Dualism and the Critical Languages of Portraiture

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Abstract

This thesis analyzes the philosophical origins of dualism in Western culture in the Classical period in order to examine dualist modes of representation in the history of Western portraiture. Dualism – or the separation of soul and body – takes the form in portraiture of the representation of the head or head and shoulders at the expense of the body, and since its emergence in Classical Greece, has been the major influence on portraiture. In this respect the modern portrait’s commonplace attention to the face rests on the dualist notion that the soul, and therefore the individuality of the subject, rests in the head.

Art historical literature on portraiture, however, fails to address the pictorial, cultural and theoretical complications arising from various forms of dualism and their different artistic methodologies, such as that of the physiognomy (the definition of personality through facial characteristics) in the 19th century. That is, there is a failure to identify the complexities of dualism’s relationship to the traditional honorific aspects of the portrait (the fact that historians are inclined to accept at face value the fact that portraits historically have tended to honour the achievements and social status of the sitter). Indeed, scholars have a propensity to romanticise the humanist individualism inherent to this long history of the honorific, particularly in canonic portrait practices such as Rembrandt’s and Picasso’s.

My thesis challenges this conventional history, by drawing on a study of Platonic and Cartesian dualist thinking, as well as on a series of anti-dualist positions (proposed by Derek Parfit, Gilbert Ryle, W. Teed Rockwell). Hence the thesis has three key components: firstly the analysis of production of the honorific in portraiture from classical culture to Rembrandt in relation to the changing determinates of dualism, then a discussion of the crisis of the honorific and the increasingly conflicted nature of dualism in modernism (Picasso and Braque), and then finally the break down of dualism, or its radical modification, in art of the 1960s. In this section - drawing on recent advances in the theory of the mind and neuroscience – the thesis focuses on the way various artists (such as Mary Kelly and Art & Language) have questioned dualist portraiture and its humanist emphasis on the honorific and the face/self.
## Contents

1. Introduction .................................................. 4

2. Narcissus’ Legacy
   *The Origins of the Western Portrait & the Emergence of Dualism* .................. 21

3. Rembrandt’s Dilemma
   *The Introduction of Cartesianism in 17th Century Dutch Portraiture* ............ 59

4. Picasso’s Solution
   *The Crisis of the Honorific & the Clash of Subjectivities* ....................... 117

5. The Turning of a Blind (Third) Eye
   *The Critique of the Honorific in Radical Forms of Contemporary Portraiture* ... 181

6. Epilogue
   *Vicious Circles* ........................................... 228

Bibliography .................................................. 247
Introduction

There are a number of factors that must be considered in analysing a portrait in order to establish its meaning: the intentions of the artist, the social identity of the artist and the person represented, the conventions of the portrait and the genre the work falls into. We are then in a position to ask: has the artist created a reasonable likeness, or an idealisation or counterfeit image of the subject? Has the artist incorporated a hidden symbolism, or biographical references - such as the subject's profession or social class, or for instance, their allegiance to a cause, principle or ideology? Knowing these things we can then surmise what the likely function of the portrait is, its relationship to other works of a similar kind, and the relationship between the artist and the person represented. My research on the place and function of the portrait in pre-modernist, modernist, and post-modernist art will apply these kind of analyses to a range of works, paying specific attention to the demise of the traditional 'monadic' and painted academic portrait and the rise of the multiple and allegorical installation-based portrait. In doing so it will attempt to map the development of portraiture in relation to the philosophical position of dualism, and its subsequent modifications and rejection.
The traditional, academic portrait has clearly been subject to various forms of denaturalisation over the last 100 years, but it is only with the incorporation of photography, and text, into 1960s avant-garde art, and as such its rejection of the 'expressive' model of representation generally, that the claims of the traditional portrait to reflect or mirror the identity of the sitter have been questioned in any explicit fashion, producing a widespread critique of the Cartesian Self. These transformations have brought into being new forms of portraiture and new kinds of working relationship between the artist and the person depicted, and new accounts of the representation of subjectivity in art. In this respect, an understanding of the history of the dualist portrait format is absolutely crucial in understanding the extensive turn to the representation of subjectivity in contemporary practice. Indeed, once portraiture is freed from conventional dualist modes of representation in the Conceptual art of 1960s, portraiture dissolves itself into a discursive politics of the self.

The first chapter of the thesis offers a historical overview of the origins and development of the Western portrait, beginning with the Egyptian and Greek portrait and stretching to the Renaissance. In doing so, it focuses initially on a selection of Greek and Christian myths of the origins of the portrait, in an effort to underpin the role and function of the portrait in these cultures. The emergence of the Western portrait is presented through an analysis of the key notions of the 'honorific' and 'exemplary' in classical portraiture, which derive from Platonic and Aristotelian positions on art. In this respect, the Hellenistic and Roman employment of portraiture as forms of self-promotion is reviewed in relation to the Aristotelian notion of idealisation. Similarly the abstraction of the figure in Byzantine art is examined in relation to the Platonic origins of the Christian prioritisation of the spiritual. These two fundamental positions form the basis for the subsequent analysis of religious, state, and humanist portraiture during the Renaissance.

In addition, the first chapter traces the philosophical origins of Cartesian dualism in classicism, and presents an overview of anti-dualist positions, spanning from classicism to the present day. The central Cartesian notion of an eternal and immutable soul is located in Platonic philosophy, while it is discussed in relation to the Aristotelian (materialist) position of ‘hylemorphism’. Furthermore, this chapter
traces the gradual assimilation of Aristotelian philosophy – particularly the unresolved question of the intellect – into the realm of Christian Dogma, which led, through the work of Thomas Aquinas and Augustine of Hippo, to Descartes’ formation of the cogito argument. Once this framework is in place, Cartesian dualism is reviewed in relation to Locke’s proto-empiricism, Hobbes and Spinoza’s materialism, and Hume’s early reductionist view of the self. This section of the chapter ends by focusing on various materialist accounts, such as Gilbert Ryle’s ‘behaviourism’, Derek Parfit’s version of ‘reductionism’, Daniel Dennett’s ‘functionalism’, and Charles Taylor’s notion of the self as a socially and culturally bounded agent.

