Castro, no date [1953]: 22). That is not to say that the revolutionary definition of what youth should be was essential or inherent (Olcott, 2003: 107) but rather that the experience of the 1940s and 1950s fed into the stabilisation of meaning (Barker, 2000: 386) in the early Revolution, which itself was temporary and thereby subject to change.

There was a pragmatic reason for categorising youth. This example from a speech by Guevara shows how the need for dedicated civic soldiers to help to build the Revolution drove the discourse of youth:

\[\text{también se necesitan cuadros militares para lograr lo cual se puede utilizar la selección que hizo la guerra en nuestros jóvenes combatientes,}\]

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25 Castro’s wariness about students was somewhat vindicated when we take into account that in this speech he praised his ally, student leader Rolando Cubela, who later turned against the Revolution.

26 This passage was later quoted in full by Raúl Castro, in his article written on the anniversary of the 26th July in 1961, in which he praised the role of the ‘jóvenes humildes’ in the 1953 attack (Raúl Castro, 26/07/61: 48). Fagen (1969: 108) rationalises the use of Castro’s speeches in the EIRs as due to a dearth of ideological texts in the early revolution.

27 The phrase ‘civic soldier’ is coined by Domínguez (1978: 341-378).
ya que quedó con vida una buena cantidad sin grandes conocimientos teóricos pero probados en el fuego. [...] Es necesario trabajar con los profesionales, impulsando a los jóvenes a seguir alguna de las carreras técnicas más importantes, para tentar de darle a la ciencia el tono de entusiasmo o ideológico que garantice un desarrollo acelerado (Guevara, 09/62: 158).

we also need military cadres and, for this purpose, can take advantage of wartime selection among our young fighters, a large number of whom survived with little in the way of theoretical knowledge but were tried and tested under fire. [...] We need to work with professionals, encouraging the young to follow a career in one of the more vital technical areas, in order to make science attractive and ideological and thereby ensure rapid development.

This text indicates that Guevara realised the value of this cohort of young fighters in military terms. Indeed, young people were seen as the most dedicated soldiers, due to bravery and fearlessness. During a speech at the University of Havana in 1961, Guevara, while paying tribute to the student martyrs of November 1871, executed by the Spanish authorities, had underlined this particular characteristic, stating that “[l]a juventud no se doblega ante la muerte y juega con ella; es irrespetuoso, es cierto” [Youth does not flinch in the face of death; it taunts death. It has no respect for it; it has confidence] (Guevara, 27/11/61: 602). Yet it is clear from Guevara’s text on the Cuadro that experience and fearlessness were not enough, and the link that Guevara perceived was needed between military, work and ideological education is clear here. This further influenced the hombre nuevo [new man] discourse that was emerging by the mid-1960s.

3.3 The Separation of ‘Youth’ and ‘Young People’: from Nosotros to Ustedes

Besides the practical need for young people to become educated to fulfil the necessary tasks of the Revolution, turning to young people was very natural for the leaders of the Revolution in the early days because they defined themselves in those terms. In September 1959, Raúl Castro explained why he saw youth as playing such a crucial role:
La juventud ha destruido mitos al parecer consagrados por los tiempos. En primer lugar, la juventud gobierna en Cuba y, aunque sus naturales errores, podemos sinceramente decir que bastante bien lo está haciendo (Raúl Castro, 19/07/60: 22).

Youth is a destroyer of long-standing myths. Firstly, it is youth that is now running Cuba and, despite its inevitable mistakes, we can honestly say it is making a pretty good job of it.

Here Raúl referred to la juventud (youth) as making up the government of Cuba. In March 1960 Guevara spoke of “nosotros los jóvenes” [we the young people]. Joven was also regularly used as an adjective, as in young communist, young worker etc. In the latter case we clearly see dual or multiple identities articulated in the leaders’ speeches, and what becomes apparent is that, while there was a differentiation on the part of the leadership between itself and the Cuban people in general, at the same time there was an identification between the leadership and youth. In 1964 Guevara was still identifying himself as a young person, saying “Y los jóvenes – yo entre ellos, me considero de los jóvenes – tenemos que estudiar, y estudiar fuerte. […] [S]implemente que es una obligación revolucionaria estudiar” [And we the nation’s youth – and I consider myself one of them – need to study, and to study hard. […] Study is quite simply a revolutionary duty] (Guevara, 30/11/64: 645; my emphasis).

One reason for the changing discourse on youth was the transition in this feeling, leading to a separation of the concept of ‘youth’ from ‘young people’, as the leadership distanced itself from young people. The first explicit move away from the nosotros (us) discourse to ustedes (you) was taken by Fidel. Fidel had talked much in the early Revolution about young people and whether he identified himself as belonging to that category or not is ambiguous. As early as 1962, Castro clearly referred to young people as separate from himself, stating that the farewell event for young visiting Soviet technicians was “un acto significativo y emocionante para todos nosotros, y de una gran importancia para ustedes, los de la nueva generación de nuestra Patria” [a significant and moving act for all of us and a very important one for you, the members of our nation’s new generation] (Castro, 06/07/62: 5). The following month this position was confirmed, when, in an important speech to the Unión de Estudiantes
Secundarios (UES) congress, Castro signified a handing over from his generation to a young generation, by symbolically passing the *relevo* [baton]\(^{28}\) with the discursive tool, repeated four times “lo que les damos a los jóvenes” [what we give to the young], the ultimate ‘gift’ being “el porvenir, la imagen del futuro, y de un futuro que será eternamente para ellos” [the future, the image of the future and of a future that will be eternally theirs] (Castro, 10/08/62: 3). The leadership discourse here used the past to allow young people to own the future. Clearly, once again we must consider the audience, which was at the very youngest end of the youth category, the UES being the organisation for secondary school students. Yet, bearing in mind the broader mass audience, it is reasonable to draw a tentative conclusion that Castro at this stage was differentiating himself from young people.

Whether Castro espoused the idea of himself as young in the very early Revolution is debatable, and it is equally ambiguous whether Guevara gave up that discourse. However, there are indications that he was moving away from it. In a speech to the UJC in 1962, Guevara differentiated himself from the group when he criticised their lack of vanguard attitudes, asking: “¿Cómo puede ser eso, si ustedes reciben ya el nombre de jóvenes comunistas, el nombre que nosotros, como organización dirigente, todavía no tenemos?” [How can that be true if you are already called young communists, a name that we, as the governing organisation, have still not been given?] (Guevara, 10/62: 361). Yet in this case the distinction was not based on age, but on differentiation through membership of distinct organisations.

It was not really until 1964, in Guevara’s important speech to a UJC meeting, that he articulated the distinction between the *Moncada* generation and the new UJC activists:

> Y también otra tarea de ustedes es crear la gente que nos reemplace, de manera que el hecho de que nosotros seamos dejados en el olvido como

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\(^{28}\) The *relevo* is a tool of Cuban generational discourse that continues to today (Guzmán, interview, 11/03/02).
cosa del pasado, pasa a ser de los índices más importantes de la tarea de
toda la juventud y de todo el pueblo (Guevara, 09/05/64: 318).

And another of your duties is to develop people who can take our place,
so that consigning us to oblivion as part of the past becomes one of the
most important indicators of the role of our entire youth and our entire
nation.

This speech is discussed in greater detail below, but significant at this point was
a consciousness of ageing on the part of the guerrilla hero. This was implicit a
year later. It is possible that the complexity of his decision to leave Cuba may
have provoked such reflections, and when Guevara left Cuba in 1965, he wrote
in his now famous letter to Fidel that "hoy todo tiene un tono menos dramático
porque somos más maduros" [today everything sounds less dramatic, because we
are more mature] (Guevara, 01/04/65: 697). The fervour that is consistent with
the dramaticism is a quality that Guevara associated positively with youth, but he
situated himself apart from that by 1965. This concurred with Guevara’s
symbolic transformation from youth to youth-hero to youth-martyr, which also
systematically accorded with the multiple definitions of youth and use of youth
as a concept. 29

The transformation of the leadership from nosotros to ustedes, along with ideals
of youth, explains the development of a culture of youth. Because it became
possible to espouse the virtues of youth without being a young person – and the
leadership was assumed to espouse those although they no longer defined
themselves as young people – the entire population could identify with the
culture of youth, which became an imaginary state of being to which all Cubans
could and should aim, where the discourse of two virtual spaces – past and future
– became crucial. Furthermore, this trend was part of the forging of a separate
relationship: that between youth and the Revolution. The differentiation based
on this changing discourse was experienced on both sides: by young people who
no longer felt the solidarity of a leadership that had identified directly with them,

29 It is possible to draw similar conclusions regarding a feeling of ‘growing up’ on the part of the
leadership from Raúl Castro, who pointed to the difference in age between himself and a group of
students who he accompanied on a ten-day march in September 1966 following the path of the
Rebel Army eight years previously (Raúl Castro, 30/09/66: 164).
and by the leadership, which was gradually becoming aware of a distance between itself and young people. This made the concept of youth all the more crucial.

There appears to be a definitional problem at the juncture where youth was considered as the most perfect, unsullied and pure cohort but also as an aspirational group. In the first sense, we see Kriegel’s claim of the “virtues which have been considered the essence of youth: its purity […] and its enthusiasm” (Kriegel, 1979: 27) vindicated, in so far as those very essential virtues formed an important part of the revolutionary discourse. Equally, the very fact that youth was by definition an aspirational group, intimately linked to the future as shown above when Castro symbolically gifted the future to young people (Castro, 10/08/62: 3), indicates that the leadership felt that young people did not live up to the very ideal that they believed youth to be, leading inevitably to a criticism of, and eventually a disappointment with, young people even while the concept of an ideal youth remained and remains to this day unchanged.

3.4 The Symbolic Idealisation of Youth

\textit{la juventud: tan sana y generosa en cualquier parte del mundo}  
[youth: so universally pure and generous] (Castro, 22/12/61)

At this juncture it is appropriate to examine, beyond Kriegel’s generic definition, exactly what this idealised Cuban picture of youth to which young people should aspire comprised. The two central features that emerge are those virtues to which Kriegel referred: purity and enthusiasm. This picture is largely a snapshot from the early years of the Revolution, and it is this idea that feeds into what I term the culture of youth: the attempted juvenisation of Cuba based on this very specific ideal at the point where young people did not necessarily live up to this ideal. This took place despite attempts on the part of the leadership to impress upon young people who had not been active in the rebellion the importance of their role, in part by building a relationship between the Revolution and the young person.
The twin definition of youth as pure and enthusiastic emerged repeatedly in the speeches of the early Revolution. In 1962, at an awards ceremony for sugar workers, Castro related stories of heroism in the sugar workers he had met. He noted that “vino un trabajador que dijo tener setenta y dos años, y se veía el entusiasmo de un joven de veinte” [a worker who said he was 72 came along, and you could see the enthusiasm of a young man of twenty in him] (Castro, 16/07/62: 3). Here the assumption that enthusiasm is a natural characteristic of youth, as opposed to that of old age, is apparent, as is, more implicitly, the view that all Cubans should aspire to such a characteristic. The following month Castro again made the connection between youth and enthusiasm, reflecting that before the Revolution young people were unable to express themselves, stating that “ni era capaz aquel mundo de canalizar eso que todo joven lleva dentro, que es fuerza vital, que es entusiasmo, que es sed de futuro, sed de lucha, sed de vida” [that world was incapable of channelling all the essential qualities of youth – vitality, enthusiasm, a yearning for the future, an urge to struggle, a thirst for life] (Castro, 10/08/62: 3). In 1963, Castro went on to develop the idea of a “sed de lucha”. In referring to the struggle in Venezuela he argued that the revolutionaries there “tendrán cada día más el apoyo del pueblo. Porque cuando los jóvenes ven otros jóvenes combatiendo y muriendo, se sienten atraídos por aquel heroísmo, por aquel valor; se sienten inspirados a emular esos ejemplos” [will gain more and more support from people, because when young people see other young people fighting and dying they feel drawn to that heroism, that bravery; they feel inspired to emulate those examples] (Castro, 26/07/63).

There is a parallel here with the portrayal of Joel Iglesias, which will be discussed below. What comes across is a view that at the heart of youth there is a certain essence that predetermines that young people, given the opportunity, will have enthusiasm and drive to a greater degree than adults. As well as enthusiasm, the notion of youth was imbued with the idea of purity. Guevara was a particular purveyor of this concept, which would contribute to his thesis of the *hombre nuevo* [new man]. He argued that youth was more significant than social class because of the specific ideals that were attached to that stage in the life cycle:
Había olvidado yo que hay algo más importante que la clase social a que perteneza el individuo: la juventud, la frescura de ideales, la cultura que en el momento en que se sale de la adolescencia se pone al servicio de los ideales más puros (Guevara, 29/09/63: 220).

*I had forgotten that there was something more important than the social class to which the individual belongs: youth, fresh ideals, a culture which, at the point of leaving adolescence, is devoted to serving the purest of ideals.*

The dilution of class consciousness in the early Revolution fed into Guevara’s conceptualisation of identity based not on class, but on youth.

Crucial to the belief in the purity of young people was that purity was not, like enthusiasm, an inherent characteristic of youth. Instead, young people born into the Revolution were pure by virtue of being untainted by Cuba’s corrupt bourgeois past. This attitude is clear from the outset of the Revolution, when Castro referred to his hopes for the nascent youth organisation (referring in this case to training for young pilots) on this basis:

> habrán estado cuatro meses en la Sierra habrán escalating cinco veces el Pico Turquino, e irán ascendiendo. […] ¡Esos jóvenes son el producto más puro de esta Revolución! (APLAUSOS), ¡el orgullo más grande y más legítimo de esta Revolución! (APLAUSOS), la semilla de la patria nueva, los que constituirán una generación mejor preparada para seguir la obra revolucionaria.  

> *Porque la Revolución debe garantizar su marcha ascendente, un futuro mejor todavía que el entusiasmo de hoy; y que un pueblo que se libera sea sustituido por el entusiasmo de una generación que será por entero producto de la Revolución.*  

> Un rato antes, hablábamos de la herencia del pasado, y la herencia que recibirá la Cuba de mañana será esta que estamos haciendo (APLAUSOS) (Castro, 27/11/60; my emphasis).

> they will have had to spend 4 months in the Sierra Maestra, they will have had to climb Mt. Turquino 5 times and they will keep climbing it. […] These young people are the purest product of this Revolution! The most legitimate and awe-inspiring! They will be the seeds for the new fatherland because they will build a generation that will be better
prepared for continuing our revolutionary effort. The Revolution must guarantee our climb to an ever better future. The enthusiasm of the people today must be replaced with the enthusiasm of a generation which will be entirely the product of the Revolution. A short while ago, I talked about the legacy of the past, but the legacy of tomorrow is what we are creating now.

This view is corroborated and expounded further by Guevara in one of his most famous texts, *Socialism and Man in Cuba*.

En nuestra sociedad, juegan un gran papel la juventud y el Partido. Particularmente importante es la primera, por ser la arcilla maleable con que se puede construir al hombre nuevo sin ninguna de las taras anteriores (Guevara 12/03/65: 380; my emphasis). In our society, youth and the Party play an important role. The former is particularly important, as it is the pliable clay out of which the new man, with none of the earlier faults, can be fashioned.

The negative use of the past, that is, the assumption of inherent flaws in those Cubans who experienced pre-1959 life was complemented by an affirmative use of the past. The definition of what youth should be (as opposed to what youth inherently is) was supported by the use of Cuba’s radical history in speeches, in particular through a canonisation of young martyrs of the rebellion, in parallel with (and in a similar way to) a celebration of young heroes of the rebellion. Miller points to the fact that the revolutionary government “embarked on a large-scale propaganda effort to represent itself as the culmination of Cuban history” (Miller, 2003: 148). In this way, the process began whereby “history is a salient part of day-to-day life and of Cubans’ sense of their identity” (Miller, 2003: 161). With regard to youth, the uses of history were part of this general trend.

The use of young heroes and martyrs in the speeches of the leadership was part of this use of history: a case of “radical historicization” of which Stuart Hall writes (Hall, 1996: 4). Two key figures in the discourse were Joel Iglesias and Conrado Benítez. Taking Iglesias and Benítez as examples of the proclaimed

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30 The context makes it unclear whether Guevara is referring to youth or to the UJC specifically, but the implication of the comment remains the same whichever translation is used.
revolutionary hero and martyr respectively, there is a similarity in the way in
which they were described.\textsuperscript{31} Both were black, poor, prime examples of the noble
working-class revolutionary of the time, which by definition had to be rural
rather than urban, the latter representing the seat of the corrupt bourgeoisie
according to these speeches.\textsuperscript{32} Benítez – a volunteer teacher murdered in the
Escambray mountains in January 1961 – took the role of martyr, where Iglesias –
a \textit{comandante} in the rebel army who became leader of the AJR and later the UJC
after the victory of 1959 – was the hero, and yet the status was the same, and the
language with which they were described was similar. Iglesias was built up as a
hero in two ways. Firstly, he was represented as an ordinary young man, that is to
say, a person whom anyone could become:

\begin{quote}
Y ustedes tienen el ejemplo aquí, en los Jóvenes Rebeldes. Cuando el
domingo escuchen ustedes la palabra del comandante Joel Iglesias, sepan
que ese comandante del Ejército Rebelde llegó a la Sierra con quince
años, que apenas sabía leer y no sabía escribir nada; y que hoy puede
dirigirse a toda la juventud, no porque se haya convertido ya en un
filósofo, en un año y medio, sino porque puede hablar al pueblo porque es
parte misma del pueblo y porque siente lo que todos ustedes sienten todos
los días, y lo sabe expresar, sabe llegar hasta ustedes (Guevara, 30/09/60:
87).
\end{quote}

\textit{And you have the example here, in the Young Rebels. When you are
listening to the address by Comandante Joel Iglesias on Sunday, bear in
mind that this Rebel Army commander came to the Sierra aged fifteen,
barely able to read and completely unable to write; and yet today, he can
speak to all the youth of the nation – not because he was transformed into
a philosopher in the space of one and a half years, but because he can}

\textsuperscript{31} Guevara made clear the difference between heroes and martyrs in his speech of November
1961 where he referred to those young students who were executed by the Spanish authorities on
27th November 1871: “Y aquellos jóvenes no eran culpables de nada, no se les puede llamar
exactamente héroes, sino, más bien, mártires. Eran estudiantes acomodados porque en aquella
epoca los estudiantes tenían que ser de familias acomodadas; sus padres eran españoles” [Those
young people were guilty of nothing; they cannot be described as heroes exactly, but rather as
martyrs. They were well-to-do students because, at that time, students had to come from wealthy
families; their parents were Spanish] (Guevara, 27/11/61: 604) The idea of a bourgeois hero
was not possible within Guevara’s world view. In the case of Benítez and Iglesias, this
distinction is less clear.

\textsuperscript{32} Gugler (1980: 521) points out that the slowdown in growth of Havana was “clearly intended by
the revolutionary leadership to whom Havana represented the evils of the old society”.

70
speak to the people, as a part of the people, and because he feels what all
of you feel in your everyday lives, and knows how to put it into words,
how to reach you.

Guevara ascribed a proximity between Iglesias and the audience, encouraging the
latter to believe that they, in a sense, were or at the very least could be Iglesias.
He did this in two ways: by bringing particular attention to Iglesias’s semi-
literacy at the time when Iglesias entered the Rebel Army and by pointing out his
intellectual naivety and inexperience.

The second way in which Guevara built the hero image for Iglesias came across
in the speech he made when handing Iglesias over from the army to the youth
movement. He outlined the heroic nature of Iglesias (who became one of a small
handful of comandantes on a par with the likes of Camilo Cienfuegos and Che
Guevara) in the Ejército Rebelde, not in spite of, but because of, his youth:

When the head of the Young Rebels, our comrade Joel Iglesias, joined
our Rebel Army a few days before the battle of Uvero, he was only 15,
and [...] 15 is an age at which a man already knows what he is prepared
to die for, and is not afraid to die, when he has an ideal in his heart for
which he is prepared to make this sacrifice.

Not only was Iglesias the symbolic youth hero of the rebellion, the quote above
is indicative of an implicit move from childhood to adulthood. According to
Guevara, at the age of fifteen a man is capable of choosing to give his life to a
cause. There is no distinct phase of adolescence here, rather at the age of fifteen
the youth/man is considered able to act with an adult level of responsibility. This
does not imply that the youth is adult – indeed, the reasons for young people
making good soldiers is covered above – but what is inferred is that one element
of the definition of youth is based on an assumption of ability to take an adult
level of responsibility. A willingness (and opportunity) to die if necessary for
one’s country is an element of national-revolutionary identity, which allows a young man to relate directly to the nation.

The way in which Iglesias was built up as the young hero has clear parallels with the way in which Benítez was built up as martyr. In a speech to volunteers in the Literacy Campaign, Castro focussed on the teacher’s modest background:

¿Quién era este joven? Era, sencillamente, un hombre humilde del pueblo, limpiabotas, panadero, estudiante de las escuelas nocturnas, porque de día trabajaba; no era el hijo de un terrateniente, no era el hijo de un industrial, no era el hijo de un gran comerciante; este joven no iba a Miami, este joven no iba a París, este joven no tenía Cadillacs; era un hombre joven de 18 años que sólo conocía del sudor honrado, que sólo conocía de la pobreza, que sólo conocía del sacrificio; era un joven humilde, y un joven negro, por lo cual conoció también de la discriminación cruel e injusta; era pobre, era negro y era maestro. He ahí las tres razones por las cuales los agentes del imperialismo lo asesinaron; era joven, era negro, era maestro; era pobre y era obrero (Castro: 23/01/61).

Who was this young man? He was, simply, a humble man of the people, a shoe shine boy, a baker, a night school student because he worked during the day. He was not the son of a land owner, or an industrialist, or an important business man. This young man did not go to Miami or Paris, he didn’t have expensive cars; he was a young man of 18 who had known nothing but honest sweat, poverty and sacrifice; he was a humble young man, a black man, and for this reason he was the victim of cruel and unjust discrimination. He was poor, he was black and he was a teacher. These were the reasons that the agents of imperialism killed him: he was a young black teacher, he was a poor worker.

Benítez did not have the military credentials of Iglesias, so the myth created around the former differed accordingly to that created around the latter.33 But the

33 Kapcia (2000) argues that Cuban history can be understood through the elucidation of those político-historical myths – both pre- and post-revolutionary – that make up Cuban national identity. This mythification of Iglesias and Benítez works in a similar way to that of the better known heroes, most notably Martí, as the human face of the revolution (Kapcia, 2000: 177-88) and Guevara as fallen hero (189-93).
similarity between the two myths is striking with regard to the idealised revolutionary, in so far as both Iglesias and Benítez fulfilled the necessary criteria for heroification or martyrdom central to which was the concept of being unaffected by the bourgeois defects of pre-revolutionary life thereby making it necessary that such heroes and martyrs derived from the formerly oppressed classes, these being the black, illiterate, rural and poor. Once the martyr myth was created, it was used by Castro in a way that connected the audience to Benítez’s hero image:

¡ese joven asesinado seguirá siendo eternamente joven! […] ¡Ese maestro será como un símbolo, ese maestro será como un héroe al que su pueblo no olvidará! (APLAUSOS); ese maestro es el mártir cuya sangre servirá para que nosotros nos propongamos, doblemente, ganar la batalla que hemos emprendido contra el analfabetismo; es un mártir cuya sangre servirá para borrar para siempre la ignorancia y la incultura en nuestro pueblo, el mártir del Año de la Educación, el mártir de los maestros, el héro anónimo del pueblo (Castro, 23/01/61).

*This young victim will be eternally young! […] This teacher will serve as symbol, a hero whom the people will not forget. This teacher is the martyr whose blood will serve to double our determination to win the battle we have undertaken against illiteracy. He is a martyr whose blood will forever serve to wipe out ignorance and lack of education in our people; the Martyr of the Year of Education, the martyr of the teachers, the anonymous hero of the people.*

By imploring Cubans to embark on the struggle for education in memory of Benítez, Castro was here using the martyr as both inspirational symbol and motivational incentive for the people, much as Guevara was later used after his death.34

The focus on Iglesias and Benítez was based on two elements. Firstly, it was based on the idea that these men (note that there was little focus on female heroes or martyrs) represented all young Cubans. In a sense, they were Cuba’s youth.

34 A revolutionary slogan at the time of writing is ‘Queremos que sean como el Ché’ (*We want you to be like Che*), displayed on a large placard at the monument dedicated to Guevara in Santa Clara, quoting Castro’s speech of 18th October 1967 following Che’s death in Bolivia (Castro, 18/10/67).
Secondly, their rise to glory was connected to their youth; in other words, they were glorious because of their youth. They personified that pure, unsullied, enthusiastic character of youth that had been built up so carefully. Furthermore, the connection between this and the action and successes of the Revolution was apparent when, in the same speech in which Castro exalted Benítez, he also pointed to the increased educational and workplace opportunities that young people had (Castro, 23/01/61).

The canonisation of heroes and martyrs was used repeatedly in discourse: Martí, Maceo, Mella, Camilo Cienfuegos and Echevarría were constantly present in speeches of the leadership particularly on anniversaries, the celebration thereof being closely linked to the evolving national-revolutionary identity. Few propaganda tactics have been used in Cuba as much as the anniversary and this is part of a conscious attempt to connect the nation to its radical history. Benítez and Iglesias were particularly relevant in this case because of the intimate link with the discourse of youth; moreover the propagandist technique of using heroes, martyrs and anniversaries was one way in which the view of what youth should be was put across, as they were used as a discursive technique to demonstrate ideological issues. The reason the heroes and martyrs were important is because they crossed the divide of an idealised view of youth on the one hand and a view of what youth should or must be as revolutionaries on the other. However, the hazard of personifying the perfection of youth in these two young men was that it caused the ideal to feel unreachable by young Cubans because the story that was woven around those lives did not account for real doubts or weaknesses on the part of the protagonists.

3.5 Attaining the Ideal: Demands on Young People

The view that young people will necessarily be pure, perfect products of the Revolution, in the vein of Iglesias and Benítez, would seem starkly deterministic and almost quixotically idealistic, were it not that closely linked to this ideal was a very real determination of what young people must show themselves to be. In the same speech where Guevara had discussed the purity of youth, he also articulated what was expected or needed of the young people of Cuba:
Y así debe estar siempre nuestra juventud: libre, discutiendo, intercambiando ideas, preocupada por lo que pasa en el mundo entero, abierta a la técnica de todo el mundo, recibiendo de todo el mundo lo que nos pueda dar, y siempre sensible a las luchas, a las desgracias, a las esperanzas de los pueblos oprimidos. En esa forma iremos construyendo nuestro futuro (Guevara, 29/09/63: 228).

This is how our youth should always be: free, engaged in discussion, exchanging ideas, concerned with events in the wider world, receptive to technical skills from anywhere in the world, taking what the world has to offer, and always sensitive to the struggle, the misfortunes and hopes of the oppressed peoples. This is how our future will be built.

Guevara was here telling young people what they needed to be concerned with in order to reach the ideal to which he previously referred. But it was Castro, in an important speech to the AJR congress, who articulated best the connection between the idealised vision and the needs of the Revolution, and how the Revolution could hold those ideals whilst engaging with the struggle that young people were entering:

Creer en los jóvenes es ver en ellos, además de entusiasmo, capacidad; además de energía, responsabilidad; además de juventud, pureza, heroísmo, carácter, voluntad, amor a la Patria, ¡fe en la Patria! ¡amor a la Revolución!, ¡fe en la Revolución, ¡confianza en sí mismos!, convicción profunda que la juventud puede, de que la juventud es capaz, convicción profunda de que sobre los hombros de la juventud, se pueden depositar grandes tareas (Castro, 04/04/62: 5).

Believing in the young means seeing not just their enthusiasm but also their ability, not just energy but also responsibility, not just youth but also purity, heroism, character, determination, love for the nation and belief in it, love for the Revolution and faith in it, confidence in themselves, a profound belief that youth can achieve things, that it has ability, a profound conviction that great responsibilities can be placed on young shoulders.

The journey that young people would have to take is evident in this speech, and Castro implied that this journey could be taken because of the belief that the leadership had in young people. This belief existed in part because at the time
this speech was made in 1962, young people had proved on a massive scale that Castro was right to place such great faith in them, as drivers of revolutionary policy through participation. Once again in this speech it is possible to identify the implicit belief that young people did not carry the burden of the decadent past and therefore could be depended upon:

Creer en la juventud es ver en ellos la generación del mañana, una generación mejor que nuestra propia generación, una generación con muchas más virtudes y muchos menos defectos que las virtudes y los defectos de nuestra generación. Porque creemos en los jóvenes, es porque tenemos una determinada actitud ante los jóvenes (Castro, 04/04/62: 5).

A belief in youth means viewing them as tomorrow’s generation – a better generation than our own, one with far more virtues and far fewer defects than our own. It is because we believe in the young that we have a special attitude towards them.

In this speech Castro even sought to close the conceptual gap between what young people must be and what young people are, seeking to add effort and commitment implicitly into the equation:

¿Se considere cada joven ya un revolucionario completo? (gritos de: “No”) ¡No! ¿Por qué todavía […] no se puede considerar ningún joven un revolucionario completo? Porque el revolucionario tiene que hacerse, tiene que forjarse. (Castro, 04/04/62: 5)

Should every young person be viewed immediately as a fully-fledged revolutionary? (shouts of “No”). Why can no young person be considered a fully-fledged revolutionary? Because a revolutionary has to be developed, has to be forged.

The next symbol in the discursive equation is therefore the move from the idealised youth and a view of what youth must be in the Revolution to what young people had to do in order to meet this demand upon them. And what young people had to do was determined by the ideology of the Revolution. In Lesson One of the Manual de capacitación cívica this attitude to what aptitudes must be developed and depended upon comes clear:

Toda Revolución verdadera no se limita a transformar las condiciones económicas, políticas y sociales de un país, sino que incluye en el modo
A true Revolution doesn’t confine itself to the transformation of political, economic and social conditions; but rather it impacts upon the way of thinking of its citizens, it does away with a certain way of evaluating things, it does away with political fears and prejudices that claim to evaluate a series of problems; it launches the best human qualities: selflessness, sacrifice, solidarity, staying power, honesty.

To an extent, in the early Revolution, young people exhibited these fine qualities. As can be seen in the speech above where Castro referred to the hike up the Pico Turquino (Castro, 27/11/60), such a raising of conciencia (consciousness) was happening in the early Revolution.

There was a need, however, for a sustainable way of increasingly raising consciousness, and this was, for young people (and for many adults), to be through education and work. Sacrifice, duty, work and education were the basis of the ideological programme for the development of young people to enable them to reach as close as possible to the ideal notion of youth. Guevara articulated this in 1961:

[Educating yourselves] es el único deber. Y ustedes honran así a todos los mártires y honran así a todos los compañeros que todavía tendremos que caer en estas luchas, estudiando cada día más, perfeccionándose cada día más, pensando también en cada momento de debilidad que están esperando por ustedes las fábricas y las escuelas, los talleres de arte, las universidades, que toda Cuba espera por ustedes, que no se puede perder un minuto, porque todos estamos caminando hacia el futuro, y el futuro necesita de técnica, necesita de cultura, necesita de alta conciencia revolucionaria (Guevara, 27/11/61: 601).

[Educating yourselves] is your only duty. This is how you honour all the martyrs and all the comrades who still have to die in this struggle – by studying harder every day, by improving yourselves a little more every day; and also by remembering, whenever things seem tough, that the
factories, the schools, the artists' studios and the universities are all waiting for you – that the whole of Cuba is waiting for you and that there isn’t a moment to lose, because we are all marching towards the future and the future needs skills, culture and a high revolutionary consciousness.

Despite the pleonastic problems with the concept of perfecting oneself more every day, this speech clearly demonstrates the link between building an actual technical future and building the perfect revolutionary. We see the start, however, of the problem of how to train those young people. In policy terms the means to ideological development was via the vanguard, as demonstrated by Castro in 1963, asking “¿cómo vamos a convertir a un joven en un cuadro profesional a los 16 ó 17 años? No puede ser. Y la primera obligación del joven es capacitarse, prepararse, que sea joven comunista, que sea un cuadro de los jóvenes comunistas, pero que siga en el centro de estudio y, además, que estudie”

[How are we going to turn a youth into a professional cadre at 16 or 17? It cannot happen. The first obligation of the youth is to train, to prepare himself. He can be a communist youth, a cadre of the communist youth, but he must remain in his centre of study and, in addition, he must study] (Castro, 22/02/63).

The concept of young person as revolutionary cadre is linked to ideological advancement. Castro was clearly and explicitly working within Guevara’s 1962 definition of cadre:

A esta altura podemos preguntarnos, ¿qué es un cuadro? Debemos decir que un cuadro es un individuo que ha alcanzado el suficiente desarrollo político como para poder interpretar las grandes directivas emanadas del poder central, hacerlas suyas y transmitirlas como orientación a la masa, percibiendo además las manifestaciones que ésta haga de sus deseos y sus motivaciones más íntimas (Guevara, 09/62: 156).

At this point we may be wondering: what is a cadre? The answer has to be that a cadre is an individual who has achieved such a level of political maturity that he can interpret the main guidelines from the central authority, take them on board and pass them on for the guidance of the masses, also understanding the masses’ expression of their most deeply-held wishes and motivation.
The focus on the vanguard and the relationship between the vanguard and the masses indicates Guevara’s influence in the developing concept of how to create that ideal revolutionary. Such a cadre could not be developed without education, and, significantly, Castro (above) maintained that young people who are potential cadres should remain in their school or university, implying the importance of contact between the cadres and the masses. To an extent this demonstrates that the leadership did not in fact aim for all young people to reach the level of perfection that the discourse would have us believe youth is, or, in a more positive sense, saw that the only way to achieve a mass movement towards that perfect ideal was via the vanguard cadres.

It would be easy to be enticed into thinking the focus on the vanguard youth left other young people who were not considered as vanguard outside the discourse, but this was not the case. The vanguard was expected to be the best citizens, but all young Cubans were subject to the same thesis of work, sacrifice, duty and education. In an important speech in 1964, Castro linked education and work firmly, by launching schools that would become centres of work and education:

[D]ebemos proponernos muy firmemente crear condiciones futuras para el estudio y debemos preocuparnos firmemente en desarrollar el concepto de que a determinado edad, en determinada etapa de la vida del joven, el trabajo no debe ser una actividad profesional, el trabajo no debe ser un medio de la vida, sino que el trabajo debe formar parte de la formación, es decir, la educación, del joven (Castro, 03/12/64: 4).

[W]e must set out clearly to create the conditions for education in the future and must ensure without fail that the idea can develop that, at a certain age, at a certain point in the life of a young person, work should not be a professional activity, work should not be a way of making a living, but instead it should be part of the training, part of the education of that young person.

The rationale for these schools was in part the above, that work was an integral part of education, but Castro went further than this:

Y podría decirse que esa [having schools that are centres for work and education] es una dimensión nueva de la actividad del joven, que la
Rovolución ha introducido y con lo cual puede decirse que se redondea, se completa, se perfecciona el papel, la función de un joven en nuestra sociedad (Castro, 03/12/64: 4).

*It could be said that* [having schools that are centres for work and education] *gives a whole new dimension to the activity of a young person, a dimension introduced by the Revolution and which can be said to round off, complete and perfect the role and the position of a young person in our society.*

Revolutionary policy (discussed in Chapter 4) was part of the means of affirming the link between cultures of work and of education. However, the story of the attempt to link the ideal to the actual is not yet finished, and the discourse used the ‘Revolution’ in a very specific way in its aim to persuade young people into revolutionary action.

### 3.6 Attaining the Ideal: Discursive Persuasion

The ‘story’ of the discourse can therefore show us how a view of an idealised youth was conveyed to the Cuban people along with a view of what youth must be. This in turn could be achieved through the means of policy, in particular education. The single element that was missing was how the commitment and duty that were needed in order to have successful policies could be maintained after the excitement and effervescence of the early months of the Revolution.

The discursive tactic that was used is an interesting but difficult one to attempt to complete the equation. The construction of heroes and martyrs was a relatively easy and much-used means to radicalise history, but the myth-making went beyond the identification with an idealised version of former heroes and martyrs to the actual construction of a relationship between people and the Revolution.

The Revolution appeared to speak directly to people through the speeches of the leadership, the result being that although people may not have developed as the philosophers Guevara wanted to see, all Cubans could identify in some way or another with the Revolution, and could, through this relationship, internalize the new national-revolutionary identity.
The humanization of the Revolution was conveyed for the most part through the speeches of Castro, although we see elements of it in Guevara. Paying homage to Maceo and reflecting on the success of the people of Cuba in repelling the Bay of Pigs invasion, Guevara pointed out that “[n]uestro pueblo todo fue un Maceo” [Our entire nation was a Maceo] (Guevara, 07/12/62: 612) thus equating the people with the heroism of Maceo using the discursive technique of dehumanising Maceo with use of the indefinite article.

In Castro’s important speech to the UES congress in 1962, early signs of the Revolution developing into its discursive form were evident. Castro outlined what the Revolution was doing to help young people:

La Revolución despoja de la mente de los jóvenes toda aquella hojarasca de la sociedad burguesa, todas aquellas variedades, todos aquellos perjuicios, todos aquellos absurdos e inculca en el ánimo de los jóvenes: sentimientos generosos, sentimientos nobles, sentimientos dignos. En fin, que la Revolución prepara a los jóvenes para una vida nueva, totalmente nueva – a ellos, luce distante aquella vida del pasado – en todos los órdenes para la vida que tenemos que lograr (Castro, 10/08/62: 3).

The Revolution clears young people’s minds of all the flippancy of bourgeois society, all that entertainment, all that waste, all that absurdity, and instead fills their minds with generous impulses, noble feelings, worthy sentiments. Ultimately, the Revolution is preparing young people for a new life in every sense – light-years away from what has gone before – preparing them for the life we must achieve.

In this speech Castro spoke of the Revolution as an entity separate from leadership, indeed, it placed the Revolution in the role of virtual leader of all Cubans (including Castro himself). But some months later the Revolution was brought closer to the Cuban people (and in particular Cuba’s young people), stating that educational advances “permitirá a este país marchar adelante con la forja de una juventud magnífica, llamada a heredar las condiciones que para esa juventud la Revolución está creando” [can enable this country to march forward in forging a magnificent youth destined to inherit the conditions the Revolution is creating for that youth] and “[a]sí avanza la Revolución con su juventud. Lo puede hacer. Nosotros hemos logrado la oportunidad de empezar a hacer todo
esó” [through this the Revolution advances hand in hand with its youth. It can do it. We have won the opportunity to begin to do all that] (Castro, 15/01/63; my emphasis). The Revolution comes across as a cadre in its own right, marching alongside Cuba’s young people.

The following month Castro conferred the Revolution with the characteristics of that heroic view of youth covered above, stating that “[s]ólo una Revolución cuya grandeza, cuyo heroísmo, cuya envergadura histórica comprenden los jóvenes puede librar esa batalla” [Only a Revolution whose greatness, heroism and wide historical scope, can encompass the young will be able to fight this battle] (Castro, 24/02/63: 4). The Revolution had effectively become a collective noun definitionally encompassing human qualities, a theme that recurred in a speech in March 1963, when Castro stated that “una de las cosas que ha tenido nuestra Revolución es saber calibrar el valor moral, humano y la dinámica y la actitud y la capacidad de los jóvenes” [And one of the features of our Revolution was that it has provided a measure of the moral and human worth and the dynamism, attitudes and capacity of the young] (Castro, 13/03/63: 3). Not only did the conferral of human characteristics on the virtual entity that was the Revolution allow young Cubans to directly relate to the Revolution, it also cemented that idealised image of the Revolution as the personification of the young hero.

Theoretically, then, following the story of the discourse, young people in Cuba could, through relating to the Revolution, express themselves through the hegemonic national-revolutionary identity. But problems arose when this structure that had been created, linking the perfect to the actual and hence to the virtual, failed to achieve those aims.

3.7 Failure to Attain the Ideal: Moral Panic

Young people by and large did not all reach this perfection that was theoretically achievable, and problems arose at opposite ends of the spectrum. Firstly, the so-called vanguard youth were deemed to be underachieving in that role, and secondly, certain groups of young people were actively rejecting the national-
revolutionary identity. The result in this case was a moral panic on the part of the leadership that comes across as a scolding of young people, thereby creating a sense of difference – not generational as much as critical of young people’s relationship with the Revolution – that was erstwhile absent.

The moral panic came across in the leadership texts. The onset of panic coincided with the era during which the Revolution took on its more human form, so the two discourses coincided. The first sign of worry issued from Guevara. His concerns lay, as we would expect given his philosophical dependence on the concept of a young vanguard, with the faults he had identified in some revolutionary cadres:

Así hemos ido encontrando multitud de nuevos cuadros que se han desarrollado en estos años; pero su desarrollo no ha sido parejo, puesto que los jóvenes compañeros se han visto frente a la realidad de la creación revolucionaria sin una adecuada orientación de partido. Algunos han triunfado plenamente, pero hay muchos que no pudieron hacerlo completamente y quedaron a mitad del camino, o que, simplemente, se perdieron en el laberinto burocrático o en las tentaciones que da el poder (Guevara 09/62: 157).

So, we have seen many new cadres developing during this period; however, their development was different, because these young comrades found themselves facing the situation created by the Revolution without having received adequate guidance from the party. Some of them managed to achieve complete success, but there were many who were unable to make the grade and were left behind in mid-stream, or simply lost their way in the bureaucratic maze or amid the temptations of power.

In early 1963, Castro’s unease with the way in which young people were acting, particularly with regard to levels of corruption amongst University teachers and some young people, came across:

¿Por qué esos errores? Porque también mucha gente jovenzuela no sabía ni lo que era una revolución, y creía que las cosas se hacían de a porqué sí, o por generación espontánea, o porque estaba escrito en un libro, o en virtud de una ley histórica (Castro, 24/02/63: 4).
Why were these mistakes made? Because many young people had no idea what a Revolution meant and believed things happened automatically or spontaneously, or because it was written in some book or because of some law of history.

In these speeches both Castro and Guevara had to accept that young people were not living up to the idealised concept they had built up. However, as well their worry about the lack of commitment in the vanguard youth, they showed concern with those young people who were expressing themselves entirely outside the national-revolutionary identity. Being so young, the excuse of a bourgeois past did not hold the weight that it could in explaining a level of decadence in the older generation, such as the university professors, although it was still used as an excuse. Castro covered this worry at length in a speech given on the anniversary of Echevarría’s death in 1963:

Claro, por ahí anda un espécimen, otro subproducto que nosotros debemos combatir. Es ese joven que tiene diecisésis, diecisiete, quince, y ni estudia ni trabaja; entonces, andan de lumper, en esquinas, en bares, van a algunos teatros, y se toman algunos libertades y realizan algunos libertinajes. Un joven que ni trabaje, ni estudie, ¿que piensa de la vida? ¿Piensa vivir de parásito? […] Si los imperialistas no los reciben allá en su “mundo libre”, que se preparen también a trabajar. […]

Muchos de esos pepillos vagos, hijos de burgueses, andan por ahí con unos pantaloncitos demasiado estrechos (risas); algunos de ellos con una guitarrita en actitudes ‘elvispreyslianos’, y que han llevado su libertinaje a extremos de querer ir a algunos sitios de concurrencia pública a organizar sus “shows” feminoides “por la libre”. […] La sociedad socialista no puede permitir ese tipo de degeneraciones.

¿Jovencitos aspirantes a eso? ¡No! “Árbol que creció torcido...” ya el remedio no es tan fácil. No voy a decir que vayamos a aplicar medidas drásticas contra esos “árboles torcidos”; pero jovencitos aspirantes, no (Castro, 13/03/63: 3).
Obviously here we have an example, another sub-product we have to oppose. These are young people, aged fifteen, sixteen or seventeen who neither study nor work; they hang around like disaffected ‘lumpen’ on street corners, in bars, they frequent certain theatres, behave badly and live in a profligate way. A young person who neither works nor studies – what’s his general idea? Does he expect to be able to live like a parasite? […] If there is no room for them in the imperialists’ “free world”, they had better get ready to work.

Many of these idle and alienated individuals, the children of bourgeois families, roam the streets wearing trousers that are too tight (laughter); some of them carry a guitar, try to look like Elvis Presley, and have taken their licentious behaviour to the extremes of wanting to frequent certain public places to organise their effeminate shows just as the fancy takes them. […] Socialist society cannot permit this type of degenerate behaviour.

Young people aspiring to that? No! “A tree that grew twisted…” [those tainted by the bourgeois past] – that’s a difficult problem to solve. I’m not saying we plan to take extreme measures against these “twisted trees”; but young people aspiring to imitate them…no.

Castro went on to point out that such decadence did not happen in rural areas, demonstrating another case of the promotion of a rural ideal. This phenomenon of the street-corner vagrant was essentially a masculine phenomenon, indicated by the couching of the severe criticism in ‘macho’ terms: by accusing those elements of behaviour that was effeminate. The groups that espoused a Western attitude will be dealt with in greater detail elsewhere, but at this point it is worth noting that the concept of youth deviance had entered the discourse as a reaction to happenings in Havana.

Despite attempts in policy to find ways of overcoming the assumed problems that would face young people in terms of becoming good revolutionaries without a revolutionary battle or war to fight, there was an increasing sense of nervousness about young people that emerged as the memory of the heroic role of young
people in the literacy campaign and during the Bay of Pigs invasion faded. In a neat reversal to the early discourse of the Revolution that indicated aged Cubans wishing they were young in order to experience the Revolution, Castro accepted the problem of identifying with the Revolution that young people who did not experience the rebellion (or pre-1959 life) might encounter, pointing out that “ningún joven tendrá que sentir la nostalgia de no haber tenido más años cuando esta lucha comenzó ningún joven tendrá que sentir la nostalgia, ni albergar la idea que llegara tarde a esta lucha” [no young person will have to feel regret at having been too young when this struggle began; no young person should feel any regret or have the idea that he was too late to take part in this struggle] (Castro, 13/03/65: 10).

In the same speech Castro gave young people a way to connect with the past, using once again an invocation of a revolutionary martyr, in this case Echevarría, in order to connect young people both to the past and to the heroic role young people were now expected to play:

\[ \text{Y ustedes, los jóvenes de hoy, han de sentirse como los seguidores de aquellos hombres, como los abanderados de aquellos hombres, los que han tomado su estandarte, los que siguen avanzado, los que siguen marchando hacia adelante por el camino ascendente de nuestro pueblo por la historia gloriosa de nuestra Patria (Castro, 13/03/65: 61).} \]

And you, today’s young people, must see yourselves as the successors of those men, as standard-bearers for those men, the ones who take up their banner, who continue moving forward, continue marching towards the

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35 In 1962 Castro had reflected on the sentiment of wishing to be young: “O el obrero anciano que nos dijo que quisiera ser joven para ver la Revolución. Yo comprendí lo que quería decir; quería decir: quisiera ser joven para ver los frutos futuros de la Revolución, para poder ver todo lo que será nuestro pueblo el día de mañana. […] El obrero que sentía no ser joven vinculaba la Revolución a un sentimiento si se quiere de nostalgia. […] El que se pasó toda la vida sufriendo y trabajando es natural y es humano que haya deseado ser joven en un momento como éste” [Or the old worker who said he would have liked to be young in order to see the Revolution. I understood what he meant: he wanted to be young so he could see the fruits of the Revolution, to see the future of our nation. […]The worker who regretted not being young, was associating the Revolution with a feeling of regret, if you like. […] It is natural that someone who has had a life of toil and suffering should want to be young at a time like this] (Castro, 16/07/62: 3).
future, along the upward path of our nation and for the glory of its history.

All this indicates that there was a tangible worry and attempt at problem-solving on the part of the leadership. Youth was moving from the early idealised vision to the territory of problem-causing or deviance. The speeches indicate a level of moral panic. And yet after 1965 the discourse of youth, whether as the early idealised vision or in terms of a moral panic largely disappeared from the speeches of the leadership.

3.8 The Culture of Youth

The disappearance of youth from the leadership discourse was in part due to the stabilisation of meaning of the concept of youth. In this case it is youth as myth that must be addressed. Kapcia (2000) argues that the myth of generations is replaced by the myth of youth, because the failure of generations in Cuban history to live up to expectations made it a difficult myth to maintain or cultivate (Kapcia, 2000: 178). The way in which the myth of youth was used signifies the cleft between young people and the concept of youth. From the early days of the Revolution, but most noticeably into 1964/5, the discourse of youth was not merely about young people and their perceived role, but rather about imbuing all of Cuba with this idealised notion discussed above. What resulted was a developing culture of youth. Taking the occasion when Castro spoke to the PURS meeting in 1963 when he voiced his views on how the cadre should develop, Castro, having talked to and about young people, then reflected: “Pero, bueno, al fin y al cabo, ¿quién puede decir aquí que es más viejo que los demás o más joven que los demás? En definitiva, esta Revolución es joven. No podemos crear un grupo aparte, exclusivo” [But, in the final analysis, who here can say that he is older or younger than the rest? Without a doubt, this Revolution is young, we cannot create an exclusive group apart] (Castro, 22/02/63).

This view is corroborated by Guevara the following year who argued that young people must hold on to their youth. Although Guevara did not relinquish the idea that only the current young generation could espouse or develop the characteristics of the heroic revolutionary, his insistence on the maintenance of
these characteristics indicates that he saw these very characteristics as an essential part of the new Cuba that was in the process of coming into being. He argued that “[a]hora, la insistencia mía en este punto, la insistencia que continuamente les he hecho, es para que no dejen de ser jóvenes, no se transformen en viejos teóricos, o teorizantes, conserven la frescura de la juventud, el entusiasmo de la juventud” [My insistence on this issue – the point I have repeatedly stressed to you – is that you should not stop being young, not turn into old theorists or theorisers, but instead that you should preserve all the freshness and enthusiasm of youth] (Guevara, 09/05/64: 313).

By 1965 it is possible to identify the canonisation of virtual youthful qualities within the discourse very clearly:

Aquí lo importante es, realmente que nosotros no perdamos el espíritu juvenil y que los jóvenes no pierdan el espíritu revolucionario. Creo que ese es el punto donde debemos encontrarnos siempre, sin que importen las edades. […] [However] [e]stamos muy lejos de poder decir que la lucha revolucionaria de nuestro pueblo ha cesado, estamos muy lejos de decir que nuestra juventud no le queden tareas y esfuerzos grandes. […] Es por eso que ese vínculo hondo, entrañable, entre las primeras oleadas revolucionarias y cada nueva oleada revolucionaria no se pierde (Castro, 13/03/65: 10).

The important thing here is really that we shouldn’t lose our youthful attitude, and that young people shouldn’t lose their revolutionary spirit. I believe that this is the point at which we shall always converge, where age doesn’t matter[…] [However] we are a long way from a situation where we can say that the revolutionary struggle of our nation is over, a long way from saying that there are no more big tasks and challenges for our young people. […] It is for this reason that this profound and intimate link between the first and each subsequent revolutionary wave will not be lost.

This is a significant speech as it linked the role of young people with the need to maintain a youthful spirit in the rest of the population. Later that year, the culture of youth was developed further by Castro, who contended that “la juventud no es sólo un estado vital, sino un derecho de todo aquél que no se deje vencer por los
años y nunca pierda su espíritu juvenil” [youth is not only a vital state of being; it is also a universal right of anyone who is not defeated by the passage of time and never loses the youthful spirit] (Castro, 26/06/65: 10).

The conclusion that must be drawn from this last section is interesting. The construction of an idealised vision of youth present and future on the basis of a radical and decadent past was in part about young people in the 1960s and their perceived and anticipated role in the Revolution. However, such a vision of youth also related intimately to the national-revolutionary identity in so far as all Cubans were encouraged to identify with the heroic image of youth presented in the leadership discourse. The key point is that in this sense, the fact that young people in Cuba were not appearing to act within the discourse of youth does not matter. The culture of youth that was developed through all the discussion of the concept of youth in the speeches (with the exception of the discourse of moral panic) was not directed – or not solely directed – at young Cubans. It was rather an inherent part of the dominant national-revolutionary identity.

3.9 Conclusion

Young people were a part of the new national-revolutionary identity, but it is possible conceptually to perceive an identity based on the culture of youth that in fact need not have had any connection with the lives of young people. The Revolution was not lazy in that sense, though. It attempted to be broadly inclusive, and what developed was a mix of youth identities that on the one hand fitted within the national-revolutionary consensus to a greater or lesser extent, and on the other, also to a greater or lesser extent, chose to reject it. Youth became a category that was associated with a virtual definition. This definition was in part contradictory, because on the one hand youth were canonised but on the other the lucha to achieve the qualities associated with such canonisation was portrayed as the Revolutionary role and duty of young people. The discursive technique for achieving this was the building up of a direct relationship between the Revolution and young people, through the concepts of heroes and martyrs, demands and expectations, persuasion and, where this did not work, moral panic.
The culture of youth was not merely built in the discourse as part of the national-revolutionary identity, but also had a tangible form in the youth policy of the Revolution. The next chapter will deal with this youth policy, which illustrates the focus on the future development of Cuba through an investment in young people. This was consistent with the model established in this chapter, so that through the discourse on the one hand and policy on the other, there was an attempt to build a coherent culture of youth that was both practical and ideological.
Chapter 4  
A Culture of Youth in Policy  

4.1 Introduction  

The period in question predates the norm of creating an official youth policy, which is now widespread worldwide. As Balardini, writing on youth policy in Latin America specifically, points out:  

the pre-1960s conservative approach [to policy-making] ignored the specific characteristics and needs of the youth in relation to adults and hardly produced any youth-specific policies. This has only recently begun to change, with the exception of Mexico, Venezuela, Costa Rica and Cuba who were the first to implement policies designed specifically for young people, although these were mostly restricted to sports and leisure programmes for urban students (Balardini, 2000a: 43).  

The first ten years of the Revolution saw the development of a de facto youth policy in Cuba, although it was not referred to as such. The fact that youth policies were so important to the revolutionary programme was part of the developing culture of youth whereby planning for a heroic future was reflected through policy as well as discourse. This chapter aims to trace that policy, but, while Balardini argues that policies were restricted to sports and leisure programmes, I will argue that these, and other elements of the youth policy, were part of a broader ethos of youth policy focusing on the relationship between education, work, leisure and revolutionary ideology.  

There is, naturally, an overlap between policy, which was driven by the revolutionary leadership, and participation, which was essentially youth-driven. Policy, and by extension the leadership, was shaped by the political culture that was being created by participation, as this political culture created the context in which policy could be successful. A counter-point to this would be policies that were not driven by political culture, such as the Family Code of 1975, which, despite legislating for an equal division of housework between men and women, failed to resolve the problem of the double shift (women’s work inside and
outside the home) due to male resistance to the code (Nazzari, 1983: 261). Fagen (1969) made the implicit connection between participation and policy, in so far as his focus was both on initiatives that were participation-driven (the Literacy Campaign) and those that were policy-driven (the Schools of Revolutionary Instruction (EIRs)). An article in *Bohemia* in 1967 elucidated this. With reference to the Escuelas al Campo programme (see below), the policy process was articulated as follows:

Muy lejos de un úkase ministerial, el plan La Escuela al Campo empezó a estructurarse desde la base, en libre discusión y análisis de las autoridades escolares con alumnos, profesores y padres. Su aplicación y éxito dependía del calor y entusiasmo de los propios interesados (*Bohemia*, 24/02/67: 52).

*Far from being a ministerial decree, the Schools to the Countryside plan began to take shape from the bottom up, in free discussions and analyses involving the school authorities, pupils, teachers and parents. Its application and success relied upon the drive and enthusiasm of the people involved.*

The aim of policy was to build the new Cuba, but the focus of policy-making was on consensus rather than imposition.

The integration of education and revolutionary programmes took place at a number of levels which will be explored below. Firstly, the broader ideology of education will be examined, as this explains why all aspects of the youth policy were associated with the revolutionary goal of development of *conciencia* through education. Secondly, the extent to which education was expanded and democratised will be considered. Thirdly, the connection between education and work will be examined. Whilst one of the central policy goals of the revolutionary Government was to provide Cuba with a work force that could fulfil the economic aims of the Revolution, of more importance is that the connection with work was part of the intimate relationship that was being forged through the discourse between *la Revolución* and *el pueblo* (the people). Fourthly, in line with a militarization of the language and discourse of the Revolution, the integration of education and the military will be considered. This does not reflect or refer to an over-powerful military; rather it relates to
Domínguez’s concept of the ‘civic soldier’, creating a culture whereby “[f]rom one point of view, civilians were militarized; from another the military were civilianized” (Domínguez, 1978: 353). Fifthly, the converging relationship between education and leisure will be explored through the policy initiatives, notably sports policy, within the Cuban adaptation of Marxist thought on the function of leisure time. Sixthly, the direct link between education and ideology will be explored. Finally, policies developed when young people did not espouse the ideology that discourse and policy encouraged them to internalise will be explored. When policy and discourse were unsuccessful, the resulting moral panic prompted policy initiatives that, through punishment and/or re-education, attempted to align those non-conformist young people with the national-revolutionary identity.

4.2 An Ideology of Education

Cuban studies on young people have focused on education as the key policy initiative relating to building the Revolution through the resource which young people could provide (Rodríguez, 1989; Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986; Gómez no date e). Education was conceptually a long-term part of Cuban political culture, having been emphasised by the Apóstol José Martí in his famous statement “ser culto es el único modo de ser libre” [the only way to be free is to be educated] (Martí, 2004 [1884]: 289), a position that was taken up by Castro in his 1953 trial statement. The reform of education was part of the programme Castro then envisaged for a new Cuba, although not one of the five revolutionary laws he espoused. He stated that “un gobierno revolucionario procedería a la reforma integral de nuestra enseñanza, poniéndola a tono con las iniciativas anteriores, para preparar debidamente a las generaciones que están llamadas a vivir en una patria más feliz” [a revolutionary government would undertake a thorough reform of our educational system, making it compatible with earlier initiatives, in order to provide a proper education for the generations destined to live in a happier land] (Castro, no date [1953]: 46-47). He then quoted Martí’s avowal that “Un pueblo instruido será siempre fuerte y libre” [An educated people will always be strong and free] (Castro, no date [1953]: 47). Conversely, a failure to nourish education demonstrated the
Batistato’s disengagement from the Cuban people. Castro’s statement is interesting because he conceived of education as part of the generational transformation that needed to take place in his vision of Cuba’s future. This concurs with Eisenstadt’s theory that it is in the transition from adolescence to adulthood that an age group is formed (Eisenstadt, 1964: 183-84); the focus on the formation of a new generation was therefore critical to the formation of a new society. The new generation was perceived as better or purer than that which preceded it, and it was formed under a new set of social relations. This early emphasis on education translated into policy after January 1959, and is still heralded today as one of the great successes of the Revolution.

The problem with focusing on education as the key to exploring the lives of young people is twofold. Firstly, as a policy it was not aimed exclusively at the young. Indeed, the aim was to educate all Cuban people, notably in the Literacy Campaign but also through adult education initiatives. For the purposes of this study I will look at developments in education that affected young people. The expansion of adult education was also an important part of education policy and this impacted on youth, largely in terms of the Literacy Campaign that created a generation of young teachers, and that will be dealt with in Chapter 7, and in terms of teacher training, dealt with below. Secondly, education was only one of the socialising forces for young people. This is not to say that it did not matter; rather the context of education policy must be elucidated. Education, whilst being one of the principal components of a de facto youth policy, was also a part of broader social policy, and other policy initiatives also impacted upon young people. Those other initiatives in social policy overlapped with education so that education referred to more than just the school and university curricula and admissions policy in several respects. Therefore in this chapter education will be dealt with in its broadest terms through its relation to and integration with other aims and policies of the Revolution and, therefore, its connection with the ideology and discourse of the Revolution.

The early focus on education was because it was seen as essential to the formation of the new generation in terms of development of revolutionary consciousness (conciencia). The development of conciencia was part of the
developing national-revolutionary identity and was intimately linked to the developing ideology. Education policy cannot be separated from ideology, as discussed in Chapter 2 and in line with Kapcia’s argument that revolutionary Cuban ideology comprised notions of equality, the liberating effect of culture, agrarianism, community, heroic nationalism, responsibility of a benevolent state and faith in nationalism (Kapcia, 1997: 83-84). Specific policy initiatives to develop this ideology on a mass level, notably via the EIRs, were a crucial part of ideological development as well as a reflection of the desire of the revolutionary Government to achieve authority as the legitimate descendents of Martí. Yet all education policy, not just specific initiatives, bore the mark of this ideology. Of course, education served a practical purpose as well. Marquez makes the point that of the three-fold aims of Cuban education – democratisation of education, answering economic needs and forming the new citizen – the first two were probably more widely understood and shared by the Cuban population (Marquez, 1972: 9). This, however, reflects the reality that education policy was undergoing development and was responding to different challenges and thus the concept of education and its relationship with the development of a new generation fulfilled all three aims.

4.3 The Democratisation of Education

The weaknesses of pre-revolutionary education serve as a useful yardstick against which to measure educational developments of the 1960s. When commenting on education in pre-revolutionary Cuba, Paulston argues that “[p]erhaps the most serious defect […] was that the Cuban school system had totally failed to meet the educational needs of the rural population” (Paulston, 1971: 379). As early as July 1959, attempts were being made to promote education and make it more inclusive, with a 25-35% reduction in the cost of textbooks approved by law (EIR, 1966: 29). The creation of 10,000 new classrooms was written into the law in September 1959 (EIR, 1966: 31). 1961 was named the Año de la Educación [Year of Education] and major educational changes took place over the course of that year. The most important of these was the Literacy Campaign, which will be dealt with elsewhere in this work, but other major policy changes with regard to education were also taking place, thus establishing
educational structures that reflected the focus on education within the early Revolution. The major educational reform of the early Revolution took place on 6th June 1961, with the Ley de Nacionalización de la Enseñanza, which moved all private schools into state hands. This law ensured that all education in Cuba was free (Comité Estatal de Estadísticas, 1981: 148).

There were various ways in which access to schooling improved after 1959, and an overview of 1960s developments demonstrates this. The first way was simply in the expansion of the numbers of schools: in the first ten years of the Revolution the number of primary and secondary schools doubled and the number of teachers tripled (Paulston, 1971: 386), and from 1961 to 1969 the amount spent on education increased fourfold (Valdés, 1972: 439). Secondly, the nationalisation of schools which led to education (including books and materials) being free to all Cubans dramatically improved access for those impoverished classes who would have been poorly educated prior to the Revolution, notably in rural areas. Added to these developments was the beca (scholarship) programme that was established in 1962. The becados, those in receipt of the scholarships, were boarders in the new boarding schools, generally going home at weekends (Marshall, 1987: 152-53) and were expected to be exemplary students (Valdés, 1972: 440). The Plan de Becas ran through the whole post-sixth grade education system. In 1960 two scholarship schemes, the “José Antonio Echevarría” and the “Ramiro Valdés Daussá”, were instituted in the departments of architecture and engineering at the University of Havana, allowing 4500 young people, the majority of whom were from rural regions, to study at the university whilst boarding in four halls of residence in Vedado (Gómez, no date b: 82 and 85). The rationale for the distribution of becas was laid out by Castro in 1961 with reference to those young people who had been alfabetizadores:

Preferencia a brigadistas que hayan aprobado el sexto grado y que en su pueblo no haya secundaria básica, y que él quiere estudiar secundaria básica, para después estudiar preuniversitario y después estudiar una carrera universitaria; o bien estudiar secundaria básica, para ingresar

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36 Castro was referring to people who had been members of the Literacy Brigades in 1961.
después en un instituto tecnológico y, sin embargo, no puede porque en su pueblo no hay secundaria básica […] pero su familia [de este brigadista], por ser muchos hermanos, por tener bajos ingresos, tiene una situación apretada y él considere que realmente necesita una beca para poder estudiar (Castro, 22/12/61).

We will give priority to ‘brigadistas’ who have passed the sixth grade and who, in their own village, do not have a secondary basic school, yet who want to complete secondary basic education to be followed by pre-university and then university education […] but the family [of such a ‘brigadista’] are financially stretched as there are a large number of children or the family income is low, and he feels he really needs a grant in order to study.

The becas plan related to a specific need based on the lack of existing schools and universities in rural areas and small towns and was the essence, in a very practical sense, of the democratisation of education, allowing unprecedented access to all levels of the education system. Furthermore, becas were seen as a reward for those young people who had participated in the Literacy Campaign, thereby functioning as a moral incentive.

The changes in educational access outlined in this brief overview were to have a significant impact on young people, many of whom would not have had access to education before the Revolution but now became part of the educational system. As a result of widening participation in the educational system, the latter itself changed. Education became more closely connected with other initiatives reflecting a holistic view of youth development and demonstrating attempts to put theory into practice.

4.4 Youth, Education and Work

The connection between education and work was made explicit in Cuban sociology of the 1980s. García, in a study of the problems of creating new revolutionary generations, argued that:

la vinculación de educación y el trabajo productivo-social no ha sido un simple método didáctico, sino la esencia de la formación comunista,
aplicado en todos los niveles, de acuerdo a la edad de los escolares, a la naturaleza de los estudios, y a los intereses de la propia sociedad (García Galló, 1986: 58).

*linking education to productive and social work has not been a mere didactic device, but is actually the essence of communist training, applied at all levels in accordance with the age of the students, the type of studies and the interests of society itself.*

The idea that youth, education and work were essentially linked is related to both Marxist theory and Martí’s ideals (Figueroa Araujo, 1976: 128), thereby representing a part of the new national-revolutionary identity, which was founded on the dual ideologies of radical nationalism and Marxism-Leninism, as discussed in Chapter 2.

The theme of youth and work espoused by García, and, according to Figueroa, culminating in the Escuelas en el Campo [*Schools in the Countryside*] programme, was a theme that Castro raised on various occasions in the 1960s. A headline in *Revolución* in 1964, introducing a speech by Castro to trainee teachers of the Makarenko institute, read: “Debemos aspirar a que llegue el día en que en todos nuestras escuelas se combine el estudio con el trabajo” [*We must aspire to a situation in which, one day, all our schools will combine study with work*] (*Revolución*, 07/12/64: 1). In a speech during the same month at the inauguration of the Echevarría University, Castro had made clear the necessity of focusing on the link between work and study:

*debemos proponernos muy firmemente crear condiciones futuras para el estudio y debemos preocuparnos firmemente en desarrollar el concepto de que a determinado edad, en determinada etapa de la vida del joven, el trabajo no debe ser una actividad profesional, el trabajo no debe ser un medio de la vida, sino que el trabajo debe formar parte de la formación, es decir, la educación, del joven (Castro, 03/12/64: 4).*

*we must resolutely set ourselves the task of creating future conditions for study and must unwaveringly develop the notion that, at a certain age, at a certain point in the life of a young person, work must not be a professional activity, work must not be a means of earning a living, it must be part of the training, i.e. of the education, of that young person.*
Within the ideology of the Revolution, the third goal of education, as identified by Marquez, was emphasised by Castro, through the policy of linking, as closely as possible, work and study, thereby broadening the definition of education.

The link drawn between work and study in the discourse, whether observed directly in the speeches of the revolutionary leadership or through the eyes of external commentators on the pedagogical path of the Revolution, was followed through by firm policy initiatives in order to translate theory and ideology into a concrete reality. There were three key policy initiatives through which this would be attempted: the Escuelas al Campo [Schools to the Countryside] (and later the Escuelas en el Campo [Schools in the Countryside]), the Columnas Juveniles, and the teacher training system.

The Escuelas al Campo programme, initiated in 1965 in Camagüey and rolled out nationally the following year, was a scheme whereby secondary school students spent 45 days a year in the countryside contributing to agricultural work (Fagen, 1969: 259). Participation rose from 20,000 students in the first year to 160,000 in 1968 (Paulston, 1971: 387) and, coinciding with the launching of the 1968 Revolutionary Offensive, the number of days was increased from 45 to 60 (Valdés, 1972: 449). This programme clearly reflects the revolutionary focus on the rural, not solely via the policy aim of developing rural areas, but also via the guerrilla ideology of revolutionary development through direct connection with the land and the building of the Revolution through voluntary agricultural work. It was summed up in a 1967 article in *Bohemia* about the programme, which pointed out that “[e]scuela y campo, íntimamente asociados, pasaron a ser un todo dentro de los planes pedagógicos de la Cuba Socialista” [school and countryside, intimately linked, have now become one in the pedagogical plans of Socialist Cuba] (Bohemia, 24/02/67: 53).

The nature of the Escuelas al Campo programme was that schools moved wholesale to the countryside: pupils, teachers, books and curricula. A typical day, according to one article, proceeded as follows: wake up at 5.30am, singing of the national anthem and breakfast; agricultural work from 7am until 11am; lunch from 11am until 1pm; agricultural work from 1pm until 5pm; bath, supper
and recreational activities until 8.30pm, school work from 8.30pm until 10pm (Escóbar, Bohemia, 09/02/68: 12). This account seems to undermine the idea that education could continue as normal during these trips to the countryside, given the number of hours apparently spent on agricultural work. It may be an exceptional example or it may be that the article did not make clear that the agricultural work was conducted in shifts.

The Escuelas al Campo programme was later complemented by the Escuelas en el Campo, boarding schools (initially secondary level schools) situated in rural areas for young people from urban areas (Barzini, 1975: 222; Holly, 1979: 174). In 1971 this programme was rolled out to younger pupils (aged 13 to 16), in part with the aim of fulfilling the productive needs of the Revolution, whilst in part reflecting the ideological goal of education fulfilling the broad needs of the population, as elucidated by Castro in a speech opening one of these schools on 7th January 1971:

Esta escuela responde a concepciones acerca de la pedagogía […] Responde a concepciones en cuanto a la pedagogía, de acuerdo con lo más profundo del pensamiento marxista, que concibe la educación, la formación del hombre, vinculada al trabajo productivo, al trabajo creador; de acuerdo con las concepciones tradicionales de nuestra patria, de acuerdo con la concepción martiana, que también imaginaba la escuela de este tipo (Castro, 07/01/71).

This school is consistent with our pedagogical concepts […] It is based upon the most profound Marxist thought, which conceives of education and the training of the individual as closely related to productive and creative work; the school accords with the traditional thinking of our country and with the view of Martí, who also devised schools of this kind (translation from Figueroa, 1976: 128).

One of the reasons for an extension of the Escuelas en el Campo was that the students did better on average at these schools than others; Figueroa claims that the rate of promotion (i.e. moving on to higher levels of education) of pupils at these schools was 11% higher than at urban schools (Figueroa, 1976: 131). Of course, the beca system could explain this – the schools were in some sense selective in the first place – but the expansion of the schools indicates a
successful initiative, related to both the espousal of the rural ethos within the Revolution and the economic focus on agriculture by the late 1960s.

A further way in which work was incorporated into young lives was through the Columnas Juveniles Centenarios (CJCs), founded in 1968 and named after the centenary of the revolutionary war of 1868, with the initial aim of developing agriculture in the province of Camagüey. They set out to form a voluntary productive force of 100,000 young people across Cuba to assist with the achievement of a 10 million tonne *zafra* [sugar harvest] in 1970 (*Granma* editorial reprinted in *Bohemia*, 21/06/68: 56). The initiative, coordinated by the UJC, Ministerio de Trabajo [Ministry of Work] and MinFAR [Ministry of the Armed Forces], was closely linked with education and military training. The same *Granma* editorial pointed out that “La Columna Juvenil del Centenario hoy, al igual que ayer las brigadas alfabetizadores o los batallones de la Milicia, constituye *una gran escuela ideológica y política* para la juventud” [the CJC today, like the brigades of alfabetizadores or battalions of the Militia in the past, represents a great ideological and political school for young people] (Bohemia, 21/06/68: 56; my emphasis). Shortly afterwards, a headline in *Bohemia* read: “100,000 Jóvenes: Integralmente cultos para honrar a Céspedes, Martí y Frank País” [100,000 young people, entirely educated to honour Céspedes, Martí and Frank País] (Rojas, Bohemia, 23/08/68: 70). This use of heroes and martyrs of Cuban revolutionary history as a practice – one that was also used in the speeches of the leadership as shown elsewhere – was part of the mobilizing and conciencia-building aim to connect young Cubans to Cuba’s radical past. The plan to realise the educational potential of the CJC is described as an aim to convert the CJC into “una escuela de cincuenta mil alumnos” [a school of fifty thousand pupils] (Rojas, Bohemia, 23/08/68: 70).

The third way in which education and work were integrated was in the training of young people to be teachers. This was an important part of the formation of a new generation of Cubans in the 1960s: Jolly argued in 1964 that “teacher preparation is […] the most distinctive, almost dramatic, feature of formal education in Cuba” (Jolly, 1964: 237). This took the form of three initiatives: the training college at Minas del Frío in the Sierra Maestra; the Instituto
Pedagógico Makarenko (known as the Plan Makarenko) and the courses at Tarará in Havana (Aguilera, 1964: 15). The students at the Makarenko institute attended at a young age. One example gives an impression of the nature and aims of the schools. Having been a teacher at the age of 13 in the Literacy Campaign, a 15 year-old Rigoberto Pupo attended the institute; in the morning the trainee teachers worked in primary schools (thus dealing to an extent with the teacher shortage in the early 1960s), followed by independent study in the afternoons and classes in the evenings. After graduating from Makarenko, Pupo attended university but still taught during the day, having his university classes at night. Whereas the teaching of Marxist philosophy was not established in the Makarenko school in the early 1960s, the focus on pedagogical training, particularly psychology, was strong (Pupo, interview, 08/05/03). A clear experiential link between study and work emerges, so that each young teacher was also a student. Indeed, through the exertions of the teachers’ union, the Sindicato Nacional de Trabajadores de la Enseñanza y la Ciencia (SINTEC), teachers offered, between 1963 and 1964, over two million hours of voluntary teaching work, indicating the further link between work and voluntarism (García, 1964: 143).37 The link between university and work through the educator/student may be a contributory factor to the change in student identity, from the powerful counter-cultural student identity of the 1950s, the zenith of which was reached in the M-26-7 under Castro’s leadership, to revolutionary participant. The CJC’s also took advantage of this idea of students who could teach while learning. By August 1968, the CJC had trained 1500 alumnos-maestros (teacher-students). This training was run by the Ministry of Education through the Asesoria Nacional de Enseñanza Obrera Campesina – part of another education initiative to promote education of the rural classes – but in this case with the particular aim of ensuring that the relevant practical technical skills could be gained by the members of the Columnas (Rojas, Bohemia, 23/08/68: 70).

The integration of work and education reflected a concern regarding the work ethic. While British cultural studies dealt with a fear from the establishment that

37This was praised by Minister of Education Armando Hart Dávalos at the I Asamblea Nacional de Organismos Populares de la Educación, with a request that voluntary teaching hours should become the main function of the Sindicato (Hart, 1964: 159).
working class youth had lost the work ethic (Cohen, P., 1997a: 94), Cuba in the 1950s had suffered from seasonal unemployment and high levels of underemployment and part of the cultural value system which had upheld a hierarchical 1950s system was the concept that manual labour was degrading, as explored in Chapter 2. In order to build the envisaged Revolution, a need for a change in attitude was essential, and, in order to achieve that change, there was a need to ensure that young people’s attitude towards work – at that crucial point in the formation of the new generation – did not emulate that of the preceding generation. The focus on work and education as integrated therefore became a revolutionary goal reflected in policy.

4.5 Youth, Education and the Military

Militarization of civilian life was part of the changing work ethic, embodying the idea of a lucha [struggle] for all aspects of the Cuban Revolution. Military policy was, after the Bay of Pigs invasion, certainly concerned principally with defence of the patria, but the integration between education and the military was also a key policy goal, expanding over the course of the 1960s. The formalisation of the connection between education and the military, like many initiatives that were conceived in the 1960s, did not really take place until the formation of the Sociedad de Educación Patriótico-Militar (SEPMI) on 28th January 1980 – exactly twenty years after the official launch of the first youth organisation (the AJR) – which was a joint venture developed in the 1970s between the UJC and the MinFAR (Campos Menéndez, 1983: 11-12). Yet the connection between youth, education and the military was clearly forged in the 1960s, right from the very earliest days of the Revolution. The role of the military in founding the AJR was the very first link between young people and the military, which was particularly important for those young people who had not played a role in the 1950s struggle.

Clearly, one causal element of the militarization of education may have been the power and strength of the fuerzas armadas, which had a greater breadth of activities than traditional armed forces, reflected in the pages of its weekly magazine founded in 1960, Verde Olivo. In 1968, the case was made in this
magazine for the militarization of young people’s lives. It was argued that the outcomes of military training – discipline, abnegation and organisation – meant that “un joven educado en los principios de formación militar […] lleva en sí mismo el germen del hombre nuevo” [a young person educated in the principles of military training carries inside himself the germ of the New Man] (Verde Olivo, 07/01/68: 5). The relationship between education and the military ran into problems in 1968. Military service had been obligatory since 1963 for men between 16 and 45, but the first to be called up for three years military service were the 16 year olds. The idea was that these young men would be able to both do military service and study. In 1965 the MinFAR formed the view that young people could incorporate education and military through military institutes. It was argued in Verde Olivo that:

[de este modo jóvenes aptos para cumplir sus obligaciones militares, son llamados a filas sin interrumpir sus estudios, tan importantes y necesarios para capacitar a los cuadros técnicos y profesionales que requiere el desarrollo científico, económico y cultural de nuestra nación (Yasells, Verde Olivo, 28/02/65: 12).

in this way, suitable young candidates for military service are recruited without interruption to their studies, which are so important and necessary for the training of technical and professional cadres vital to the scientific, economic and cultural development of the nation.

Despite this relatively early optimism, the expansion of the Plan de Becas discussed above resulted in some young people avoiding military service by virtue of being in full time scholarship education. Castro had already anticipated this difficulty in 1964, stating that “surgió la necesidad de conciliar el estudio con el Servicio Militar […] y ha de llegar el día en que la totalidad de la juventud tenga que estar estudiando” [the need arose to reconcile studying and military service […] and the day will come when all young people are in compulsory education] (Castro, 03/12/64: 4).

The Deputy Minister of the FAR, talking in 1968, clarified the problem the military were facing in 1968:

[…] mientras una gran parte de nuestros jóvenes cumplía el Servicio [SMO] de acuerdo a lo establecido por la ley, otra parte quedaba
exceptuada por nuestros reglamentos, no pasaba ese Servicio y al tiempo que no se preparaba estaba en una situación privilegiada en relación con los demás [...] y lo fundamental [...] que no se ha venido preparando adecuadamente esa gran masa de jóvenes que por estar en distintos planes educacionales no había sido llamado al servicio (Castilla, Verde Olivo, 03/03/68: 12).

[…] while the majority of our young people complete their national service in accordance with the law, others who, by virtue of the very same law are exempted from so doing, not only remain untrained but also are in a privileged position compared with those who do undertake national service. As a result – and this is the issue here - this group of young people has not received an adequate training because as they followed different curricula they were not called up.

The problem was two-fold: a lack of young people in the armed forces but also a lower level of education amongst those young people who were doing their military service as these were, by definition, those young people who had not managed to secure a scholarship. The solution on the part of the military was to make education an integral part of military service, through the inception of Centros Militares de Enseñanza, identical in principle to the military institutes of 1965, so that those participants would study at the same time as undergoing their military service.

The integration of military ideology into Cuban life was not just reflected in policy terms from the perspective of the military. While the military became education-oriented in response to the difficulties they faced, education in turn became more militarised. Military instruction as part of the curriculum became more widespread in the mid-1960s until finally it was made compulsory at Secondary School level in 1968, with agricultural institutes being put under the direct control of the military (Valdés, 1972: 453). 38 The concept of the integration of education and the military had an aim that was connected not just to military need but also to the military ethos of the Revolution, partly based on discipline, as elucidated by Guevara in his chapter in the 1960 Manual de

38 Another important early revolutionary military initiative, the milicias revolucionarias, will be dealt with in Chapter 7.
capacitación cívica, entitled ‘Moral y disciplina’. Guevara’s concept of discipline is based not solely on response to external orders, but also on a discipline that is internal to the subject. Referring to refraining from drinking, he states that

El soldado rebelde no bebía, no porque su superior lo fuera a castigar, sino porque no debía beber, porque su moral le imponía el no beber y su disciplina interior reafirmaba la imposición de la moral de ese ejército, que iba sencillamente a luchar porque entendía que era su deber entregar la vida por una causa (Guevara, 1960: 299).

*A rebel soldier did not drink – not from fear of punishment, but because he was not supposed to drink; it was a moral question, one where his own inner discipline reinforced the army’s moral imperatives, an army which went off to fight simply because it perceived its duty as being to risk its life for a cause.*

Guevara’s renowned reputation for discipline influenced Castro who, in a speech in 1964, talked of the importance of discipline in an educational setting, stating that “[e]l estudio sale ganando, por cuanto se ha podido observar una mayor disciplina, mayor constancia en el estudio, presencia rigurosa y un comportamiento extraordinario” [education gains from this, as can be seen from improved student discipline, a more sustained and conscientious rate of work, excellent attendance and exceptionally good behaviour] (quoted in Yasells, *Verde Olivo*, 28/02/65: 12).

The link between the military and youth policy did not take only the form of initiatives (although these were of course of importance). Additionally, the military style of the Cuban government influenced the way in which youth policy on a broader scale was propounded. The fact that almost every policy initiative was organised using military terms – *lucha, brigadas, cuadros, columnas* – led to a militarization of political culture in terms of the way Cuba perceived itself. This of course was closely linked with the ideology of the Revolution, seeing itself as the descendant of the 1868, 1898, 1933 and 1953 revolutionary generations.
4.6 Youth, Education and Leisure: Sport as Heroic Pastime

The reasons behind the importance of leisure time to the Revolution have been discussed in Chapter 1, and the use of leisure time translated into policy initiatives which, like other policies, were aimed at all Cubans, but that focussed on and were driven by young people in many ways. This was part of construction of revolutionary conciencia in the new generation, unsullied by the past. Sport in particular was a key policy initiative in this area, and was seen as a key way to develop the new Cuban citizen. It was less contentious in the face of the revolutionary ethos than other leisure activities, such as music (that was influenced in part by external youth cultures so conveyed a challenge to the ethos of post-colonial radical anti-yanqui nationalism).