In the last part of this chapter I develop an account of the dualist portrait. In general, the dualist portrait is characterised by two things: a prioritisation of the head, implemented through a compositional reduction of the portrait format from life-size to bust, and the direct illumination of the face in contrast to a darker rendering of the rest of the body. The immediate outcome of focusing on the head is that the head is the prime locus of physiognomy. Yet, the Aristotelian and Platonic employments of physiognomy differ radically. For instance, the Platonic (and dualist) model applies a physiognomic reading of the subject in order to access his or her inner being, hence the demand for a realist rendering of external appearance. The Aristotelian employment of physiognomy, on the other hand, is guided by a process of idealisation that leads to formal abstraction, in so far as the representation of the sitter’s facial characteristics are represented according to the desired outcomes of sitter and artist.

The second chapter of the thesis addresses the origins of the Western European portrait, and the formation of the ‘self’ prior to the Enlightenment. This chapter includes an examination of painted portraits and self-portraits by various canonic artists of this period, where the construction of the concepts of interiority and subjectivity within painting are active. This chapter looks specifically at Dutch seventeenth-century portraiture and focuses on the way the emerging middle class chose to represent itself in relation to an emerging notion of the autonomous self. In addition, it examines the dialectical relationship between popular attempts at individual self-definition through portraiture and Rembrandt’s exploration of subjectivity and identity through the employment of self-portraiture. The aim of this
is to produce a critical reading of these works based on their relationship to classicist and/or dualist notions of the self.

The case studies of this chapter are presented in their historical, political, and social context (the early days of the independence of the Dutch Republic) in order to understand the nature and characteristics of the new middle class - the emerging patron of the new portraiture. In this respect, I question whether this new middle class managed to formulate any independent class values, as such, that is, to what extent was it influenced by, or opposed itself to, preceding and dominant aristocratic values. Furthermore, this chapter also presents a review of Descartes’ impact on the Dutch cultural and political scene, and, specifically, how the cultural values of the emerging middle class responded to the new Cartesian philosophy, which was perceived at the time as an alternative to the ruling Aristotelian classicism. Finally, I analyze the influence of religion on the popularisation of the portrait among Dutch citizens, the impact of the crisis of Catholicism as a result of the Reformation and the rise of Calvinism.

Once this context is drawn (the pictorial-ideological position), significant portraits of esteemed members of Dutch society are analysed in relation to the depicted subjects’ social position or ambition. These works were produced in one of the three major metropolitan and artistic centres of 17th-century Netherlands: Utrecht, Haarlem, and Amsterdam. As such, this comparative overview seeks to establish artistic connections between these cities and the preceding Renaissance pictorial traditions – especially that of Caravaggio – in order to assess their association with classicism and/or dualism. The outcome of this analysis of 17th-century Dutch portraits forms the platform for the enquiry into Rembrandt’s self-portraits, (and portraits of others), and the role of classicism and/or dualism in his practice. It does this by interrelating early and middle 20th century romantic readings of his work with recent revisionist positions, especially those following the results of the Rembrandt Research Project’s disattribution of a large percentage of his work.

Regarding Rembrandt’s Leiden period the chapter questions the intention of Rembrandt’s intense study of his emotional states in the self-portraits. For this purpose, I reflect on Michel de Montaigne’s similar self-explorative quest, in order to scrutinise the proto-romanticist Cartesian dualist culture of this period. Moreover,
particular attention is paid to Rembrandt’s pictorial employment of light and chiaroscuro especially during his middle and late periods. The role of costume and performativity, which dominate these periods, is treated as key in defining the realist character of these works, which is crucial to Cartesian dualism’s quest for Truth. By extension, this chapter questions the recently revealed controversial practices that took place in Rembrandt’s studio. Besides the disattribution of many of his paintings, it is now well known that Rembrandt encouraged his students to work on, or from, his paintings, or straight from nature, rather than from famous paintings and sculptural masterpieces of the past. Furthermore, Rembrandt refused to employ academic, scholastic art theories in his practice, such as anatomy and human body proportions and perspective exercises, preferring to work directly from nature with no rules attached.

In defining the classicist or dualist character of Dutch and Rembrandt’s portraits, my analysis seeks to address the role of portraiture in the creation and maintenance of social hierarchies, and in the formation, naturalisation and empowerment of social categories of identity, including that of the category of individuality itself. The choice and the variety of the works discussed is driven, in this sense, to unravel the various complexities surrounding the social function of the portrait (the reasons for its employment and development) and the ways in which the formation of the ‘self’ is articulated in these works. In this respect, dualism plays a central part in the history portraiture, insofar as it allows for the visual construction of a subjective, invisible entity. That is, dualism is defined by its singular capacity to integrate the subjective demands of the client or commissioner into the artist’s powers of ‘expressiveness’. The portrait, then, as a product of artistic introjection and client negotiation, becomes in its ‘honorific’ function, a complex ideological vehicle.

Thus, if portraiture is to be treated as a reflection on, and negotiation with, the processes involved in construction of self and identity, it is necessary to take seriously the relationship between portraiture as a social and cultural practice and the exigencies of ideology. This is a problem that is somewhat troubling for writers on portraiture. For instance, Harry Berger Jr. argues that:

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1 However, a rejection of dualism should not imply a rejection of ‘subjectivity’ altogether. Dualism is problematic on the grounds that it supports a notion of the soul, self, or subject that can exist separately from the body, or object.
Whether these correlations are purely associative or reinforced by formal resonances, they make it possible to imagine that the aesthetic and ideological values were fused together, so that regardless of what motivated painters to make a given set of aesthetic choices and formal moves, the choices and moves themselves convey social meanings.¹

Nevertheless, the aim here is not to analyse portraits as reflections of fixed ideological mechanisms and positions. In this respect, I am critical of the essentialist view that there is a single, homogenous, bourgeois visual ideology that carries on unaltered throughout the history of Western art, and that portraiture, in its bourgeois forms, is best representative of. Artists do not inherit ‘visual ideologies’ blindly. On the contrary, work is produced in internal negotiation with such ideologies. But, at the same time there is a crucial distinction that has to be drawn between works that reflect prevailing social and cultural attitudes and mores (commissioned portraits) and ones that are less bound by these constraints (non-commissioned portraits). In the case of the former an artist is required to carry out a portrait that is mediated by the desires of the sitter, which at the very least involves a certain level of flattery, and at the most, an incorporation of the conventions of popular style. Therefore, the terms ideology and visual ideology, will only define attitudes of certain individuals and groups at a given historical time and context. By extension, therefore, the application of these terms cannot be universal. Finally, in an effort to avoid vulgar uses of these terms they will not be employed to describe the intentions of individuals alone, but to question the impact of personal interests on creative outcomes.

Likewise, the relationship between portraiture and philosophy are not causally linked in a direct sense, since such a position would presuppose the subordination of art to philosophy. Therefore, an account of portraiture is at the same time not reducible to the formation of the Western subject. However, we have to ask why do portraits exist in the intellectual form that they do? My approach to this art-historical question is defined by the view that the relation of art and philosophy is synagonistic and not antagonistic, both sharing a common reflective nature and often, as such sharing similar paths in their development. The notion that the causal view is highly

problematic is highlighted by its potential methodological ineffectiveness in a discussion of early portraiture in relation to the representation of the self, since the self as a distinct concept did not exist before Descartes, in spite of the fact that the dualist mind/body problem derives from Plato and Aristotle. A systematic philosophic analysis of human nature and metaphysics might not exist prior to classicism, yet, the strong influence of the concept of the ‘after life’ in Egyptian religion, culture and art (viz pyramids, sarcophaguses) acts as a testament to the fact that artists’ dealing with certain issues which have come to be considered as philosophical subjects, might be parallel to, yet independent of philosophy. For these reasons, it should be clarified that the use of philosophic terms does not imply a causal relation between art and philosophy, but rather serves as the appropriate means, for clarifying the shared terrain of art and philosophy.

Thus, artists may not necessarily be philosophically aware of the mind/body split but they do acknowledge the issue through the adoption, transformation and development of the subgenres of portraiture. It could be argued that every artist that has dealt with portraiture has dealt, to a variable extent, with the question of being and identity. As part of their methodology during the execution of portraits artists are forced to take a position and decide on whether they will acknowledge the existence of a soul or a self. In many cases, this does not reflect their own personal beliefs. For an artist practising in Europe during the period from 13th – 17th century it would be impossible to evade the handling of the portrait in relation to religious doctrine, considering that the Church was the main patron of arts, besides royal courts. It is generally perceived that the exception to this rule is the majority of 17th century Dutch portraits, which is one of the reasons why the second chapter is devoted to this historical era. Finally, to claim that an artist is philosophically illiterate (in terms of dealing with and producing ideas – not necessarily studying philosophy in the academic sense) is to reduce artistic practice to a purely technical activity and disregard its intellectual significance and cultural contribution.

\[3\] In his seminal essay on portraiture Ernst H. J. Gombrich discusses how the experiments on the psychological and cognitive perception of the human face run by Töpffer preceded the similar ones run by the psychologist Égon Brunswick in Vienna one hundred years later. Ernst H. J. Gombrich, “The Mask and the Face: The Perception of Physiognomic Likeness in Life and Art”, in Ernst H. J. Gombrich et al., Art, Perception, and Reality (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972), p. 120.
The treatment of the soul varies throughout the history of art and is determined by a variety of factors that are bound to cultural conditions and stylistic preferences, and occasionally, as in the case of commissioned portraiture, are infused by ideological concerns. However, it would constitute a methodological error to associate dualism with a certain aesthetic style, be it either naturalism or abstraction. For this reason, it is crucial to examine certain key positions in relation to the question of representation. In his seminal essay on portraiture, Ernst H. J. Gombrich argues that representation is a matter of resemblance, since the “experience of likeness is a kind of perceptual fusion based on recognition, and here as always past experience will colour the way we see a face.” Gombrich goes on to discuss certain psychological aspects of perception in relation to a set of permanent and mobile variants, claiming that a “likeness has to be caught rather than constructed”. These variants are of crucial importance to Gombrich, since they determine perception. However, the hierarchical distinction that he enforces between permanent and expressive alterations is sympathetic to dualism.

Conversely, Nelson Goodman is critical towards a model of representation that is based on resemblance, disregarding such models as “naive”. Goodman argues that representation is not a matter of imitation, and therefore, resemblance could not be regarded as sufficient for representation. What he proposes instead, from a semiotic perspective, is that denotation – which is independent of resemblance – lies at the core of representation. Illusionism is problematic for Goodman since it “confuses the representation with the represented” which is further complicated by the fact that “what is observed varies with interests and habits”. Thus, and in a clear response to Gombrich, Goodman perceives representation as a “symbolic relation that is relative and variable” according to cultural contexts and aesthetic standards and “not as an idiosyncratic process like mirroring”.

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5 Ibid, pp. 129-130.
7 Ibid, pp. 4, 10.
8 Ibid, p. 5.
9 Ibid, p. 34.
10 Ibid, p. 43.
Goodman’s view has a lot in common with the linguistic studies of Valentin Voloshinov, who, writing in the 1930’s, argues that signs are “multi-accented”, thus are able to carry “multiple meanings”. Voloshinov’s views stem from a critical engagement with Wilhelm von Humboldt’s understanding of language as a ‘generative process’ that is “implemented in the social-verbal interaction of speakers”. Voloshinov is particularly critical of the Saussuerian school, for in his view the treatment of the “relationship of sign to sign within a closed system” and the excessive interest in the “logic of signs itself, taken, as in algebra, completely independently of the meanings that give signs their content” is influenced by the Cartesianism and Rationalism of the 17th and 18th centuries.

An interesting semiotic approach to portraiture is proposed by Harry Berger Jr., who builds his argument around C. S. Peirce’s semiotics of representation. However, by resorting to the Lacanian view of self-presentation as constructed and composed, Berger claims that early modern portraiture is governed by fiction due to the sitters’ habit of posing. Accordingly, he argues that “the portrait presents – performs, displays, stages – not a person but a representation, and the representation not of a person but of an act of self-presentation”. Therefore, for Berger, “a portrait presents itself as a sign that denotes its referent by resemblance; the referent it denotes is not simply a person but a person in the act of posing; and since posing is part of the causal event that produced it, the portrait as a sign is indexical as well as iconic.” As sound as this argument might be, it has to be noted that the view of the portrait as ‘iconic index’ is only applicable to certain historical eras (from Renaissance until modernism), to commissioned portraiture and to many portraits that are produced in artists’ studios where posing is a central constituent of the process of self-representation. The fact that this model is prescribed for the pre-modern era is

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12 Ibid, pp. 48-49, 98.
13 Ibid, p. 58.
14 Peirce distinguishes between three modes of representation: the icon (the sign that denotes by resemblance: a visual imitation), the symbol (the sign that denotes by convention: language), the index (the sign that points not merely to a referent to some dynamic relation between itself and its referent (e.g. smoke is an index of fire). Charles S. Peirce, The Essential Peirce: Selected Philosophical Writings, Peirce Edition Project (ed.) (Bloomington & London: Indiana University Press, 1998).
15 Berger, Fictions of the Pose, p. 13.
enforced by Berger’s insistence on relating denotation to resemblance, which is contrary to Goodman’s position. Consequently, a semiotic account of portraiture derived from Berger cannot act as a methodological panacea for the understanding of portraiture’s development throughout history, since it assumes in a highly undifferentiated way that all portraits are idealised representations; to accept this position, therefore would be highly essentialist.