During the mobilisation for the IX Youth Festival in Algeria planned for 1965 (which was eventually cancelled following the military coup deposing President Ben Bella in June that year), young people were encouraged to excel in the field of sport, something often ignored in the historiography of the Revolution. Some of the broader surveys of Cuban history and political culture overlook sport entirely: Fagen (1969), Domínguez (1978) and Thomas (1971) make no reference at all to sport within the Revolution. Despite this, several in-depth studies of Cuban sport have been published, demonstrating an interest in the philosophy behind sports in Cuba. Hampson’s 1980 survey of sports policy in Cuba stands out in particular. He pointed out that the aim of the Instituto Nacional de Deportes, Educación Física y Recreación (INDER) ['Institute of Sport, Physical Education and Recreation'] was to promote participation in sport amongst the whole population: “In fact massiveness can be noted as a distinct feature of physical education in Cuba” (Hampson, 1980: 65), particularly in rural areas where sports participation was low. The level of investment in all areas of sport indicates the crucial role of sport in the Revolution. Pickering noted that “to excel at sport in Cuba is regarded in exactly the same way as the whole world regards excellence in art, drama, music or architecture. It is only in some areas of Western society that sport is regarded as a strange bedfellow in such company” (Pickering, 1978: 169). This reflected the role of sport as part of
cultural participation and education.\textsuperscript{39} It is worth noting that sports policy was highly centralised through a pyramid structure with INDER sitting at the top, down eventually to policy implementation through organisation in localities and in schools (Pettavino and Pye, 1996: 123). Despite this hierarchy, the policy formation process often began at a local level. Hampson pointed out that in the formation of the Plan de las Montañas (see below), rural dwellers were first consulted over what type of sports facilities they would like (Hampson, 1980: 67). Despite the relative absence of sport in many texts referring to the Revolution, these specialist sources indicate that changes in sport were substantial and also that sports policy was a significant part of the fusion of education, work, production and ideology.

The first significant impetus to sport within the Revolution was the formation of the INDER in January 1961, under the leadership of José Llanusa Gobel (EIR, 1966: 69), who later became Minister of Education. An article in \textit{Mella} magazine in 1959 affirmed the need to build a sports policy, stating that “hasta ahora en Cuba nunca había sido atendido como era necesario para que los jóvenes cubanos pudieran crecer fuertes y saludables” [until now, there had never been an understanding in Cuba of just how necessary it [sports policy] was in order to enable young Cubans to grow up strong and healthy] (\textit{Mella}, 15/08/59: 20). This article pointed out that sporting equipment was now distributed free of charge by the precursor to INDER, the Dirección General de Deportes. It also emphasised the fact that sport was of particular importance to young people, who made up most of the spectators at sporting events, and who sought to emulate their sporting heroes. Llanusa articulated the broad focus on sport:

\textsuperscript{39} Having said that, in a survey of Cuban cultural leaders in 1969, when asked the question “¿Usted piensa que en la actualidad existe una relación real, orgánica, entre cultura y deporte?” [Do you think that at present there is a real organic relationship between culture and sport?] five respondents answered categorically that not only was there not that relationship but also that it would be unwelcome/impossible, one abstained in his answer, two spoke of the possibility as something positive that could be aimed at and only one, Héctor Azar, Director of the Bellas Artes theatre answered in the affirmative stating that “Creo que el deporte es una forma de cultura, en tanto se entienda la cultura como una manera de expresar las cosas de la vida” [I think that sport is a form of culture, if culture is understood to mean a way of expressing life’s issues] (Timossi, \textit{Casa de los Américas}, March-April 1969: 127).
[e]l deporte tiende a mejorar al individuo físicamente, de lo cual se deriva una mejor salud, un aumento en la producción, ya que producirá más el obrero que esté en mejor estado físico y mantiene [...] nuestro pueblo preparando para la defensa de la patria en caso de agresión (Llanusa, *Mella*, 06/05/61: 43).

sport tends to improve the individual physically, leading to improved health and an increase in production, since a worker in better physical condition will produce more, and it keeps [...] our people ready to defend the country in the event of attack.

In line with similar educational initiatives, the lack of expertise was dealt with through the education of sports teachers. As the pedagogy of sport was underdeveloped in Cuba prior to the Revolution one of INDER’s first tasks was to provide a manual for physical education teachers.40

The goal of expanding sports education and participation was related to more than just production, defence and a healthy workforce; rather, as emphasised by Torroella in the third of his articles on the education system in Cuba in *Bohemia* in 1967:

La educación física y deportiva aspira a formar jóvenes de mente sana en cuerpos sanos, a estimular al desarrollo físico y la salud, y a fomentar actitudes de colectivización y de camaradería que favorecen la integración del individuo al grupo, como aspecto esencial de la formación integral de la juventud (Torroella, *Bohemia*, 21/01/67: 22).

Physical education and sport aim to produce healthy minds in healthy bodies, to stimulate physical development and health and to develop attitudes of collectivisation and comradeship which assist in integrating the individual into the group, as an essential aspect of the overall training of young people.

The clear link here between sport and the New Man ideal in part reflected the time at which this article was written and in part reflected the hopes and pressures that were conferred upon young people as that untainted blank slate

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40 This manual, produced in 1961, reflected the lack of pre-revolutionary expertise in education through its bibliography. Twenty-eight texts were drawn upon. Of these, 14 were US-published, 1 British, 1 Soviet, 2 Spanish, 9 from other Latin American countries and only 1 published in Cuba (Fernández and Ruiz, 1961: iii-iv).
that defined them as communist citizens superior to the tainted generation that preceded them.

There were three key initiatives relating to INDER and young people. Soon after its inception, INDER launched the sporting trials entitled Listos Para Vencer (LPV) [*Ready for Victory*; this also in effect served as the slogan of the institute]. Young people were encouraged to take part in the LPV trials which consisted of a series of sporting activities including gymnastics, running, rope-climbing and long jump (for full list of sports, see Hampson, 1980: 66). In a letter from the AJR to youth leader Joel Iglesias, at the time unwell, sent while he was on his six-month tour of socialist countries, the importance of sport to the youth movement was emphasised. It stated that “[e]l deporte es tarea ya de grandes masas de jóvenes y del pueblo. Queremos que te pongas bien para que puedas pasar las pruebas de LPV, aunque sabemos que tú siempre estás listo para vencer” [*Sport is a task for great numbers of our youth and of the people. We want you to get fit in order to pass the ‘Ready for Victory’ trials, although we know you are always ready for victory*] (Mella, Editorial, 04/07/61: 10).

The recruitment drive to the LPV tests through the AJR reflects that the tests were considered an essential youth initiative, but the fact that the AJR was urging Iglesias to go through the test indicates that involvement was anticipated not just from the rank and file of the organisation, but equally from the leadership. The same would be seen in the Columnas Juveniles Centenarias (CJC*Js), into which many of the leadership of the UJC were incorporated (Marquez, 1972: 22). Mass policy initiatives aimed to incorporate all Cubans and this included the leadership at all levels.

Other measures, alongside the LPV test, aiming to involve young people in sporting activities through competition and emulation were the Plan de las Montañas [*Mountain Plan*] starting in 1963 and the Plan de la Calle [*Street Plan*] starting in 1966. These were softer measures than the LPV tests. The Plan de la Calle involved the reservation of public spaces for youth sports on Sundays (Torroella, *Bohemia*, 21/01/67: 22) while the Plan de las Montañas aimed to promote rural sport (Hampson, 1980: 67).
Sports policy aimed to involve Cubans from a young age in mainstream schools whilst allowing for the continuation of those promising students through specialist schools, eventually aiming to provide Cuba with world-class athletes and pedagogically and theoretically trained coaches and teachers. Specialist sports education, like all areas of education, centred on the concepts of work and study, as well as training in sports. Sports policy, however, had a broader participatory aim, which was to encourage the enjoyment and appreciation of sport by the population at large. This aim was translated into policy in 1967 when all sports events were made free to spectators (Pettavino and Pye, 1996: 118). Sport served a pragmatic aim – that of having a healthy workforce – but more importantly it concurred with the view that the positive use of leisure time contributed to the formation of the New Man.

4.7 Youth, Education and Ideology

In a sense, all education policy reflected the ideological aims of the Revolution. In turn, ideological training was part of education policy. Whilst access to schooling and universities was greatly improved by the Plan de Becas and expansion of the school and university systems, education also became, in some senses, more selective. This was particularly the case with the Escuelas de Instrucción Revolucionaria (EIRs) [Schools for Revolutionary Instruction], which began operating on a national and regional level in January 1961 (EIR, 1966: 65). Castro laid out the role of these schools, saying “[l]a fundamental tarea de las Escuelas, es sencillamente, la formación ideologica de los revolucionarios, y, e su vez del pueblo” [the fundamental task of the schools is, quite simply, the ideological training of revolutionaries and, in turn, of the people] (quoted in Soto, 1964: 62). The aim of the schools was to provide ideological training to a select group of individuals who, although the term was not yet used frequently in the discourse, would serve as the revolutionary ‘vanguard’. In the school’s early days, the training was provided by the PSP as they were almost the only cohort of Cubans with a knowledge of Marxist principles (Fagen, 1969: 107). In Fagen’s study of these schools, information on the age of participants is unfortunately somewhat scant, but he did point out that
in 1963 and 1965 between 70 and 80 percent of students were under 35 (Fagen, 1969: 256n), and that the minimum age was 16 (Fagen, 1969: 130n). He also quoted data indicating that 39.4% of instructors at these schools were under the age of 25, and 8.9% of instructors were drawn from the ranks of the UJC (Fagen, 1969: 134). Teacher training in general has been dealt with above, but this is a good example of the importance of young people as educators of other young people, and indeed of the population at large. Furthermore, there were specialist UJC EIRs from 1963 to 1966, probably established in an attempt to strengthen the perceptibly weak ideological grounding of the UJC. It is clear from this that, although the schools were not aimed exclusively at young people, the role of young people as instructors and participants was of importance.

The second way in which ideology and youth development came together was through the inception of the Isla de Pinos as the renamed Isla de la Juventud. Fagen describes this as “one of the most audacious of all the social experiments of the Castro government” (Fagen, 1969: 176). After the success of a youth column in repairing hurricane damage to the island in July and August 1966, the island was renamed the Isla de la Juventud, with the aim, through the Plan Camilo Cienfuegos, of developing the erstwhile under-populated island into a site of agricultural prosperity. Young people travelling to the island to work also underwent education in the state farms, with other young people serving as their teachers, as well as participating in sport and recreation activities (Bravet, Bohemia, 03/03/67: 4-10). Many of the international youth brigades went to the island to do voluntary work (Levinson and Brightman, 1971) alongside young Cubans. In essence, the Isla represented a Guevara-esque utopic vision, a site upon which ideals of youth perfection, purity and commitment, could be projected. The actual life on the island is less important than the island as a rhetorical device through which la juventud were given part ownership of the Revolution.

41 In the lifetime of these special UJC schools, 1848 young people graduated (Fagen, 1969: 226)
4.8 Moral Panic in Policy

Whilst the above covers the positive policy measures that aimed for the creation of an idealised youth as defined by the discourse, the other side of the coin was the reaction in policy to apparent dissent. While differences could be dealt with locally, through educational facilities, mass organisations, family, or at the workplace, certain measures were brought in to close down those forms of expression that were felt to be, in one way or another, contrary to the aims of the Revolution. Over the course of the 1960s, as some young people continued to neither work nor study, a youth problem came to be perceived. This perspective deepened as the distance from 1959 widened, and aside from attacking those young people who were deemed un-revolutionary in speeches, there were also policy initiatives which aimed to re-educate this group.

The first policy solution intended to re-educate young people was announced by Castro in 1963, on the anniversary of the Moncada attack:

> [Q]ue el joven ausentista e indisciplinado y vago se mande a determinadas escuelas en las montañas (APLAUSOS), de manera que ese filtro no pase, porque la sociedad socialista no ha de permitir, no debe permitir que en su seno se desarrolle el elemento parasitario, el lumpen en potencia del mañana, y para eso tendremos dos instituciones: la escuela y el Servicio Militar Obligatorio […] Ahora, todo joven tendrá que pasar por la escuela o por el ejército (APLAUSOS); y esas serán instituciones enemigas de la vagancia, enemigas de la indisciplina (Castro, 26/07/63).

The undisciplined idle young absentee will be sent to certain schools in the mountains [applause] so that he doesn’t fall through the net, because a socialist society cannot and must not allow a parasitic element to develop in its veins, as tomorrow’s potential lumpen. And to this end we will have two institutions: the schools and obligatory military service. […] Now every young man will have to go through school or go into the army [applause]. And these institutions will be the enemies of idleness and indiscipline.

The policies which Castro was, at that stage, anticipating (boarding schools and SMO) to deal with the moral panic were those that were already coming into
being as positive policies to encourage young people to participate in the Revolution. These policy solutions were seen as a way of saving – rather than punishing – those young people who were at risk of being tomorrow’s troublemakers.

However, as the 1960s progressed the moral panic deepened. Overtly non-revolutionary (if not counter-revolutionary) activity, notably pertaining to homosexuals and hippies, but also to those who neither worked nor studied, came to be dealt with harshly. The most significant policy to deal with the problem and problematization of non-conformist cultures was the launch of the UMAPs (Unidades Militares de Ayuda a la Producción). The UMAPs were probably founded in 1965 and were closed in 1967, and were a form of forced labour camp. Although no single history of the camps has been written, various accounts of the policy exist and Cubans today are more critical of the UMAPs than any other aspect of 1960s Cuban history. The most thorough account of the UMAPs comes from Yglesias’ account of Cuban revolutionary life. He describes the UMAPs as follows:

[They] were begun to take care of young men of military age whose incorporation into the Army for military training was considered unfeasible. Young men known to avoid work were candidates; so were known counter-revolutionaries; and also immoralists [sic], a category that included homosexuals (Yglesias, 1970: 269).

Although aimed initially at young men, it appears that the UMAPs grew out of control, with older Cubans also being sent to these camps. However, Yglesias discovered that in 1967, the year of his study during which the UMAPs had become unfeasible in the long term due to criticism from inside and outside Cuba, those released before their full sentence was served were the over-27 year olds. The implication is that the UMAPs had grown out of proportion, had over-reached their original aims, and that 1967 saw a return to those aims. Yglesias also pointed out that the UMAPs were unpopular particularly with the intellectuals (Yglesias, 1970: 268) and with Castro himself (Yglesias, 1970: 273-74) and that in that respect the thinning out of the inmate numbers could reflect

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42 These were also there to serve other aims; for example, the non-conventional (protestant) religious leaders were sent to the camps.
initial moves toward the eventual closure of the units. UNEAC also campaigned for their closure, and may have been influential in the decision to close them (van der Plas, 1987: 229). The UMAPs saw some high profile inmates such as prominent young intellectual José Mario, formerly of the El Puente publishing group, and Pablo Milanés, a key protagonist of the Nueva Trova movement.

While the UMAPs were a short-lived policy initiative which in all probability did not affect large numbers of young people, 1971 saw the launch of a second policy to deal with those people who were neither working nor studying. In 1969 there were 400,000 young people (under the age of 16) who were neither studying nor working, 200,000 of whom were between the ages of 12 and 16 (Castro, 05/01/69). The Ley Contra la Vagancia passed in April of 1971, disingenuously called the “Law against Laziness” by Bunck (1994: 157), aimed to deal with people who were neither working nor studying, or who were working unproductively, and reflects both the panic over the above figures and an attempt to enforce a work ethic, which had partially taken hold given the levels of voluntary work carried out (particularly surprising given pre-revolutionary attitudes to manual work) but to which not all Cubans adhered. Very little has been written on this legislation, and when it is referred to it is cast in the context of the move towards a more hard-line regime (Bunck, 1994: 157-61), as a feeble attempt to prop up communism (Nelson, 1972: 121-26), or in the context of economic and labour policy. Yet rather than the start of a new era, it marked a stage in a particular moral panic that had begun in the mid-1960s, responded to initially with the UMAPs. Furthermore it was the natural birth child of the policy of moral incentives of the late 1960s, despite it coinciding with an abandonment of moral incentives with Castro’s acceptance of income differentials in his 1971 May Day speech.

The concept of vagrancy and the purpose of the legislation were set out by Castro in this May Day speech. Castro explained that in capitalism vagrancy was a way of life, based on shareholder indolence on the one hand and the need for an army of unemployed to keep wages down on the other. He went on to state his position that:
[en el socialismo no debe ni puede haber desempleados, porque las riquezas salen del trabajo y solo del trabajo. Hasta los bienes que sean de más fácil acceso por la naturaleza se requiere trabajo para obtenerlos. El trabajo es la fuente de los bienes materiales y los servicios que el pueblo necesita […] Esa Ley […] no es una ley para los trabajadores; ¡es una ley para los no trabajadores! (APLAUSOS.) No es una ley para los que cumplen el deber, sino para los que rehuyen el cumplimiento del deber (Castro, 01/05/71).

[under socialism unemployment should and must be impossible, because wealth comes from work and only from work. Work is required even to access natural resources. Work is the source of material goods and services that the people need. […] This law […] is not for the workers, it is a law for the non-workers! (Applause) It is not a law to govern those who are doing their duty, but for those are shirking their duty.

The legislation was both economic, in so far as it was attempting to solve the problem of under-employment and misuse of workforce resources, a key concern of the Ministry of Labour at the time, and moral in its relation to attitudes to work. And furthermore, the process of formulating the policy (a mass workplace consultation) in fact to an extent negated the need for the law itself: by the time the law was on the statute books, 90,000 people had registered for work under its provisions (van der Plas, 1987: 230). The law would operate in two stages. Firstly, those who were not registered to work or were persistently absent would receive a warning and then be closely supervised by their workplace. If they persisted in unemployment or absenteeism, the second stage would come into operation. They would at that stage be committing the criminal offence of vagancia and would be sent to a re-education centre for between one and two years (van der Plas, 1987: 230). Van der Plas argues that this means of punishment emphasised “the educational aspect of the law and [complied] with the desire to correct those who did not work through convincing argument and education”. Once again, a policy was formed around the central tenet of education.

Perhaps the law was more symbolic than effective in policy terms – it came in the wake of the failure of the 10 million tonne sugar target of 1970, as a result of
which there was a culture of *autocrítica* and a concern with economic development. Yet even in its symbolic form it is significant, representing a reaction to structural problems as well as perceived redolent echoes of the Cuba of the 1950s. It was formulated through the space where cultures met and clashed – the hard-working revolutionary versus the disaffected youth, material versus moral incentives, a less flexible ideology versus the cultural dynamism of the Sixties, fear for the future versus fear of the past – and as such represented a barrier attempting to close off these battle fields.

### 4.9 Conclusion

The range of policies discussed in this chapter lead us to several conclusions. The first is that there was a reality of youth policy in 1960s Cuba through nationwide initiatives that aimed to incorporate all young Cubans. Secondly, youth policy was uniquely connected to education. Either policies were driven through education initiatives, or other initiatives became ‘educationalised’. Thirdly, these policies had a practical purpose for revolutionary Cuba through their aim to satisfy the economic needs of the country. However, there was a more important force at work, which was the formation of the new generation based on the principle of the ‘blank slate’ view of young people as expounded in the discussion of the leadership discourse of youth. The result was that young life in Cuba changed to an extraordinary degree, with opportunities improving for many sectors – particularly rural sectors – which, prior to the Revolution, had been excluded from opportunities. The disadvantage of this expansive youth policy agenda is the constraint therein, leading young life to be effectively crowded out, allowing relatively little time for alternative forms of expression. Yet policy only told one story. Many young people both drove policy, as activists and participants, and benefited from or took advantage of policy initiatives. However, the criticism of Cuban education in the 1960s – as stifling to creativity and originality – can be accepted, in part because some young people chose not to participate and came to be perceived as non-conformists, and in part because the policies of the 1960s led to a level of institutionalisation in the 1970s, which then began to stifle creativity.
The positive building of the culture of youth through policy and discourse, and the moral panic associated with it, was brought about by internal factors, such as attitudes to manual labour, but also operated in the context of a broadening of the concept of youth worldwide, with an explosion of youth movements. The next chapter will explore the effect inside Cuba of this external youth culture, which affected the lives and experiences of young Cubans and which, from the point of view of officialdom, was variously heralded and condemned.
5.1 Introduction

A full discussion of worldwide social and cultural change in the 1960s is beyond the scope of this work. However, a brief discussion of the decade is necessary in order to attempt to clear away certain myths and misconceptions. This chapter aims primarily to identify which external events and movements in the 1960s permeated the Cuban consciousness, and the way in which this influence, either positive or negative, fed into the developing culture of youth in Cuba. The external influence mirrored and interplayed with the discourse of the revolution; on the one hand, some external factors were seen as consistent with the national-revolutionary ideology and, on the other, part of the moral panic which came across in the speeches of the leadership was stimulated by perceived negative influence from the outside, in particular from the USA. This influence should not be overstated and the researcher is struck by the relative lack of evidence of a profound influence of outside youth culture over the many diverse facets of Cuban youth.

Much of the evidence in this chapter has been extracted from the pages of Bohemia magazine through 1967 and 1968. The broad coverage of this publication makes it an attractive source. The pages of the publication covered the multifarious sites of youth culture (political movements, music, fashion and so on). Its focus being both national and international in scope meant that movements outside Cuba were given coverage whereas the youth-specific publications (Mella, Alma Mater) focused on micro-political Cuban issues, rather than international ones. Mella in particular, being the organ of a political organisation, was concerned with mobilisation and organisational issues, rather than examining a broader picture of political culture, so, while giving us a good view of youth activism within Cuba, it needs to be set in contrast to the broader cultural view offered by publications such as Bohemia. As well as being supplemented by Granma and Verde Olivo, some of the information in this
chapter is from interview evidence, as the nature of some of the themes covered is such that there are few written sources available.\footnote{For purposes of anonymity much evidence in this chapter is not credited to specific interviewees, but a full list of interviews is included at the end of the thesis.}

There were some instances where external contact was deemed positive, with leaders of the European New Left and US black rights activists being invited to and welcomed into Cuba. However, in some dominant sites of 1960s youth culture – fashion, music, and protest – a more uneasy relationship existed between that which was indigenously Cuban and that which was seen as external influence. With regard to youth movements outside Cuba, the Cuban press largely ignored their existence and significance, although some discussion of external youth movements can be found. Prior to May 1968, there was little perception in Cuba of external youth culture as a ‘youth movement’, despite such a culture being self-defined in those terms. The reception of youth movements and culture in Cuba therefore came in three different forms: firstly, there were some misunderstandings between Cuba and the external culture; secondly, what was deemed to be an external influence was ‘Cubanised’, that is, was viewed in a Cuba-centric fashion in order to neutralise the sense of influence; and thirdly external influence was vilified, creating moral panics and folk devils, the latter across space rather than time, in contrast with Cohen’s original argument (Cohen, S., 1987: 11). Despite the fact there was not necessarily a divergence between Cuba and the outside, such moral panics in Cuba often followed what was viewed by the dominant Cuban culture as unhealthy influence. Cuban activism, discussed elsewhere, was in part responsible for this closing of Cuban culture to ideas and movements that were not necessarily antipathetic to the Cuban ethos.

5.2 The Sixties: the Collision of the External and the Internal

Much has been written on the 1960s, and the ‘Sixties’ as a concept has become a trope which has multiple meanings (Townsley, 2001). The history of the 1960s, therefore, can be obscured in the wealth of memoir and nostalgia that the concept has engendered. Farber points out that many accounts of the 1960s are “acts of
memory wrestling with history” (Farber, 1994a: 1). One of the difficulties with examining the 1960s is dealing with the commonly-made assumption that they mattered, that they were a period that significantly differed from what came before – and after – and that it is possible to identify cut-off points for a beginning and an end. Marwick is one of the few commentators on this period to engage with this question, justifying his choice of the Sixties as a period worthy of nine hundred and four pages of scholarly study:

the prima facie evidence is strong enough to warrant exploring the proposition that there was a self-contained period (though no period is hermetically sealed), commonly known as ‘the sixties’, of outstanding historical significance in that what happened during this period transformed social and cultural developments for the rest of the century (Marwick, 1998: 5; my emphasis).44

Watts’s review of the period identifies the 1960s as the precursor to contemporary civil society – a rehearsal period – whilst contemplating that the Sixties contained many stories, not a single international social movement, with a “geographical specificity of such local articulations” (Watts, 2001: 173). Key to Watts’s perspective is that the simultaneity of such articulations – with over 70 countries experiencing insurrections in 1968 – meant that “the 1968 movements were a cri de coeur against the world system in which the Old Left and the Old Right had both failed” (Watts, 2001: 175-76). The events in Cuba were an active part of this period of history – the iconic status of Che Guevara in the rest of the world emphasises this – but the movement was also part of Cuban life. Throughout this chapter, the difficulties that Cuba faced in dealing with external youth culture will be examined in terms of the clash between concepts of rebellion and revolution, with the Cuban model differing greatly from that of many external manifestations in the Sixties. In other words, external movements on occasions felt closer to Cuba than Cuba felt to them.

Scholarship on the 1960s is characterised by a focus on the youth culture. The term ‘youthquake’ referred to in Chapter 1, which would concern cultural

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44 For Marwick the Sixties began in 1958 and ended in 1974.
theorists during and after the period in question, was probably coined by Diana Vreeland, the editor of US Vogue. It referred originally to fashion, but soon became the term of reference for the many elements of youth culture that appeared to be gaining ground. Hobsbawm contextualises this youthquake, arguing that “the political radicalization of the 1960s, anticipated by smaller contingents of cultural dissidents and drop-outs under various labels, belonged to these young people” (Hobsbawm, 1995: 324; my emphasis) and centred on a youth culture that was “demotic and antinomian” (330). The link between radicalism and the counter-culture is implicit in Hobsbawm’s work. He argues that in the USA, “where rock fans and student radicals met, the line between getting stoned and building barricades often seemed hazy” (333). Contrary to Watt’s focus on local specificity, Hobsbawm argues that the 1960s saw the emergence of a global youth culture, resulting from improved technology, travel and media, which together resulted in young people experiencing fashion, sex, drugs and rock music as an international phenomenon (333).

The youth culture explosion in Europe and the USA clearly had its foundations in the early 1960s, but it was in the late 1960s that dissent, protest and cultural expression by young people came together and spilled into the public domain. The two highest-profile moments were the ‘Summer of Love’ (1967), the phenomenon that had the effect of transferring the counter-culture into the realms of mass consumer culture, and the rebellions starting at the universities in 1968, most famously in France, but across Europe and the Americas, which were perceived as the closest Europe would come to revolution. Furthermore, the rise of the Black Power movement in the USA during these years, though not strictly a youth movement, also brought civil disobedience and rebellion onto the streets of the USA. These two years have been chosen therefore as the focus of this chapter, while bearing in mind the influence of the preceding years both within and outside Cuba.

45 This position counters the point made in other texts on the 1960s, arguing that the role of youth has been exaggerated, such as Lyons, who argues that “[t]hose events [associated with the 1960s] were by no means exclusively or even in some significant instances predominantly shaped by baby boomers. The peace movement and antiwar sentiment are cases in point. Older Americans were more opposed to the Vietnam War than were the young; and leadership in the peace movement included a remarkable number of less boisterous, less telegenic personalities born before 1946, often considerably earlier” (Lyons, 1996: 7).
The literature on the 1960s leads us to two issues concerning youth: the emergence of sites of culture that were viewed as youth specific, and the emergence of youth movements that utilised these various sites of culture, but which were organised, massive and felt at the time to be radical or dissident by their parent cultures. Cuba was aware of and affected by these cultural changes, with Cuban youth engaging with sites of youth culture, but the effect is not one of simple influence; rather it is a case of the emergence of a Cuban-centric view and interpretation of the events outside Cuba.

5.3 Music, Fashion, Protest: Cuban Reactions to Dominant Sites of Youth Culture

Three sites of external youth culture can be identified as influential in Cuba. Firstly, the music explosion of the 1960s, made up of new styles of music – particularly rock music – invaded Cuban youth consciousness. Secondly, new trends in fashion and style influenced Cuba, but were ‘Cubanised’ to dilute any potential perceived negative influence. Thirdly anti-Vietnam protest, although not generally conceived of as a site of youth culture, was reviled as inauthentic and, despite the concentration of Western youth in the anti-war movement, was never seen by Cuba as a youth culture with which it was worthwhile to engage.

Music is one of the central sites of youth identity. Lipsitz argues that “the power of popular music in shaping and reflecting cultural changes makes it an important site for social and historical analysis” (Lipsitz, 1994:208). He argues that in the USA “rock and roll emerged as the core practice of an exuberant youth counterculture” during the 1960s (Lipsitz, 1994: 208). Music was more than merely something young people consumed. As Leech argues, “the ideas expressed through pop songs may […] be potentially and actually subversive of the established order thereby central to understanding the counter-culture” (Leech, 1973: 8). Popular music in its many manifestations (from folk/protest music, to the rock music explosion, to psychedelic drugs-related rock), and in its close
links with ‘the Movement’\textsuperscript{46} therefore allowed young people to express themselves \textit{in spite of}, as well as due to, its conversion into a big industry. Popular music was also a social leveller, uniting young people from different sub-cultural tastes, so that, as Lipsitz argues, “for a brief time [in the mid- to late-1960s], Bob Dylan’s audience was also James Brown’s and Grateful Dead listeners could also be Beatles fans” (Lipsitz, 1994: 218).

Non-Cuban music was a contested site of culture in Cuba, but was not viewed solely as a negative influence. In general, music was reported in the context of Cuban musical trends, or connections between external music and Cuba. Whilst the Cuban press covered the protest song movement in some detail, as it was later seen as one of the precursors to the Nueva Trova movement of the late 1960s onwards in Cuba (see Chapter 8), the Cuban coverage of the 1960s music explosion was narrow. The reason for covering protest song in detail was not merely because protest music was a music whose ethos tied in with the philosophy and ideology of the Cuban revolution; the political nature of protest song explains why it in particular was \textit{analysed}. The sources consulted did not ignore other popular music; instead they chose to confine it to popular culture columns, such as the \textit{Música} column in Bohemia, which was informative rather than analytical. The Bohemia column, although largely referring to Cuban music, publicized some external popular music. For example, it announced that Petula Clark, described as “una favorita de la juventud en Europa” [\textit{a favourite among European youth}] had recorded two songs in Spanish (\textit{Bohemia}, 12/01/68: 79), and extensive coverage was given to Spanish Eurovision winner Massiel, who had participated in the Varadero music festival in Cuba in 1967 (Abreu, \textit{Bohemia}, 19/04/68: 80-81). While rock music may have been controversial, Western pop was acceptable and popular.

\textsuperscript{46} ‘The Movement’ was originally used as a term to describe the activism associated with the Students for a Democratic Society but came in the late 1960s to have a broader meaning. As Miller (1996) writes, “by focusing on the fate of the SDS as a national organization, scholars overlook the mass movement that flourished in the late sixties and early seventies after SDS expired. [...] By 1970 the Movement and the related counter-culture had expanded numerically, had gained importance in the lives of participants, and had penetrated or influenced virtually every aspect of American society, from the armed forces to religion, from business to sports” (Miller, 1996: 5).
Rock music was accessible to Cuba in the late 1960s, although it was largely absent from the magazine sources consulted, and it was controversial. The eventual rehabilitation of the Beatles, with a sculpture of John Lennon in Havana being unveiled by Fidel Castro in 2000, led to a re-situating of 1960s rock music, and the term ‘Los Beatles’ is now used in Cuba to represent the kind of music that was accessible but of ambiguous official standing in the 1960s. The United States’ 1967 policy of broadcasting rock music to Cuba as a subversive force led to the withdrawal of rock music broadcasts on Cuba’s official media (Kapcia, 2005a: 145). In this Batalla con los Beatles (García, interview, 03/04/03), the lines of conflict were fought between young people and some political forces that held the view that rock music harmed young people. Young members of the sometimes narrow-minded UJC were critical of the Beatles, associating them with the ‘rebel without a cause’ ethos, which was anathema to the dominant national-revolutionary identity. The interest in the Beatles came after the Beatles had broken into the US market in 1964, demonstrating the centrality of US, as opposed to European, cultural influence. Despite the political battle and the removal of rock music from broadcasting, the majority of young people continued to listen to the Beatles. Clara Díaz explains this:

[S]e sucedía entre los jóvenes el cómplice intercambio de discos adquiridos por vía muy personal, anunciado por el resultado artístico de solistas y grupos no difundidos según la política de la cultura oficial (Díaz, 1993: 16).

*There was a secret record exchange between young people announced through an alternative hit parade of groups and solo artists whose music was not officially in circulation.*

Interview evidence suggests that late-1960s Beatles music was the most popular, with one interviewee singing “Day in the Life”, from Beatles album *Sgt. Pepper’s Lonely Hearts Club Band* of 1967 and another humming “Fool on the Hill” from *Magical Mystery Tour* of the same year (Martínez Heredia, 19/05/03; Rodríguez, 06/05/03). Martínez Heredia made the point that many young people in Cuba would sing along to Beatles songs but had no idea of the meaning of the lyrics. The Beatles were a means through which young people expressed themselves, but this was not the subversive force through the lyrics that Leech referred to. Because the recordings were considered almost clandestine, they
gave Cuban young people a focus to express themselves and provided a
differentiation between those people who listened to Western music, and those
who didn’t. The fact that some people disapproved of Western music was only
half the reason why young people wanted access to it: its scarcity value also
raised its mystique.

Despite Beatles and Rolling Stones originals being hard to obtain, recordings of
their songs in Spanish by Spanish or Latin American groups were readily
available (Martínez Heredia, interview, 19/05/03). US artists were occasionally
available. Bob Dylan was popular in the early 1960s, but, on joining the rock
music explosion in the mid-1960s, he was seen to have betrayed the protest song
movement and been seduced into the comfort of commercialism (Serrano and
Nogueras, Caimán barbudo, 1966: 10). He commanded almost no coverage in
the Cuban press in the late 1960s, despite continuing to be popular in Cuba. The
relationship with Western music was ambiguous, with only a narrow extremist
element in the youth organisation and the Party considering it as a negative
influence, and with most young people having access to and enjoying Western
music as well as enjoying the new Cuban music that was emerging, notably
Nueva Trova.

A further important site of youth culture in the 1960s that influenced Cuba was
style, and the related concept, fashion; style being the way in which fashion
(among other things) is used, subverted and given a variety of meanings through
the process of bricolage (Hebdige, 1980: 103-04; see Chapter 1). Although it is
difficult when looking at Europe and the USA to separate fashion from cultures
of conspicuous consumption and celebrity, the trends were nonetheless be felt
outside those cultural criteria. Changes in fashion in the 1960s were European-
led, and these developments were covered, largely comically, in the miscellany
pages of Bohemia, entitled ‘En pocas palabras’. The coverage was light-hearted
and uncritical, showing, for example in the Cámara-bazar section, a photo from a
fashion show in Munich promoting winter tights suitably warm to be worn under
mini-skirts (Bohemia, 16/08/68: 55), and covering European fashions from
Britain, France, Spain and Germany. The only criticism of European fashions
was in response to one new English style – Vietnam chic – which was described
as “sangriento, cruel, inhumano” [bloody, cruel, inhuman] (Bohemia, 01/03/68: 95), reflecting Cuba’s sense of close relationship to the Vietnamese people. Fashion was not, in these ways, used as style; instead it was used as a tool to critique Western culture, or was seen as something unimportant.

The mini-skirt, perhaps the most significant fashion of the 1960s, was, in a sense, depoliticised in Cuba. Political columnist Mario Kuchilán was derisory of attempts by Western sociologists and psychologists to attribute importance to the phenomenon of the mini-skirt. With reference to attempts to link the length of skirts to international crisis, Kuchilán wrote that the mini-skirt, “a nuestros ojos frívolos es tan sólo un espectáculo agradable y agradecible, a la mirada de reojo” [to our frivolous eyes, is just an agreeable and pleasing show, glanced out of the corner of your eye] (Kuchilán, Bohemia, 28/07/67: 78), and went on to argue that expenditure of effort on this type of study detracted from the real importance of international issues. He was later equally contemptuous of views that the gradual denuding of the female body could foster an era of lower fertility (Kuchilán, Bohemia, 05/04/68: 57). The mini-skirt was seen as a comical phenomenon, demonstrated by Ñico in his cartoon ‘La Minifalda’. This showed two women in mini-skirts, one of them saying to her tailor, “digan lo que digan, yo no me muevo sin ponerme una minifalda!” [Whatever anyone says, I am not moving without wearing a mini-skirt], the other looking surprised as a car driver says to her “¿Para qué se la pone?” [Why do you wear one?], and an old woman looks over the scenes saying “¡Qué barbaridad! En mis tiempos no era igual!” [What a disgrace! It was different in my day]. At the bottom of the cartoon ran the line “¿Tiene usted, el gusto joven? ¡Si….pues úsela!” [Do you have young taste? Well, use it then!] (Ñico, Bohemia, 09/02/68: 74). This cartoon gives us a Cuban view of the mini-skirt, showing the generational issues surrounding the mini-skirt yet promoting taste above fashion per se. The perennial machismo, evident both in Kuchilán’s comments, and in the lack of female commentary either in favour or against it the mini-skirt, indicates a depoliticisation. Cuba did not engage at all with Western debates on the mini-skirt as an attempt on the part of the young generation to stay looking young, thereby setting them apart from the parent
generation (Green, 1999: 79). While the mini-skirt was not politically controversial in Cuba, sub-cultural or counter-cultural uses of fashion were frowned upon by political activists, although for the most part absent from press comment.

On the streets in Cuba, fashion was more generationally contested, particularly surrounding the Coppelia group (Chapter 8). Here fashion was linked with the Batalla de Virginidad (García, interview, 03/04/03), a reaction to the liberalisation in sexual relations Cuba was seeing. The mini-skirt for women and long hair for young men, so popular amongst this group, were seen as representative of this sexual revolution, leading to what one commentator described as “una verdadera guerra” [a real war] (García, interview, 03/04/03), with older people even attempting to cut the hair of young men and to pull skirts down to protect the modesty of young women. This group of young people existed as a curious sub-culture. The cane-cutting boots which were provided free for young people doing voluntary work became a fashion item, almost in an act of bricolage, but subtly. This did not represent a rebellion, rather a type of liberation, particularly for young women, where involvement in voluntary work took them firmly out of the traditional role prescribed to them into a much greater sexual freedom. Perhaps in no area can the extent of social change be seen as much as in the lives of young women. The young woman wearing no make-up, volunteering as militia member or cane cutter, spending time away from her family at a young age, found a new identity outside traditional femininity. Youth fashion and style were thereby related to Cuban issues of women’s liberation rather than Western influence.

Protest against the war in Vietnam was an interesting site of youth culture in the 1960s, as it moved away from cultural expression to the political sphere. Given the level of Cuban concern about the war, with 1967 being named the Año del Vietnam Heroico [Year of Heroic Vietnam], a level of convergence and even solidarity between internal and external protest could be anticipated. In 1967 and 1968 there was some coverage of anti-war protest in the rest of the world, with

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47 The mini-skirt caused more problems outside Cuba. In some areas of the USA there were even fears that the mini-skirt might increase the incidence of rape (Marwick, 1998: 467).
brief references to, and/or photos of, people burning draft papers (Bohemia, 26/01/68: 84) and demonstrations in London, Washington, California, New York, Brighton, Lyon, Rome, Milan, Salamanca, Amsterdam, Stockholm, Berlin and Montevideo. Initially, the anti-war protest in the USA was seen as hypocrisy: “De un lado la tejanocracia seguía agitando sus hipócritas banderines de paz. Del otro intensificaba los ataques contra la población civil [in Vietnam]” [On the one had, the jean-wearing elite were continuing to wave their hypocritical little peace flags. On the other hand, attacks against civilians [in Vietnam] were intensifying] (Bohemia, 10/03/67: 58). The anti-war sentiment is contextualised in terms of a youth sentiment only once, when British historian Arnold Toynbee was quoted as writing that “los jóvenes norteamericanos detestan los ‘valores’ defendidos por sus padres” [young North Americans detest the ‘values’ which their parents uphold] (Bohemia, 08/03/68: 85). This was perhaps the first appreciation of the anti-war protest as youth rebellion and as a positive radical measure against the US government. In general, however, any solidarity was not between Cuban protest, and US and European protest against the Vietnam war, but was expressed as direct link between the Cuban people and the Vietnamese people. The slogan adopted in support of Vietnam demonstrated this: “Vietnam: Contigo en la rebeldía antiyanqui con más producción y siempre en la defensa” [Vietnam: We are with you as you fight the yankees, as our economies grow and as we continue to defend ourselves] (Bohemia, 10/03/67: 58). The struggle of the Vietnamese was here seen in the context of the Cuban vision of fighting imperialism with production.