Is the reading of portraits best represented by the psychological confirmation of likeness as in Gombrich, or is it actually separate from issues of resemblance as Goodman argues? Cubist portraiture is the moment that these models clash: the period where formal abstraction clashes with the demands of facial resemblance. By the beginning of the 20th century the traditional mimetic realistic portrait was no longer able to carry forward the traditional dualist split. By the time of Cubism a divide had opened up between a dualism inherent to traditional portraiture, and the complex requirements of representation of the self. Although Gombrich’s model may be, to a certain extent, applicable to pre-modern and early modern portraits, Voloshinov and Goodman’s approaches offer a more appropriate means of understanding the history of Western portraiture, given the fluctuating aesthetics of this tradition. In other words, it would be impossible to imagine that a conventional portrait is able to stand as a critique of dualism, if we were not to perceive portraits as multi-accented signs.

Accordingly, the third chapter looks at the demise of the naturalistic painted portrait at the end of the 19th century (Courbet, Manet) and the rise of modernism (Cézanne, Cubism) in relation to expressive models of subjective interiority in painting. Portraiture’s development in modernism is significantly different to pre-modernist models, which is due to the reconfiguration of the artist’s role in the modern, industrial world and the emergence of the concept of stylistic novelty and the ‘new’. For instance, the artist now takes pride in being the sole creator of his art, refusing to employ assistants in his or her studio. In addition, naturalism is no longer the preferred model for the representation of the sitter’s ‘inner being’, insofar as it is regarded as too formally restrictive and too subordinate to the interests of clients. Accordingly, formalist abstraction begins to replace naturalism as it enables an impression of the ‘spiritual’ in artistic form to transform the physical representation of
the subject. Cubism’s challenge to the belief that visual resemblance of the external characteristics of the subject is necessary to the representation of individual identity will be seen as the key point of transformation in this process of denaturalisation. In these terms, this chapter focuses on Picasso’s cubist portraits of his dealers in an effort to clarify the Cubist portrait’s position in respect to the emerging crisis of the Cartesian tradition. Moreover, the socio-economic nature of Picasso’s relationship with these sitters calls for an examination of the modernist portrait’s social function, in relation to the new complexities that arose with the new artistic freedoms and autonomy of the artist under industrial capitalism.

The critical moment in Picasso’s Cubism is that the process of denaturalisation of the figure seems to be in conflict with portraiture’s conventional demand for visual identification. Did Picasso acknowledge this problem through the execution of his dealers’ portraits? In other words, did the creative process of these works force him to seek a solution for this rupture somewhere between his own creative demands (abstraction) and his sitters’ expectations (some level of realistic representation appropriate for identification)? Prior to modernism, it was only the subjectivity of the sitter that was honoured, through the noteworthy individual’s inclusion into the pantheon of portraiture, whilst the subjectivity of the artist was ‘honoured’ as the receiver of a commission – denoting a form of ‘benighted’ creative subservience of the artist. Modernism’s objection to patronage, however, allowed the artist to become the primary selector of his subjects, as a result securing a certain level of creative autonomy on the part of the artist. Sitters and commissioners, then, were not expected to submit fully to the creative intentions of artists. As a result, their yearning for the accommodation of their desired projections of themselves in the creative outcomes of the artists reveals a spiralling conflict of interests between the subjectivities of the artist and the sitter. In an attempt to address such issues, Picasso’s Cubist portraits of his dealers are examined for possible mimetic compromises that are the immediate outcome of Picasso’s realisation that his subjectivity was interfering with the representational demands of portraiture. Such creative decisions are further analysed in relation to Cartesian dualism and to G.W.F. Hegel’s work on art and aesthetics, since the Cubist portraits’ aesthetic compromise between naturalism and abstraction seems to comply with Hegelian aesthetics.
A return to early Cubist writing is considered necessary, given the fact that a rereading of these texts will highlight the use of dualist language and, consequently, represent attempts to brand its style as a Cartesian enterprise. As we will see, these attempts are located in their anti-classicist rhetoric, which in many respects conforms to dualist views. To further understand Picasso’s practice, his methodology is examined in comparison with Braque’s by looking at accounts of the artists’ studio practice by those who were close to both artists and who actually witnessed their collaborations. Such analysis will assist greatly in comprehending Cubism’s position in relation to dualism, since, in contrast to early Cubist writing, contemporary readings seem to propose an anti-dualist reading of Cubist style.

The results of this analysis are employed for an extensive assessment of Picasso’s portraits of his dealers. In doing so, the works are viewed in the context of Picasso’s business relationships with each of his subjects in order to question the impact that they had on Picasso’s creative choices. As we will see, the weight of these choices is quite significant both in terms of Picasso’s career moves as well as his work’s relation to modernist attitudes (e.g. ‘free expression’ – free that is from heteronomous practices such as commissioned portraiture), and to dualist positions. This chapter also argues that the problem posed by portraiture’s demands for resemblance was so important that it forced Picasso in the following years to work simultaneously with a plethora of styles, appropriate for the varying representational demands of different subjects. To support this argument, the closing part of this chapter looks at the stark contrasts between Picasso’s portraits of his close business associates and prospective patrons (neo-classicist), and those of his partners at the time (expressionist, surrealist, etc.).

Finally, the fourth chapter reflects on post-60s portraiture: portraiture after both modernist denaturalisation of the figure, and the expulsion of expressive, individualistic modes of making art. This part of the study will consist of work by artists who have employed post-Cartesian modes of portraiture (repetition, seriality and sequencing) in order to address the problematic nature of the honorific. Artists discussed in this chapter include: Andy Warhol, Art & Language, and Mary Kelly. What unites the practices of these artists is their common employment of allegory in their pursuit for non-abstract alternatives to mimetic resemblance. In this respect, the
allegorical principles of fragmentation, confiscation, superimposition, and decentralisation are analysed in relation to the dualist notions of originality and immutability. Moreover, the allegorical production of meaning is discursive in ambition, in so far as it encourages the viewer’s participation in the process of deciphering visual metaphors. Thereby, this chapter’s examination of allegory focuses on the critique allegory makes of the inherent hierarchical and conflictual function of hermeneutics. In hermeneutics the author/work dictates the meaning of the work to viewers, and as such successful interpretation depends on the skill of the viewer/reader to unlock the content of the work, whereas in allegory, meaning formation relies on collaboration, between author and audience, and, therefore, rests on an extended, temporal, process.

An analysis of collaboration and its various forms is central to this chapter, therefore, due to its essential place in the critique of Cartesian subjectivity in art. The methodology inherent in Descartes’ model of self-reflection, as described in Meditations, proposes the dualist subject as singular, monadic, introverted individual. Thus, the ideal Cartesian artist would abstain from all processes and methods that would weaken the expressive externalization of interiority, such as mechanical reproduction; he or she would engage on a private and reflective process in order to determine the final form of the artwork. This process of sole and privatised authorship is in full agreement with Platonic and Cartesian models of the subject, both founded on the notion of the individual as a producer of self-originating knowledge. Such a model reaches its full manifestation in modernist artistic practices, where the artist takes pride in being the singular producer of his or her work.

Participatory and collaborative practices, then, are particularly successful in deflating dualist subjectivity and overcoming the restrictions of sole authorship. The collaborative production that took place in Andy Warhol’s early Factory is a well-known example of such practices, even though Warhol insisted on not sharing the intellectual rights of the works. In their ontological critique of the category of art Conceptual artists inherited the tradition of the readymade from Duchamp and Warhol and expanded it into forms of anti-dualist making-at-distance. More importantly, many Conceptual artists collaborated in the production of their art as a shared intellectual research project, the foremost example being Art & Language.
This artist collective rejected traditional modes of sole authorship while its members substituted the employment of traditional craft skills with group discussion and the development of intellectual skills in an effort to eradicate any remnants of individual self-expression associated with painterly or sculptural practice. Recent collaborative and relational practices further expand this critique of authorship by substituting sole authorship with dialogic agency, and forms of collective poly-authorship. The resulting artwork is not a static and formally complete object, but a subjective and immaterially continuous process that is open to variable contributions through open participation. Charles Taylor’s notion of the ‘framework’ is employed to justify the position that free will and agency are socially bound notions, thereby, suggesting that perhaps introversion and singularity are not the best artistic means by which to approach the nature of human subjectivity. In addition, W. Teed Rockwell’s ‘network theory’ is used as a methodological tool, since his concept of consciousness, based as it is on a model of collaboration, can be proven to be extremely helpful in an examination of collective artistic practices.

There is a limited critical literature on 20th-century portraiture. What exists is engaged predominantly with the discussion of portraiture across genres, and as such lacks any analysis of the relations between problems of identity, representation and the construction of the self. Likewise, scholars seem confused when it comes to understanding dualism’s early visualisations and its subsequent development during modernism, let alone the character of its contemporary rejection. This is mainly due to an ongoing failure of major scholars of portraiture, such as Norbert Schneider and Joanna Woodall, to distinguish the two major forms of dualism (Platonic and Cartesian), which, among other problems, can lead to a confused understanding of the varied uses of physiognomy in portraiture.

Thus, Schneider views German idealist philosophy as a platform for the development of Cartesian dualist tendencies in late 18th- and early 19th-century art, in so far as he holds it responsible for the emergence of an expressionist aesthetic which gave “metaphysical presence to the “essential being” of the subject portrayed”.17 But, he links the development of this Cartesian dualism to the use of physiognomy alone, disregarding altogether the bodily abstraction that G. W. F. Hegel, for instance,

demands in his lectures on art, and which stands in stark opposition to the physiognomic requirements of flawless representation of facial characteristics. This confusion is probably located in Schneider’s emphasis on Descartes’ call for ‘objectification’ of the worldly in physiognomy’s methodology (objectification of facial characteristics). In this respect, Schneider fails to acknowledge that physiognomy is unable to fully ‘disengage’ from the material (facial characteristics), as the results of such ‘scientific’ examination are presented with and through the assistance of the body. Even though this process asserts the soul’s superiority (as facial characteristics are subservient to mental states) it automatically cancels the Cartesian notion that the soul is able to exist outside and independent of the body. Descartes talks of how the soul instrumentally controls the body, not of how it depends on it in order for it to be accessed.

The relationship between classical physiognomy’s demand for an acute naturalism of facial features and Cartesian dualism’s demand for the abstract treatment of the body seems problematic, therefore, in relation to the presence of dualism in modernist portraiture. Like Schneider, Joanna Woodall too fails to distinguish the two major forms of dualism in her historical analysis of portraiture. By employing the Platonic self as a dualist model she is left with a similar confused account of the role of physiognomy in modernist portraiture. For instance she views the work of Courbet, Manet and the Impressionists as an “interrog[ation of the] presumed identification between individualised physiognomy and a distinctive, interiorised identity” and as such “a visual mode which subverted the distinction between sight and insight, object and subject.” As such, like Schneider, for Woodall, modernist abstraction of the body establishes a rejection of dualism, despite the fact that this move, as I have suggested above, is in full agreement with the thinking of Descartes and Hegel. There is no doubt about modernism’s interrogation of the physiognomic model in order to achieve an ‘inner reading’ of the sitter. However, the rejection of physiognomy cannot be equated with a rejection of dualism per se, but rather as a reconsideration of such a position. In fact, it can be argued that regardless

18 “It was thought that this quality [essential being of the subject portrayed] could be ascertained directly from physiognomic expression.” Ibid, p. 18.
of the extent of bodily abstraction, the modern portrait retained most of physiognomy’s effects, such as the attention to the face at the expense of the body.

Modernist distancing from the real can be seen in relation to the ideal representation of the aristocracy in previous centuries, and perhaps this is what also produces Woodall’s confusion. As Woodall carefully remarks the modernists “…challenged the belief that visual resemblance to a living or once-living model is necessary or appropriate to the representation of identity.” But, they did so in order to break free from the stylistic and methodological restrictions of mainstream art and portrait theories of the time, and not because they were reconsidering the validity of dualist notions of identity, or of self, and its possible incorporation into art. In fact, the modernists strongly believed in the Platonic notion of the artist’s penetrating gaze that could reveal the sitter’s true self, but this should not thereby encourage us to believe that the Platonic self was still active during modernism. Rather, Platonic notions – such as the penetrating ‘artistic vision’ – remained active in modernism via their mediation by Descartes and other Christian scholars. As such, this Platonic notion (artistic vision), combined with the notion of artistic freedom, is responsible for the immense plurality of group and personal styles that distance themselves from realistic representation.