5.4 Youth Rebellion: Cuban Reactions to the Campus Rebellions of 1968

Given the importance of youth activism to youth culture in Cuba (Chapter 6), it is interesting to examine the Cuban reception of external youth activism in 1968. In the Cuban press, coverage of developing youth movements, which exploded into the campus rebellions of 1968, varied depending on whether the European or the US movement was being discussed. In interviews conducted, little mention was made of the political protest occurring elsewhere, indicating that such rebellion had little influence on Cuban youth culture in the 1960s. In the press, Cuban perception of an external youth rebellion can be divided into two clearly
separate periods: before 1968 (when there was no clear perception of an external youth movement), and after the university rebellions of 1968, when a youth rebellion was identified. Prior to May 1968, Europe was not entirely absent from the Cuban press, but the external political coverage focussed predominantly on the USA in terms of domestic politics and external policy, whereas Europe was viewed largely in terms of ‘high’ culture, with few references to politics. In none of the coverage examined here was there any mention at all of a youth rebellion prior to May 1968. There is evidence of some excitement at the rebellions in Europe, but this was largely couched in terms of Cuban influence to be found therein, rather than there being any evidence of influence of these rebellions on Cuba.

The first report referring to the non-Cuban youth movement came in January 1967, when Bohemia reported that Time magazine had nominated the young generation as its Man of the Year:

Más grande que su número – dice – es el impacto que imprime en cada sector de la vida contemporánea de la política al pop-art, de la moda a las finanzas, de los derechos civiles a la desobediencia civil”. Es la generación que se enfrenta a los ocambos como LBJ (Bohemia, 20/01/67: 73).

Greater than its number, says Time magazine, is the impact that it has on every area of contemporary life, from politics to pop art, from fashion to finance, from civil rights to civil disobedience. It is the generation which stands up to the old folk like LBJ.

The idea that there was a new generation counter to the old guard, and that youth had a widespread impact on society was new, but as yet there was no perception in Cuba of why this might be of importance. The appreciation that there was some type of movement was slow to enter into the pages of Bohemia. The first mention of a youth rebellion outside Cuba was made with reference to protests in Germany. In April 1968, an article in Bohemia noted that “[p]or lo menos en cuatro de las ciudades más importantes de la Alemania capitalista […] la rebelión de la juventud daba la tónica de los acontecimientos durante todo el curso de la semana anterior [In at least four of West Germany’s most important cities,[…] the youth rebellion was the focal point of the events in the preceding
weeks] (Bohemia, 26/04/68: 82; my emphasis). The struggle was, unsurprisingly, explained as a conflict between generational perspectives, but, although the conflict was described as a youth rebellion, the youth referred to were students and no appreciation of a broader youth movement can be found.

Where, prior to April 1968, there was no real perception of youth rebellion, after this date European youth rebellion became coterminous with student protest. This can be explained in the context of the radicalisation of the student movement in Europe; German student leader Rudi Dutschke was quoted as saying “No estamos en presencia de una revolución socialista en acción en Europa Occidental, pero podemos y debemos crear las condiciones de la misma” [We are not in the presence of a socialist revolution in Western Europe, but we can and must create the conditions for one], to which the article responded “Las palabras del joven revolucionario alemán demostraban que una brisa del Tercer Mundo comenzaba a soplar en plena Europa” [The words of the young German revolutionary show that a Third World wind is starting to blow throughout Europe] (Bohemia, 26/04/68: 84). Although there was no parallel being drawn, we see a convergence between the Cuban experience and that of radical students in Germany. The connection between the students and the New Left was significant here. Dutschke, along with New Leftists Robin Blackburn and Stuart Hall, visited Cuba (Artaraz, 2001: 59n), and all were perceived in Cuba as part of the same movement.

A month later, the concept of youth rebellion was further established, meriting a small headline in one of Bohemia’s regular columns, ‘Zafarranchitos’. The rebellion was now seen to incorporate the generation of Europeans and North Americans born in the late 1940s, and there was a suggestion that this generation was influenced by the Cuban Revolution, explaining the European and North American youth rebellion as follows: “Puede ser […] la presencia de una revolución joven de dirigentes jóvenes, triunfante, lo que acicatea la responsabilidad de las juventudes” [It could be […] the presence of a triumphant young revolution, run by young people, that awakens a sense of responsibility in

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48 A sub-section of Kuchilán’s “En Zafarrancho” column
the communities of young people] (Bohemia, 24/05/68: 57). This demonstrated an emerging pride in the influence of the Cuban Revolution on the capitalist world.

The events in Paris of May 1968 were initially reported as a student protest, and the synchronicity between these student protests and others around the world was noted. While highlighting the events in Paris, Bohemia also reported on student protest in the USA, Italy, Britain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Spain and Argentina (Bohemia, 24/05/68: 82-86). The inclusion of countries in the Eastern Bloc is interesting as it shows the perception of a generalised student protest although it does not draw links between these protests. While describing the French movement as a student/worker coalition, influenced by the ideas of the Cuban revolution and in particular Che Guevara (83-4), the protests in general were described as the movement of “La Nueva Generación” [the New Generation] (84). In the following issue, the “Zafarrancho” column was headlined “La Rebelión de los Jóvenes” [Youth Rebellion], but, despite mentioning young people in the headline, the article pointed to students, workers and farmers as the protagonists, a group not necessarily generationally linked. Yet the rebellion was once again explained in terms of the new generation, a generation who must be yielded to, arguing that “[v]ivimos una época en que los ocambos tenemos que ceder el paso a los muchachos. Eso se filtra en Cuba desde 1959. Es el signo de los tiempos” [we live in an era in which we old folk have to give way to the young folk. This has been happening in Cuba since 1959. It is a sign of the times] (Bohemia, 31/05/68: 56). A link was made between Cuban young people and young people elsewhere: one of the few occasions where the Cuban experience and the European experience were linked in the Cuban press.

Although analysing the conflict as one that transcended the narrow scope of student protest, the phrase “La Rebelión de los Jóvenes” in the pages of Bohemia had become shorthand for the events on campus in Europe and elsewhere. Given that student populations in the countries in question had massively expanded, and bearing in mind the tradition of radicalism rooting itself in the student body, the blending in meaning of the terms ‘youth’ and ‘student’ was not surprising, but it failed to take into account the mass of young people who were not students and it
undermined the importance of non-student groups involved in the protests. The references to the Cuban revolution and the iconolatry associated with the image of Che Guevara as used by student protestors, indicates an excitement and optimism in Cuba at the rise of an external, politicised and to some extent anti-capitalist (or at least anti-establishment) class, although it is clear that student protest was viewed in terms of rebellion rather than revolution. As an example, a cartoon in Bohemia in June 1968 explored this notion: a book was shown serving as a barricade from which two guns were directed. On the cover of the book were the words “Rebeldía Estudiantil en Europa” [Student Rebellion in Europe], under the title “En Pie de Lucha” [Ready for War] (Bohemia, 07/06/68: 64). According to this, European student protest represented rebellion as the very first stages of armed struggle, much in line with the Cuban definition of rebellion as the precursor to, or first step towards, revolution. Youth outside Cuba was viewed from within Cuba as a rebellious body of partially ‘Cubanised’ students, that is to say, politically awakened and influenced by the Cuban revolution. Much as could be seen with other areas of youth involvement, convergence with the Cuban experience was the form in which student protest was viewed. In this case, the external student movement was considered ‘Cuban’ in so far as Cuba was influential on it, while the notion of student protest, as reported in the pages of Bohemia, was only ‘Cubanised’ in the sense that student protest was seen as a youth rebellion.

Perhaps what is most surprising is that, despite the above coverage, the rebellion was underemphasised, both in Bohemia and elsewhere. MinFAR magazine Verde Olivo gave no coverage at all to the protests. Bohemia confined it to the middle pages. Granma covered the protest, but chose to call it a Rebelión estudiantil rather than joven (e.g. Granma, 01/06/68: 6) and saw it as a more international movement, focusing particularly on student protests in Latin America and the United States, with Paris being given less coverage than in Bohemia. Instead, Granma in May 1968 was interested in Paris as the place where the peace negotiations between the USA and Vietnam were taking place. The muted reaction to the European youth rebellion in the Cuban press can be viewed in the context of international relations. Despite a natural excitement at the events in Europe, in particular in the context of the perceived Cuban
influence on events, Western Europe in the late 1960s was choosing to ignore the US embargo and continue trading with Cuba, so what comes across is a desire not to antagonise the governments of Western Europe. Having said that, the relatively positive view of the student protests – seen as student specific rather than a general youth movement – indicates a level of optimism in Cuba at external events.

5.5 Wasted Potential: Cuban Reactions to the Counter-culture

The moral panic over youth in Cuba in the late 1960s was partly associated with the US counter-culture. This leads to the question of where the non-student youth were in the Cuban press. Outside Cuba, ‘youth rebellion’ meant more than just the student movement. Amongst the variety of youth cultures, one of the highest-profile groups was the hippies (often coterminous with the counter-culture). They crossed a variety of sites of culture: fashion, music, sex and psychedelic drugs, as well as an anti-establishment ethos which they had in common with the students. The Cuban reaction was a specific reaction to the US counter-culture, and no mention was made at all of similar imitative cultures in Europe.

The initial associations of the emerging hippie culture with homosexuality and drugs, particularly following Ginsberg’s visit to Cuba (see Chapter 8), led to a developing perception of the counter-culture as a threat to masculinity or machismo and as an essentially drug-oriented culture. In 1967, Cuban coverage of the counter-culture was scant, with the ‘summer of love’ passing unmentioned in the pages of Bohemia. The first treatment of hippies was comical. A photograph of a hippie was shown, with the headline “Hipies [sic] de Frisco”. The hippie was described as “un tipo de animal – que tiene el ‘coco’ hecho cisco” [a type of animal whose head is a mess] (Bohemia, 09/02/68: 95). The counter-culture was not given serious coverage until May 1968, in reaction to the publication of a volume in Spanish about the hippie phenomenon, by Margaret Randall.49 The article was headlined “¿Rebeldes o escapistas? Los Hippies: Un

49 Randall was a US communist and feminist who later lived in Cuba.
problema interno del imperialismo” [Rebels or Escapists? Hippies: An imperialist problem]. The perspective was circumspect, and the volume was summed up as follows:

Los comentaristas tienen buenos indicios para señalar tanto los peligros de una evolución fascista de los hippies como las posibilidades promisorias de una colaboración con la izquierda o el movimiento negro, una inclinación hacia las vías revolucionarias (Villares, Bohemia, 24/05/68: 21).

*The commentators have good evidence for two possibilities: there is a danger that the hippies might drift towards fascism, but there is also evidence of an encouraging potential for collaboration with the left or the black movement, that is to say, a predisposition to follow a revolutionary course.*

The hippies were seen as being dangerous but also having potential, and were even viewed as a waste of the youth resource, with Randall quoted as writing “Si pudiera esta gran masa de energía humana – la juventud – aliarse a la verdadera izquierda […] el resultado sería una guerra civil o una revolución” [If this great mass of human energy – in youth – allied itself to the true left, […] there would be a civil war or a revolution] (Villares, Bohemia, 24/05/68: 21). There was no real conclusion to the question in the title, of whether hippies were rebels or escapists. Instead the counter-culture was viewed as an alien phenomenon that would not exist in a non-capitalist society but which would also be unlikely to change a capitalist society (and could even make it worse) and in the latter sense constituted a futile expense of the time and energy of young people. As in the case of the youth rebellion in Europe, the hippie movement passed almost unnoticed by the Cuban press. One of the reasons for quiet disapproval of the hippie movement was that it was a US-based movement that did not essentially challenge the US world-view or way of life (essentially, the definition of counter-culture).

However, the presence of home-grown hippies created a much more negative view of the counter-culture. There was a hippie movement of sorts in Havana in the late 1960s. The lack of written evidence makes this a notoriously difficult area to research, but interview evidence from 2003 indicates that these groups
did exist, and there was influence from the external youth counter-culture. The Coppelia set (Chapter 8) identified with hippies in terms of music and fashion, although not really with the psychedelic, marijuana side of hippie culture. Furthermore, there were about ten bandas (gangs) of hippies in Havana, which were associated with beat music, long hair and free love, but whose activities seemed to centre on vandalism, indicating a type of sub-culture rather than membership of the counter-culture. One set of young people in Playa were identified with hippies but were in fact a more violent gang sub-culture, in a sense closer to the yippie culture in the USA. Some young cultural producers such as José Mario were also associated with the hippie culture, partly due to their sexuality and partly through the Ginsberg connection. These cultures were certainly seen as a problem in the late 1960s in Cuba, and in part account for the Anti-Vagrancy Law of 1971. Furthermore, it was within these cultures that a malignant external influence was perceived, dealt with by the sending of some members of these groups to the UMAPs. Yet the importance of the Cuban hippie-type displays should not be exaggerated and neither the existence of these groups, nor their effect on culture, created any moral panic or generational anxiety similar to that occurring in the USA.

5.6 Potential Revolution: Cuban Reactions to the Black Power Movement

An examination of the positive reception of external youth cultures, notably Black Power, gives us an indicator of the ethos that the Cuban national-revolutionary identity held, and in turn this positive reception allowed such movements to be absorbed into that identity. As was the case with the external protest movement, Black Power was not something that featured much in the interviews conducted, although Angela Davies and Stokely Carmichael were mentioned (Ortíz, Vásquez and Azahares, interview, 03/07/2002). This may reflect the limitations of the interviews, or may simply reflect the fact that when talking of youth in the 1960s, Cubans do not now particularly associate the Black Power movement with youth culture. However, in the press an interest in Black Power was clearly evident, and in the solidarity events there was certainly a

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50 Three were named: ‘Los chicos de la flor’, ‘Los Papas’, ‘Los chicos de Quinta y B’.
degree to which this movement permeated the Cuban consciousness. However, because the Cuban government was reluctant to discuss racial issues in Cuba (Chapter 2), support of the Black Power movement was limited to a narrow perception based on issues other than race.

While Cuba saw relatively little prospect of revolution in the hippies, a much greater interest was taken in those US movements that seemed to hold the possibility of creating revolution in the United States, and this was the way in which Black Power was perceived. Although not so clearly a youth movement as the hippies, it is hard to separate Black Power from the youth explosion, particularly in the way it was perceived in the Cuban press. Cuban black identity, more than any other form of Cuban cultural expression excepting the hippies, was formed under US influence, but the movement was ‘Cubanised’. The relationship with Black Power is important to this study in two ways. Firstly, it demonstrates the ‘Cubanisation’ of external influence, and secondly, within this Cubanisation there was a perception of the Black Power movement as the acceptable non-Cuban youth culture. The interest in Black Power was reflected in the Cuban press. Pensamiento Crítico, the intellectual journal of the late 1960s, printed translated articles by Black Power leaders, and Bohemia took great interest in Black Power. According to Artaraz, “blacks were seen as a natural constituency of a potential rise of the ‘wretched of the earth’ that lived at the heart of the imperialist enemy” (Artaraz, 2001: 185).

The connection between Cuba and the Black Power movement is no surprise. Black Power took its inspiration in part from the guerrilla warfare ideas of Che Guevara (particularly by 1968 when the Black Power movement was espousing ‘urban guerrilla’ tactics), which in turn canonised the role of ‘youth’ (the term rather than young people per se) in revolution. This common ideological territory was clearly evoked by Stokely Carmichael, speaking at the OLAS conference in Havana in 1967:

Particularmente son los que tienen “sangre joven” quienes llevan dentro de sí el odio del que habla Che Guevara cuando afirma: “El odio como factor de lucha, el odio intransigente al enemigo que impulsa más allá de las limitaciones del ser humano y lo convierte en una efectiva, violenta,
selectiva y fría máquina de matar”. El movimiento del Poder Negro ha sido el catalizador para la unión de estos [sic.] sangre joven: el verdadero proletariado revolucionario dispuesto a luchar por cualquier medio necesario por la liberación de nuestro pueblo (Carmichael, *Bohemia*, 11/08/67: 30).

*It is particularly those of “young blood”, filled with hatred, to whom Che Guevara is referring when he says: “Hatred, as a factor in the struggle, obstinate hatred for the enemy which spurs them on beyond the limitations of their human weakness and changes them into an effective, violent, selective and cold-blooded killing machine”. The Black Power movement was the catalyst for those [sic] young blood: the true revolutionary proletariat prepared to use all necessary means in the fight to free our people.*

During the course of 1967 and 1968, with the radicalisation of the Black Power movement in the United States, particularly following the effective end to peaceful black protest with the death of its leading exponent Martin Luther King, the Cuban press became more and more interested in Black Power.

Young people were the perceived foot soldiers of the movement. The actions of Black Power were repeatedly referred to in terms of the involvement of young black men; in the speech quoted above, Carmichael stated that “los verdaderos revolucionarios potenciales de este país son las juventudes negras de los ghettos” ([the true revolutionary potential of this country lies in the black youth in the ghettos]) (Carmichael, *Bohemia*, 11/08/67: 31). Indeed, already in January 1967, *Bohemia* journalist Talia Carol, who wrote regularly on the black struggle in the USA, quoted a US study that found those who were most disadvantaged among the black community were adolescents, and those who most hated white Americans were the young (Carol, *Bohemia*, 21/01/67: 26). Writing again in August on black poverty, Carol focussed on the young: “Los jóvenes de esta generación desataron ya la rebelión y es imposible contenerla” [Young people of this generation have already unleashed the rebellion, and it is impossible to contain it] (Carol, *Bohemia*, 25/08/67: 58). In a translated article by H. Rap Brown in 1968, the focus was once again on the young black radical:
Una sociedad que puede montar una acción militar contra un joven negro que rompe una ventana, y al propio tiempo expresa que se encuentra impotente para proteger a los jóvenes negros que son asesinados todos los años porque tratan de hacer que la democracia en los Estados Unidos sea una realidad, es una sociedad enferma, criminal, enajenada (Rap Brown, *Bohemia*, 12/04/68: 81).

A society which can take military action against a young negro who breaks a window, while at the same time claiming to be powerless to protect young blacks who are assassinated every year because they seek to make democracy into a reality in the United States, is a sick, criminal, alienated society.

The above demonstrates a natural solidarity based on ideology between the Cuban revolution and Black Power, but a subtler link also emerges, which is more indicative of the Cuban ideology than that of Black Power, this being the link between the Cuban perception of Black Power, the young US soldier and conscientious objector, and poverty. That is to say, Black Power was perceived as one of several impetuses to revolution in the USA, rather than a racial struggle. Carol, in an article entitled “Comienza la Revolución en Estados Unidos” [*The Revolution is beginning in the USA*] wrote: “Y es que el negro inició ya la revolución social en Estados Unidos. *El cariz racial es un mero accidente en este proceso revolucionario*” [And it is the black man who started the social revolution in the United States. *The racial aspect is a mere accident in this revolutionary process*] (Carol, *Bohemia*, 18/08/67: 10; my emphasis). This reveals both the hope that Cuba had for Black Power and the central difference between the ideologies of both.

Furthermore, the Black Panther ideology of separatism was ignored in Cuba. For example when making reference to the desired release of Black Panther leader Huey Newton from prison, one article stated that “[l]a auténtica libertad de Huey Newton será el resultado de la acción revolucionaria de los afroamericanos y de los blancos que junto a ellos corran sus mismos riesgos” [the real liberty of Huey Newton will be the result of revolutionary action from African Americans and from white people who, side by side with them, take the same risks] (Bohemia, 16/08/68: 67; my emphasis). In 1967 Cuba established a campaign of solidarity...
with black Americans, and its rally in August illustrated this ‘Cubanised’ version of the black struggle in the USA. Elida Acosta, of the organising committee, briefly covered “el fin de la discriminación racial en Cuba, al embate de la justicia revolucionaria, que eliminará la opresión en todas sus formas” [the end of racial discrimination in Cuba brought about by the blow dealt by revolutionary justice, which eliminates oppression in all its forms] (Bohemia, 25/08/67: 61).

Quite aside from the naivety of believing that racism had ended in Cuba, the black question was seen as part of a broader process of freedom from oppression. UJC leader Jaime Crombet also spoke at length during this event and his speech reiterated the latter view:

Recordando frases del Apóstol, condenatorias de la discriminación por el color, decía que ‘hombre es más que negro, más que mulato’, cualquiera que sea el color de su piel y que todo lo que importaba era que fuese un revolucionario, un defensor de la patria (Bohemia, 25/08/67: 61-2).

Recalling phrases of the Apóstol condemning racial discrimination, he said that ‘man is more than black or mulatto’ and that, whatever the colour of his skin, the only thing that mattered was that he was a revolutionary, a defender of the nation.

Cuba’s view was curiously outdated in terms of US politics, more reminiscent of the multi-racial Freedom Rides of the early 1960s than the new separatist reality of the late 1960s. The keynote speech came from a white Cuban, Crombet, while musical entertainment came from black American Lena Horne, white American Barbara Dane, and Cuban guajiro singer “El Jilguero” (Bohemia, 25/08/67: 63).

No reference was made to Malcolm X, while Carmichael and Rap Brown were praised, despite this being the very era in which they were moving to violence (supported by Cuba) and separatism, which was the Black Panther’s position (counter to Cuba’s position). As is repeatedly evident in the 1960s in Cuba, an external force was viewed in Cuban terms, telling us more about Cuba’s view on race politics than the reality of black American life.

The relationship with the Black Power movement was based in part on a shared ideology and in part on a Cuban anticipation of potential rebellion or revolution – particularly among the youth section of the movement – within its fiercest enemy. Yet this narrow definition of US radicalism in the Cuban press left much
of the youth explosion missing from the discourse. These groups were perceived as a young generation rising against the old, but at the same time other groups were rising in different ways. The optimism in Cuba that those groups which most correlated to the Cuban prescription for the future would be those that would prevail seems naïve in retrospect, but in the context of the radical social change in Cuba and outside, is not unexpected.

5.7 Conclusion

The developing culture of youth in Cuba took account of external events and forces, but the influence and input was not of great significance. Cuba was interested in external youth forces when they connected – or could be seen to connect – to the dominant discourse and ideology of the Cuban Revolution. When they did not, various things could happen. Firstly, they could be largely ignored. This happened to some extent with all elements of the youth movement outside Cuba but applied to the student protests and the hippie movement in particular. Secondly, they were ‘Cubanised’, as was the case with Sixties style, and the Black Power movement, which was written about in terms not of what it was, but in a way that was instead pleasing to the Cuban consensus. Finally, external forces could be criticised. This happened much less than may be expected, but Cuba’s scepticism of the movement to protest against the Vietnam War indicates that such protest was seen to be inauthentic in Cuban eyes and therefore irrelevant to Cuban identity.

All of this is not to say that external influence was lacking, and young lives in particular were influenced by external youth cultures; rather the perceptions of what youth was, could and should be were so radically different that the internal and external had very little to do with each other. Whilst external youth was seen (and saw itself) as anti-establishment and as a challenge to dominant power forces, internally youth was seen as a positive force for change within the dominant ideology. The result of this difference of perception affected the experience of young people. Some attempted to live up to the Cuban revolutionary version of what youth represented, some chose to be involved but
less intensively, whilst others tested where the margins of the culture of youth fell. These three groups are the focus of the next three chapters.
6.1 Introduction

The advent of the Revolution heralded an opportunity for young people to express their political commitment to the cause of building a new Cuba. The development, formation, and merging of youth organisations meant that young Cubans had a part of the Revolution which was ring-fenced for them and controlled by them. The organisations – the Juventud Socialista (JS), Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes (AJR) and the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas (UJC) – were dominated by the developing culture of youth so that they were guided by, and contributed to, both discourse and policy. The youth organisations that came into existence were the means through which politically committed young people could express their commitment and become an active part in building the political life and structure of the new Cuba. But the story of the evolution of the ‘official’ youth movement in Cuba indicates the levels of uncertainty to which young people were exposed, firstly in the search for identity which the youth movement underwent in the early Revolution and secondly in the search for excellence. An attempt to live up to the vanguard quality, in terms of discipline, commitment, purity and heroism, was demanded by the discourse of the Revolution. The story of the development of the youth organisations, therefore, traces how and why they moved from crisis to crisis and why attempting to create a type of stability in a period of such effervescence was so difficult.

Because of the rapid changes in the early years in almost every area of Cuban life, it is not surprising that the emergence of the youth movement was uncertain, changeable, both proactive and reactive and, to an extent, spontaneous. The occasional crises and panics that hit the youth organisations were, however, an exaggerated response to teething problems encountered. The story of the
evolution of the main youth organisation is of an oscillation from vanguard to mass to vanguard. The result of this was that the political sphere in which young people overall operated was opened, with the advent of the AJR, then closed, with the move to a vanguard organisation, the UJC. Therefore, the space in which young people in the 1960s expressed themselves – in particular those who were politically committed – was insecure and in flux.

This chapter will explain the evolution of the youth movement from 1959 to 1962, during which time significant changes took place, and then take a snapshot view of the youth organisation in 1965, to judge its success and identity thus far. 1965 was an important year in terms of the youth organisation because it marked a stabilisation of the UJC after its first crisis of identity in 1964. After 1965 the youth organisation, although undergoing similar panics to those described below (notably in 1970 in the lead-up to its Second National Congress in 1972), changed remarkably little – indeed to this day it remains a vanguard organisation which operates as the cantera or ‘breeding ground’ for membership of the PCC – although of course the plethora of initiatives with which it was involved were to develop and change. After the sharp decline in membership following the 1962 Congress, reaching a low in 1964, membership steadily increased throughout the rest of the 1960s and 1970s (Domínguez, 1978: 321). The pressures exerted on the youth movement by revolutionary discourse and attempts by the youth organisation to deal with these will be shown here. The result was a series of crises, repeated autocriticas [self criticism] and an attempt by the youth organisation to assert its identity as the opposite of non-conformist elements both in youth and society at large by vehemently criticising such elements. The UJC therefore engaged with – and fed into – the moral panic over non-conformism, even to the extent of defining what the latter was. Furthermore, activism on the part of the UJC inhibited alternative activism, as elucidated by the case of the student’s association, the FEU, also discussed below, which, despite a rich radical history, was unable to situate itself in a position of strength to counter the dominance of the UJC.
6.2 The Path to Unidad

During the 1950s, youth organisations had continued or been formed in support of the rebellion, the most significant of these being the youth wings of the M-26-7 and the Directorio Revolucionario (DR), the FEU, and the youth wing of the communist party (PSP), the JS. Furthermore, many young people had fought in the Ejército Rebelde but, quite naturally, given the greater aim of overthrowing the dictatorship, lacked an organisation specifically for young fighters. In January 1959, youth organisations were not integrated or organised, although many of them had played some role in the overthrow of the Batistato, both in the llano and in the Sierra and there was no dominant youth organisation in Cuba in a position to capitalise on the revolutionary effervescence which characterised that period. As a result, the task in the early days of the Revolution was towards unity of disparate groups, and it was on this task that the JS was particularly focused. Taking the FEU as a separate case, the largest and most organised of the youth organisations at the beginning of 1959 was the JS. The JS is surprisingly under-researched in Cuban historiography, with the exception of the pamphlet by Martín Fadragas (1998), while many studies on youth focus on the AJR and the UJC (Rodríguez, 1989; Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986; Gómez, nd, a, c, d and e). Given the importance of these two in Cuba today, this is not surprising, but it leaves a gap in the history of the development of youth organisations in post-revolutionary Cuba that needs to be filled. The significance of the JS in 1959 was two-fold. Firstly, it was the only organisation under-researched in Cuban historiography, with the exception of the pamphlet by Martín Fadragas (1998), while many studies on youth focus on the AJR and the UJC (Rodríguez, 1989; Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986; Gómez, nd, a, c, d and e). Given the importance of these two in Cuba today, this is not surprising, but it leaves a gap in the history of the development of youth organisations in post-revolutionary Cuba that needs to be filled. The significance of the JS in 1959 was two-fold. Firstly, it was the only organisation that had a fixed institutional structure, having been founded in 1944, and secondly having its own publication, Mella, which had survived clandestinely during the dictatorship when the JS itself was banned (Thomas, 1971: 846).

In what was probably the first edition of Mella (No. 162, April 1959) after January 1959, the JS showed itself to be a confident organisation, keen to play an active part in the building of the Revolution. The magazine published a letter

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51 The llano represents the urban struggle based in Havana against Batista, whilst the Sierra represents the struggle in the Sierra Maestra in the East of the island with Fidel Castro at its helm. 52 The UJC still operates as the vanguard organisation for young people and the source of membership for the PCC, and the AJR is seen as its heroic (but flawed) predecessor, particularly due to its perceived links with Guevara, alfabetización and the Milicias Revolucionarias (see Chapter 7).
written by the JS Executive Committee and sent to all youth organisations in Cuba, which urged the *unidad* [unity] of all youth organisations:

Nosotros, los jóvenes socialistas, estamos dispuestos a trabajar con todos ustedes por la integración de un movimiento unido revolucionario de toda la juventud por una especie de confederación revolucionaria de la juventud, en la que estén integradas las organizaciones y movimientos nacionales, las organizaciones y movimientos de sectores: obreros, campesinos y estudiantes y las instituciones de localidades y poblaciones: clubs deportivos y culturales, sociedades etc. (Comité Ejecutivo del JS, Mella, 04/59: 20).

*We young socialists are prepared to work with you all to create a united revolutionary movement of all young people, for a sort of revolutionary confederation of youth, which will include national organisations and movements and sectoral organisations and movements: workers, peasants and students, as well as institutions from the towns and villages: sports and cultural clubs and societies, etc.*

It is clear from the above that the JS was not certain exactly what type of organisation it was suggesting: integration and confederation could be two entirely different structural possibilities. But what is also clear is that it saw its role as a broadly cultural, rather than narrowly political, one; the letter went on to say that, as well as supporting the objectives of the Revolution, the movement would serve as a “lucha diaria por las demandas y anhelos juveniles y realización diaria por nosotros mismos de todas aquellas cosas que llenan – con el trabajo y la política – la vida del joven: deportes, arte, cultura y recreo [daily struggle for the demands and desires of the young and the daily achievement, by our own efforts, of all those things which – along with work and politics – fill the life of the young: sport, art, culture and leisure] (Comité Ejecutivo del JS, Mella, 04/59: 21). This idea of an all-inclusive youth movement contrasted with the original aims of the AJR (discussed below), and showed an ambitious and confident JS in 1959, with a clear sense of strategy and destiny, despite the fact that Castro was yet to declare the socialist nature of the Revolution.

Calling for unity, however, was a long way from achieving that unity, and some of the leaders of the M-26-7 rejected the letter and the idea of the organisations
merging (Calcines, *Mella*, 02/05/59:12-13). Although this is not necessarily evidence of a power struggle, it indicates that talk and action on unity had not yet converged. In July the JS reasserted its heroic legacy through *Mella*, by adding the strapline to the contents page “80 ediciones bajo la tiranía. Fundado en 1944” [80 editions under the tyranny. *Founded in 1944*] (*Mella*, 01/07/59: 3) and by outlining the activity of the Juventud Cívica Unida, the nascent unity organisation of youth.\(^{53}\) For several months following this, the magazine did not mention *unidad*, although the strapline once again changed, to “Voz de la Juventud. Publicación quincenal editada por la JUVENTUD SOCIALISTA” [Voice of Youth, *Fortnightly publication edited by the JS*] (*Mella*, 15/08/59:10), making clear the magazine’s role as official publication of the JS and its self-perception as the publication for all Cuban youth, as well as announcing, prematurely, an increase in frequency from monthly to fortnightly.

With this assertion of its authority, the JS shifted away from *unidad* in the sense of integration or confederation, this being replaced by the discourse of *vanguardía*, that is to say that the JS started to see itself, with its September 1959 Plenary at Yaguajay, as an organisation of vanguard youth responsible for directing other young people:

> ¡Luchemos por estrechar, cada vez más, las filas de toda la juventud en el combate por defender a nuestra revolución y hacerla avanzar! Los jóvenes socialistas deben ser vanguardia en aplicar estas orientaciones, en divulgarlas, y luchar por su ejecución (Editorial, *Mella*, 10/59: 25).

*Let us fight increasingly to close the ranks of the whole of youth in the struggle to defend and take further our Revolution! Young socialists must be in the vanguard in applying these guidelines, in disseminating them and in the battle to have them followed.*

This was backed up (or perhaps initiated) by PSP President Juan Marinello, who stated that “La JS debe ser en estos momentos la vanguardia de la lucha de la acción constructiva, de la unidad indispensable” [The JS must, at those times, be the vanguard of the fight, of constructive action and of the unity which is so essential] (*Marinello, Mella*, 10/59: 15).

\(^{53}\) It appears that this organisation petered out as new initiatives overtook it.
By the beginning of 1960 another subtle change in JS policy transpired. After the Santiago JS plenary of November 1959, another call to Cuban youth was made, which this time read:

Los Jóvenes Socialistas, junto a nuestros hermanos del “26 de Julio”, del Directorio Revolucionario, etc., alzan a la vanguardia de la juventud cubana, los principios y los hechos revolucionarios que están transformados, ya, a nuestra amada Patria. […] La unidad es hoy más vital que nunca antes (Editorial, Mella, 01/01/60: 48-49).

The Young Socialists, together with our brothers of the ‘26th July Movement’, of the Directorio Revolucionario, etc., must bring to the vanguard of Cuban youth the revolutionary principles and deeds which have already become part of our beloved nation. […] Unity is more important today than ever before.

This indicates how the principles of unidad and vanguardia had now fused, and is significant in that it was the first joint declaration with other youth organisations, excluding, of course, the AJR which was in its infancy at this time. However, the JS made sure it asserted its identity, in this case also promoting its logo, showing a star containing a picture of Julio Antonio Mella in the centre (Mella, 01/01/60: 46). Shortly afterwards, the pages of Mella were opened to contributors who were not members of the JS, notably Rolando López del Amo and Alfredo Calvo, with the aim of making the magazine of, and for, all young Cubans (Machadando, Mella, 02/60: 27), although the editor continued to be Isidoro Malmierca, Secretary and later President of the JS (Gómez, no date a: 1).

In the lead-up to its 4th National Congress in April 1960, the JS was keen to place itself in a strong position, both contemporaneously and historically. Its President, Ramón Calcines, pointed to the unique nature of the JS:

Como todos sabemos, la Juventud Socialista, es la única organización política juvenil que existe en nuestro país. El 26 de Julio y el Directorio Revolucionario, por ejemplo, son organizaciones revolucionarios con gran cantidad de jóvenes en sus filas, pero de carácter general, es decir,

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54 This would become the emblem of the UJC.
As we all know, the JS is the only political organisation for youth in the country. The 26 July and Directorio Revolucionario, for instance, are revolutionary organisations with a large number of young people in their ranks, but they are general in nature, i.e. not specifically youth organisations. [...] We can proudly state that this will be the Congress of the only political organisation which emerged from the underground alive and with its honour intact, and with the glory of having contributed with all its might to the overthrow of the bloody Batista regime.

This repositioning of the JS in the history of the 1950s rebellion indicated some nervousness on the part of Calcines. This could be following the establishment of a youth organisation (the AJR) with much more intimate links to the 1950s than the JS, although the AJR was not mentioned by Mella’s contributors at that time. The JS, as expressed in Calcines’ position, was keen to assert itself as the only political organisation, which, at a time when Cuba’s search for a new political system was under way, would raise the profile of the JS, and furthermore attract young people who were politically motivated.

The Congress itself marked an important moment in the history of youth organisations in Cuba. Participating alongside JS members and leaders were guests from the M-26-7, the Directorio and the AJR, as well as smaller organisations, and the opening was presided over by PSP dignitaries Aníbal Escalante (Executive Secretary) and Juan Marinello (President) (Mella, 15/04/60: 21). The key outcome of the Congress was the decision to dissolve the JS (Mella, 15/04/60: 18) in favour of a single revolutionary youth organisation, a decision that is celebrated in Cuban historiography. Rodríguez points out that this decision “demuestra la madurez política de esta organización y la confianza...”

55 It is important not to overstate this potential ‘threat’ - the AJR was primarily established for the specific purpose of educating or finding employment for young people who had neither; its aims could thereby be complementary to those of the JS. That said, being an organ of the Ejército Rebelde, the AJR clearly had a closer link to the Sierra than the JS.
A subsidiary resolution of the Congress was that the JS’s constituency should be persuaded to join the Milicias Revolucionarias created in October 1959, stipulating in its llamamiento [appeal] to young people that “[l]a juventud tiene el deber ineludible de aprender el manejo de las armas y de formar parte masivamente, de las milicias populares” [Youth has the inescapable duty of learning how to bear arms and to participate massively in the popular militia] (JS, Mella, 15/04/60: 20). This indicated a convergence with the aims of the AJR, as the JS moved away from being a predominantly political organisation to one which also had a defence role. This was a clear move to unidad [unity], as, at the time of the Congress, the future role of a unity youth organisation was perceived to be multifacted. It paved the way for the JS to merge with the AJR. These changes on the part of the JS were reflected shortly after the Congress, demonstrating that the JS found its role more defined, as the source of foot soldiers for the new revolutionary initiatives. The JS encouraged its members to join the Brigadas Juveniles de Trabajo Voluntario, an initiative of the AJR (Mella, 28/06/60: 2), describing the AJR as follows:

Esta organización que dirige el Gobierno Revolucionario está orientada a agrupar en su seno a toda la juventud sana de nuestra patria, para educarla en el trabajo tan necesario para que crecer nuestra nación y para que la revolución pueda alcanzar todos sus objetivos (Mella, 28/06/60: 27).

This organisation, run by the Revolutionary Government, sets out to bring together in its ranks all the morally upright youth of the country, to
educate them to do the work which is so vital to the growth of our nation and to the achievement of all the goals of the Revolution.

By expanding its scope thus, the JS was allowing its members to develop a closer link with the evolving aims of the Revolution.

The AJR had come into existence and increased in importance in the months leading up to the JS Congress, although it was not until the subsequent months that it gained enough prestige to give its name to the new unified youth organisation. Its creation was first proposed in a document of 30th August 1959 (reprinted in Rodríguez, 1989: 8-11). This document was published by the Departamento de Instrucción del Ejército Rebelde, and the rebelde ethos of the new organisation, in line with the discourse of heroification of the rural/peasant/guerrilla, was indicated in its proposed programme, which included organisation into brigades, marching exercises and sports programmes, but also exchanges between young people from the campo [countryside] and the llano [city] (Departamento del Ejército Rebelde, 30/08/59 in Rodríguez, 1989: 8-9). The glorification of the campo was a part of the rebelde ethos, given that the Ejército Rebelde comprised those who had fought in the Sierra Maestra, and saw contact with the countryside as an agent of socialisation towards the aims of the Revolution. The document suggests:

Excursiones de los diferentes grupos o brigadas al campo, para contribuir al acercamiento de los jóvenes de la ciudad y del campo y al conocimiento de las riquezas naturales del país, al amor por nuestra patria, por sus ríos, montes y llanos. En estas excursiones al campo los jóvenes entrarían en contacto con la realidad de nuestro agro, con la vida del campesino, con el avance de la Reforma Agraria (Departamento del Ejército Rebelde, 30/08/59 in Rodríguez, 1989: 9).

Visits out into the country by the different groups or brigades, to help bring together young people from the towns and those from the country, and contribute to an awareness of the country's natural wealth, a love for the country, its rivers, mountains and plains. In these trips to the country, young people would gain an appreciation of our agriculture, of the life of the peasant and of progress with Agrarian Reform.
In line with this ethos, the first tasks in the list of those to be fulfilled by the AJR were to help with agrarian reform and alfabetización [literacy training] (Departamento del Ejército Rebelde, 30/08/59 in Rodríguez, 1989: 8-9). The new organisation was intimately linking itself to the early aims and objectives of the Revolution. In this sense it was a more useful organisation than the JS, with a clearer vision of what it could do, making it attractive to young people who wished to express their support for the Revolution.

The official launch of the AJR was associated with its first public event on 28th January 1960, although it already counted 7,000 members at that date (Rodríguez, 1989: 22). This was a high profile event to celebrate the anniversary of the birth of Martí, and marking ten years since the first major march against Batista. During the event, Che Guevara gave a speech extolling the virtues of young Sierra hero Commandante Joel Iglesias, who would be placed at the helm of the new organisation.56 The organisation became active with the formation of the brigades, (which were named after the recently deceased hero of the Sierra, Camilo Cienfuegos), which Castro in a television appearance in May 1960 encouraged young people to join. The aims of the organisation were elaborated more clearly by Castro in this appearance, stating that the idea of the AJR was:

la de organizar, bajo los auspicios del Ejército Rebelde, todos esos muchachos de familias humildes, que no van a la escuela porque por la edad ya no tuvieron oportunidad de ir a un centro de segunda enseñanza, que no tienen trabajo, que andan mal vestidos, mal alimentados, que son un problema y preocupación para la familia (Castro, 17/05/60, reprinted in Rodríguez, 1989: 53).

to organise, under the aegis of the Ejército Rebelde, all those young men from poor families, who don’t go to school because due to their age they have lacked the opportunity for secondary education, who have no work, who are badly clothed and poorly fed, and who are a problem and source of concern for their families.

The constituency of the AJR, according to Castro, was the young under-educated or unemployed, and the location of training would be the Sierra Maestra. In the

56 The emulation of Iglesias as a hero figure in the discourse of the Revolution is dealt with in Chapter 3.
letter accompanying the *Solicitud de Ingreso* [call to join], dated 20th May, Castro’s TV appearance was cited, and the aims, terms and conditions of the brigade to which entry was being solicited were clear:

Miles de jóvenes deben ir a las sierras a trabajar en el reforestación, en la construcción de escuelas, hospitales, caminos, etc. Recibirán instrucción, adiestramiento militar, alimentación, ropas y todo lo necesario para vivir. (Departamento de Instruccion de MinFAR, 20/05/60, in Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 167)

*Thousands of young people must go up into the hills to work in reforestation, in the building of schools, hospitals, roads, etc. They will be given education, military training, clothes and everything they need to live.*

Young people would feed and be fed by the Revolution in these brigades, entry thereto being consequently unlimited by wealth or education.