In light of such scholarly confusions, my research addresses how theories of the subject and the history of the Enlightenment, bear on the production of the category of portraiture within art history and art theory, in a study of the transformed social function of the portrait in art over the last 350 years. This will provide a critique of the dualist accounts of self and identity, which underlie conventional interpretations of portraiture. For this purpose, the thesis begins with an examination of the historical conditions of the emergence, development, and transformation of the honorific in relation to the mind/body problem in Hellenic philosophy. This historic and philosophic examination will provide the context for the subsequent critique of dualism’s reification in the traditional genre of portraiture. However, the aim of this contextualisation is not to employ the early history of portraiture simply to illustrate this critique. On the contrary, the aim is to re-think the relationship between dualism and portraiture as a problem of artistic form, and to trace the historical conditions of

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dualism’s incorporation into portraiture, and, therefore, how it has affected its course and development.
Narcissus’ Legacy:

The Origins of the Western Portrait & the Emergence of Dualism

There are certain myths about the origins of portraiture that we should first take into account in our narrative, since they reflect common (dualist) conceptions of portraiture. Firstly: the well-known myth of Narcissus. In classical Hellenic mythology, Narcissus, born at Thespia, in Beortia, is loved by Apollo and is counted among the most handsome of young men. According to some, he was the son of the river God Cephisus and the nymph Liriope, or according to others, the son of Endymion and Selene (Moon). One day a nymph, Echo, saw Narcissus hunting, as he pursued the chase upon the mountains. She fell in love with him and followed his footsteps. Rejected and in despair of having in vain endeavored to attract him, Echo prayed to Nemesis, the Goddess of Rhamnus, that he might some time or other experience what it was like to love and, yet, meet no return of affection. The Goddess heard and granted the prayer. On yet another day of hunting, Narcissus came to this pool heated and thirsty, fatigued from hunting. He knelt down to drink and saw his own image in the water. He thought it was some beautiful water-spirit living in the fountain. He stood, gazing with admiration at those bright eyes, those locks curled like the locks of Bacchus or Apollo, the rounded cheeks, the ivory neck, the parted
lips, and the glow of health and exercise over all. When later Narcissus realised he was facing his own image, he fell in love with himself, and not being able to find consolation, he died of sorrow by the same pool. It is said that Narcissus still keeps gazing on his image in the waters of the river Styx in the Underworld kingdom of Aides.\footnote{For further reading on the subject refer to Apollodorus, of Athens, The Library of Greek Mythology, trans. by Robin Hard, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997); Sabine G. Oswalt, Concise Encyclopedia of Greek and Roman Mythology, (Chicago & Glasgow: Collins, Follett, 1969); Kenneth P. Corsar, Discovering Greek Mythology, (London: Edward Arnold, 1977).}

Another myth tells of the Corinthian maid Dibutade, who was the daughter of Butade, a potter of Skyon. Her lover was about to embark on a perilous and treacherous journey to foreign lands. About to be separated from her lover, she realised that she could preserve his likeness by tracing the outline of his shadow cast on a wall. The maid’s father Butade, a potter of Skyon, used the drawing to model a clay relief, which he baked in his kiln to create a ceramic memorial, in order to comfort his lonely daughter - Pliny uses the story to illustrate the origins of clay modeling.\footnote{Pliny, the Elder, Natural History, in Katherine Jex-Blake and Eugenie Sellers, The Elder Pliny’s Chapters on the History of Art, (Chicago & Fort Lee, N.J.: Argonaut, 1968), p. 175.} By the eighteenth century, the myth became popular, as artists such as Joseph Wright of Derby, Joseph-Benoît Suvée, and Anne-Louis Girodet de Roucy-Trioson depicted it as the origin of painting and of portraiture.\footnote{For more information about the story of Dibutade and related imagery, see Frances Muecke, “Taught by Love: The Origin of Painting Again,” Art Bulletin 81 (1999), pp. 297-302; Robert Rosenblum, “The Origin of Painting: A Problem in the Iconography of Romantic Classicism,” Art Bulletin 39 (1957), pp. 279-290.}

In the Bible, when Christ fell on his way to the Golgotha, Veronica, one of the holy women who accompanied Christ to Calvary, came running to him, holding in her hands a wet towel. She compassionately pressed the cloth on Jesus’ face and wiped his sweat and blood, leaving an imprint of his face on the wet cloth. She, then, went to Rome, bringing with her this image of Christ, which was then exposed to public veneration. Christian legend relates that St. Luke, a Hellene physician from Antioch, the compiler of the third Gospel, the Acts of Apostles, and Paul’s companion, was the first Christian painter, after he painted a number of icons of the Virgin Mary holding the Child Jesus from life, having experienced a vision of the Virgin Mary. As a consequence of his religious painting he was attributed the status of the painter par
excellence, and became the patron saint of painters, and the patron saint of painting guilds in many towns and cities before and during the Renaissance – from Candia (Crete), Florence and Rome to Antwerp and Bruges. St. Luke’s icons are said to be of the full ‘οδηγήτρια’ (hodegetria) type, which means that the icon is a ‘guide’ or ‘indicator of the way’. Even though there is only one copy saved today, of the original three, many churches all over the world later copied the ‘οδηγήτρια’ style, which has become one of the prominent compositional styles of the Christian tradition.24

The reason that I mention these myths is to draw out significant aspects and models of portraiture, and not to simply trace the alternative historic origins of this genre. The reference to Narcissus, for instance, points out the vain desire of human subjects to be included in the ‘restricted pantheon’ of portraiture. In doing so, and in conjunction with the myth, subjects consider themselves in possession of bodily attributes worthy of commemoration. What is significant about this swift misplacement of attention is that the ‘right’ to be portrayed is dependent upon bodily attributes, and not intellectual excellence or other moral values. By portraying Narcissus as an awkward character, the story places emphasis on the fact that portraiture constitutes a synthesis of both external appearance and internal characteristics. Consequently this story of the first self-portrait addresses one of the two important prerequisites, which underline the dual identity of this genre: that vanity and pride can often be regarded as perilous virtues of a personality, but nevertheless can act as the driving force behind a commission.

Resolving problems of re-presentation, making present a subject that is absent, is also located at the core of naturalistic portraiture. It is within the intellectual quest for resolving such problems that Aristotle treats portraiture as the absolute model of re-presentation, since it does exactly what it sets out to do, by making present again the depicted person. For him our pleasure in viewing a portrait does not lay in the artistic style of the creator, but in his/her ability to employ technical skills in order to assist the viewer in recognising the depicted person:

«Τὸ τε γὰρ μιμεῖσθαι σύμφυτον τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐκ παίδων ἐστὶ καὶ τούτῳ διαφέρουσι τῶν ἄλλων ζώων ὅτι μιμητικώτατον ἐστι καὶ τὰς μαθήσεις ποιεῖται διὰ μιμήσεως τὰς

The instinct of imitation is implanted in humans from childhood, in this we differ from animals, that is, humans are the most imitative of living creatures, and through imitation learn the earliest lessons. This is justifiable according to real experiences, where while we view certain objects with sorrow, we are delighted to view images reproduced with minute fidelity, such as forms of ignoble animals and dead bodies. (my translation)

Portraiture was the paradigm of representation in Aristotle’s discussion of literary genres of poetry and drama, which in turn informed his thinking about pictures:

«ἔπει δὲ μίμησις ἐστὶν ἡ τραγῳδία βελτιώνων ἢ ἡμεῖς, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς εἰκονογράφους· καὶ γὰρ ἔκεινοι ἀποδιδόντες τὴν ἰδίαν μορφὴν ὡς κοινῆς καλλίους γράφουσιν· οὕτω καὶ τὸν ποιητὴν μιμούμενον καλλίους γράφει ὡς καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἔχοντας ἐπὶ τῶν ἡθῶν τοιούτων ὡς ἔπεικεῖς ποιεῖν, οἷον τὸν Ἀχιλλέα ἀγαθὸν καὶ παράδειγμα σκληρότητος Ὀμηρος.»

Since Tragedy is a representation of better people from those of our times, one should imitate good portrait painters, who, while rendering the distinctive form and achieving a likeness, yet paint people better than they are. So too the poet should ennoble the representation of people who are irascible or have other similar defects of character; just like Homer portrays Achilles as a noble, yet also as an example of brutal strength. (my translation)

If we look closely at these myths, we can see that they cover almost every generic aspect of portraiture; self-portraiture (as in the cases of Narcissus and St. Veronica);

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26 Ibid, 15.1454b 8-14.
27 There are two suggested ways of translating the word ‘ἀγαθὸν’ in the last phrase. The one proposed in the publications by Rostani and Bywater, takes ‘ἀγαθὸν’ as a reference to the poet Agathon and his work Telephos. However, the translation of ‘ἀγαθὸν’ as ‘noble’, as found in the latest academic revisions in the source at hand, seems more appropriate for grasping the dialectics of Aristotle’s argument, those between acute representation and idealisation.
portraiture in its conventional form where it incorporates an artist and a sitter (as with Dibutade and St. Luke); and, portraiture of a divine inspiration and subject-hood.

*The Honorific and Exemplary in Egyptian, Hellenic, Roman and Christian Portraiture*

Painted or sculpted figurative, or genre type of artworks, have been evident since the first days of human creativity. However, the first portrait - that is, a visually identified representation of a human being - emerged in ancient Egypt. Here also emerges the honorific function of the portrait, albeit an extremely self-restricted process. It might not be quite obvious today, but until recently, portraiture was interrelated with religious systems at a very high level. In ancient Egypt, for example, where naturalistic portraiture initially emerged, those worthy of commemoration were either Gods, semi-Gods, or sons of Gods; in other words, only individuals of a divine origin. Only pharaohs were eligible for such an honour since they were thought of as divine beings. On their departure from earth they would ascend to the gods, where it was believed they came from. This was exactly the purpose that the pyramids where built for – not a demonstration of the power of the rulers or manifestation of their riches, but as a means for making the ascendance of the pharaohs easier. At the very least these robust and immensely fortified memorials would help preserve the body, which was an essential prerequisite in order for the soul to transcend to the beyond. That was why Egyptians were so keen in preventing the corpse from decaying by applying the delicate and detailed processes of preservation, which has become known as mummification. In an effort to secure the eternal existence of pharaohs they believed that an exact preservation of their likeness should be achieved too. The means, by which such a representation was to take place, was through this process of mummification, in which the painted sculptural sarcophagus, acting as the immediate host of the corpse, was perceived as adding symbolic value to the ascendance of the

28 By naturalistic portraiture, I would agree with Joanna Woodall in referring to a physiognomic likeness that refers to the identity of the living or once-living depicted person. Joanna Woodall, “Introduction”, in Joanna Woodall (ed.), *Portraiture: Facing the Subject*, (Manchester, Manchester University, 1997), p. 1.

body. And, as if this was not enough, they also ordered sculptors to execute accurate busts of the kings’ heads’, out of extremely durable materials, such as granite. The fact that these were placed inside the tomb where no one could view them, leaves no doubt that these busts were created in order to retain the soul in the afterlife; hence, the practical function of the portrait during the Egyptian era. As Ernst Gombrich informs us, one Egyptian word for sculptor, was actually, ‘He-who-keeps-alive’. At this point it is very crucial to clarify that despite the deification of the pharaohs, the sculptors were not concerned with flattering their subjects; they left every lesser detail out, dealing only what they thought of as essentials.

Flattery was not sought after in classical antique portraiture either, since Platonic tendencies of pure representation dominated the arts. In contrast with the criteria of the Egyptian ruling class, though, the Hellenes broaden the scope of inclusion to the ‘pantheon’ of immortality. This was a result of portraiture’s social function in the early Hellenic democratic society, which can be defined as exemplary. This exemplary function of art is also evident in the popular treatment of figurative works – that stretch beyond the genre of portraiture, as they are not attributed to specific individuals – that stood as examples for the ideal athlete, soldier, or even young man and woman (Gr. kouros and kore). This time eligibility for inclusion in the pantheon of portraiture was not only granted to Gods, and divinities, but also to individuals whose intellectual ability was considered advanced, and who developed this intellectual ability for the purposes of civic humanist issues. This ability could either be defined on the grounds of introducing a new social system, such as democracy, or even contributing to philosophic and scientific practices. Such portraits were sculpted out of marble, and treated their subjects in full and life-size formats. Upon their completion they were installed in public spaces, such as squares and stadiums, to act as leading demonstrations of exemplary heroic or civic virtue. The origin of these various heroic or intellectual abilities were thought of as divine, but certainly not of a hereditary nature as in the case of the Egyptians. This model encouraged self-development in citizens and reinforced pragmatic criteria of judging an individual according to their social contribution.