At this stage, the AJR was an organisation dominated by the ideology of the Rebel Army and the aims of the early Revolution, and it was shortly after this that the JS urged its members to join the AJR brigades. In supporting the AJR both in concept and in personnel, the JS was actually altering the support base for the AJR, which was reflected in the expanding role that the AJR came to play, although even at this stage it was not certain that the AJR would become the single unity youth organisation. The early days of the AJR were dominated by the work of the brigades, with young people undergoing military style training in the Sierra Maestra. One of the rites of passage of entry to the brigade was that the member should climb the Pico Turquino five times over a three month period,57 living the life of the guerrillas. This was seen as a “prueba de tesón, preparación física y formación revolucionaria” [a test of determination, physical fitness and revolutionary training] (Gómez, no date e: 19). The brigades were each made up of 100 young men, and the leadership of each comprised a *jefe* (Chief) and *segundo jefe* (Second in Command), who were members of the Ejército Rebelde, and a *maestro adoctrinador* (Political Commissar). Almost all Political Commissars were members of the JS (Centro de Estudios sobre la

57 More than 20,000 young Cubans underwent this challenge (Quintela, 1962: 31)
Juventud, 1986: 31), which is not surprising that because the JS had a long history as a youth organisation incorporating political training, therefore possessing the personnel to fulfil the role of young teachers. For young Cuban women, the Centro Clodimira, a school for underprivileged girls teaching transferable skills was established (INRA, 05/61: 34-41).

From 21st to 24th October 1960 the AJR held its first National Plenary. At this meeting the AJR became independent of the Ejército Rebelde (Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 63) and became the main youth organisation, with the merger of all other youth organisations, with the exception of the FEU. Central to membership of the AJR was compulsory membership of the Brigadas and the Milicias Revolucionarias. The JS held to its promise made in its April Congress to dissolve its organisation and send its members to the AJR. JS President Malmierca made a speech at the Plenary outlining and justifying this intent:

> Cuando llamamos a todos los jóvenes socialistas a incorporarse a la Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes, cuando anunciamos la determinación de disolver nuestra organización, lo hacemos conscientes de que la AJR es ya, y lo será más cada día, una organización capaz de ocupar la vanguardia de la juventud en la lucha por impulsar las tareas de la revolución (Malmierca, Mella, 01/11/60: 15).

> When we ask all young socialists to join the Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes, when we announce the decision to dissolve our organisation, we do so in the knowledge that the AJR is already – and will increasingly be – an organisation able to occupy the vanguard of youth in the struggle to promote revolutionary activity.

This is an interesting statement, because Malmierca was asserting the vanguard nature of young members, a position carried over from the Yaguayay meeting of October 1959, while also associating himself with the revolutionary nature of the AJR, even to the extent of incorporating the language of lucha. The Plenary did not entirely define the transfer from JS to AJR, as Malmierca afterwards wrote an open letter to Joel Iglesias urging the latter to continue publishing Mella (Mella, 01/11/60: 33). By the following edition, Mella had become the Organo de la AJR [Official publication of the AJR], under the editorship of one of the AJR
leaders, Fernando Ravelo, and with an expanded editorial board including Malmierca, but also including Ricardo Alarcón of the FEU (*Mella*, 06/12/60: 15).

The aim of *unidad* had been finally achieved with apparent ease and speed, although, as the above shows, it had in fact taken eighteen months and the creation of a new organisation. While the above passage has examined the internal developments of the organisations in question, and in particular of the JS, one of the exogenous problems that the organisations faced related to the broader reorganisation of politics in revolutionary Cuba, and the move to socialism and subsequently Marxism-Leninism. In 1959 it was by no means clear what role the PSP, the parent organisation of the JS, would play, and consequently the politicking between and within existing youth organisations did not take place in a vacuum. The implication of this search – or even struggle – for identity meant an uncertain environment for young people. Many young people were eager to support the Revolution but the question of how they should do this, given two organisations with very different cultures, plagued youth activism. The AJR, as the unity organisation of youth, had the task of bridging these two cultures. It was not until the youth organisation became a firmly vanguard organisation that there was any certainty in that culture, but the emergence of a vanguard role for the organisation would exclude those young people towards whom the AJR had been originally directed.

**6.3 The Triumph of Vanguardia**

The early months of the AJR would appear to be a catalogue of successes, in terms of recruitment to the Literacy Campaign and the Militias (see Chapter 7), an increased contact with youth groups in the Communist bloc and eulogistic articles in the AJR’s magazine about young people in communist countries (*Mella*, nd [June 61]: 26-29; Soto and Casanova, *Mella*, 04/07/61: 24-27; *Mella*, 05/10/61: 3-5), and in terms of leisure and sport, with the implementation of the LPV initiative (see Chapter 4). Broadly speaking, the AJR was attempting to fulfil its aim to be the organisation of all youth; its magazine circulation in 1961 was at 100,000, rising to 150,000 and its membership had risen to 100,000 in early 1962 (*Domínguez*, 1978: 321).
Despite these obvious successes, there was evidence that the AJR was failing to deal with its own success. Rodríguez described the trajectory of the AJR as follows:

Fueron las primeras experiencias que, a la luz de hoy, se nos presentan con la natural inmadurez y lógicas imperfecciones de que se hace por primera vez, pero no por ello dejan de ser valiosas (Rodríguez, 1989: 5).

*They were the first experiments which, with hindsight, appear to have all the predictable immaturity and inevitable imperfections of something being done for the first time, but they are no less valuable for all that.*

One explanation for Rodríguez’s tentative criticism of the AJR is that, until its October 1960 plenary, the organisational structure of the AJR had been uncertain, and only with the said plenary did its remit become clear and its independence from the Ejército Rebelde become established. Nonetheless, in October 1961 it suffered serious criticism from PSP leader Blas Roca about its organisational fragility, and about problems within its membership:

El problema principal que tiene la Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes es el de organizarse en la base, el de constituir fuertes y eficientes comités municipales, el de agrupar a cada joven en alguna institución de base, de modo que se acaben los miembros sueltos, los afiliados sin organización, los que se llaman Jóvenes Rebeldes, sin estar sujetos a ningún control, a ninguna disciplina, a ninguna responsabilidad.

La situación permite que individuos aislados, muchachos sin ninguna preparación ideológica, revolucionaria ni política y elementos anarquizantes que confunda la revolución con la indisciplina y la malacrianza hagan muchas cosas inadecuadas y erróneas que comprometen el nombre de la Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes (Blas Roca, *Mella*, 05/10/61: 24-25).

*The main problem for the Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes is organising at grass roots level: building strong and efficient municipal committees, involving each young person in some grass roots institution, in a way which gets rid of freewheeling members, members with no organisation,*
people calling themselves Jóvenes Rebeldes without being subject to any control, discipline or responsibility.

It is a situation which enables isolated individuals – kids with no ideological, revolutionary or political training, and anarchists who confuse revolution with indiscipline and bad behaviour – to do many inappropriate things and make many mistakes which damage the good name of the Asociación de Jóvenes Rebeldes.

He went on to cite the youthful tendency towards *extremismo izquierdista* [leftist extremism], and criticised the AJR for adopting the motto *Izquierda, Izquierda, siempre Izquierda* [Always towards the left] in favour of preferable slogans, referring to, for example, *Estudio* or *Unidad* [study or unity] (Blas Roca, *Mella*, 05/10/61: 27). This was significant criticism from a political heavyweight, and indicates that the perception was that the AJR had grown at such a rapid rate that it had effectively been unable to control itself. The AJR seemed at risk of losing its reputation as a revolutionary organisation, and youth activism was showing signs of “extremism” and inflexibility that continued to impact upon it negatively throughout the early Revolution.

This criticism was reiterated by Castro in an important speech directed at young people in preparation for the 1962 youth congress. The *Revolución* headline on 14th March 1962, reporting this speech, read “Hay que crear en la juventud un mayor espíritu comunista” [We need to imbue young people with a more communist spirit] (*Revolución*, 14/03/62: 1). The criticism of Cuban youth in this speech was implicit except in Castro’s explicit criticism of youth leader (and *Sierra* hero) Capitán Fernando Ravelo. The latter was criticised for, in a eulogy to revolutionary martyr Echevarría, leaving out the section of the eulogy that referred to the latter’s Catholicism, leading Castro to accuse Ravelo of *sectarismo* [sectarianism].

Ravelo was held up as an example of what was wrong with the youth organisation, when Castro stated:

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58 This speech is important in the broader context of the Revolution as it effectively marks the onset of the ‘Escalante affair’. The accusation of *sectarismo* was made towards Aníbal Escalante shortly afterwards, in a speech on 27th March (Thomas, 1971: 1379)
¿Qué juventud?, ¿Acaso una juventud que simplemente se concreta a oír y repetir? ¡No, queremos una juventud que piense, que aprenda por sí mismo a ser revolucionaria, que se convenza a sí misma, que desarrolla plenamente su pensamiento, y esta juventud tiene todas las condiciones para lograrlo! (Castro, 13/03/62: 1).

What sort of youth? Perhaps a youth which merely listens and repeats? No. We want a youth which thinks, which learns revolutionary behaviour for itself, which convinces itself, which develops its thinking fully – and this youth has everything it needs to achieve that.

Castro had a clear idea of what youth and young people should be, as outlined in Chapter 3. Significantly, Castro’s position was both critical and optimistic.

On 20th March 1962, Blas Roca reiterated this criticism after Ravelo admitted his ‘error’ of *sectarismo*:

La denuncia que hizo Fidel del error y el reconocimiento público que hizo Ravelo de su responsabilidad, contribuirán grandemente a contrarrestar la influencia del sectorismo, del subjetivismo y del extremismo izquierdista en las filas de la juventud en general y de la AJR y del movimiento estudiantil en particular (Blas Roca, *Noticias de Hoy*, 20/03/62: 2).

Fidel’s criticism of the error, and Ravelo’s public acknowledgement of his responsibility, will go a long way to counteract the influence of sectarianism, subjectivism and left-wing extremism in the ranks of young people in general and of the AJR and student movement in particular.

These criticisms exposed weaknesses in the AJR, which were contributing to the decision to make substantial changes in the organisation. These changes were announced by AJR president Joel Iglesias in a television show at the beginning of March:

[D]ijo que la AJR es la juventud de las ORI y terminó, recordando que Fidel apuntó el vínculo de los jóvenes rebeldes con las ORI, señalando el papel de vanguardia que les tocará tomar a los jóvenes rebeldes para dirigir en el futuro los destinos de nuestra Patria Socialista (*Revolución*, 02/03/62: 6).

He said that the AJR was the youth of the ORI and ended by reminding us that Fidel had referred to the link between the young rebels and the ORI,
underlining the vanguard role to be exercised in the future by young rebels in directing the destiny of our socialist nation.

Clearly, in situating the AJR as the youth wing of the ORI, Iglesias was indicating a change in its orientation away from an independent youth organisation, and by incorporating the concept of the vanguardia, the AJR was moving away from its roots as a mass youth organisation, and closer to the JS position, showing the enduring influence of the latter in the unity organisation, given that the word vanguardia had not been used by the AJR prior to the merger. This position was corroborated by the invitation to members of the AJR to the April 1962 Congress, in which it was stated:

Nuestro Congreso adoptará los Estatutos que regirán la nueva vida de nuestra organización […] con los cuales, nuestra organización por sus ideas y por su acción se convierta en la organización marxista-leninista de la juventud cubana, en la organización juvenil del futuro Partido Unido de la Revolución Socialista (Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 134-35).

Our Congress will approve the rules to govern the new life of our organisation […] with which our organisation, through its ideas and through its actions, will transform itself into the Marxist-Leninist organisation of Cuban youth, the youth organisation of the future United Party of the Socialist Revolution.

The Congress was a high profile event, the days preceding it receiving daily coverage in one form or another in the national press (daily papers Revolución and Noticias de Hoy).\(^59\) The Congress itself coincided with the trial of mercenaries from the Bay of Pigs invasion, which dominated the headlines of the national press, but the coverage was still considerable on the inside pages of the papers. The importance of the Congress can be measured in the personnel it attracted. It was opened by President Dorticós on 30\(^{th}\) March and closed in a mass event in the Parque Latinoamericano Stadium in Havana by Fidel Castro on

\(^59\) As an example, on the 28\(^{th}\) March Revolución ran a story about the lead-up to the Congress in the Oriente province on the front page, which was an identical story, with just a few words changed, to that which had been run two days previously on page 5. This may have been simple editorial error, but it certainly indicates the rising profile of AJR stories within the newspaper.
4\textsuperscript{th} April. As well as 596 AJR members from across Cuba (\textit{Noticias de Hoy}, 01/04/62: 1), it was attended by 52 representatives of other youth organisations (\textit{Noticias de Hoy}, 01/04/62: 1) from 26 countries (\textit{Revolución}, 31/03/62: 12). \textit{Mella} was produced daily during the Congress to keep the delegates informed of events and developments. Ten committees were established to discuss all aspects of the role of young people.\textsuperscript{60}

During the Congress, the criticism formerly directed at the AJR by Blas Roca and ‘confessed’ by Fernando Ravelo was effectively internalised, in a statement of \textit{autocrítica} [self-criticism] by the National Committee of the AJR. This was subtly different from Blas Roca’s criticism and Ravelo’s ‘confession’, in that it accused itself of over-confidence and complacency:

\begin{quote}
ha comenzado a manifestarse en nosotros, un espíritu de conformidad con las tareas realizadas y ha comenzado a ver solamente lo positivo.

Este auto-elogio, nos ha ido matando el espíritu auto-crítico y nos íbamos convirtiendo en críticos de los demás, pero no en críticos de nosotros mismos, de nuestra labor, de la labor de nuestro Organismo, de nuestra provincia, de nuestra Organización, se encontraban manifestaciones que al matar el espíritu crítico igualmente mataban el trabajo colectivo (\textit{Revolución}, 02/04/62: 5).
\end{quote}

we began to show signs of a spirit of complacency in what we were doing, seeing only the positive side of things. This self-congratulation crushed our spirit of self-criticism, and we were gradually becoming critics of other people but not of ourselves, of our work, of the work of our body, constituency or organisation – attitudes which because they deadened our critical faculties also prevented us from working collectively.

Although most of the Congress was positive and forward-looking in terms of the role of youth in the Revolution, it is clear from the above that one function of the Congress was to deal with the deficiencies into which the AJR appeared to have fallen.

\textsuperscript{60}These were: agricultural production, industrial production, secondary students, universities, sport, work with children, culture, organisation, propaganda and revolutionary instruction (\textit{Revolución}, 02/04/62: 5)
The Congress gave birth to a new organisation, the UJC, quite different in scope and character to the AJR, but to which the AJR would send all its members, numbering 80,000 (Rivero, 1962: 48) and transfer *Mella*, with a circulation of 300,000 (Rivero, 1962: 49). The AJR was renamed the Unión de Jóvenes Comunistas and new statutes for the UJC were approved. The statutes stated that the UJC, while being structurally independent, would serve as the youth organisation of the successor of the ORI, the PURS. Most significantly, the UJC was to be a *selective* organisation. Adolfo Rivero wrote, with some contradiction that: “si la UJC es en cierto sentido una organización de masas, no es menos cierto que, al mismo tiempo, es una organización afín a la vanguardia política de la clase obrera” *[if the UJC is in a certain sense a mass organisation, it is equally certain that it is also an organisation related to the political vanguard of the working class]* (Rivero, 1962: 49). Clearly the organisation could not be both mass and vanguard at the same time, unless it was assumed that the masses of potential members also comprised the vanguard. Although the ideal portrait of youth drawn in the discourse of the Revolution implied that this *could* or should be the case, the reality, particularly bearing in mind the criticisms levelled at the AJR by the revolutionary leadership, was far from this ideal, and the new entry criteria would severely limit the numbers of members and *aspirantes.*

The relationship between the organisation and young people evolved into one where the UJC had a crucial mobilisation role in order to make a success of the many revolutionary tasks for which it was deemed to be responsible. This was relatively easy with large numbers of people willingly participating in the early Revolution, but as this became more difficult, the UJC itself needed to expand in membership terms in order to maintain its army of young volunteers. The move from mass to vanguard meant that while in the early years of the Revolution activism had the potential to be a mass culture among young people, after 1962 a small body of young people who were accepted as members of the UJC claimed the authority to determine what constituted youth activism within the national-revolutionary identity.

61 An *aspirante* was an applicant who was going through the pre-membership preparation period at the end of which decision on full membership could be conferred.
The UJC statutes stipulated that anyone between the ages of 14 and 27 who demonstrated a vanguard attitude to study, work, and defence, accepted the revolutionary programme for the construction of socialism, and agreed to carry out the aims of the UJC could apply for membership. Each application had to be backed by the signatures of two existing members of the UJC or one member of PURS (Rivero, 1962: 51). The new organisation in fact had more in common with the JS than the AJR, given the reestablishment of the concept of the vanguard, and even adopting a logo adapted from the JS logo, rather than that of the AJR.⁶² Organisationally, the top level organisation of the UJC would be the biennial National Congress which would elect an executive to run the organisation in the interim years (Rivero, 1962: 52).⁶³

It is significant that the new youth organisation was given the denomination ‘communist’ long before the parent party was named as such (in 1965). The name seems to have been popular with the members: in Castro’s speech to the Congress (Castro, 04/04/62: 1 and 5) there was reportedly applause every time he mentioned the words socialismo and comunismo. Much was made of the concept of being given the name “communist”, both by Castro in this speech and by Guevara in a speech to the UJC in October 1962. Guevara’s speech was crucial to the youth movement. Despite being to an extent critical of young people and their attitude to work, Guevara placed young communists at the centre of the revolutionary project. Guevara emphasised the point that the youth organisation was given the name communist before the party (Guevara, 10/62: 361) and he expected young people in the organisation to live up to this name as a vanguard both for youth and for all society, stating that:

> Ustedes […] deben ser la vanguardia de todos los movimientos. Los primeros en los sacrificios que la revolución demande, cualquiera que sea la índole de esos sacrificios. Los primeros en el trabajo. Los primeros en el estudio. Los primeros en la defensa del país (Guevara, 10/62: 357; my emphasis).

⁶² In another important change at the congress, the Unión de Pioneros Rebeldes (UPR) was renamed Unión de Pioneros de Cuba (UPC) (Revolución, 04/04/62: 4) and put under the control of UJC (Noticias de Hoy, 06/04/62: 3). The UPC will not be looked at in detail here except in its relationship to the UJC, as it was an organisation for children rather than a youth organisation.⁶³ However, the second National Congress did not happen until 1972, reflecting ongoing problems in the organisation.
You […] must be the vanguard of all movements. You must be the first in terms of the sacrifices demanded by the Revolution, irrespective of the nature of these sacrifices, the first in terms of work, the first in terms of study, the first in the defence of the country.

He expanded this point later in the speech saying that a young communist must “ser un ejemplo vivo, ser el espejo donde se miren los compañeros que no pertenezcan a las juventudes comunistas, ser el ejemplo donde puedan mirarse los hombres y mujeres de edad más avanzada que han perdido cierto entusiasmo juvenil” [be a living example, a mirror for friends who are not members of the young communists, an example for older men and women who have lost something of their youthful enthusiasm] (Guevara, 10/62: 364).

These quotes clearly show that Guevara viewed some young people as potentially deeply committed to the Revolution, although it must be taken into account that in this speech he was addressing himself to a vanguard, rather than all young people of Cuba. A young elite was held up as a good, even a perfect, example, to all of society. This placed a much greater emphasis on youth than that seen in the 1959 Manual de capacitación cívica, where youth was seen as one of several important groups and was thought to be important but not necessarily essential: “la juventud jugó en la primera fase de la Revolución, y juega ahora un papel muy destacado” [youth played a very important role in the first phase of the Revolution, and continues to do so now] (MinFAR, 1960: 55).

Clearly there was a leap between the perceived role in 1959 and that in 1962 once the youth organisation had been given the name communist and had become selective, and it indicates the development of the culture of youth in Cuba, with some youth being held up as the example to all Cuba, but excluding from this heroic culture those young people who did not conform to the ideal.

The 1962 Congress, with the move to selectivity, and a new identity as communist and as the youth wing of the party, defined the youth organisation. Theoretically this should have strengthened it, as that its mission was now much clearer. Over the next two years, the UJC expanded in scope while sharply reducing in membership numbers. From the 80,000 members at its inception, by May 1964 the UJC had only 29,508 members (Martín, 1964: 50). UJC branches
were opened in the Armed Forces in 1964 and in the Ministry of the Interior in 1965 (Gómez, no date d: 4). At the 1962 Congress it had been decided that the UJC would have a University Bureau to deal with students, and the relationship between the students and the youth organisation was an ongoing difficulty, with UJC Secretary-General Miguel Martín complaining in 1964 that one of the reasons why the UJC was having difficulties was because of its failure to attract the vanguard among the university students (Martín, 1964: 50-51).

Despite its clearer identity, the UJC did not have an easy birth. In its first two years, it had a difficult relationship with the ORI (later PURS) and in 1964 Miguel Martín wrote an article in *Cuba Socialista* bitterly complaining about the role of the PURS:

> [E]l papel de dirección del Partido debe estar libre de dos tendencias. [...] En primer lugar, la tendencia al *paternalismo*, que se expresa en la subestimación del grado de madurez de los jóvenes. Esta tendencia conduce a frenar la iniciativa de la organización, a impedir su desarrollo normal, y a hacer depender toda su vida y actitud de ‘lo que diga el Partido’. La segunda tendencia [...] consiste en no prestarle ninguna atención ni ayuda a la UJC, en dejarla sola, en no preocuparse por sus problemas, ni ayudarla a vencer sus dificultades (Martín, 1964: 68).

[…] the role of Party leadership must be free of two tendencies […] Firstly, the tendency towards paternalism, reflected in an underestimation of the degree of maturity of young people. This tendency leads to the placing of obstacles in the way of the organisation’s initiative, preventing its normal development, and making its entire life and attitude dependent on ‘what the party says’. The second tendency […] is not to help or pay attention to the UJC, leaving it alone, not concerned with its problems or helping it to overcome its difficulties.

This comment seems contradictory and reflects in some way the immaturity of the UJC as an organisation, complaining of too much and not enough interference at the same time.
6.4 The Emergence of a UJC Ethos

The ethos of the new organisation began to develop during these early years, despite the problems with the relationship with the Party. The mission of the UJC was summed up in its slogan “Junto al trabajo y al estudio, el fusil” [The rifle, an adjunct to work and study] (Martín, 1964: 66). Young communists were expected to display a vanguard attitude in every area of life. It was not enough to excel in study, one also had to participate – and excel – in sport, culture, defence and voluntary work. In addition to this, the young communist needed to seek excellence in the _lucha ideologica_ [ideological struggle] (Martín, 1964: 59). The level of excellence demanded ranged from grand objectives, such as being “alumnos ejemplares” [star pupils] in their place of study (Martín, 1964: 58) to the minutiae of life, so that “el joven comunista ha de ser, por ejemplo, un compañero que entierre la semilla a la distancia y profundidad correctas” [for instance, the young communist has to be a comrade able to plant seeds at the correct distance and depth] (González, 1965: 59). Of course, these demands were adapted according to the situation of young people. For example, in the lead-up to the IX Festival of Youth in Algeria scheduled for 1965, in order to obtain the festival ‘badge’, targets for young students and workers centred around attendance, while those of young agricultural workers focussed on productivity (_Mella_, 12/04/65: 17).

High expectations were reflected in new entry criteria to the UJC, which mirrored those of the PURS. This process involved the proposition of membership of an individual from the _masas_ (other young people), followed by a decision on membership from existing members of the UJC or PURS based on whether the potential member displayed a communist attitude, followed by a presentation of the potential member back to the _masas_ (Martín, 1964: 53). The central concern with the quality of its membership was reflected in a _Mella_ editorial in February 1965, reflecting on the previous year’s process of “reestructuración y construcción” [restructuring and building], which stated that “es responsabilidad nuestra velar por el fortalecimiento de nuestra organización de Vanguardia, para que todos los que ingresen posean las condiciones requeridas, y para que no quede fuera ninguno de los que las posean.” [it is our
responsibility to ensure that our Vanguard organisation grows stronger, so that all new entrants have the right qualities and so that no one with the right qualities fails to gain admission] (Mella, 08/02/65: 11). One way to achieve this excellence was through aspirante status which was the half-way house to membership of the UJC. This was a period through which each applicant to the UJC had to pass, which operated as “una escuela en la cual se forman los futuros militantes de la UJC y se impregnan del espíritu y los métodos de trabajo de la Organización Juvenil del Partido” [a school where future UJC members are trained and imbued with the spirit and working methods of the Youth Organisation of the Communist Party] (Mella, 07/06/65: 8).

In tandem with this ethos of how the vanguard youth must act was fierce criticism of that which was anathema to its ideal, and this was related to bourgeois influence, particularly that of North America. Indeed, this was something of an obsession with Martín. He saw this counter-vanguard ethos as the central threat to victory in the lucha ideologica [ideological battle]:

Los ideólogos de la burguesía fomentaban el desprecio al trabajo […]
Presentaban como ejemplo a los James Dean, Elvis Presley, etc., que no tienen parecido alguno con un obrero, con un trabajador manual o intelectual. Los que trabajan, por el contrario, son tontos, atrasados (Martín, 1964: 59-60).

The bourgeois ideologues fostered a contempt for work […] offering people like James Dean or Elvis Presley, etc. as role models – people who bear no resemblance to a labourer or to a manual or intellectual worker. Those who work, on the other hand, are considered as stupid, backward.

The role of the hero, to young people, needed to be played by the revolutionary hero or martyr – Martí, Benítez, Iglesias, Echevarría – as discussed in Chapter 3, rather than the youth culture idols of the capitalist world. Martín echoed the views of the revolutionary leadership in criticising Western heroes and extolling

64 “Counter-vanguard” is a term I have coined to express those young people who were not counter-revolutionary but were at odds with the definition of what young people could or should be.
Cuban heroes, but he clearly feared that Western youth cultural attitudes might pervade Cuban youth.

Under the headline “Nuestra Juventud debe inspirarse en el ejemplo de los mártires” [Our youth organisation must draw its inspiration from the example of the martyrs] Martín articulated this fear:

[Es necesario desechar toda actitud de los jóvenes que pueden llevarnos a la blandenguería, al pesimismo, al actitud de elvispreslismo, a la actitud de algunos jóvenes que existen y que tenemos que combatir duramente y que se inspiran en el Rock and Roll; en algunos otros intelectualoides que andan por ahí, que añoran el regreso al pasado (Suárez, Mella, 26/04/1965: 25).

We have to get rid of all youthful attitudes which are likely to lead us into weakness, pessimism, into the attitude of ‘Elvis Presley-ism’, into attitudes like those of certain young people, inspired by rock and roll, whom we must oppose robustly; or inspired by other ‘intellectualoids’ yearning for a return to the past.

This criticism was expressed through humour in the pages of Mella. One cartoon strip, showing a young man dressed in a Western style flanked by two girls in miniskirts, bore the caption: “Lo hacen ídolo ciertos elementos … a todas horas nos quiere empujar a los Beatles por la cabeza… son los rebeldes sin causa… ellos no lo saben, pero les dan cuerda” [Certain groups idolise him… he wants to fill our heads with the Beatles all the time… these groups are the rebels without a cause … they don’t know it, but someone else is pulling their strings], that last phrase describing the final frame showing the man as a wind-up doll, with Uncle Sam turning the key (Nuez, Mella, 18/01/65: 11).

Criticisms were not restricted to condemning displays of approbation of Western culture, but were directed also towards Cuban characteristics. Religion came under censure (Martín, 1964: 61), as did bureaucracy in a cut-out card game equivalent to Old Maid, in which the Old Maid is represented by “El Jinete Burocrata” [the Bureaucratic leech or freeloader] (Mella, 22/02/65: 18-19). Yet it was in its criticism of its own constituency that the hard-line ethos of the UJC, its constant moral panics and inflexibility, comes across. Three particular
constituencies came under fire: secondary school students, university students and campesinos [peasants].

The counter-vanguard in terms of secondary school students was represented by those students who failed in attendance or who cheated. The UJC made it its mission to root out such behaviour. A declaration from its national body stated that:

"Es necesario que en todos los planteles secundarios del país pongamos en tensión nuestras fuerzas para librar la batalla del estudio y disciplina, contra los fraudes como copiar y soplar, y por la promoción escolar (Mella, 15/03/65: 11)."

In all the secondary school campuses in the country, we are flexing our muscles to fight the battle for study and discipline against cheating, such as copying and sharing answers, and in favour of academic excellence.

To this end, the UJC organised the Semana de Asistencia [Anti-Truancy Week] between 21st and 28th March 1965. Secretary-General Martín shortly afterwards demanded that the UJC, in collaboration with the UES, should ensure that those secondary school students who were committing the offences listed above should be, through special meetings, excluded from the becas [scholarship] programme and prevented from entering university (Martín, Mella, 03/05/65: 10). The effort to prevent the counter-vanguard from entering university, and to demonise that group of young people, was then stepped up, and in a letter to secondary students from the UJC, the students were urged to expel those “elementos, contrarrevolucionarios y homosexuales […] para impedir su ingreso en las universidades” [counter-revolutionary and homosexual types […] to stop them getting into the universities] (UJC, Mella, 31/05/65: 3), expounding a trait of the mid-1960s whereby counter-revolutionary attitudes and homosexuality were portrayed as synonymous. The suggested remedy was that these sections of society should be made to undergo their military service, and through that could “cubrir en sus expedientes las lagunas que hoy tienen, y que les impiden ingresar a nuestras Universidades” [fill the gaps they currently have in their school reports and which are an obstacle to their university admission] (UJC, Mella, 31/05/65: 3). At the time there was, in addition, the harsher penalty of the
UMAP camps, which also played host to these perceived counter-revolutionary elements, particularly young males (see Chapter 4).

The second group of whom the UJC were critical were university students. The search for revolutionary identity of the university students will be dealt with separately below, given that they had such a distinct historic identity and an existing youth organisation that survived for some years. It is sufficient to observe at this point that the UJC on the one hand desperately needed the students in order to fulfil its role in the revolución técnica [technical revolution] and, on the other, was deeply critical of them at certain moments during the 1960s. This fight for dominance effectively forced aside the ability of university students to assert their identity despite their historic importance and their ownership of two of the crucial youth martyrs, Mella and Echevarría.

It may seem surprising, considering that the antecedent to the UJC was the AJR with its firmly rural ethos, that one of the moral panics that hit the UJC surrounded agricultural workers. González, Secretario Organizador [General Secretary] of the UJC, wrote at length in Cuba Socialista in 1965 about the role of the UJC in the countryside. He pointed to the importance of young agricultural workers, stating that “[e]stos jóvenes, por su posición de clase y por sus tradiciones de lucha, constituyen, junto con los trabajadores adultos, el primer baluarte de la Revolución en el Campo” [These young people, because of their class position and combative traditions, are, alongside adult workers, the first bastion of the Revolution in the countryside] (González, 1965: 47). Yet despite the fact that the class position of young agricultural workers made them the most natural constituency of the UJC, González argued that the UJC in the countryside needed to create cultural and existential codes similar to those in the cities (González, 1965: 47) and pointed out that, partly due to the counter-revolutionary activities that had taken place in the early 1960s in rural areas, the UJC would have to combat “las perjuicios y las falsas ideas” [prejudice and mistaken ideas] existing in the countryside (González, 1965: 49). At the same time, due to the crucial economic importance of the development of agriculture after the failure of initial attempts to industrialise resulting in a renewed focus on Cuba’s potential agricultural strength, particularly with regard to sugar, the UJC
aimed to develop an agricultural *conciencia*, in order to prevent flight from the countryside to the urban areas. This was in line with policy initiatives which purposely neglected Havana in favour of the development of rural areas. The development of revolutionary consciousness to this end, as well as an ideological goal, was a practical economic goal – a policy initiative with which the UJC was tasked. Expanding membership and fighting the *lucha ideologica* [*ideological struggle*] in the countryside were therefore key aims.

Overall, the ethos of the UJC was closely related to the leadership discourse of fear or panic that young people simply were not living up to the position of vanguard that the Revolution had conferred on them. The lack of stability, fluctuating membership and uncertain future – even extending to uncertainty in 1964 over the future of its magazine, *Mella* (*Mella*, 22/02/65: 2) – caused it to be overcritical of its own constituency. Yet, to an extent, the restructuring of 1964 helped the organisation, and from the moment that Crombet took over as Secretary-General in February 1966 (Gómez, no date a: 8), it continued to increase in membership. Furthermore, it was helped in its self-definition by Guevara’s 1965 text, ‘Socialismo y el Hombre en Cuba’, which reiterated the importance of nurturing a new generation unsullied by the bourgeois past, thereby giving the UJC a firmer sense of mission and a renewed belief in the importance of youth. It rose to the challenge of countering what it perceived as non-conformism through its coordination of mass participation activities, such as the CJC (see Chapter 4), which inspired a faith in young people and in the youth organisation which would be refreshed as new initiatives arose, right up to the present day. However, the strict adherence to a narrow definition of vanguard would restrict membership, and make the UJC appear exclusive.

### 6.5 UJC: Successes

Despite the negativity in the early ethos of the UJC, it made many positive moves that drew young people closer to it, and that partly explain the expansion in membership through the second half of the 1960s. The UJC was strengthened by changes in the national press in 1965. It was given its own daily newspaper, *Juventud Rebelde*, heralding the end of its weekly publication *Mella*. At this
point the culture of youth in action was visible. This was certainly a paper aimed at young people, but saw its constituency as much broader. An editorial in *Granma* announcing its launch stated that its function was:

>Cumplir con el propósito de informar y orientar a los jóvenes obreros, campesinos, estudiantes, deportistas, a los jóvenes miembros de las Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarios, desarrollar una intensa batalla por el ascenso del nivel ideológico de nuestra juventud, al la vez que *brindar una información general a los trabajadores y a todo el pueblo sobre estos y todos los problemas*, es meta a lograr por el nuevo órgano periodístico que saludamos hoy (*Granma*, 22/10/65: 1; my emphasis).

*To fulfil the role of informing and providing guidance to young workers, peasants, students, sportsmen and young members of the Revolutionary Armed Forces, to fight fiercely to improve the ideological level of our youth, while at the same time providing general information to the workers and the people as a whole on these and all problems* – this is the objective of the new publication we are welcoming today.

It is significant, though, that the name given to this paper was *Rebelde* rather than *Comunista*, demonstrating the enduring mass appeal of the rebelde ethos, which carried the youth culture and activism to the rest of the population based on the code of the heroic young guerrilla of the 1950s.

A further way in which young people were elevated was in relation to the Isla de Pinos. Following Hurricane Alma in June 1966, which devastated the island, the UJC issued a call to members to go to the island and assist in its reconstruction, under the logo “¡A recuperar lo perdido y avanzar aún más!” [*To recover what was lost and make things even better than before!*] (Gómez, nd a: 9). This call led to hundreds of young people joining to assist with the reconstruction, and marked the beginning of the structure of *Columnas* [*Columns*] which thenceforth dominated youth participation. In September the designation of the island as the “Isla de la Juventud” first appeared in the press, although it was not until 1978 that the name of the island was officially changed (Gómez, no date a: 13). The island became the focus for youth activism, attracting international youth brigades as well as settlements for young Cubans.
One area in which the UJC saw considerable success was in external relations, and perhaps the counterpoint to criticism of Western youth culture associated with Elvis, Rock and Roll and the Beatles was a perceived proximity between Cuba and the Black Power movement in the USA, with Crombet being a key participant in the solidarity event of 1967 (see Chapter 5). Aside from solidarity with Black Power, international links with the socialist world were also an important part of the work of the UJC. Students on becas [scholarships] went to the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe to study, and similarly Eastern European and Soviet delegations (notably from Komsomol, the Soviet youth organisation) visited Cuba. Furthermore, the UJC used participation in international youth festivals – Helsinki in 1962 and to a greater extent preparation for Algeria in 1965 (later cancelled) – to increase the activism of its members and to inspire participation in all young Cubans.

In terms of initiatives, one of the main responsibilities of the UJC was to guide and organise the UPC. In this it only had partial success. Although it was given responsibility for organising the UPC in April 1962, the internal turmoil in the next two years meant that this task was the object of relatively little attention from the UJC. In a moment of autocritica [self criticism] in 1965 the UJC berated itself for its failure in this task (Hernández, Mella, 28/06/65: 5) and began to focus its attention on managing the children’s organisation, by recruiting “guías de pioneros” [Pioneer Leaders] (Suárez, Mella, 24/05/65: 18). As was characteristic with the UJC, perhaps the aim of this initiative, which was to recruit 40,000 guías, was unrealistic bearing in mind the number of other tasks that were demanded of young people. In 1962 it had been perceived that the UPC would follow the character of the UJC, and be a selective organisation, but in 1966 it was determined that it should be a mass organisation, open to all children, and would be connected with the classroom (Wald, 1978: 185-86), rather than those extracurricular activities with which the UJC was so deeply involved. This led to a natural separation of the two organisations as the aims of a mass organisation differed significantly from that of a vanguard organisation, and this was finally formalised in 1970, when the UPC was made legally distinct from the UJC.
6.6 Students: Activism that Never Materialised

The university students emerged at the start of the Revolution as a confident grouping, having largely peopled the Directorio Revolucionario and with the FEU still intact organisationally, despite the fact that the universities had been closed from November 1956 (Suchlicki, 1969: 74). Part of the confidence of the FEU came from its revolutionary roots, having been founded by Julio Antonio Mella in 1923, and also claiming one of the most significant martyrs of the 1950s struggle, Echevarría, who had led the unsuccessful but heroic attack on the Presidential Palace on 13th March 1957. Furthermore, Echevarría, as leader of the FEU had extended its role in the 1950s beyond that of a purely university student organisation:

[A] partir de ocupar la presidencia de la FEU fue estrechando los lazos y coordinando las acciones con los jóvenes de los otros centros estudiantiles: institutos de segunda enseñanza (preuniversitarios), escuelas de comercio, de artes y oficios, normales para maestros, de kindergarten y escuelas del hogar, que en número aproximado de veinticinco funcionaban en las antiguas seis provincias en que se dividía el país. Especiales vínculos se mantuvo con los compañeros de la Universidad de Oriente y también con muchos centros estudiantiles privados que se sumaron a la formidable lucha de masas que generó el movimiento estudiantil (García Oliveras, 2003: 103-4).

[A]fter taking over the presidency of the FEU, he tightened links and coordinated its activity with young people from other student centres: secondary schools, business and technical colleges, teacher training colleges, nursery nursing and domestic science colleges, of which there were some twenty-five in the former six provinces into which the country was divided. It maintained special links with comrades from Oriente University and with many private student centres which added their weight to the formidable struggle of the masses set in motion by the student movement.

The FEU therefore emerged from the 1950s struggle with firm revolutionary credentials, stronger than the JS particularly in terms of its links with the DR. In
the first edition after the victory of its magazine, *Alma Mater*, on 3 January 1959, this confidence was reflected:

> Reaparece *Alma Mater* con el derecho y el deber que le corresponde como órgano de los iniciadores de la lucha revolucionaria en Cuba. Lo mismo en la primera Guerra de Independencia, lo mismo durante los primeros años de la República, lo mismo cuando la dictadura de Machado y ahora durante estos terribles años de Batista, el estudiantado universitario ha sido el precurso, el iniciador, el que ha dado la voz de alerta para la lucha (quoted in Contrera Areu, 1989: 92).

*Alma Mater* reappears with its rights and obligations as the organ of those who began the revolutionary struggle in Cuba. As in the first War of Independence, as in the first years of the Republic, as during the dictatorship of Machado and so too during these terrible years of Batista, the university student body has been the precursor and instigator, giving the call to arms.

However, the FEU was clearly a different type of organisation from the JS. Despite its role in unity and mobilisation during the fight against Batista, and despite Echevarría’s attempts to broaden its scope, it still had a limited constituency comprising university students who numbered just over 25,295 in 1959 (Domínguez, 1978: 166) and therefore had a limited appeal. Its constituency had traditionally been radical but largely urban middle class, and occasionally associated with the *bonches* [violent gangs], thereby at odds with the new revolutionary ethos championing the poor, the rural and the *rebelde*. However, it had a rich history and tradition as the student voice within the universities, which it was keen to assert. Therefore, in spite of signing the act of integration of youth organisations in October 1960 (Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 67), the FEU maintained its own organisational independence rather than becoming a part of the AJR. Rodríguez explains this as follows:

>[la FEU] mantuvo su personalidad política en consideración a su histórica existencia y a las posibilidades reales de utilizar, en beneficios de la Revolución, sus relaciones internacionales y el bien ganado prestigio de que gozaba en las más importantes tribunas juveniles del mundo (Rodríguez, 1989: 100-101).
[the FEU] preserved its political character, because of its historic past, and the real possibility of using, for the benefit of the Revolution, its international relations and the well-earned prestige it enjoyed in the leading youth forums throughout the world.

This view is corroborated by Suchlicki, who adds that the fear of alienating students who were proud of their organisation led to it being allowed to maintain its organisational structure (Suchlicki, 1969: 101).

The FEU at the University of Havana went through an early power struggle shortly after the university reopened in 1959, between Pedro Boitel, previously of the M-26-7, and Rolando Cubela, previously of the DR (Suchlicki, 1969: 89-90).65 This should not really be over-emphasised, as the FEU had a tradition of bitterly fought elections, and Echevarría himself had undergone a struggle for the presidency in 1955 (Thomas, 1971: 864 n10). In order to move on from this and to assert its identity and role in the newly restructured universities, as well as wishing to maintain its revolutionary credentials, the FEU began to ally itself closely to the revolutionary programme. In July 1960 the FEU outlined a document encouraging depuración [purging] of perceived counter-revolutionary elements in the universities as well as promoting greater access for poorer students. The latter was probably also a response to a perceived crisis in enrolment, with university student numbers dropping by 6000 between 1959 and 1960 (Domínguez, 1978: 166).

Despite the radical tradition of the FEU, the role of the students in the early Revolution was not an easy one. One of the problems that particularly affected the students was that, more than any other sector, they were proponents in the early Revolution of a radical anti-clericalism. This may have been a response to the fact that, according to Domínguez, at the start of the Revolution “the government launched an ideological campaign against the church, intending to foster a fear of persecution” (Domínguez, 1989: 48), although this view is at odds with Castro’s pronouncements and it is likely that issues more local to the students explain the vehemence of their position. Castro, while criticising the

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65 Cubela would later turn against the Revolution.
clergy in his speech at the University of Havana in November 1960, was explicit in not criticising religion or the church, instead blaming corruption amongst the clergy on economic interests and class (Castro, 27/11/60). During this speech the students and young people began to chant “Fidel, seguro, a los curas dales duro” [Fidel, come on, hit the clergy hard] (Castro, 27/11/60), indicating levels of extremism that later caused problems. Given that much pre-revolutionary education had been controlled by the church, and that the Catholic students tended to come from the traditional student classes (from middle-class backgrounds), the newer generation of students from working-class backgrounds (who were more likely to be members of the AJR), saw a threat of discontent or even counter-revolutionary activity deriving from church-dominated groups, notably the Agrupación Católica Universitaria, at the University. In early 1961, there was fear of a conspiracy on the campuses, with the foiled attempts by the “esbirros con sotana” [cassocked meddlars] to take over the Escuela Electrónica [School of Electronic Engineering], and to convene a counter-revolutionary demonstration, leading the AJR to campaign against them with the slogan “HORMIGA, ARAÑA, ¡QUE LOS CURAS CORTAN CAÑA!” [ANT, SPIDER! LET THE CLERGY CUT SUGAR CANE] (Mella, 01/03/61: 13 and 26-27). The Revolutionary leadership may have encouraged the use of slogans, as was the case with the AJR/UJC motto, comprising Trabajo, Estudio, Fusil [Work, Study, the Rifle] but slogans were also outside the control of the leadership, and reflected deep-seated student concerns rather than a particular revolutionary policy or programme.

Student fears of counter-revolutionary activities amongst the religious groups deepened when a former member of the Agrupación, Manuel Artine, commanded the Bay of Pigs invasion in April 1961 (Crahan, 1989: 9). The FEU then launched a fierce attack against the bishops:

Ustedes están procurando la división de nuestro pueblo. […] Ustedes van alzando la bandera de los reaccionarios, de los latifundistas, de los mercenarios, de los explotadores, de los criminales de guerra, de los imperialistas. Ustedes no cumplen con Cristo, sino que lo traicionan. Ustedes van demostrando que obispo y mercador son términos
These veins of anti-clericalism eventually caused problems for the students and damaged them as a group. The students’ association with anti-clericalism caused them to be linked with one of the key political crises of the early Revolution, the Escalante affair. As discussed above, this affair was triggered by Castro’s criticism of Sierra fighter Ravelo based on his exclusion of reference to Echevarría’s Catholicism from his eulogy on the anniversary of the death of the student leader. Many students, in particular the new generation of students from working-class backgrounds, felt they were fighting a genuine struggle, if not against counter-revolutionary elements, certainly against conservative elements in their ranks and they were not familiar with historic, sometimes violent, FEU power struggles. Their motivation was therefore probably genuine, but they found their anti-clericalism to be associated, through Castro’s bitter critique of sectarianism, with the inflexibility of the PSP, and they therefore – almost by accident – became associated with the inflexibility and extremism that had also dogged the AJR.

These early difficulties should not necessarily have precluded FEU members at the Universities from being activists in support of the Revolution, participating, mobilizing, and trying, like the UJC, to live up to the definition of vanguard laid out by the dominant culture of youth. The FEU was supportive of the Revolution, and it played a role, by establishing Brigadas – by January 1960, 2000 students had joined the Brigadas Estudiantiles “José Antonio Echevarría” (Terrero, Mella, 01/01/60: 17) – as well as founding specialist University Militias (Cruz, interview, 26/05/03). Therefore the effective closure of the FEU in 1967 is surprising. The students, so important to the UJC, as expressed by Martín (above), did not seem to have yielded to the pressure to conform to the culture of the UJC, and were constantly criticised by the latter. The FEU itself was not
criticised, and allied itself closely to the UJC, and the two joined forces in 1965 in a new *depuración* [purging] of the university studentship. The definition of those who needed purging was broad, according to FEU member Ileana Valmaña:

> Se depura a los contrarrevolucionarios activos […] los ciudadanos que asumen una actitud negativa, continua, impertinente, confusionista, oportunista, y aislados de las masas a las que desprecian; son fácilmente detectadas por ellas. El estudiantado universitario ha ido a la lucha ideológica con estros sujetos y por ende *en su perfecto derecho revolucionario* ha exigido su depuración (Sautie and Perdomo, *Mella*, 05/04/65: 2; original emphasis).

*The active counter-revolutionaries have to be purged […] citizens with a negative, relentless, irrelevant, confusionist, opportunistic attitude, isolated from the masses they despise; the masses can easily identify them. The university student body has fought an ideological struggle with those people and therefore, well within their revolutionary rights, has demanded that they be purged.*

The merging of the concept of the counter-revolutionary and the homosexual was again asserted here:

> Dentro de la clasificación hay que incluir a esa escoria pública que son los homosexuales de escándalo, ya sean nacidos hombres y mujeres y lógicamente a los activistas prácticas e ideológicos de contrarrevolución (Sautie and Perdomo, *Mella*, 05/04/65: 2-3).

*The classification has to include that public scum, namely scandalous homosexuals, irrespective of whether they are men or women by birth, and, logically, those who engage in thought and deed in the counter-revolution.*

This was a clear display of the institutionalised homophobia referred to in Chapter 2. The moral panic that the universities would be populated by homosexual students is a curious panic, and is related to Martín’s idea that the university students were those with whom the UJC most needed to engage. Because the students were already a *de facto* vanguard because they were

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66 FEU leader Crombet later became the long-standing leader of the UJC.
selected on academic excellence, the UJC felt a particular need to ensure a vanguard attitude in all areas amongst them.

The successful purging of the university did not cause the activists of the UJC to relax. The eventual solution to keeping the university students as a vanguard, which occurred in 1967, was to merge the UJC and the FEU, claiming that it would prevent duplication of duties due to overlap of membership. In fact, only 30% of FEU members were also UJC members (Domínguez, 1978: 280). Domínguez sees this as extraordinary:

> [t]he political demobilisation of the university students in the late 1960s is the most important exception to the trends in the politics of the time […] The suspicion that the federation had been dismantled to eliminate a source of political trouble for the government is reinforced by the outpouring of remarks made by student leaders in 1971 [when the FEU was re-established] professing the loyalty of university students to the revolutionary government (Domínguez, 1978: 280).

The panic over the revolutionary credential of the students preceding the merger of the two organisations to some extent corroborates this. Exclusion of the masses from the UJC was a policy decision, but exclusion of 70% of students from the UJC-FEU, given that the students were anyway a small population, seems remarkable. There may, however, be a further reason for the collapse of the FEU: the expansion in higher education. This was perhaps responsible for the collapse of university student identity based on the connection to its heroic organisation. No longer were university students the small elite group who continued education after school. In EOC (Educación Obrero-campesina) colleges and polytechnics a new generation of students was created that had no link with the historic radicalism of the FEU which had been, after all, closely linked to the liberal arts and legal studies. Perhaps pre-revolutionary organisations such as the FEU no longer had a place within the Revolution.

### 6.7 Conclusion

The UJC, whose aims may have been laudable, massively over-reached its ability to deliver. By demanding of its members vanguard behaviour in every aspect of
life, and by narrowing that concept of vanguard to exclude anyone who would even have sympathy with that which it considered non-conformist, the UJC made it almost impossible for its members to feel a sense of satisfaction. This was *autocrítica* gone mad. Furthermore, by creating that sense of differentiation from the counter-vanguard it defined the latter culture to include any espousal of Western culture. Whether or not the UJC could have functioned better as a mass organisation is a moot point, but if it had allowed itself latitude in its definition of vanguard it could have succeeded without the constant moral panics. These moral panics certainly came from the revolutionary leadership as well as from the leadership of the UJC, but because it did not allow itself to evolve naturally and pragmatically, the concept of *lucha*, so crucial to the Revolution, became a negative influence on the youth organisation, and, through the organisation, on the young activists. So although it is doubtless that the young activists were highly committed, and worked extremely hard to fulfil the aims of the Revolution, at the expense of their leisure time (in so far as their leisure time was absorbed by the initiatives in which they were involved), the latitude of expression was very narrow, as large groups of young people were forced into a non-conformist position through failing to reach the standards expected by the youth organisation.

The failure to provide an outlet for expression, either for university students, or for those masses of young people who were not in the UJC seems like an omission, and the lack of a mass organisation for young people was one of the things that resulted in a weak sense of youth identity. Those young people who were not activists who conformed to the very narrow view of vanguard taken by the UJC, could participate in revolutionary programs, or could sit closer to the outside margins of what was deemed acceptable. These groups will be the focus of the next two chapters.
Chapter 7
Participation and Voluntarism

7.1 Introduction

In Cuban historiography, participation is limited to the link between education and participation, in particular the Literacy Campaign of 1961. This is in part due to the position of the Centro de Estudios Sobre la Juventud, Centre for Youth Studies, that was established in the 1980s in reaction both to concerns over young people’s participation and development and also – and more importantly – to establish the importance of youth within the historiography of the Cuban Revolution (Rodríguez 1989, Centro de Estudios Sobre la Juventud 1986, Gómez no date a, b, c, d and e). Youth participation in Cuban is, however, broader than this perspective, and indicates how participation can happen in a given set of circumstances. The policy initiatives discussed elsewhere were in part a response to the high levels of involvement by young people in the early years of the Revolution. The culture of youth participation, once formed, would change relatively little considering the substantial further changes that Cuba underwent from the early 1960s. In the 1990s it was reinforced with the Elián González crisis and the crucial role youth played in the mass protest against the detaining of Elián in Miami (Kapcia, 2005a: 400).

Whilst, in the 1990s, mass involvement on the part of young people was easily achievable due to the presence of institutions, notably the UJC, which could coordinate a campaign as a form of mobilisation, in 1959 Cuba had no such established institutions through which policy could be either driven or enacted. This therefore supplies a unique set of circumstances where participation can be measured quite distinctly from mobilisation. Under mobilisation, participation levels can be connected to obligation and/or peer pressure. However, in Cuba in the 1960s youth participation was primarily linked to voluntarism. The result was that opting out of participation was, at the most serious degree, expressed through exile and, at the least serious, expressed by simply not participating. The fact that the latter group were not covered by the moral panic in the early years is
indicative of two facts. Firstly, levels of participation were very high as those who opted in were driven by a critical momentum built up by an increasing desire to be a part of building the new Cuba. Secondly, those who were not participating were considered in the discourse of the Revolution as suffering from a tainted bourgeois past, so were excused.

The story of youth participation in the Militias and the Literacy Campaign shows mass participation in matters that were a key part of building a new Cuba, firmly within the developing national-revolutionary identity. This continued in some areas, so that youth participation in the aficionado movement continued to follow the voluntary, organic, model of building a participative movement. Youth participation in other areas moved towards mobilisation so that structures were put in place to encourage participation, and in fact early voluntarism was so successful in its multifarious aims that it prompted the creation of those structures, notably via the UJC and the education system. Put together, the three affairs under consideration created a culture of youth participation that still remains today, despite a gradual acceptance of a failure on the part of some young people to use the voluntary model as their means of connection with the Revolution.

As a form of socialisation of young people, the various means of participation in Cuba were probably unique. Those young people who participated in any of the above ways were keen and willing. Voluntary work gave them a space in which to express themselves in the company of other young people, and, in particular for young women, provided a level of independence that provided an unprecedented degree of liberation.

7.2 Political Participation in Cuba

Much work on political participation in Communist systems sees involvement in politics not as participation exactly, but as mobilisation in favour of the ruling party.\textsuperscript{67} The high levels of participation in the early Revolution in Cuba were

\textsuperscript{67}See, for example, Gripp (1973) and Holmes (1986). This view is challenged by Schulz (1981).
triggered by a different impetus. They were in part a consequence of the relatively low levels of participation in the struggle against Batista, so in January 1959, whilst a large proportion of the Cuban population welcomed Castro’s Revolution, the majority of Cubans had not been instrumental in bringing about the victory. Popular participation gave many Cubans the authority to internalise the Revolution, particularly in the context of the discourse of the revolutionary leadership, which increasingly connected the Revolution directly with all Cubans. Part of this process was the focus on direct democracy, which meant that the leadership, in particular Castro, enjoyed and worked for a proximity to the Cuban people that was unprecedented. Leogrande explains this proximity:

[Castro] would often spend hours with small groups of people discussing local problems, ordering action to solve the problems, or explaining why the problems were unsolvable. Not infrequently, he would take the side of the citizenry against abuses or inefficiency by local officials. Castro personally came to be regarded as a more reliable bulwark against governmental irregularity than any set of structural safeguards (Leogrande, 1978: 118).

Leogrande argues that participation in 1960s Cuba was based on essential premises of the concept of socialist democracy:

(1) that the essence of democracy is the pursuit of policies which serve the interests of the people; (2) that democracy requires the active support of the people through their direct participation in the implementation of public policy; and (3) that a direct, informal, and noninstitutional relationship between the people and their leaders is sufficient to ensure governmental responsiveness to popular needs and demands (Leogrande, 1978: 117; my emphasis).

This argument concurs with Chanan who argues that “in the 1960s, Cuba was overtaken by revolutionary euphoria, mass enthusiasm, the spontaneous self-incorporation of the masses, the phenomenon of direct democracy” (Chanan, 2001: 400).

Indicative of the relationship between direct democracy, participation, connection to the Revolution and relationship with the guerrilla struggle of the 1950s, was the attempt to emulate the heroes of the 1950s rebellion which was a
prominent feature of participation in the early Revolution, and in this sense it was driven by the revolutionary discourse on young martyrs and heroes. It was this type of popular participation that was visible in the early years of the Revolution, rather than that evident in Fagen’s position that “the primary mechanism for effecting individual and cultural transformation is directed participation in revolutionary institutions” (Fagen, 1969: 16). Fagen’s position is closer to a mobilisation stance, and although this was to become the case as institutionalisation increased through a variety of policy initiatives, his position under-emphasised the mass participation without institutionalisation in the early years of the Revolution. Cuban historian Luis Gómez similarly overlooks the lack of institutions early on in the Revolution, seeing asociacionismo (meaning membership of new organisations) as the route to participation rather than the other way round, although he does point out that the institutions themselves “surgieron de forma explosiva e instantánea, es decir, de forma revolucionaria, no hubo tiempo para largos pactos de grupos y mucho menos para evoluciones graduales” [mushroomed explosively and instantaneously, in a revolutionary manner; there was no time for long group agreements, and even less for evolutionary development] (Gómez, no date e: 4).

Fagen (1969) examined three participative mechanisms: the Literacy Campaign, the Schools for Revolutionary Instruction (EIRs) and the Committees for the Defence of the Revolution (CDRs). These were key initiatives of the early Revolution, and fed into the transformation of political culture to which he referred. His failure, however, to distinguish between institution-led participation and participation-led policy initiatives means that his conclusion – that “many who participate do so not because their values necessarily fit in with those of the leadership, but because they have few if any alternatives and are subjected to substantial peer group pressure” (Fagen, 1969: 152) – disempowers a large proportion of the Cuban people whose choice to participate was crucial in the building of the Revolution. Such participation was most significant in the early years of the Revolution, notably with reference to the Literacy Campaign and the Militias which will be considered here, but a culture of participation continued into the later years of the 1960s and beyond, as can be seen with the third case considered here, that of the aficionados movement. The result is a story of the
1960s that sees massive pro-establishment involvement, quite contrary to varying levels of anti-establishment processes undertaken, to a greater or lesser extent, by young people in the Western world. The importance of young people in particular as participants in Cuba in the 1960s is emphasised by Gómez, who writes that “[l]a Revolución coincidió con la mentalidad predominante en los jóvenes que esperaban a ser testigos y actores de cambios profundos y rápidos en las más diversas esferas de la sociedad cubana; de aquí lo atractivo de la Revolución para ellos” [The Revolution responded to the prevailing attitudes of young people who hoped to witness and take an active part in profound and rapid changes in the most diverse aspects of Cuban society; that is why it was so appealing to them] (Gómez, no date e: 6). In a sense, he is talking of the empowerment of young people given the discourse on youth discussed elsewhere; the very culture of youth which was developing in effect having its own momentum as discourse, culture and participation came together.

The aim of this chapter is to explore the role of youth specifically as participants in the 1960s. To this end, it will re-examine one of Fagen’s cases, the Literacy Campaign, from the perspective of youth participation in this campaign and seeing the campaign as youth-driven. It will also look at two other examples of popular participation in which youth was critical, the Revolutionary Militias and involvement in the aficionado movement, which corroborate the position that the young participant in Cuba was an actor in the formation of a new ethos and culture – and policy – of the 1960s.

7.3 Educational Voluntarism: the Literacy Campaign

The Literacy Campaign of 1961 is still held up as one of the key successes of the early Revolution. Although education was one of the elements in Castro’s 1950s programme for reform laid out in La historia me absolverá (Castro, no date [1953]: 42), his focus at that stage was on improving working conditions for teachers (47-48) and, although he mentioned illiteracy, pointing out that 30% of Cuba’s peasants could not sign their own name (48), the Literacy Campaign emerged from the development of the guerrilla struggle and the impetus towards education of the early Revolution. The former was partly inspired by the role
that educated guerrilla fighters in the Ejército Rebelde in the 1950s, including Che Guevara (Anderson, 1997: 298) had played in teaching literacy to those illiterate or semi-literate cadres. Skierka argues that Castro incorporated a mass literacy campaign into his second Sierra Maestra Manifesto of 1957 in response to advice from urban revolutionary leader (and martyr) Frank País to broaden the appeal of the rebellion (Skierka, 2004: 55).

The popularity of the Literacy Campaign was unprecedented. Pérez Cruz argues that:

> La alfabetización surge como necesidad histórica del desarrollo del proceso revolucionario y como genuina demanda democrática y popular de las masas cubanas cabalmente interpretada por la vanguardia revolucionaria (Pérez Cruz, 1988: 181-82).

*Literacy emerged as an historic necessity for the development of the revolutionary process and as a genuine democratic and popular demand of the Cuban masses, faithfully interpreted by the revolutionary vanguard.*

This relationship with democratic demand is corroborated by the momentum that the Literacy Campaign generated. Fagen argued that “when the planning for the national Literacy Campaign formally began in the autumn of 1960, there was already considerably organizational and pedagogic experience to draw on”, as INRA, the Ejército Rebelde and volunteer teachers had already begun to undertake literacy work (Fagen, 1969: 38). If we take this perspective further, by the time of Castro’s mobilisation speech in May 1961, he was either catching up with, or capitalising on, the existing popular participation in the Literacy Campaign, and he himself pointed out in the speech that there were already 60,000 young teachers (Castro 1960 in Fagen, 1969: 182). Indeed, the AJR had begun recruiting to the campaign in December 1960, the application form to register as an alfabetizador being printed in *Mella* (06/12/60: 34-35), preceding the formation of the specialist literacy brigades.

The Literacy Campaign had two significant impacts on the Cuban people. It succeeded in teaching literacy skills to hundreds of thousands of illiterate Cubans, but more importantly to this study is the corollary to literacy learning:
the role of the alfabetizador [literacy teacher]. Through this means, the campaign functioned as an important socialising agent for a generation of very young Cubans. As Medin points out:

Illiterates were taught not just a language but the language of the Revolution, and the literacy teachers were taught a new terminology that incorporated them into the conceptual and axiological world of the socialist Revolution (Medin, 1990: 69).

To this end, the manual for the literacy teachers consisted of twenty-four “Tiempos de Orientación Revolucionaria” [Themes for Revolutionary Guidance], including the Revolution, Fidel as leader, nationalisation and imperialism, among others (Ministerio de Educación, 1961: 7). Through this, and through the action of giving the benefit of their own education to others, the experience that young teachers would gain was one of the key aims of the campaign. Castro, speaking to the brigadistas in May 1961, pointed out that the latter, though being given the task to teach, would also learn about rural life:

You are going to teach, but as you teach you will also learn. You are going to learn much more than you can possibly teach and in the end you will feel as grateful to the campesinos as the campesinos will feel to you for teaching them to read and write. [...] They will teach you the “why” of the Revolution better than any speech, better than any book. [...] They will also teach you the real meaning of sacrifice, and how honest and healthy the hard life is (Castro 1960, in Fagen, 1969: 183).

The focus on the rural was tied up with the hero/martyr ideal (discussed elsewhere), whereby the virtues of the humildes were held up as genuine and authentic, unsullied by a bourgeois urban culture. Therefore the entry of young people from the cities to the countryside as literacy teachers was one of the most

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important aspects of the campaign with 88.2% of the *brigadistas* hailing from urban areas (Fagen, 1969: 45). One contemporary commentator wrote:

> [young people] han abandonado las comodidades del hogar urbano, sus libros, sus aulas, sus distracciones juveniles, y han ido a las sierras o a las ciénagas a dormir en hamacas, o sobre el suelo, a ayudar a labrar la tierra, a hacer hornos con los carboneros y a soportar enfermedades e inclemencias del tiempo (García Galló, 1961: 79).

> [young people] have abandoned their urban home comforts, their books, classrooms and juvenile entertainment, and taken themselves off to the marshes, sleeping in hammocks or on the ground, helping to till the land or make furnaces with the charcoal-burners and suffering illnesses and inclement weather.

Clearly, according to García, being an *alfabetizador* was more than merely a teaching post; through sacrifice and an experience of rural life it developed *conciencia* and forged a connection between young urbanites and the land. The success thereof later translated into policy with the Escuelas al Campo programme in 1965 and, in the 1970s, the Escuelas en el Campo programme (see Chapter 4).

The role played by young people in the Literacy Campaign is one of the ways through which it is remembered. The youth brigades of literacy workers were named after Conrado Benítez, a young teacher killed by counter-revolutionary guerrillas, who was used in Castro’s speeches to develop the discourse of youth in terms of a rural, humble ideal, representing commitment and martyrdom (see Chapter 3). Fagen pointed out astutely that “[a]lthough there were never as many Conrado Benítez *brigadistas* participating in the Literacy Campaign as there were adult *alfabetizadores populares*, it was the élan, the image, and the exploits of the former that captured national attention” (Fagen, 1969: 42). In Castro’s speech to the 1962 Youth Congress, he made a point of praising young people for their role in the campaign (Castro, 04/04/62: 5), and an analysis of involvement in the campaign corroborates this. Of the 271,000 literacy teachers or *alfabetizadores*, about 100,000 were members of the Brigadas Conrado Benítez (Fagen, 1969: 47; Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, 1986: 83).
Within these youth brigades, 87.5% of members were in the age range 10 to 29 (Fagen, 1969: 45).

Not only were young people involved as teachers – which itself had an influence which still marks out that generation today (Martínez Heredia, interview, 19/05/03) – but every young person in Cuba was affected as all schools were closed for the eight month duration of the Literacy Campaign. All those with at least primary education were encouraged to join the literacy brigades, and statistics show that as many as 47% of those young people eligible to become alfabetizadores did, although the percentage among pre-university and university level students was lower (23.9 and 22.6% respectively) (Fagen, 1969: 45). It is difficult to identify a reason for the lower levels of participation amongst this group, and neither Jolly (1964) nor Fagen (1969) offer any explanation. Regarding university students, it is not inconceivable that participation would be lower due to the many changes – and difficulties – in universities in the early Revolution (see Chapter 6). Alternatively, it may also be the case that university students were already involved in other teaching initiatives; indeed, Jolly points out that in 1959 Castro appealed to pre-university and university students to be volunteer teachers in new rural schools, a call to which 5000 students responded (Jolly, 1964: 226-27). These anomalies may have come about without obvious cause due to the spontaneous and reactive nature of the method of building the Literacy Campaign.

Each brigadista was expected to teach between 6 and 10 people (Castro, 14/05/61: 182). The young volunteers were sent to a training centre in Varadero, and from there were sent to rural areas. The manual (Alfabeticemos) was given to all literacy teachers, and, as well as the 24 themes, included direction to young teachers on how to behave towards their adult students, advising them to be friendly, interested, non-authoritative, and understanding of economic and other difficulties (Ministerio de Educación, 1961: 11-12). Interestingly, aside from the manual and the primer (Venceremos), the arsenal of each brigadista also comprised an arithmetic primer (García Galló, 1961: 77), indicating that the campaign saw literacy and numeracy as hand in hand; in other words that this was not just a literacy campaign but also an education campaign. This generated
future policies to raise the level of education of all Cubans first to third grade and later to sixth grade, indicating once again the way that successful voluntary participation drove a future policy agenda.

Participation in the Literacy Campaign had an enormous effect on young literacy teachers. For many it was the first time they had left their home environment and for women in particular, this was a fundamental social break from the past, as more than half of the literacy workers were women (Fagen, 1969: 45; García Galló, 1961: 79). Young women found themselves firmly away from the casa and could thereby subvert the casa/calle divide that prevailed from pre-revolutionary times. Not only were they leaving their homes, but they were leaving for several months, generally going from urban to rural areas. Of course, there was also a practical element driving the involvement of young people in the campaign; while older people were involved in productive work without which the economy would suffer, by closing the schools young people were freed up to be alfabetizadores without a direct impact on production.

The Literacy Campaign emerged as a result of the centrality of education to the emerging national identity, with the influence of Martí being constantly present. The ad hoc literacy teaching in the Sierra Maestra, along with its incorporation into the programme of the Revolution in the late 1950s, and the naming of 1961 the Year of Education, made literacy a central aim of the Revolution. However, the level of success it had was based on the emergence of a genuine mass movement on the part of those who wished to be literacy teachers. Whilst later initiatives did not have the level of popular involvement that the Literacy Campaign enjoyed, the latter laid the groundwork for a new way of educating Cuba, dependent on mass participation and ruralism. This led to the initiatives to raise education to third and sixth grade, and to the Escuelas al Campo and Escuelas en el Campo programmes (Chapter 4), but it also influenced the way in which teachers were trained, with the system of teacher training commencing with training in the rural school at Minas del Frío. This was a “system based on the success of the rough training methods used for volunteer teachers in 1959 and 1960 (Jolly, 1964: 237).
7.4 Military Voluntarism: the Revolutionary Militias

The success of the Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias (MNRs) as a mass participative movement was another remarkable success of the early Revolution. Evidence on the Militias is unfortunately scant, remarkably little work having been done on this part of Cuban revolutionary history.  

From January 1959 onwards, it was clear that Cuba was threatened by counter-revolutionary forces both inside the country and, shortly afterwards, from exile. The need to defend the country militarily became acute, particularly after the 21st October air raids on Havana by Díaz Lanz. As a result it was decided that the arming and training of civilians was a necessary solution to the military threat. At a mass acto on 26th October 1959, the founding of the Militias was announced. Castro called on workers, peasants and students to play their role in defending Cuba, alongside the “soldados campesinos del Ejército Rebelde” [peasant soldiers of the Rebel Army] (Granma, 26/10/70: 2). The concept of a people’s Militia was not a new one. As a military solution, Militias formed part of both Cuba’s and Latin America’s historic defence (Sartorius, 2004), but the meaning of participation in Militias had, by the time of the Revolution, changed substantially, with the Militias being associated with rebellion rather than merely defence. This change the in role of the Militias was reflected in the evolution of the rebel forces in the Sierra and the llano in the 1950s. According to the editorial of a 1950s underground publication, reproduced in Granma on the anniversary of the founding of the MNR, the 1950s Militias were based originally in the cities but moved into the countryside due to Batista’s strength in the cities, becoming part of the Ejército Rebelde and having as their mission the sabotage of the routes of communication of Batista’s forces (Granma, 26/10/70: 2). Militias had become one of the arms of military strategy within the rebel forces so the move to Militias as a military strategy after the January 1959 was a natural and organic process. There was not, however, a direct continuation of the Militias of the guerrillas rebellion, as these were demobilised in January 1959 at the point that the Ejército Rebelde attempted to professionalize.

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69 Albert Manke of the Department of Iberian and Latin American History, University of Cologne, Germany, is currently undertaking his PhD research on the Militias. I am grateful for his help on this section of the thesis.
Despite the demobilisation of the 1950s Militias, between the victory of January 1959 and the official launch of the MNR on 26th October 1959, *de facto* militias had already been formed:

> Desde su creación […] las Milicias Nacionales Revolucionarias tuvieron la cooperación valiosa de entusiastas compañeros, abnegados militantes revolucionarios […] que ya, meses antes, de aquel memorable 26 de Octubre de 1959, intervenían en la organización de las primeras milicias (Gutiérrez, *Granma*, 25/10/65: 1; my emphasis).

> From their inception […] the National Revolutionary Militias obtained valuable cooperation from enthusiastic comrades, selfless revolutionary militants […] who months before that memorable 26 October 1959 had taken part in organising the first militias.

This related to the emerging need to defend the Revolution; there was not sufficient planning to fulfil this need, and it could only be attempted by using those loose structures that preceded the victory of 1959. With this in mind, Domínguez argues that “forming a militia was an *ad hoc* response to the need for organized support at a critical time” (Domínguez, 1978: 208; my emphasis). The result was that when the creation of the Militias was announced on 26th October 1959, and notwithstanding the fact that the leadership had not really referred to militias before this date, there was already a significant militia-type force consisting of organisations such as the Patrullas Juveniles, and the *acto* to announce their creation in effect was an announcement of their formalisation and expansion.

Despite the shortage of evidence, membership was massive and rapidly accelerated, from 100,000 people in 1960 to up to 300,000 in 1961 (Domínguez, 1978: 208). The first Militia officers graduated from special officer training schools in November 1960, having undergone a five-month training period in the Sierra Maestra, climbing the Pico Turquino (Castro, 24/11/60), much like the first members of the AJR.⁷⁰ Although the age breakdown of membership is

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⁷⁰It is not surprising that the AJR and the Militias would undergo a similar training. They were both under the auspices of the Ejército Rebelde and probably had some overlap in personnel, as young members of the AJR were encouraged to join Militias.
unavailable, there is evidence that young people were key participants in the Militias. The work of the Militias, unlike that of other organisations such as the CDRs, was physical – handling weapons, marching, preparing for combat – inclining membership toward the young and fit, as well as towards a manual worker/peasant workforce. The early Militias were led by Captain Acevedo, who was under twenty years old (Thomas, 1971: 1268), and from October 1960 it was compulsory for all members of the AJR to be incorporated into the MNRs (Rodríguez, 1989: 118). At its April 1962 Congress, the AJR numbered 100,000 members (Quintela, 1962: 37), indicating that perhaps as many as one in three Militia members were also members of the AJR. The youth of Militia members extended even into near childhood. The role of the anti-aircraft gunners, aged around 14, is well written into contemporary Cuban historiography, and these were particularly singled out for praise by Fidel Castro in his speech to the 1962 Youth Congress (Castro, 04/04/62: 5). Furthermore, the involvement of students in the Militias is perhaps one of the only cases of clear and enthusiastic participation on the part of this problematic group.

As the students were treated as a separate group, there were specific university Militias. The formation of Militias in the universities was particularly important for two reasons: firstly because an ideological battle was being fought on the campuses (particularly of the University of Havana) and Castro was keen to revolutionise the universities and the students, and visited the University of Havana several times in the early Revolution in order to achieve that aim; and secondly because much technical expertise was concentrated in the student body as well as their teachers, who would also join the university Militias. In particular, the exodus of a proportion of the middle classes had resulted in a shortage of doctors, so medical students became important, and formed their own Brigadas Sanitarias which would serve all other Militias. The university Militias paraded in uniform on 13 March 1960, being then the very first Militias to have formed and trained under the auspices of the new policy. According to the organiser of the Brigada Universitaria Sanitaria at the University of Havana, Mario Cruz, the majority of university students were members of the Militias (Cruz, interview, 26/05/03).
The Bay of Pigs invasion was when the Militias were at their most active. All the university Militias were mobilised, and although one unit from the Ejército Rebelde was mobilised, the rest of the defence force at Playa Girón was made up of Militias (Cruz, interview, 26/05/03). Militias were mobilised across Cuba, as there was no certainty where the attack would take place but those who saw fighting during the Bay of Pigs invasion were Militias from Havana, Matanzas and Cienfuegos. The students’ specific advanced skills were essential to the Bay of Pigs defence, with the Brigada Sanitaria servicing the needs of all the other Militias by sending its members to join larger Militia groups (in the case of Cruz, six students joining a company numbering 180) (Cruz, interview, 26/05/03).

The Militias are remembered both for these actions, at the Bay of Pigs, and for their role in defeating the counter-revolutionaries in the Escambray mountains. Participation in the Militias, however, largely involved military training and the guarding of public buildings, members giving up eight hours a week to this pursuit (Thomas, 1971: 1321). Not all members of the Militias were involved in direct combat; the island was felt to be threatened from all directions, therefore the Militia were usually responsible for their locality. For example, Pinar del Río province saw no direct invasion, but was felt to be both of strategic importance and at risk. In 1960 at a speech to newly graduated milicianos in that province, Castro said:

Esta provincia tiene un gran valor revolucionario, y un gran valor militar. [...] Esta provincia, bien defendida, es extraordinariamente valiosa desde el punto de vista militar. Por eso vamos a tomarnos especial interés en el entrenamiento de las milicias de esta provincia (Castro, 21/08/60).

This province is of great revolutionary and military worth. [...] This province, if well defended, is incredibly important from a military point of view. Because of that, we are going to pay special attention to training the Militias of this province.

This demonstrates both the mass nature of Militias, covering the entire island as an invasion could come at any location, and the local nature of them, with members being trained to defend their locality if necessary.
Despite not necessarily being involved in direct combat, being a *miliciano* was a unique socialising experience in itself. For young people to be trained in using weapons to defend an as yet only loosely defined project was clearly revolutionary in any sense of the word, reaching the extreme of Benedict Anderson’s idea of the imagined community (1990) (see Chapter 1). According to another university student involved in establishing the Militias, Fernando Martínez Heredia, membership of the Militias was a “forma de socialización determinada” [*specific type of socialisation*] (Martín Heredia, interview, 19/05/03). Indeed, Castro speaking on 1st May 1960, in a speech that was reprinted in the *Manual de capacitación cívica*, stated that “¡Democracia es ésta, en que, no sólo cuentan los derechos de las mayorías, sino que le entrega armas a esa mayoría!” [*In democracy, it is not only the rights of the majority which count, but also that arms should be given to that majority*] (MinFAR, 1960: 307). In other words, the Militias were a form of the direct democracy expressed by Leogrande and Chanan.

The Militias lost their importance in the mid 1960s, reduced in status to a “civil defence force and military reserve” (Leogrande, 1978: 117) and it was not until the 1980s when the Milicias de Tropas Territoriales were launched that this means of military defence was re-established. But participation in the Militias, as in other initiatives, had had the effect of providing the leadership of the Revolution with evidence of the success of young people’s involvement in the defence of Cuba, and when SMO was introduced in 1963 (see Chapter 4) it served to formalise youth involvement in the military, thereby transforming young people’s involvement in defence from voluntarism into compulsion. Cuban historian Luis Gómez makes reference to this when he discusses the move from voluntarism to enlistment:

> ...lo importante de este salto cualitativo es que en gran medida fue posible gracias a la participación activa, voluntaria y desinteresada de la juventud desde los mismos albores del proceso revolucionario (Gómez, no date e: 36-7).

> What is important about this qualitative step-change is that it was made possible to a large extent by the active, voluntary and selfless...
participation of young people from the earliest days of the revolutionary process.

SMO was soon made youth-specific when it was decided that young people could carry out their military service in the CJC's and later, in the 1970s, the EJT (Gómez, interview, 28/05/03).

7.5 Cultural Voluntarism: the Aficionado Movement

Unlike in the military, in the field of culture the critical necessity of participation was not an issue. Culture, however, was very important in the Revolution, so voluntarism in this field indicates one way in which young people connected with the Revolution. Whilst the cultural producers, a small group of artists, are dealt with in the next chapter, the cultural promulgator and audience was more closely connected with the culture/education agenda covered in Chapter 4. Indeed, part of the narrowing of the gap between culture and education was due to the mass involvement in culture which took a very different form to the involvement of the artist, although both can be conceived to be dentro de la Revolución. Early in the Revolution one of the major developments in the field of cultural education was the rise of the aficionado movement, another under-researched feature of 1960s Cuban history. The concept of direct or socialist democracy went hand in hand with this move towards democratising culture.

The aficionado movement made up part of a new structure to enhance cultural democratisation at the helm of which was the Consejo Nacional de Cultura that was established in January 1961 (EIR, 1966: 66), feeding down to community work through, from 1970, the Casas de Cultura, as well as an expansion in printing output and increase in the number of museums and libraries (Rojas, interview, 06/05/03). The idea of the aficionado movement was to create a culture of amateur participation in the arts stretching across the whole country, and with a particular focus on rural areas, i.e. attempting to reduce the cultural hegemony of Havana. It is not clear where the impetus behind the move to create the movement lay, but it is related to concept of leisure time. Two things are of importance here: firstly, that leisure time was seen as critical to the development of conciencia; and secondly that, as elucidated in Torroella’s 1963
survey (of research conducted in 1962) young people can express themselves through their leisure time and through interpersonal relationships. The aficionados movement provided a social space in which young people could operate whilst being clearly within the national-revolutionary identity, as promulgation of culture was one of the key aims laid out in Castro’s *Palabras* of 1961.

Other cultural initiatives complemented and helped to stimulate the aficionado movement. The overwhelming interest in cinema led to the creation of Cine-Clubs founded in 1959 with the aim of bringing cinema to the whole population whilst encouraging cine-debate (discussions prior to watching films) and education relating to cinema as part of the Cine-Clubs (*Mella*, 04/59: 22; *Mella*, no date [06/61]: 48-49). Cinema is an interesting example of democratisation of culture as Cuba had almost no cinema industry prior to the Revolution. Although this developed over the course of the 1960s, many of the films shown were international. The best of world cinema, ranging from Soviet, to Japanese, to Indian, was part of the itinerant Cine-Club programme, and amongst young people Agatha Christie films were particularly popular (*Gómez*, interview, 02/04/03), indicating a cultural link with the popular taste in detective fiction (*Wilkinson*, 2000). Furthermore, the link with Latin American cinema – particularly Brazilian – was strong due to the presence of expert technicians from Latin America coming to Cuba to teach the trade of film-making (*García*, interview, 03/04/03). Television was similarly seen as serving an important role in the cultural education of the Cuban people, “para hacer llegar al pueblo el pan elemental de arte particular y universal del que se ha visto privado siempre” [to provide the people with the individual and universal art of which they have always been deprived] (*Mella*, 28/06/60: 51). Culture, in all its forms, was moving closer to the Cuban people.

The aficionado movement, after its inception in the early years of the Revolution was developed via three branches of cultural organisation for young people. These three were the Movimiento Nueva Trova (formed in 1972), reflecting the
particular importance of new Cuban music, the Brigadas Hermanos Saíz\(^{71}\) (1963) for young amateur artists, and the Brigada Raúl Gómez García\(^{72}\) (1963) for \textit{instructores de arte} (see below) who had some prior artistic training.\(^{73}\) By 1963, the \textit{aficionado} movement was developed enough to celebrate its first national festival, described as “una muestra de primera calidad del poder creador de un pueblo liberado que construye con su trabajo, apoyándose en la solidaridad internacional, su porvenir socialista feliz” [A \textit{top quality display of the creative power of a liberated people, which, with its work and the help of international solidarity, builds its happy socialist future}] (Noticias de Hoy, 22/01/63: 1). This comment reflects the aim of the \textit{aficionado} movement, viewing it as more than merely a past-time or leisure activity, rather part of the construction of the Revolution. By 1965 the \textit{aficionado} movement in the arts was highly developed, reflected in the 1,500 participants at the III Festival de Aficionados (Reyes, \textit{Mella}, 15/02/65: 4). The \textit{aficionado} movement was given a particular impetus in the run up to the IX Festival of Youth in Algeria in July 1965.\(^{74}\) Prior to the mobilisation for the festival, there were 1,144 \textit{aficionado} groups, which expanded in the months preceding the festival to 5,380 (\textit{Mella}, 05/07/65: 25). What had begun as a relatively small initiative had, largely due to a critical momentum and the work of the UJC and the mass organisations, become a widespread initiative. Although outside the realms of this study, the development of the movement continued into the 1970s, and by the late 1970s, the movement was a genuinely mass national movement, with, in 1975, over 220,000 \textit{aficionado} performances played to audiences totalling 42 million (Ministerio de Cultura, 1982: 83)

The \textit{aficionado} movement went hand in hand with the formation of \textit{Instructores de Arte}, who were responsible for heading the groups of \textit{aficionados}. A school was opened to train the instructors in 1961:

\(^{71}\) In line with the theme of young martyrs, this Brigade was named after Sergio and Luis Saíz, who were killed in Pinar del Río province in the 1950s struggle (Gómez, no date e: 32).

\(^{72}\) Gómez García was another martyr of the Revolution, a young poet killed in the attack on the Moncada barrack on 26/07/53 (Gómez, no date e: 32).

\(^{73}\) In 1986 all three organisations were merged to become the Asociación Hermanos Saíz (Rojas, interview, 06/05/03)

\(^{74}\) This was cancelled due to regime change in Algeria, and held the following year in Sofia.
El primer fundamento de la Escuela para Instructores de Arte que está bajo la dirección del INRA, expresa: ‘No es un centro para formación de artistas. Su función es preparar los instructores de arte que trabajaran en los Centros Escolares, Granjas del Pueblo y Cooperativos. Y ahí el mensaje hermoso y fraternal que llevarán estos muchachos: cultura popular a sus hermanos de tierra adentro’ (Soto, Mella, no date [06/61]: 22).

The first purpose of the School of Instructores de Arte, which is under the management of INRA, states: ‘It is not a centre for training artists. Its role is to train the art instructors who will work in the schools, people’s farms and cooperatives. And there, the beautiful and fraternal message they will take with them is: popular culture for their brothers in the countryside’.

This indicates, in line with the guerrilla ethos of the Revolution, the focus on the development of rural areas, once again situating the focus of the expansion of cultural activity away from Havana.

The instructors were mostly recent graduates and the idea of having the schools to train instructors was to professionalize the career as an instructor (Rojas, interview, 06/05/03). Although, as expressed by Soto above, they were not necessarily artists themselves (artists would train instead at the Instituto Superior de Arte) they were tasked with the connection of the mass of Cubans – particularly in rural areas – with culture, notably art, theatre, literature and music. The aim was that the instructors would, after graduation, go on to form groups of aficionados, and by 1965 it appears that there was a close proximity between the instructors and amateurs, with instructors and members of groups alike making up single brigades (Rojas, interview, 06/05/03). Despite the apparent distinction between professional artist, teacher and amateur, it is worth noting that young artists of the 1960s did participate in this movement, and considered it an important part of the cultural story of the 1960s.

The success of the aficionado movement in the arts led to the inception of aficionado groups in sciences as well, launched in 1965 by President of the Academy of Sciences Antonio Núñez Jiménez, who spoke of its aim being
“viabilizar el estudio de las ciencias a nuestras jóvenes, ya sea orientándoles del modo más efectivo y provechoso posible, ya facilitándoles los medios materiales de investigación y de estudio” [to make it possible for our young people to study sciences, either by giving them the most effective and useful guidance possible, or by supplying them with their material needs for research and study] (Nuñez Jiménez, Mella, 04/01/65: 16). In this case, the link with education is clear and explicit as one of the aims of this type of group was to facilitate progress in school work.

The aficionado movement took off and became a mass movement partly because it was participation-driven. Given Castro’s aim to develop “las condiciones que permitan al pueblo la satisfacción de todas sus necesidades culturales” [conditions to enable the people to satisfy their cultural needs] (Castro, June 1961 in López Lemus, 1980: 15), it became an important part of cultural policy, even perhaps one of the most important parts of the cultural policy. The expansion of these groups needed the structures that allowed training for the art instructors, but the levels of participation could not merely be created by the existence of teachers. This was a movement with genuine mass involvement, which both fulfilled and created new revolutionary aims.

7.6 Conclusion

In general the primary agents of socialisation for young people have traditionally been considered to be the family, school and work (Almond and Verba, 1989: 266-306). Although Almond and Verba accept that there may be alternate agents of socialisation (Almond and Verba, 1989: 305) they fail to examine these further. It would be easy to suggest in the Cuban case, that youth, or generation, itself acted as a socialising agent, given that activity through specific youth bodies can be measured. Participation by young people (in many cases at the lowest end of the youth age group) in the building of the early Revolution fed into the emerging national-revolutionary identity with the concept of youth, as part of the discourse, acting as a socialising agent to connect young people to the Revolution. This emerging identity, rather than necessarily connecting young people to ‘youth’, was becoming an identity in itself. Young people as
participators were held up as (and perceived themselves as) so crucial in the early stages of the Revolution that they felt themselves to represent not a particular cohort or generation, but the whole of a new, rejuvenated nation. Through massive spontaneous and snowballing participation in the early 1960s, young people were politically socialised into support for the new project because they were playing a role in its construction.

By the late 1960s, participation was institutionalised through mass organisations and programmes of voluntary work connected to schools and workplaces, so participation became closer to mobilisation. But the modes of participation were not only constructed by economic need, rather through the success of early forms of participation. And because, through their level of participation, young people had been so essential in the initial construction of this new revolutionary identity, the latter incorporated youth involvement and commitment. Hand in hand with the dominance of youth in the discourse of the Revolution, ‘youth as participant’ became a central youth culture of the 1960s. This centrality of youth to the revolutionary culture, though still relatively unchallenged in Cuban culture today, can be challenged by taking into consideration practical actions that the Cuban state later took: the UMAPs in the mid 1960s and the Anti-Loafing Law of 1971 to attempt to deal once again with young people neither working nor studying, and the establishment of the Centre for Studies on Youth in the 1980s, which reflected the other side of the discourse of youth that feared that young people would not be the perfect citizens that their role in the processes described above, along with the discourse on purity and enthusiasm, would assume them to be. The next chapter will examine this group of young people who existed at the edge of the definition of what was revolutionary.
Yo se que hay gente que me quiere
Yo se que hay gente que no me quiere
I know there are people who like me
And I know there are people who don’t like me

Silvio Rodríguez, Esta Canción (1975).

8.1 Introduction

The culture surrounding young artists is probably the smallest identifiable youth culture in 1960s Cuba, but its importance is greater than its numbers suggest. This section will focus on the cultural polemic in the 1960s and examine the role of the young artist within this. Of these young artists three groups in particular stand out: that surrounding the El Puente publishing house, those connected with the first era of Caimán Barbudo from 1966 to 1968 (henceforth Caimán and the Caimán group), and the musicians who are associated with the Nueva Trova. The reason that these groups are particularly relevant to this study is because they had a unique culture that expressed their attempts to differentiate themselves from that which came before. This culture was also self-consciously a youth movement. There were several factors that brought each group into existence. Firstly, a public means of cultural production...
was necessary. Secondly, and related to cultural production, the patronage of the cultural authorities was needed but was not without problems. Thirdly, these groups operated at the cultural margin, either through pushing back boundaries, or through association with those who did. They felt they represented a new generation, and were at the cutting edge of the battle of the meaning of culture to, and the role of the cultural producer within, the Revolution. These groups were Havana-based, and found their own physical space in the streets and bars. There were many inter-group personal connections, as well as connections between young people in these groups and the political vanguard. They were composed of young people, mostly in their twenties but sometimes younger, who saw themselves as a cultural vanguard but who were always at risk of being seen as non-conformist. They also, like the majority of young Cubans, participated in revolutionary objectives, so had a direct connection with the land and with the project to construct the new Cuban nation. They had greater links with the outside world, particularly North America, than most other Cubans, through literary awards, festivals and so on. They were a product, in some ways, of the cultural polemic that dominated 1960s intellectual life. However, they sought to differentiate themselves from what had come before, and sought a separate identity and authority by representing themselves as the first artistic generation genuinely created wholly within the Revolution. This concurs with the discourse of the leadership that perceived young people to be potentially more pure and unsullied by virtue of their lack of bourgeois background. Conversely, the experience of these groups concurs with the parallel perspective that young people were not living up to that potential.

8.2 Emergence of the 1960s Cultural Polemic

A brief look at the cultural history of the early Revolution is necessary to elucidate the context in which these groups emerged. In the early years of the Revolution, culture was brought under the operational control of the state. Institutions were established (such as the writer’s union, UNEAC; a new cultural centre, Casa de las Américas; the new national publishing house, the Imprenta Nacional; and the Cuban cinema institute, ICAIC) within which cultural
producers would operate. Castro’s famous speech in June 1961, *Palabras a los Intelectuales*, outlined the view of the Revolution towards culture:

La Revolución no puede pretender asfixiar el arte o la cultura cuando uno de los propósitos fundamentales de la Revolución es desarrollar el arte y la cultura, precisamente para que el arte y la cultura lleguen a ser un real patrimonio del pueblo. Y al igual que nosotros hemos querido para el pueblo una vida mejor en el orden material, queremos para el pueblo una vida mejor en todos los órdenes espirituales; queremos para el pueblo una vida mejor en el orden cultural. Y lo mismo que la Revolución se preocupa por el desarrollo de las condiciones y de las fuerzas que permitan al pueblo la satisfacción de todas sus necesidades materiales, nosotros queremos desarrollar también las condiciones que permitan al pueblo la satisfacción de todas sus necesidades culturales (Castro, June 1961 in López Lemus, 1980: 15).

The Revolution cannot try to suffocate art or culture when one of the very aims of the Revolution is to develop art and culture, precisely because art and culture are becoming the patrimony of the people. And we want the people to have a better material existence, but we also want a better spiritual life for everyone; we want a better cultural life for the Cuban people. And whilst the Revolution is concerned with the development of the conditions and forces that will satisfy all the people’s material needs, we also want to develop the conditions that will allow everyone to satisfy all their cultural needs.

Culture was to be encouraged by the Revolution, but it was also the servant of the people. The expansion of publishing and the establishment of cultural supplements to national newspapers (such as *Lunes de Revolución*, and, later, the cultural supplement of the daily newspaper *Juventud Rebelde, Caimán barbudo*), aimed to increase the audience of both indigenously produced and imported culture. By the late 1960s, culture had risen vastly in status, but it was given responsibilities as well as rights. By 1971, the link between education and culture (culture as an educator rather than merely an aesthetic pursuit) was firmly embedded, as can be seen in that year’s First National Congress on *Education and Culture* (my emphasis). Del Duca describes the final declaration of the Congress as follows:
Underlying each comment or directive was the basic assumption that culture, like education, is not and cannot be apolitical or impartial, because it is a social and historical phenomenon conditioned by the needs of social classes and their struggles and interests throughout history (del Duca, 1972: 103).

The establishment of new institutions and publications gave the impetus to a change of cultural means and meaning. The establishment of these institutions and publications, however, also marked the start of a struggle that dominated the cultural landscape in the 1960s, between cultural bureaucrats and cultural producers. The distinction between the two is not absolutely clear, as the link between institutions and cultural producers was close, with, for example, poet Roberto Fernández Retamar being president of Casa de las Américas. However, the battles over freedom of expression and the polemic on the role of the artist within the Revolution were played out within this context of a new institutionalisation of culture, and culture as part of the policy portfolio of the Revolution. ‘High’ culture, such as poetry, achieved an increasingly high profile in the Revolution, partly due to the return from exile of several internationally renowned writers (Gaceta de Cuba, 12/62: np). This group was involved in the development of cultural policy and itself defined culture as high culture.

The identity as artist manifested itself both confidently and uneasily in its relationship with national-revolutionary identity, and the relationship between the artist and the Revolution was the hub of the cultural polemic of the 1960s. The crossover between poet and popular culture came through the lens of the Nueva Trova movement, where there was a close connection between its protagonists and the poets, but whose influence pervaded society and that became an important site of expression for young people. The Nueva Trova therefore engaged with, and was part of, the cultural polemic, whilst translating this polemic into a culturally accessible form. The connection between protest singer and poet parallels that happening in the USA where Bob Dylan and Ginsberg had, in the early 1960s, toured together and were closely acquainted, and where the lyrics of Dylan were considered as a form of poetry in their own right.
In so far as the polemic was played out as a struggle or battle, certain incidents in the 1960s that affected the formation youth cultural groups, stand out as significant, and indicate the changing cultural environment in which artists operated. The struggle was not a non-conformist or counter-revolutionary struggle; it was a struggle by the intellectual classes, most of whom considered themselves, or represented themselves, as revolutionaries, to define exactly what that meant. Early in the Revolution two manifestos were produced by the existing generation in support of the Revolution. The first of these was published in January 1959 to announce the formation of the Instituto Nacional de Cultura (INC) and focussed on the dissemination of culture:

La difusión [de cultura] se refiere, especialmente, a las clases más humildes del pueblo; el estímulo, a los grupos intelectuales y creadores del país. La distinción es necesaria, pero no conlleva la idea de que el pueblo deba destinarse un producto inferior, una “vulgarización” de la cultural. Muy por el contrario, pensamos que uno de los mayores beneficios del cumplimiento de las tareas propuestas, sería poner a las clases humildes en contacto frecuente y directo con las manifestaciones más puras y eternas del espíritu humano (Revolución, 31/01/59: 14).

The dissemination [of culture] refers particularly to the poorer classes within the population; the stimulus concerns the country’s intellectual groups and creative people. This is a necessary distinction, but it does not imply that a second-rate product should be delivered to the people, a “popularisation” of culture. On the contrary, we believe that one of the main benefits of doing what is proposed would be to give the poorer classes frequent and direct contact with the purest and most timeless outpourings of the human spirit.

This statement reflected the sense of possibility and action of the very early days of the Revolution, whilst not really incorporating a clear picture of what the Revolution was. However, the responsibility for dissemination in tandem with maintenance of quality on the part of the artist was articulated, thus situating the artist as actor within the Revolution. This was developed in a second manifesto, written by a group of writers, artists and intellectuals in November 1960, which articulated this same idea more clearly:
Debemos esforzarnos por alcanzar una plena identificación entre el carácter de nuestras obras y las necesidades de la Revolución en avance. El objetivo es acercar el pueblo al intelectual y el intelectual al pueblo, sin que padezca por ello la calidad artística de nuestro trabajo (Revolución, 19/11/60: 1).

We must make an attempt to equate the nature of our works wholly with the future needs of the Revolution. The aim is to close the gap between people and intellectuals, intellectuals and people, without the artistic quality of our work suffering as a result.

At the centre of this statement was the implication that, while artists would support the diffusion of culture, they would not compromise where it came to quality.

The first crisis in terms of the role of the artist – and the debate over the concept of artistic freedom – came in May 1961, with the crisis over the showing of the film *PM*, which eventually led to Castro’s famous *Palabras a los Intelectuales* on 30th June 1961 and the closing of the cultural supplement of *Revolución, Lunes de Revolución*. Castro’s *Palabras* speech marked a key moment in the cultural policy of the Revolution, though it did not lend clarity to what was a muddy debate over the role of the artist, and it fed the cultural polemic that continued until 1971. Though referred to elsewhere with reference to ideology, and the meaning of culture, it is worth considering *Palabras* again here from the point of view of the cultural producers to whom Castro spoke directly in this speech. Of particular importance is Castro’s most debated statement of how culture must operate in Revolutionary Cuba: “dentro de la Revolución todo; contra la Revolución nada” [within the Revolution, everything; against the Revolution, nothing] (Castro, 30/06/61).

The debate that was sparked by Castro’s speech was played out on the pages of a variety of journals and magazines. In *Bohemia* in August 1961, Juan Marinello addressed a group of young writers calling itself the Grupo Novación Literaria. His explanation of Castro’s words at the Primer Congreso de Escritores y Artistas was as follows:
Creo firmemente que en esa intervención están dibujadas las grandes líneas y matrices que deben normar la obra del escritor de nuestro día. Ni empíreo, ni chabacanería: humanidad palpitante, comunicación con el pueblo y atención incansable al oficio. Que nadie se sienta forzado a una manera específica de expresión, que nadie renuncie a su pensamiento, siempre que este confluya en una gran voluntad nacional que no es legítimo contradecir ni atacar. Libertad, sí, menos para querer torcer el camino que ha escogido nuestro pueblo con cabal conciencia y a todo riesgo (Marinello, 1989: 96-7).

*I firmly believe that this speech provides the guidelines and framework to guide the work of today’s writers. Neither empyrean nor vulgar; burning humanity, communication with the people and tireless attention to their craft. No-one must feel compelled to use a specific form of expression, no-one must surrender his ideas – on condition that these ideas contribute to a vast national determination, which can brook no legitimate contradiction or challenge. Freedom, yes, but not to depart from the path consciously chosen by the people, with all the risks it involves.*

Marinello’s view was that the artist should be the servant of the people. This view perhaps contributed to a period of socialist realism, particularly in more popular art, which was criticised, but in essence the *Palabras*, and Marinello’s interpretation thereof, left artists with a fairly high degree of freedom. They did, though, sound the death knell of the *Lunes* group (in so far as it could be considered a ‘group’, being disparate and somewhat eclectic) who were accused of “fostering division within the revolutionary camp and not being truly socialist” (Casal, 1971: 459). Certainly, the closure of *Lunes* may tell us more about the battle between the PSP (and its newspaper *Noticias de Hoy*) and the less dogmatic elements in politics, but it serves to remind us of cultural margins and constant cultural change and uncertainty.

Despite the closure of *Lunes*, relative artistic freedom can be seen within the second major cultural struggle of the Revolution, that over the showing of Fellini’s *La Dolce Vita* in late 1963. Again, the battle was played out on the pages of *Noticias de Hoy* versus *Revolución*, and even within the pages of
Noticias (Halperin, 1976: 197). The outcome was that the film was allowed to remain showing at screens across Cuba. Halperin (1976: 197) explains this as a pragmatic move, as the film was very popular amongst the student population, and, moreover, there was a relaxed attitude to cinema because “there was the practical matter of providing entertainment for the Cuban people, strongly addicted to the movies and brought up on American and other capitalist films” (Halperin, 1976: 199). During the debate, Revolución in 1963 dealt with this issue by asking people how they felt about which films it was appropriate to watch. Eduardo Manet, a cinema director, opted for those films that were of the highest quality no matter where they originated, while Remy Martínez Silveira, FEU cultural chief and president of the Cine-Club universitario, argued that while all films, including La Dolce Vita, should be shown, there should be “notas o referencias ilustrativas que lo guie en la apreciación correcta del film” [explanatory notes or references to help achieve a correct understanding of the film] in the cinema (Revolución, 21/12/63: 13). This is an opinion one would expect from a coordinator of Cine-Clubs as part of the aim of such bodies was debate and education with reference to cinema (see Chapter 7). A survey in the Noticiero de la Juventud finds a similar difference of opinion, with one young person claiming that it was best to see capitalist films as it was through this that the decadence of the capitalist system could be seen, while another claimed that films such as La Dolce Vita were immoral, with the prostitute/homosexual as hero, and that films such as El Comunista would be preferable (Noticiero de la Juventud, 30/12/63: np).

8.3 The El Puente Group

The El Puente publishing group, under the leadership of poet José Mario Rodríguez, emerged in 1960, while this polemic raged. This was a privately financed project, thereby initially outside the direct direction of the new cultural institutions. The intention was to publish books and volumes of poetry, and also to have a journal that called El Puente: Resumen Literario. In this journal the aim was to publish new Cuban literature as well as translations of other texts.

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77 The funding came from José Mario’s father, who owned a successful hardware store in the Buena Vista zone of Havana (Fulleda, 2005: 4).
particularly of interest being the controversial “Howl” by Ginsberg (Zurbano, 2005: 2).\footnote{This poem sparked a trial for alleged obscenity in the USA in 1957, but was deemed by the judge to be of social importance and therefore not falling under the category of obscene. This gave the poem considerable publicity and increased its sales (Miles, 1989: 227-33).} El Puente is hard to categorise; poet Gerardo Fulleda León, who published with them, argues that “[n]o éramos un movimiento literario en sí, […] sino un grupo de jóvenes que necesitábamos expresarnos por medio de la literatura” [we weren’t exactly a literary movement […] rather a group of young people who needed to express ourselves through literature] (Fulleda, 2005: 3). Josefina Suárez (also one of the group but not published), on the other hand, argues that “[y]o creo que sí nos considerábamos un ‘grupo literario’, para algunos incluso ‘una generación’, pero nuestra mentalidad no era nada excluyente” [I think that we did consider ourselves a literary group, for some people even a literary ‘generation’, but our attitude was not exclusive] (Arango, 2005: 8). The reality is probably somewhere in between the two positions. They identified themselves as a group through personal links, friendships and common aims. They had a public space in which they met, the Gato Tuerto bar where they listened to feeling music, a style of US-influenced music popular in the 1950s. They also spent evenings and nights of songs, poems and conversation sitting outside on the Malecón (Havana sea wall) (Fulleda, 2005: 4; Mario, 2002: np).\footnote{The Malecón still serves, at the time of writing, as an important public night time space for young people in Havana.} Artistically the group never had the time to mature or solidify its literary identity, but it did emerge as a youth culture incorporating identification with poetry, music – from feeling to the Beatles – and extravagant forms of dress (Fulleda, 2005: 6). However, this group also participated in rallies, and organised the Brigada Hermanos Saíz (Arango, 2005: 7), so to place them beyond the cultural margin is inaccurate. This was a very Cuban group, which identified with and worked for the Revolution but also tested the limits of the Revolution, and were part of the process of defining exactly what the Revolution was and what the role of artists within it could and should be.

Over its lifetime the publishing house produced 38 titles (Zurbano, 2005: 2). Its most celebrated text was Novísima Poesía Cubana in 1962, the prologue of which served as a ‘statement’ from the publishing group. The authors, Ana
María Simo and Reinaldo Felipe\textsuperscript{80}, stated that “[q]uieroemulsar […] un movimiento que erradique definitivamente la complacencia intelectual, el amiguismo y la mala fé que han llevado la escasa crítica literaria que existe entre nosotros al estado inoperante en que hoy se encuentra” [\textit{we want to spark a movement that finally eradicates intellectual complacency, ambiguity and bad faith, that have led from the scarce literary criticism that exists amongst us, to the ineffectual state of play today}] (Espinosa, 2005: 11-12). The text confidently established the group as a new generation operating against the flaws of the past, reminiscent of the support by young people for the \textit{Ortodoxos} in the 1950s against ingrained and institutionalised corruption. In the case of El Puente, these young poets were within the Revolution in so far as they were conforming to the view of a new generation as a blank slate. They were, however, operating within a world of new institutions and positive attitudes to young people. Those institutions were interested in this group, particularly as it included several Afro-Cuban artists. As a result, José Mario was invited in 1962 by UNEAC President and cultural grandee Nicolás Guillén to integrate El Puente with UNEAC. Initially refusing, fearing the loss of independence, El Puente was eventually integrated with UNEAC in 1964 (Mario, 2002: np). It is not this institutionalisation that Mario blamed for the closure of El Puente, but the attacks coming from some elements within UNEAC and from the UJC, including attacks made in 1966 by \textit{Caimán} founder Jesús Díaz.

The decline and fall of El Puente could be considered a spectacular failure. It did not fade, or become incorporated; rather it became utterly discredited and, until a 2005 issue of \textit{Gaceta de Cuba} from which much of the evidence in this section comes, written out of the literary-cultural history of the 1960s. Literary historian Isabel Alfonso argues that “[a] pesar de tal incorporación [a UNEAC] y del interés participativo de estos poetas dentro del proceso revolucionario, a ser examinados a la luz de posiciones esencialistas y reduccionistas, los de Le Puente fueron quedando cada vez más al margen del canon literario del momento” [\textit{in spite of its incorporation [into UNEAC] and of the participation of those poets in the revolutionary process, being examined under the spotlight of

\textsuperscript{80} Pen name of Reinaldo García Ramos.
an essentialist and reductionist position, the El Puente group found itself further and further from the literary canon of the time] (Alfonso, 2005: 9). However, the group was sitting at the margin not just of the literary canon, but also at the margin of what was deemed to be acceptable revolutionary behaviour. The group was dissolved in 1965, accused of “a number of aesthetic (transcendentalism), moral (homosexualism), and, primarily, political (being unreliable as revolutionaries) sins” (Casal, 1971: 450). Accusations against the group included accusations that the group was supporting the Black Power movement, a strange accusation given that Cuba later became well-disposed towards this movement. This incident coincided with the formation by MinFAR of the UMAPs (see Chapter 4) where several of the nation’s cultural producers were sent, including José Mario.

One of the key problems that provoked a reaction to the El Puente group was the visit to Cuba of poet and hippie guru Allen Ginsberg. He was invited to Havana as a judge in the Casa de las Américas annual book competition. Ginsberg’s visit was controversial and resulted in his deportation from Cuba. José Mario, writing from exile in Paris in 1969, recounted Ginsberg’s visit. He claimed that at first Ginsberg’s visit was seen as an acontecimiento [happening] (Mario, 1969: 49) but Ginsberg became persona non grata due to his criticism of the treatment of the enfermitos and his pro-marijuana stance. The enfermitos were a small youth sub-culture, based in Vedado (but connected to the arts scene), who listened to European or North American music, danced the twist, wore flamboyant (even effeminate) fashions, drank and possibly took marijuana. In UJC publication, Mella, they were criticised as attempting to be neoyorquino or europeo, that is, being sops to an imported ideology that had nothing to do with – or was even dangerous to – Cuba. Enrique Jane criticised the enfermito position as follows:

Desde divagaciones cretinoides, hasta contrarrevolucionarias, como las de ‘no existe libertad si un grupo no tiene facilidad de expresión o vehículo donde poder manifestar sus concepciones del mundo’, se estiran los criterios ‘enfermos’ (Jane, Mella, 06/09/65: 7).

Their ramblings range from the idiotic to the counter-revolutionary, such as the view that ‘there is no freedom if a group has no means of
expression or vehicle through with to show its idea of the world’, they stretch the concept of “sick”.

Jane insisted that there was no risk from this group, which he called “exiguo y minoritario” \cite{enfermitos}{a meagre minority}, that La Rampa was the property of all Cubans,\footnote{The Pabellón Cuba on La Rampa was built in 1963 to promote universal access to Cuban culture.} not merely this small group, and that young people could ‘clean up’ from the inside out, to rid themselves of this small element (Jane, \textit{Mella}, 06/09/65: 8). Of course, his insistence that this group was irrelevant can be seen as an attempt to create a self-fulfilling prophecy, but what is certainly clear from Jane’s article is that the \textit{enfermitos} were unpopular with the UJC and \textit{Mella}, to the extent of being viewed as counter-revolutionary, and Ginsberg’s support of them was therefore unpopular with the institutions.\footnote{However, they were not demonised to such a great extent elsewhere, and the extremism of the UJC may be evident here. In FEU magazine \textit{Alma Mater}, the \textit{enfermitos} were later given slightly softer treatment. They were compared to the Teddy Boys in the UK and the Beatniks in the USA as, similar to these, the use of fashion defined their members as belonging to a certain group. They were described as “un grupo enajenado, a milla de distancia de la construcción de socialismo” \cite{enfermitos}{an alienated group, a million miles away from the construction of socialism} (Rodríguez, \textit{Alma Mater}, 20/07/67: 4).}

Part of the conflict between Ginsberg and the Cuban authorities was based on differing views of what constituted “revolution”. Ginsberg saw it as the acceptance of homosexuality and the legalisation of marijuana and took those views to Cuba, according to his biographer Barry Miles, expecting to experience a sympathy but instead discovering that the Cuban vision of revolution – schools, hospitals and literacy – had nothing to do with this vision (Miles, 1989: 367-68). Indeed, when Ginsberg was in Cuba in 1965, he debated the issue of marijuana with Haydée Santamaría, who explained, according to Ginsberg, that his ideas were contrary to the law of Cuba, and, more particularly, damaging to young people (Miles, 1989: 348-49). Certainly, it is impossible to separate Ginsberg’s visit from issues of homosexuality, which, even more than his attitude to marijuana, explains his eventual discrediting. 1965 marked a toughening of Cuban policy towards homosexuals, particularly in reference to the University of Havana. A letter from the UJC and UES to school children wrote of those “elementos, contrarevolucionarios y homosexuales, es necesario expulsarles de los planteles en el último año de su carrera, para impedir su ingreso en las
universidades” [counter-revolutionary and homosexual elements, who must be expelled from their classes in the last year of school so that they can’t get to university] (Mella, 31/05/65: 3). Those young poets who spent time with Ginsberg were under suspicion, were occasionally arrested, and, in the case of José Mario (a homosexual himself), eventually sent to a UMAP. Mario expressed surprise at the gossip that was developing surrounding Ginsberg, writing that he thought that “la personalidad de Allen estaba por encima de toda mojigatería” [Allen’s personality set him above gossip] (Mario, 1969: 50).

The El Puente group was tainted by association with Ginsberg, by accusations of homosexuality and perhaps by the perceived dissidence of the enfermitos. The history of El Puente indicates that the cultural producer in the 1960s was operating in a context of uncertainty: cultural production was greatly expanded and encouraged, but there was an inherent suspicion of bourgeois influence and creeping counter-revolutionary feeling. Overall, with the failure of the El Puente group and the success of the new institutions, by the mid-1960s the ‘old guard’ had, to a large degree, survived. Taking Roberto Fernández Retamar as an example, in the early days of the Revolution he was editor of the Nueva Revista Cubana (although the first two numbers were edited by Cintio Vitier), a cultural review. He went on to be the editor of Casa de las Américas. This group survived during the 1960s with a reasonably high degree of artistic freedom whilst playing their revolutionary role as outlined in the manifestos above. Whilst the artists debated the function of culture and the role of the artist within the Revolution, nervousness on the part of the political establishment (who felt cultural producers could be loose cannons), and fears of dissidence (particularly caused by the existence of institutionalised homophobia) made the environment in which the cultural producer operated an uncertain – if exciting – one. It was in this context that Caimán barbudo emerged.

8.4 The Caimán Group

Poet Guillermo Rodríguez Rivero was on the editorial board of Caimán and wrote the opening statement of the first issue. Fifteen years old at the start of the Revolution in 1959, he claims that rather than there being a generational
antagonism between older and more established cultural producers and the Caimán group, the latter aimed to assert themselves through difference: “queremos hacer otra cosa” [we wanted to do something different] (Rodríguez, interview, 06/05/03). This reflected a strong desire for this group of young artists to forge their own identity, through the spectrum of literary generations, although without reference to a specific subaltern position. Indeed, so powerful was the culture of youth that in some senses the assertion of a new identity – or indeed, the attempt to forge one, as identities are essentially virtual – was facilitated by the focus within the Revolution on youth conceptually, as well as the increasing status of young people through policy. The emergence of the group was assisted by coincidence and unexpected opportunity. The latter comes to the fore when we take the case of Jesús Díaz, with whom Rodríguez became acquainted at the University of Havana. Rodríguez was a student at the Escuela de Letras, where Díaz was one of a generation of very young graduates who became teachers due to the exodus of a large number of established lecturers. The privileged position of lecturer gave Díaz had considerable influence and power. Both Rodríguez, in a series of interviews (06/05/2003, 15/05/03, 29/05/03) and Díaz, in his later memoir of the first Caimán era (Díaz, 1994) point to the mid-sixties as a period of great uncertainty and effervescence. Rodríguez referred to the Sino-Soviet split, the deterioration of relations between the Soviet Union and Latin America and the debate between Che Guevara’s thought and orthodox Soviet socialism (Rodríguez, interview, 06/05/03). Díaz referred to the Vietnam war, the civil rights movement, decolonisation in Africa, the increasing distance between Cuba and the Soviet Union, the death of Che and Martin Luther King, and the events of 1968 in Paris, Mexico and Prague, as the essential elements that led to a feeling, amongst these young artists, of impending world Revolution (Díaz, 1994: 65). A sense of possibility and hope – feelings of effervescence and convulsion – fed the spirit of this new group of cultural producers.

The idea of Caimán originated from Díaz. He claimed there were five coinciding factors that explained its inception (Díaz, 1994: 65). Firstly, he pointed to the emergence of a new talented literary generation. Secondly, he indicated that control of the press by the party and the UJC was not absolute, so there was “un
margen, estrechísimo, es cierto, para que se produjeran disfunciones y sorpresas”

[Some scope – but admittedly very little – for idiosyncrasy and the unexpected].

Thirdly, he was friends with Miguel Rodríguez Varela (known as Miguelito), the new editor of Juventud Rebelde, the official daily newspaper of the UJC that was founded in 1965. Fourthly, Díaz won the prestigious Casa de las Americas prize in 1966 for his short novel Los Años Duros, raising his status as artist. The fifth and final reason Díaz pointed to for the birth of Caimán in 1966 is perhaps the most interesting:

Quinta, [...] la coincidencia entre el prestigio de que gozaba entonces la revolución y el brillo literario de La Habana de la época nos cegaran, haciéndonos albergar la ilusión de que una cosa era consecuencia de la otra, de que una “vanguardia política”, como decíamos entonces, era conciliable con una “vanguardia artística” experimental y incluso herética (Díaz, 1994: 65).

Fifth, [...] the combination of the prestige enjoyed at that time by the revolution and the literary brilliance of contemporary Havana blinded us, giving us the illusion that one was the consequence of the other, that a ‘political vanguard’ as we called it then, could be reconciled with an ‘artistic vanguard’ capable of being experimental, and even heretical.

Of course, this was written from exile, and reflects Díaz’s later disillusionment with the Revolution, but it also points to the sense of possibility and ambition that permeated the new publication. To the reasons expounded by Díaz I would add two. Firstly, Díaz the individual is an important factor. This is not to say that the publication would not have come about without Díaz but, such was his profile as rising star, young academic, novelist, and revolutionary, that far greater attention was attracted by the publication than would have occurred otherwise. Secondly, the youth of the contributors was a driving factor of the publication, in part because of the impatience of the young artists to assert themselves and break the literary glass ceiling and in part because the discourse of the Revolution had created a culture of youth that was based on excelling and achieving, and which opened up the possibility that this group of young people could be influential or, at the very least, have their work read. This last concurs with Kapcia’s view that, in the early Revolution “there was no consensus, within either the community or the revolutionary vanguard, about who the cultural ‘leaders’ should be, the
established ‘giants’ who were returning to Cuba […] or members of the new generation” (Kapcia, 2005a: 131). This very uncertainty made Caimán a possibility, and gave it a sense of purpose.

Díaz approached Rodríguez at the University of Havana with the idea of forming the magazine, and Rodríguez was able to bring his acquaintance of young poets to Caimán (Rodríguez, interview, 06/05/03). Despite being a publication concerned with all art forms, poetry defined it. The aim of the Caimán group was laid out in their statement in the first issue of Caimán in January 1966. This led to a year-long debate fought in Gaceta de Cuba between young artists, notably between Caimán editor Jesús Díaz and other artists. This was a critical part of the cultural polemic of the Revolution. García argues that this was a personal argument rather than a fight between the publications (indeed, it was not rare to find the same writers published by both Caimán and El Puente). It centred on the debate launched in the early 1960s by Castro in his Palabras, with, according to García, those young people in the Caimán group attempting to change mentalities while young people of the earlier group Lunes had attempted to change literature (García, interview, 03/04/03). The foundation of Caimán is perceived by Rojas as an attempt by the post-Sierra generation to assert itself, “reclamando su lugar en la Revolución y en la política cultural de la Revolución” [demanding its place in the Revolution and in its cultural policy] (Rojas, interview, 06/05/03).

The statement “Nos Pronunciamos” in the first issue of Caimán set out the editorial view of culture in Cuba, stating that “[l]a cultura de Cuba se salvará con Cuba, el desarrollo del país es el desarrollo de su cultura” [Cuba’s culture will be saved as part of Cuba’s own salvation; the country’s development is the development of its culture]. The statement also dealt with how culture must be produced within the Revolution: “No pretendemos hacer poesía a la Revolución. Queremos hacer poesía de, desde, por la Revolución” [We don’t want to dedicate poems to the Revolution. We want to write poems about, from and by the Revolution] (Caimán barbudo, 1966 issue 1: 11). Casal interprets this as meaning that the group “could present a critical view of the Revolution and the problems of constructing socialism, taking for granted their involvement with
and loyalty to revolutionary principle” (Casal, 1971: 451). In that way the *Caimán* group could find space for themselves within the cultural polemic while presenting themselves as a new vanguard, much as the politically committed young people sought space for themselves to function as the new political vanguard, or at least vanguard in waiting. In this sense the *Caimán* group was more focused than the UJC, with a clearer sense of mission and identity based on the concept of operating dentro de la Revolución [within the Revolution]. In the opening statement poetry was given a central role:

> Consideremos que todo tema cabe en la poesía. Rechazamos la mala poesía que trata de justificarse con denotaciones revolucionarias, repetidora de fórmulas pobres y gastadas: el poeta es un creador o no es nada (*Caimán*, 1966 issue 1: 11).

*We think that poetry can encompass every type of subject. We reject bad poetry that tries to justify itself with revolutionary allusions, repeating feeble and threadbare maxims. A poet is creative or he is nothing.*

Unlike the political vanguard that had various ways through which to attempt to express its commitment, the prioritisation of poetry gave the *Caimán* group a clear focus as well as an authority, given the primacy of poetry within the cultural hierarchy. Rodríguez acknowledges that he sees the statement that he authored as naïve, but justifies this on the basis of its authors’ youth. He saw it as a right of passage in the maturation of the young artist.

Rodríguez (interview, 15/05/03) summed up the aim of *Caimán* and the statement, explaining that the *Caimán* group were rejecting art as a form of vulgar propaganda – while accepting that everything is propaganda in some way – and trying to prevent the reduction of the condition of art and poetry. They saw themselves as distinct from populist poets – which led to a criticism of

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83 The signatories of this statement were Orlando Alomá, Sigifredo Alvarez Conesa, Ivan Gerardo Campanioni, Víctor Casasús, Félix Contreras, Friolán Escobar, Félix Guerra, Rolén Hernández, Luis Rogelio Nogueras, Helio Orovio, Guillermo Rodríguez Rivera, José Yanes (*Caimán*, 1966, issue 1: 11). Interestingly, editor Díaz’s name is not on this list but probably because he was not an author of this statement and not a poet himself. As editor he clearly supported the position put across therein and his central role in the polemic that was sparked off by the inception of *Caimán* corroborates this. Rodríguez was the only one of the actual editorial board of *Caimán* who was also an author of this statement but other key protagonists in the *Caimán* group, notably Víctor Casasús and Luis Rogelio Nogueras did figure.

84 The assertion that everything is a form of propaganda probably reflects a more recent influence of post-modernism on the poet.
elitism\textsuperscript{85} – whilst believing that the central function of poetry was to communicate. Essentially, they were trying to place culture at the centre of the Revolution, rather than it being a servant of the Revolution, but the group were at the same time fulfilling the revolutionary role ascribed to (and signed up to by) artists very early on in the Revolution to bring culture to the \textit{pueblos humildes}. They argued that they were doing this doubly, as, prior to this generation, Rodríguez argues, poetry tended towards the hermetic and dark, and even then was not accessible to large numbers of Cubans. \textit{Caimán}, on the other hand, had a production run of approximately 200,000 per issue and was sold with \textit{Juventud Rebelde}, thereby reaching a vastly larger audience than poets in the past (Rodríguez, interview, 15/05/03).\textsuperscript{86} In this sense, \textit{Caimán} attempted to serve as the exception to a general trend whereby “the new poetry and narrative were, essentially, still produced by a minority for a minority” (Kapcia, 2005a: 141).

Furthermore, \textit{Juventud Rebelde} was the only newspaper to be distributed in the afternoon (Rodríguez, interview, 15/05/03; Díaz, 1994: 65), allowing it a distinct audience to the morning publications. The \textit{Caimán} group saw their fight to publish those texts that they wished to publish as part of their revolutionary struggle, although publication of certain items, particularly those making reference to homosexuality, was proscribed. Rodríguez still asserts that \textit{Caimán}'s editorial policy was less limited that the El Puente group, claiming that the publication criteria for \textit{Caimán} were that the work in question must be something that would interest young people, rather than what Rodríguez still perceives as the limited editorial line of El Puente (Rodríguez, interview, 15/05/03).

The uneasy relationship between the \textit{Caimán} group and that which had come before – particularly the El Puente group – was played out in the pages of \textit{Gaceta de Cuba} between Díaz and Ana María Simo from the El Puente group.\textsuperscript{87} A further debate was played out in the pages of \textit{Bohemia} between Díaz and populist

\textsuperscript{85} García spoke of this criticism (interview, 03/04/03), probably referring to the debate between Díaz and El Indio Naborí, who was zealous in his criticism of Díaz (see below).

\textsuperscript{86} Of course, \textit{Lunes de Revolución} also served as a cultural supplement, so shared with \textit{Caimán} the benefit of having a large audience. Rodríguez did not refer to \textit{Lunes}, perhaps part of the feeling of being a new generation. The concern was with the recent (El Puente) rather than the early revolutionary era.

\textsuperscript{87} Simo went into exile shortly after this.
poet El Indio Nabori. These were a crucial part of the cultural polemic of the Revolution of the 1960s, stemming from divergent opinions of the role of culture in the Revolution. All parties felt themselves to be dentro de la Revolución. Rodríguez’s continued perception of the El Puente group as artistically narrow reflects the debate that was raging in the late 1960s. Díaz laid harsh accusations at the door of El Puente, arguing that the new generation’s “primera manifestación de grupo fue la editorial ‘El Puente’ empollada por la fracción más disoluta y negativa de la generación actuante. Hay que recalcar este último, en general eran malos como artistas” [first statement as a group was the editorial ‘El Puente’, produced by the most dissolute and negative part of that generation. It should be emphasised that, in general, these were very poor artists] (Díaz, Gaceta de Cuba, April-May 1966: np). Simo responded by fervently denying any type of editorial limitation, and indeed denying the presence of a group culture amongst the El Puente contributors, arguing that “[n]i estética [sic] ni ideológicamente las Ediciones formaron un grupo definido y homogéneo. Between 1962 and 1964, a battle was fought within the Ediciones to achieve this homogeneity, this specific group identity. The attempt failed] (Simo, Gaceta de Cuba, June-July 1966: np). Simo pointed to the role that the El Puente group had played in establishing the Brigadas Hermanos Saíz as a reflection of their central concern that “los jóvenes creadores, todos, participaran y no solo conformaran con ser elementos socialmente pasivos” [young creative individuals, all of them, took an active role and refused to act as mere passive spectators] (Simo, Gaceta de Cuba, June-July 1966: np; original emphasis). Simo admitted deep divisions within the El Puente group, and admitted that many of the publications by that group were of a poor quality – “[c]reo que publicamos, junto a las cosas de valor, un montón de la más infame literature que un ser humano pueda concebir” [I believe that, along with the worthwhile pieces of work, we also produced a mass of the most dreadful literature ever conceived by man] (Simo, Gaceta de Cuba, June-July 1966: np) –

88 Díaz later withdrew his position, accusing himself of mixing politics and literature, and apologising to Simo (Díaz, 1994: 66)
but claimed that the reason for this was the split within the El Puente group between those for whom generational agitation was the prime motive (above aesthetic quality) and those who saw literature as the end in itself, and saw ways other than publication to encourage literary production (Simo, *Gaceta de Cuba*, June-July 1966: np). Díaz responded to Simo’s justification of El Puente, asking the question “¿dónde reside la corresponsabilidad de Ana María Simo? Evidentemente es corresponsabilidad en el error, el silencio y la debilidad ideológica – ya que no pudo serlo en la dirección efectiva de la Editorial” [Where does Ana María Simo share responsibility for this? She obviously shares responsibility for the mistakes, the silence and the ideological weakness – since she denies effectively determining editorial policy] (Díaz, *Gaceta de Cuba*, Aug-Sept 1966: np). Díaz, in other words, would not allow Simo to absolve herself by claiming to have disagreed with the editorial line of the El Puente group. What emerges as a counterpoint to that is a certain homogeneity and sense of collective responsibility on the part of the *Caimán* group.

Whilst in essence this debate may be considered exaggerated, as the two positions were not diametrically opposed and both combatants attempted to achieve supremacy over the same territory (i.e. being the authentic representatives and promoters of young people)\(^{89}\), its existence gives us an indication of the aims and objectives of the *Caimán* group. On the one hand, the debate and the evidence from Rodríguez indicate an attempt at differentiation on the part of the *Caimán* group from what came before, in an attempt to forge a new identity for themselves. In literature an attempt to forge an identity based on differentiation with the past is a traditional technique, and the aspiration of a new segment of cultural producers to distinguish themselves should not surprise us.\(^{90}\) On the other hand, as the *Caimán* group had experienced the failure of the El Puente group, the former was attempting to distinguish itself from the latter for practical as well as aesthetic reasons. One of the problems of the El Puente

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\(^{89}\) Rodríguez had also submitted his own work to the *Segunda Novísima Poesía de Cuba*, which El Puente was planning to publish prior to its closure (Mario, 2002, no page).  
\(^{90}\) Statement of aims of a new generation through a manifesto was a familiar technique in the arts, used before by groups as diverse as the symbolists, with Moréas’s 1886 manifesto in *Le Figaro* (Cuddon, 1992: 941), and the Italian futurists, with Marinetti’s 1909 manifesto (Cuddon, 1992: 360).
group stemmed from accusations of homosexuality. The Caimán group needed to distance itself from the Puente group, in order to stay dentro de la Revolución. Caimán, therefore, through their uneasy partnership with the UJC, largely avoided publishing overtly ‘homosexual’ art (whether defined by the textual or the biographical). Díaz identified eight occasions on which the publication was dissonante [dissonant]91 and on not one of those occasions is the reason for such dissonance anything referring to homosexuality; these occasions referred to criticism of the Revolution or the praise of Cubans who had travelled into exile. Rodríguez referred to the fight with the UJC which was undertaken by the Caimán group to publish certain items, based on different visions of culture. The UJC, under the leadership of Jaime Crombet did not differentiate, according to Rodríguez, between the work of the poet and the worker, and felt that young intellectuals were actively attempting to differentiate themselves, thereby posing a threat. Conversely, the young artists at Caimán saw the struggle to publish as part of the Revolution; essentially, as their central role dentro de la Revolución (Rodríguez, interview, 15/05/03).

The second debate which the founding of Caimán sparked was a fierce battle played out on the pages of Bohemia between Díaz and populist poet “El Indio Naborí”, Jesús Orta Ruiz. Bearing in mind the position on poetry set out in the manifesto in the first edition of Caimán, there was a certain inevitability to this conflict. In debating who or what the ‘future Homer of Cuba’ could be in an open letter to Díaz in Bohemia, Orta Ruiz fiercely accused Díaz of elitism, arguing that “[s]ería absurdo que una Revolución de obreros y campesinos desterrara el arte popular, única base del futuro Homero, por el escrúpulo de unos nuevos intelectuales aristocratizantes” [it would be ridiculous for a Revolution of workers and peasants to dismiss popular art, the only basis for the Homer of the future, because of the scruples of a few aspiring elitist intellectuals] (Orta Ruiz, Bohemia, 05/08/66: 27). Orta Ruiz in part blamed what he viewed as Díaz’s errors on his youth:

Mira, a los veinticuatro años se puede ser genial en cualquiera de las manifestaciones del arte, pero un crítico cabal…difícilmente. En esa

91 Díaz makes the explicit point that while the publication could be viewed as dissonante, it would not be accurate to view it as disidente (Díaz, 1994: 67).
edad, la pasión puede enturbiar los cristales de la realidad, y el crítico debe ser sereno y consecuente (Orta Ruiz, Bohemia, 05/08/66: 26).

Look, when you are twenty-four, you can be a genius in any art form, but it is hard to be a consummate critic. At that age, passion can cloud reality and a critic has to be serene and objective.

Here, Orta Ruiz was accusing Díaz of arrogance, or of overstepping his role, as at such a young age he could not, according to Orta Ruiz, possess the wisdom to lead a cultural polemic. His terms were harsh, but examining this statement in the context of the revolutionary discourse on youth enables us to see those specific constraints and enablements for young people under which the Caimán group were operating. On the one hand, the passion to which Orta referred was related to the idea of ‘enthusiasm’, one of the key characteristics of youth according to the revolutionary leadership. Orta Ruiz explicitly focussed on the importance of youth, arguing that “la Revolución necesita formar nuevos valores, y una preciosa cantera es la juventud de vanguardia” [the Revolution needs to form new values, and one vital source is the vanguard youth] (Orta Ruiz, Bohemia, 05/08/66: 26). However, he was accusing Díaz of, at best, naivety and at worst, arrogance and elitism. This coincided with Castro’s invocation that a revolutionary must build himself rather than exist:

¿Se considere cada joven ya un revolucionario completo? [Gritos de: ‘No’] ¡No! ¿Por qué todavía… no se puede considerar ningún joven un revolucionario completo? Porque el revolucionario tiene que hacerse, tiene que forjarse (Castro, 04/04/62: 5).

Should every young person be viewed immediately as a fully-fledged revolutionary? [Shouts of ‘No’]. Why can no young person be considered a fully-fledged revolutionary? Because a revolutionary has to be developed, has to be forged.

Orta’s invocation of Díaz’s youth as the cause of his errors was somewhat disingenuous, a point Díaz picked up on, and Díaz was able to claim the moral high ground in defending himself.

Y si resulta injusto meter a los intelectuales hechos en un solo saco, hacer de ellos un bloque y juzgarlos con una masa de perjuicios por medio: más injusto y menos revolucionario resulta marcar a intelectuales jóvenes,
nacidos con, por y para la Revolución, y cuya vida y obra se ignoran, con el cliché de “intelectuales aristocratizantes” (Díaz, Bohemia, 16/09/66: 37).

And if it seems unfair to lump all mature intellectuals together, class them as a group and judge them with a whole series of preconceived ideas, it is even more unfair and less revolutionary to brand young intellectuals – who were born with, by and for the Revolution – with the stereotype of intellectual elitism.

Díaz here reiterated the position of Caimán: that the authority which it held was based on young intellectuals being firmly within the Revolution. His position was influenced from the other side of the discourse on youth which argued that young people were by definition purer because they grew up within the Revolution and therefore did not suffer from the influences of a bourgeois upbringing. He therefore defined the work of the new generation as superior by definition to that of its predecessors:

Entonces Cuba – el socialismo – no puede sino aspirar a un arte y una literatura que superen en hondura y belleza y autenticidad y totalidad y sentido del futuro, todo lo que se está creando y lo que ha sido creado bajo el dominio de la burguesía (Díaz, Bohemia, 16/09/66: 37).

Therefore, Cuba – Socialism – can only aspire to an art and literature whose depth, beauty, truth, universality and sense of the future surpass everything now being created and everything created under the yoke of the bourgeoisie.

Furthermore, Díaz was empowered by the discourse that linked young people to the future. He argued that “hay entonces una responsabilidad, de y con, la juventud. El artista que realiza una labor diaria debe tener en cuenta la responsabilidad en que incurre, en un sentido de futuro” [There is therefore a responsibility of youth and to youth. The artist in his everyday work must be mindful of his responsibilities, of a sense of the future] (Díaz, Bohemia, 16/09/66: 38).

What emerges from the two key debates deriving from Caimán’s position is the way in which this group of young artists forged their identity – and defended themselves – based on the building bricks of the powerful discourse on youth
which dominated Cuban life in the 1960s. In essence the group were a product of the prominence of youth in discourse, the democratisation of culture in policy and the polemic on what the function of culture within the Revolution should be.

It therefore may surprise us that this phase of Caimán was so short-lived. There are two interrelated reasons for this. The first was the role of Caimán in the Padilla affair. The latter was instigated in the pages of Caimán in 1967 when Herberto Padilla criticised Lisandro Otero’s novel Pasiòn de Urbino and eulogised Tres Tristes Tigres by novelist in exile, Guillermo Cabrera Infante. The main anti-Padilla organ was Verde Olivo, the official magazine of the Fuerzas Armadas. Verde Olivo published attacks on Padilla’s award-winning volume of poetry Fuera del Juego, and, when Caimán was relaunched under a new editorial board in 1968, the editorial position made a full turn, supporting Otero and allowing him to publish a statement condemning Padilla (Caimán barbudo, issue 21, 1968: 2-5 and 6-8).92 This was a way in which the first era of Caimán was disonante, praising a writer in exile over a revolutionary one, and reflected the fine line which the editorial board trod between artistic freedom and the didactic and dogmatic views amongst the UJC.

The relationship with the UJC forms the second reason why Caimán was so short-lived. This relationship was always an uneasy one. Miguel Martín, leader of the UJC at the inception of Caimán, was in favour of the publication, but Jaime Crombet, who took over as leader of the UJC in 1966, was more difficult to work with. Rodríguez states that while some members of the UJC were sympathetic to or in agreement with the definition of culture which the Caimán group espoused, others saw culture as a political phenomenon with political consequences (Rodríguez, interview, 15/05/03). Eventually, the whole editorial board was asked to resign and Caimán continued but under the editorial leadership of cultural bureaucrat Felix Sautie. Díaz viewed the continuation of the publication with regret, arguing that “a nuestro modesto empeño no se le reconoció siquiera el derecho a morir” [Our modest efforts were not even allowed

92 Although Padilla survived this onslaught, in 1971 he was arrested and some weeks later published a confessional statement admitting to having “committed serious transgressions [...] against the Revolution itself” (in Halperin, 1976: 205).
the right to die] (Díaz, 1994: 67). The first Caimán group did not enjoy the patronage of a particular institution once the support of the UJC was lost, and therefore the possibility of survival was low. Although the young poets were closely connected to the Nueva Trova movement and shared some similar perspectives and difficulties, the protection which the Nueva Trova movement enjoyed through the patronage of ICAIC was absent for the artists at Caimán. Certainly, the individuals within the group survived, with some, such as Díaz and Orlando Alomá choosing exile (although Díaz did not leave Cuba until the 1980s) and others, including Rodríguez, staying in Cuba and continuing, after the austere cultural landscape of 1970s Cuba, to be respected as artists.93 The concept of the young vanguard artist as outlined in their manifesto, however, was lost, or at least deferred.

The early demise of the Caimán group was certainly a tragedy, and reflects the closing of culture which led to the quinquenio gris during which many young artists, including Rodríguez, but also some of the preceding generation such as Pablo Armando Fernández, were to publish. In the 1970s, non-publication effectively functioned as a form of censorship. But it is worth examining the broader basis of the rise and fall of the Caimán group. In many ways, the group acted as a sub-culture, attempting “to express and resolve, albeit ‘magically’, the contradictions which remain hidden or unresolved in the parent culture” (Cohen, P., 1997a: 94). It operated, like the literary generations who came before it, in the context of the debate on the role of artist within the Revolution. In attempting to resolve this issue, it found itself dealing with the same problems encountered by its literary forebears. Therefore the fact that these young artists felt themselves to be differentiated, due to their youth and the revolutionary discourse on youth which empowered them and gave them unparalleled space in which to operate – certainly more than the average youth grouping in capitalist

93 However, perhaps the profile of these artists is lower than would be expected considering that they were attempting to be a new vanguard in the 1960s. For example, at a conference convened by the Ministry of Culture and Casa de las Américas in 1999 the names of contributors were those from that original group of cultural producers (Retamar, Pogolotti, Vitier, Pablo Armando Fernández) rather than from the Caimán group. Miguel Barnet, and Nancy Morejón, connected to the El Puente group, were represented however. Also contributing was Ricardo Alarcón, certainly of the same generation and already an important youth leader in the late 1960s (Heras Leon, 1999).
society at the time – could not guarantee their survival. Their search for a new identity was likely to fail because the constraints upon them, though apparently less than the generation before, were in fact exactly the same. As the strength of the political vanguard increased, the space for which the aspiring cultural vanguard fought diminished. The culmination of this struggle, marking the triumph of the strictly political over the broadly cultural, came at the 1971 First National Congress on Education and Culture. This closed the cultural polemic for some years, because it focussed on “the basic assumption that culture, like education, is not and cannot be apolitical or impartial, because it is a social and historical phenomenon conditioned by the needs of social classes and their struggles and interests throughout history” (del Duca, 1972: 103). All this corroborates the dichotomy in the discourse on youth which, on the one hand, saw the possibilities which youth held and, on the other, feared that young people did not or would not operate to espouse the principles and characteristics of young people which were held so dear. Certainly, the young artists were not dissidents, but the contradiction between empowering and constraining young people was played out in this case, as was the difficulty which young people had in finding (and keeping) space in which to express themselves.

8.5 Canción Protesta and the Nueva Trova Group

Musical production in the Revolution in the 1960s followed a similar trajectory to other areas of culture, but had a greater impact as it dominated young people’s leisure time. When Cuban psychologist Torroella considered leisure activities in his 1963 UNESCO study of Cuban youth, the main aim of which was to establish what elements of life motivated and mattered to young people, his results demonstrated the importance of music to young Cubans.94 The survey asked young people what their preferred activities were.95 The group chose high

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94 The study posed open questions, and the answers (categorised and collated by Torroella and his team) do not, perhaps, surprise us, as the sample was taken entirely from young people in advanced educational settings (pre-university, technical institutes, teacher training colleges and universities), reflecting a relatively high level of revolutionary consciousness, which in turn reflected the changes in the educational curriculum.

95 This did not, like later sociological surveys, break down the amount of free time which was expended undertaking any particular activities, but gives us an outline of the preferences of this educated group of young Cubans between March and June 1962 when the survey was conducted.
cultural pursuits as their favourite *espectáculos* [shows] (theatre, ballet, opera, drama, and comedy), above other pursuits such as cinema (although this came a close second), sport, or television (Torroella, 1963: 138). Yet, above these, the most important pursuit of young people was music; this featured twice in the answers of the survey, first as the favourite when asked to rank the arts (architecture, cinema, music, dance, sculpture, literature, music, painting, theatre, television) (Torroella, 1963: 155), and second as something which young people would choose – and the only one of the arts which figured in this response – to console them when they were suffering (Torroella, 1963: 112). There was a difference in response between 16-18 year olds and the older group, with the younger group claiming that the aim of music was “para que los individuales puedan expresar sus emociones” [to enable individuals to express their emotions] and the older group claiming it was “para comunicarse en un plano de sensibilidad” [to communicate feelings with one another] (Torroella, 1963: 48).

The report explained this by claiming that adolescents were more concerned with discovering themselves, whilst the young adults are principally concerned with interpersonal relationships (Torroella, 1963: 48).

Music, from the point of view of both fan and musician, was contested cultural territory in 1960s Cuba. Certain foreign influences were welcomed, in the form of the global *Canción Protesta* movement, but some Western music – in particular rock music – was feared by certain sections of the Party. *Canción Protesta* was a powerful musical discipline of which Cuba had a proud history. This was reflected in the articles and cartoons in the pages of *Bohemia* surrounding the *Primer Encuentro de Canción Protesta* [First Festival of Protest Song] held in July 1967. Juan Marinello, writing from Paris in March 1967, remarked on the internationalisation of the Cuban song *Guantanamera.* He credited Pete Seeger and Joe Dassin with the popularisation of the song, and tracked its popularity through North America, Europe and Latin America, but criticised the failure of all performers to credit Joséito Fernández, the Cuban who, he claimed, first put Martí’s verses to music in 1938 (Marinello, *Bohemia*, 10/03/67: 26-29). *Guantanamera*’s importance as an international protest song was reinforced in Soloni’s article in July 1967; despite the impact of other famous protest songs, “[l]a *Guantanamera* ha sido la de mayor impacto alrededor
del mundo, con versiones en más de siete idiomas” [Guantanamera has had the biggest impact around the world, with versions in seven languages] (Soloni, Bohemia, 27/07/67: 18). He went on to trace the foundations of Cuban protest music in the struggles for liberation, beginning in 1844 (18-21 and 114).

The internal perception of Cuban protest music as part of an international movement was reinforced by cartoons on the pages of Bohemia. Entitled ‘La Canción Protesta’, Ñico showed a guajiro holding a guitar, singing Guantanamera, Si yo tuviera un Martillo (Pete Seeger’s ‘If I Had a Hammer’ popularised in the 1960s by Trini López) and Sí, somos americanos (by Chilean protest singer Rolando Alarcón) (Bohemia, 11/08/67: 32).96 Cuba’s role in the protest music movement was reflected in the convening of the Encuentro Internacional de la Canción Protesta in July 1967 (Díaz, C., 1994: 21), at a time when, in a sense, the protest song movement was suffering a crisis of identity. Writing some weeks before the festival, Bohemia’s cultural correspondent Cossío attempted to define what a protest song should constitute, and, invoking the endorsement of French protest singer Jean Ferrat, wrote that “contra los pseudo-cultores de la canción protesta también tenemos que luchar” [we need to fight against the fake adherents to protest song] (Cossío, Bohemia, 07/07/67: 47). He went on to quote Italian musicologist Piero Gigli as follows: “Basta con meter en una canción, incluso si todo el resto es mediocre, la palabra “paz” o la palabra “libertad” para creer o hacer creer que se trata de una canción de protesta” [You just need to put the word ‘peace’, or ‘liberty’ in a song, even if it is a bad song, and you can say you have written a protest song] (Cossío, Bohemia, 07/07/67: 49). The definition of protest song deriving from this position was clear. A protest song should be “el alma revolucionaria de los pueblos que luchan por su liberación” [the revolutionary soul of a people fighting for liberation] (Cossío, Bohemia, 07/07/67: 51). Cuban leadership of the protest song movement reflected an aim to maintain its revolutionary message.

The forces of protest music in combination with rock music influenced a new form of Cuban music, the Nueva Trova. Despite the influence of the protest song

96 He also quotes from three other unidentified songs in the article.
and canción nueva, Benmayer claims that “Cuba is the only country in which the new song is not protest music and where it is recognised and institutionally supported as an art form” (Benmayer, 1981: 11). Evidence below demonstrates that contrary to this position, the proponents of Nueva Trova were writing protest songs (amongst other types of songs), but were doing this while attempting to stay within the national-revolutionary identity and had the eventual patronage of one institution in particular, ICAIC. Nueva Trova had an uneasy birth, and the institutional support of which Benmayer wrote, and which many genres of music in Cuba enjoyed (Manuel, 1990: 299-300), took some time to materialize. The dissemination of Nueva Trova music began through the spontaneous nightly gatherings at Coppelia ice cream parlour on La Rampa in Vedado, where poets, musicians and students met to perform and to discuss the role of culture within the Revolution (Díaz, 1993: 17). It first entered the public domain in June 1967, when Caimán barbudo organised an event at the Museo Nacional de Bellas Artes which, as well as poetry readings, included a performance from the twenty year-old Silvio Rodríguez (Díaz, C., 1994: 18). The latter became one of the leading exponents of the Nueva Trova, and as artist, poet and musician, Rodríguez was acquainted with the group of young poets and singers who were connected both with the University of Havana (especially the young artists who founded Caimán barbudo) and Coppelia crowd. Silvio Rodríguez began to appear regularly on the television show Mientras Tanto in 1967, which showcased his songs and turned him into a musical hero for Cuba’s youth. Writing in early 1968, Pedro Abreu sees Silvio Rodríguez as a unique type of revolutionary hero – “Podemos afirmar que este Silvio, gente plena, viene a convertirse en el astro de una juventud entregada a la ejecución de grandes empeños sociales” [We can confirm that Silvio, dear readers, is becoming the star of a youth which is devoted to carrying out great social undertakings] (Abreu, Bohemia, 22/03/68: 76; original emphasis) – at a time when a new hero born out of the post-Sierra era was sought by Cuba’s youth. As well as being a musician, Silvio Rodríguez had been a member of the AJR, an alfabetizador, an aficionado, and, by 1967, had carried out his SMO. He, like many of the writers discussed, participated in the Revolution, and was seen as an example of the new generation of revolutionary cultural producers.
As well as the popularity of his music, Rodríguez’s love of external music and in particular the Beatles in the Sergeant Pepper era clearly struck a chord with young people in Cuba. This caused the Nueva Trova’s first difficulty, when Rodríguez’s television show was pulled from the air in April 1968 by “tendencias conservadores” [conservative tendencies] in the Instituto Cubano de Radiodifusión (ICR) (Díaz, 1993: 25), for his declared indebtedness to the music of the Beatles. This occurrence, which still angers Cubans today, was a clear display of the uneasy relationship between the dominant ideology and external influence. Silvio Rodríguez then spent five months on a fishing boat named Playa Girón during which time he wrote a wealth of songs (Díaz, 1993: 20), one of which, ‘Debo partirme en dos’ [I’ve got to cut myself in two] reflected on the removal of the show from Cuban television:

Unos dicen que aquí, otros dicen que allá
Y solo quiero decir, solo quiero cantar
Y no importa la suerte que pueda correr una canción.
Unos dicen que aquí, otros dicen que allá
Y solo quiero decir, solo quiero cantar
Y no importa que luego me suspendan la función,
Mi función (Rodríguez, 1978: np; my emphasis).
Some say turn this way, and others, turn that.
But all I want is to speak, to sing
And what happens to my songs doesn’t matter.
Some say turn this way, and others, turn that,
But all I want is to speak, to sing.
And if because of that they stop the show – my show – so be it.

This song demonstrates the difficulty the young trovadores found as they struggled to write music which they considered revolutionary, but were constrained in its dissemination.

However, the very fact that Silvio Rodríguez wrote and performed this song (which he later recorded in 1975) shows the import of the trovadores. In the late 1960s they were a new generation, created within the Revolution, who “constituyan una vanguardia de enfrentamiento a conceptos conservadores del período” [constituted a vanguard which confronted conservative ideas in that
era] (Díaz, C., 1993: 18), in other words they were, rather than a counter-vanguard, an alter-vanguard. According to Robin Moore, they “considered themselves as patriotic and rebellious at the same time, ready to defend Cuba despite the fact that it might not always give them reason to feel proud” (Moore, 2003: 11). This applied as much to the groups of young writers as the 
trovadores, the key difference being in the level of diffusion of their work, and their endurance. The songs of the Nueva Trova were widely disseminated through live performances after the cancellation of *Mientras Tanto* in 1968.

Rodríguez’s lyrics contained an alter-discourse, which was not contrary to the dominant discourse of youth, but which challenged dominant notions of *vanguardia* and measures of what constituted a good young revolutionary. This comes across in another song written by Silvio Rodríguez whilst on the fishing boat:

Compañeros poetas,  
tomando en cuenta los últimos sucesos  
en la poesía, quisiera preguntar  
— me urge —,  
¿qué tipo de adjetivos se deben usar  
para hacer el poema de un barco  
sin que se haga sentimental, fuera de la vanguardia  
o evidente panfleto,  
si debo usar palabras como  
*Flota Cubana de Pesca y«Playa Girón»?* (Rodríguez, 1975; my emphasis).  

*Tell me now, poets  
— And I need to know now —  
*Bearing in mind  
The direction poetry has moved in recently  
What words should one choose or phrases one use  
to write a poem about a boat,  
*A poem that’s not sentimental, or outside the vanguard or obviously a political tract?  
Can I use words like  
*Cuban Fishing Fleet and “Playa Girón”?*
Silvio Rodríguez here articulated the difficulty facing cultural producers. His fears of over-sentimentalising, which he also dealt with in *Debo partirme en dos* where he ridiculed some of his own earlier songs, or of writing a song which was nothing more than a political slogan, correlate to the worries of the *Caimán* group about popular poetry; his fear of falling outside the vanguard reflects the uneasiness with the dominant concept of vanguard. This situation as alter-vanguard entailed an uneasy relationship with certain cultural bureaucrats and also led to problems for Pablo Milanés, another key proponent of Nueva Trova music, who spent some time in a UMAP.

Despite the uneasy start, the *Nueva Trova* movement was nationally and internationally important and extraordinarily popular. Its endurance and expansion was based not only on its popularity, but the patronage of ICAIC under the directorship of Leo Brouwer which protected this music inside its Grupo Sonora Experimental established in 1969 (Díaz, C., 1994: 26-7). So important was the music to become that in the context of youth cultural institutions that the Nueva Trova had its own organisation, the Movimiento Nueva Trova (MNT), independent of the Brigadas Hermanos Saíz, but affiliated to the UJC.97 Despite this, the MNT never really had an institutional structure, but was rather a loose virtual organisation, leaving the music to develop “sin petrificarse” [without stagnating] (Pacheco, interview, 27/05/03). The semi-institutionalisation of Nueva Trova is interesting. It demonstrates how the concept of a music genre significantly influenced by the alien trends in Western music was eventually accepted. With institutionalisation, the Nueva Trova movement was thoroughly Cubanised, so that the influence of the external could be downplayed. Although the fan bases of the two main protagonists differed, with Silvio Rodríguez attracting more white urban Cubans who were fans of external music and Pablo Milanés attracting more black Cubans favouring national music (Moore, 2003: 13), the institutionalisation of the music brought Silvio Rodríguez and Pablo Milanés together and their cooperation yielded much progress in Nueva Trova music. Furthermore, the incorporation of the music into the cultural mainstream indicates the success of this musical movement in both

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97 The nature of this affiliation is unclear.
attracting and keeping a mass audience, particularly amongst the young, which the more dogmatic elements of the more closed activist culture could not ignore.

8.6 Conclusion

The role of young artist saw some young Cubans testing cultural boundaries. By association with elements which were considered counter-revolutionary, these groups put themselves under threat, but by operating as an alter-vanguard they succeeded to varying degrees in expressing themselves as both different (from the dominant discourse) and revolutionary (according to the dominant discourse). Because of cultural institutionalisation and the removal of the market from music and literature, these young people had opportunities which their counterparts in the Western world could not, for the most part, enjoy. With those opportunities, however, came responsibilities. Whilst these groups felt that they fulfilled their responsibilities within their own definition of how they must act to be revolutionary artists, some elements within the cultural apparatus did not feel that they were doing so, which led all these young artists into difficulty. In the case of the Nueva Trova, protection was found in two ways; firstly, through the patronage of ICAIC, which, as the cinema institute, was not the natural protector of musicians; and secondly, through enduring mass popularity and the ease of dissemination of music (both Cuban and Western) in 1960s Cuba. The poets and writers discussed enjoyed some institutional patronage, but when this was removed, the groupings could not survive because the culturally conservative elements within the political structure felt threatened. In the case of El Puente, the group found itself accused of going beyond the accepted cultural margin, whilst in the case of Caimán, a type of discreet censorship took place.

The young artists thereby fell into the two contradictory orientations expounded in the discourse of youth. They were championed as representing a new generation unsullied by the past, but they were also subject to the moral panic, which erupted at any attempt to seek an alternative vision of youth. They were both helped and hindered by policies of the new revolutionary government and were left, as is evident in Silvio Rodríguez’s lyrics, with a great deal of uncertainty. Their difficulties were caused by their own attempts to solve the
conundrum of feeling like, and wishing to be, good revolutionaries, but operating in a sphere that challenged the definition of what a good revolutionary was.
Conclusions

A Study of Youth, the Sixties and Cuba

As with any field of contemporary history, a study of the Sixties presents the researcher with a specific set of problems. The period in question is still within the memory of many, political systems remain, and a direct cause-effect relationship between the 1960s and the present make the tool of hindsight less reliable. Instead of a shortage of sources, we are confronted with a mass of evidence, as yet unassimilated by the process of historiography. It is necessary therefore to confront and challenge not an historical paradigm, but rather a set of popularly held assumptions and rewritings. In the present case, these perspectives are often put forward by key youth protagonists of the period some of whom are now in positions of power.

Similarly, a study of youth presents its own challenges. Models of youth behaviour, deviance and delinquency compete to rationalise or explain youth cultures and their effects. These are culturally and temporally specific, so when used as a tool in an alternative cultural site they must be viewed with caution – though this is not to say that they are of no value.

This work has taken both of these issues into account, and proposes a model to understand youth in 1960s Cuba. Whilst accepting that the Sixties has now become a trope, the 1960s are a period that merits historical study, in particular in Cuba. It is a decade which still obsesses commentators on Cuba, and certain assumptions are attached by some to the Cuban Sixties, meaning that it has been necessary to unpick these in writings produced both within and outside Cuba.

The aim of this work has been to paint a broad picture of youth and it has avoided focussing on just one type of youth, a tendency which so often dominates youth studies. The aim has been to give precedence to neither the spectacular nor the mundane, rather to build a partial model of young lives in Cuba in the 1960s by examining the culture to which they were exposed and
which they themselves had a part in creating, and by examining how they operated within, on the boundaries of and outside such a culture, and developed alternative cultures. To this end, I must admit certain exclusions, which have, due to the breadth of this project necessarily lain outside it; these might form the bases for future study. Firstly, no research was conducted within the exile community, and thus a youth culture which still considered itself Cuban, and probably affected life within Cuba, has yet to be explored. Secondly, some of the evidence gathered has been centred upon young life in Havana, and it is anticipated that a more rural perspective, or a perspective from the East of the island, particularly Santiago de Cuba, would give further inflection on youth culture and identity in 1960s Cuba.

This work feeds into the debate on the Sixties in general, the debates on youth culture and the debates over the meaning of the Sixties in Cuba, and to this end, the key findings are summarised below.

**Key findings**

The thesis’s examination of discourse, policy and external influence has built up a picture of a culture of youth, and has viewed this as a changing part of a new and evolving national-revolutionary identity. The leadership discourse changed over time, as the leaders no longer identified themselves with young people, and as the memory of the 1950s grew dimmer. The concept of youth was developed to mean an aspirational state, whereas young people were viewed as potential agents of change. The Revolution discursively developed its own relationship with young people in Cuba, so that young people could relate directly to the Revolution rather than indirectly via a different generation. In terms of policy, the vast number of initiatives concerning young people made up a *de facto* youth policy, by linking multiple policy initiatives to education. Leisure, schooling, ideology and culture became part of this broad policy agenda. The dominance of youth in the outside world also influenced Cuba and was part of the culture of youth, although less than may be anticipated. As young people outside Cuba began to dominate the political and cultural landscape, Cuba welcomed certain
events and movements, ignored others, and thoroughly Cubanised still others. The culture of youth was in its essence Cuban, radical and revolutionary.

Young people reacted in a variety of ways to the evolving culture of youth, and these ways in turn determined youth cultures within the Revolution. Their actions also changed each axis of the culture of youth, so that they were partly responsible for creating the external element of their identity. Those in the youth organisations, especially the UJC, who attempted to live up to the image projected upon young people found themselves struggling, and unable to succeed in this pursuit. Not only did they attempt (and fail) to live up to this image, but in so doing they narrowed the definition of the culture of youth and limited its organic progression. The reasons for this were several. Unlike the leadership they did not have the pragmatic aims concerning production, development and so on, and therefore the way that the youth organisation saw and constructed the culture of youth was entirely ideologically driven. Secondly, the organisation was, with its members, immature, and could not deal practically with problems in its ranks and therefore responded at times with moral panic and a demonization of anything that appeared to be outside this definition. The moral panic was particularly associated with external influence but also included the enduring problem of young people who were neither working nor studying, about which the revolutionary leadership was concerned. Even more so, the moral panic reached the organisation’s own ranks. The constant autocrítica damaged the organisation and made it appear weaker than it was, or could have been.

The potential that young people did fulfil through the dual forces of policy and participation, was firmly dentro de la Revolución but did not necessarily aspire to the unrealistic ideals of the discourse of the leadership and the UJC. The force of voluntary participation moved the concern away from infeasible aspirations to achievable goals that linked young people directly with the Revolution so that one relationship in young lives, alongside that with, for example, family or teachers, was the relationship with the anthropomorphized concept of the Revolution. To this end, young people enjoyed the “gifts” of the Revolution – free education, better provision of leisure facilities and so on – while in return giving the Revolution part of their leisure time through voluntary participation in
several mass movements, notably the Literacy Campaign, the Militias and the *aficionado* movement. This voluntarism would form a youth culture that was powerful and confident, and which was genuinely intimately linked to the process of building the Revolution. These were mass movements with mass involvement, and this research has undertaken the long overdue task of showing how the lack of a mass youth organisation was a failure of the Cuban 1960s. If a mass youth organisation had existed, it could have benefited from the high levels of youth voluntarism, although equally, had it been similarly plagued by the pervasive under-confidence of the actual youth organisation, it may have damaged that same voluntarism.

Whilst many young people participated in and forged their own relationship with the Revolution, young people, sometimes even those who were participating enthusiastically and voluntarily, also found themselves facing various difficulties. Firstly, there was the moral panic associated with the culture of youth. The issue of young people neither working nor studying continued to plague the 1960s, and concern about this would in fact increase in the late 1960s, as those young people who fell into this category were no longer given the excuse that structural, economic, social or class issues had forced them into under-employment and under-education. The reasons for the continued existence of this problem are related to the moral panic itself, which narrowed the field in which young people could express themselves; it therefore suppressed alternative expressions of youth culture. Similarities between the Cuban Sixties and the external Sixties were played down, even when such a convergence could have been consistent with revolutionary-national identity; similarly many continuities from 1950s Cuba were downplayed. Therefore, while the creation of a critical distance from the 1950s had created such an identity, it had not in a practical sense resolved enduring social issues, such as racism, the position of women and homosexuals, and, most importantly in this case, a non-participative youth.

Secondly, the narrow-mindedness of the UJC sometimes alienated those young people who felt themselves to be revolutionary but did not conform in some way to the to definition that the UJC prescribed. This had consequences even for its own members, and many young people who had been members of the AJR were
not welcome through the narrow gates of the UJC. In one bookshop in Havana, the manager proudly told me of his role as alfabetizador, showing me his AJR membership card, but he told me he had never been – and had never wished to be – a member of the UJC. Such an attitude is a reflection of – and perhaps a cause of – the problems which the UJC faced, as a consequence of expectations placed upon it by the leadership. This attitude, moreover, led to an over-dogmatic, sometimes over-enthusiastic and always imperfect youth organisation that could not cope with its own imperfections and therefore had to demonise the external Other in order to feel it could survive.

Thirdly, the assumed link between the objects of existing prejudice and counter-revolutionary traits excluded many young people. The lucha with which these young people would engage was not (or not only) the battle against imperialism, which dominated the revolutionary-national identity, but the battle against the narrowing of the definition of ‘youth’ and ‘Revolution’. The songs of Silvio Rodríguez eloquently express this struggle, and the cultural producers, while attempting to be not a counter- but an alter-vanguard were tainted with associations drawn between them and demonised issues, notably homosexuality, the influence of Western culture, and dissidence. It is true that actual associations existed. For example, José Mario of El Puente was associated with Ginsberg, who was associated with the enfermitos, who were the epitome of all that was deemed wrong with young people: the use of Western clothing, the love of rock and roll influenced music, and ostentatious displays of homosexuality (but probably not drug use). The Nueva Trova movement came into being in Coppelia in Havana, which was populated by young men wearing their hair long, young women wearing mini-skirts with Militia boots, and young poets seeking to express themselves as an alter-vanguard by stamping the personality of their own generation on the young, Cuban, Revolution. The line between dissident and dissonant was a fine one. Most dissidents either left Cuba or were arrested and sent to UMAPs, while a level of dissonance could be expressed through style, poetry and music. The fineness of the line, however, meant that many young people existed at a cultural margin that they did not necessarily wish to populate but which, in order to express their identity, they were forced to uncomfortably
inhabit. The result was that they could cross, unaware, from dissonance to dissidence and find themselves in uncomfortable predicaments.

**Paths for Future Research**

Throughout this thesis, the phrase “still unchanged today” has recurred. The culture of youth of the 1960s made its way into the national-revolutionary identity, and still holds powerful sway in Cuba. The contention here has been, however, that young people throughout the 1960s in Cuba continued to influence this identity. An under-researched decade, the 1980s, would be appropriate for study in this context. There was a new youth culture in Cuba in the 1980s (Kapcia, 2005a: 163), but external and internal forces had changed. The Sixties outside Cuba were fading into memory, and a new generation, influenced by punk, came into being, bringing with it an anarchist, rather than utopian, ethos. The moral panic over youth during the 1980s in Cuba became formalised with the establishment of the Centro de Estudios sobre la Juventud, although its inception was prompted as much by the desire to write the radical history of Cuban youth organisations as to critique youth. The distance between the 1950s and the 1980s, and between the original leadership and young people in Cuba had grown, and, after a difficult decade with little publication, young artists who had stayed in Cuba became the new adult generation, while remaining, particularly in the case of the *trovadores*, the heroes of a new cohort of young people. The model applied here – an examination of discourse, policy and external forces, combined with examinations of youth cultures – has potential to enhance work on the 1980s, and beyond.

This thesis has been largely island-centric. Part of the picture of 1960s Cuban youth culture that could be painted includes a youth culture in exile. The forces acting on this culture in exile, in Miami, Madrid, Paris and elsewhere, came from the island. Cubans in exile were not all the *gusanos* they were often termed. Their relationship with Western youth cultures may have been in cases geographically closer, but was unlikely to be spiritually so. An examination of the relationship between island youth identity and exile youth identity in the
1960s could feed into the current academic debate that is brewing in Cuba over the cultural implications of ‘two Cubas’.

Finally, the use of cultural theory to understand the Cuban model is important in two ways. Firstly, it allows the researcher to focus on issues outside the traditional academic focus and to recast those within it. So, for example, viewing artists in Cuba not from an aesthetic perspective but from the point of view of their effect on political culture allows us to develop the political picture of the cultural. Secondly, the limits of theoretical models, which emanate mostly from the Western academe, become obvious when applied to an external example. This study has shown the limits of cultural theory, not to critique it, but to attempt to test it as hypothesis and correspondingly revise it. Cultural theory would not, normally, consider membership of a youth organisation a cultural act; and those theorists would leave it to the political sociologist to deal with participation. But by contending that the cultural is political and vice versa, a broader and more comprehensive perspective can be brought to youth and identity studies in a Caribbean or Latin American frame.

This thesis has challenged popular and academic assumptions surrounding youth, the Cuban Revolution and the Sixties. By exploring the convergence of these three coordinates it has theoretically, methodologically and empirically added to our understanding of each, and of their interaction. It is hoped this study moves our understanding of the Sixties away from what David Farber describes as “acts of memory wrestling with history” (Farber, 1994a: 1) and instead has helped to ensure that the multiple voices, experiences and actions of young people in the Cuban 1960s are written into the history books of the Revolution.
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