A great desire for individuality is noticeable in the portraits of military generals,

state and civic administrators, and, of course, in those of scientists, writers, and philosophers. At the same time, the social role of these individuals is crucial to understanding the portrait’s exemplary function in Hellenic antiquity, which drew its subjects from civic, military, or intellectual excellence. The diversity of these portraits also signifies the multiplicity of the orders of the Hellenic world, through a type of portraiture that has been described as “a successful balancing act.”31 Its structure is understood as the articulated expression of character through natural norms, which “become artistic forms only when they consolidate the codified structure of such temperament.” Finally, this “balance was established, on the one hand, by the urge to depict nature and, on the other, by the no less driving need to immortalise the individual temperament, the individual character.”32 Even though this view suggests that the treatment of the “natural norms” is subservient to that of the “individual character”, the balance between them is justified by the intention to do equal justice to both. In other words, the visualisation of “temperament” is not reified at the expense of “nature”. This balance was reinforced by the conscious insistence on the inclusion of the whole figure, in the often life-size, compositions of either paintings or sculptures.

Idealisation of natural appearance did not occur until the time of Alexander the Great, and the introduction of imperialist monarchy. Vasari refers to Plutarch who elaborates how the ancient court painters corrected physical defects while still maintaining likenesses, as far as possible. He also talks of how Alexander allowed only Apelles to paint his portraits, which perhaps stand as the first examples of politically infused portraiture.33 Alexander built on the exemplary function of the portrait and historical painting; as every one of his significant accomplishments, either military or civic, was followed by a major artistic commission. Copies of such commissions were often disseminated to both loyal and recently conquered areas. By doing so he employed the visual representation of his accomplishments to reinforce his support, and to subtly warn the recently subjugated of the consequences of opposing his rule. As for sculpted portraits, numerous marble copies of various formats decorated

32 Ibid.
exterior public spaces and interior civic buildings. The delicate expressiveness of his face and overall body pose of these sculptures demonstrate the development of the portrait through the initial incorporation of his teacher’s (Aristotle) physiognomic theories. Eventually, the success of this productive relationship was elevated as an exemplary reference for rulers and their portraitists of the future.

However, it was only in the first century A.D. that the portrait fully developed into a political medium, given the Romans elaborate use of them in their civic and imperial roles. During this era, the portrait never ceased serving as a form of a public statement, as it often incorporated the physiognomic characteristics of historically great individuals in an attempt to construct the public image of a ruler. In doing so, the portrait subsumed the role of transmitting each emperor’s stance on issues regarding politics, power, and often morals, which in turn called “for idealisation above lifelikeness”. Only this time it was done at the expense of nature, and not through the balanced co-existence of nature and character. The sole reason for this imbalance is that temperament was seen as constructed, and not a given attribute at the time that the sitting took place. And this construction of character, in contrast to the Classical tradition, was visualised through the subservient employment of natural norms. To emphasise the level of physiognomic manipulation that every emperor’s portrait underwent, we only have to observe the various types of portraits that could be formulated over the course of a reign. A good example of such types is the incorporation of ‘old age’ in portraits of politicians, as it stood for mature wisdom and political ability, possibly deriving from the sagacity of the aging appearance of classical philosophers and scientists. As if this was not enough, the divine connection of the Egyptian period – also rejected in the Hellenic tradition – resurfaced, which even permeated the names of the emperors in the form of Julius, Augustus, etc. As a result, Roman rule depended on noble hereditary divine rights, which in the context of portraiture simply posed as another excuse for idealisation. Therefore the emperor had to establish his accession to power by justifying his ancestral origin through the delimitation of his own individual characteristics, eradicating any hopes for an individual image. In all, the Roman emperor’s public image was caught between a

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desire to address specific social issues in connection to political questions, and a
defence of familial origin that underlined the precedence of social and political
context over appearance.35

During the early Christian years, and the formation of the Byzantine Empire,
the right to be portrayed was restricted to holy subjects. The lack of development of
Christian art was due, essentially, to the conservatism of the Christian church, which
derived from the Old Testament objection against graven images.36 Extreme views on
the subjective and aesthetic nature of 'images' lead to the Iconoclastic controversy
during the 8th and 9th century. The instant rejection of the portrayal of subjects
external to Christian doctrines, along with the immediate prohibition of any three-
dimensional format (as anything sculptural expressed Idolatry) reflected the nature of
the victorious iconophiles' views. They argued, however, that representation of Christ,
and other holy subjects, was eligible on the grounds of Christ assuming human form
through incarnation, and, therefore, he could be portrayed as an embodied man.37 As
Christianity flourished, pictorial representations of aspects of Christ's life, as
documented through the Old Testament, as well as images of saints, and scholars,
were produced in great numbers. For icons were officially attributed the same status as
that of gospels, as they were thought of as visual expressions of verbal doctrines, and
as such served as an alternative means for religious communication.38 Moreover, the
victors of the Byzantine iconoclasm escaped accusations of idolatry by arguing that
icons embody their subjects and did not simply represent them. In agreement with the
Egyptian belief of the pharaohs' divine origin, and the God-like status of Roman
emperors', Byzantine emperors were thought of as God's vice-regents on earth, as well
as being the defenders of Orthodoxy and the 13th Apostle.39 They were often
portrayed crowned by Jesus Christ, while emerging from a 'heavenly' background

35 On the common idealising tendencies of Hellenistic and Roman portraiture see Shearer West,
1987).
37 Robin Cormack, The Byzantine Eye: Studies in Art and Patronage (London: Variorum Reprints,
1989).
38 Peter Brown, Religion and Society in Late Antiquity (Berkley: University of California Press, 1982);
Averil Cameron, Christianity and the Rhetoric of Empire: The Development of Christian Discourse
39 Slobodan Curic and Doula Mouriki (eds.), The Twilight of Byzantium: Aspects of Cultural and
surrounded by angels, and so forth.

In contrast to Hellenistic and Egyptian traditions of accurate representation, physical likeness was not the primary concern of early Christian art. Instead it sought to identify the spiritual interiority of the depicted subjects, resulting in the emergence of a homogenous pictorial style that treated the human body as the host of the soul, hence the unflattering slim figures. Bearing this in mind, then, the frontal facial view certainly encouraged a more engaging inner reading of the subject. Inspired by this emphasis on interiority in Christianity the emperors gradually rejected the Romans’ extensive use of the distant ‘profile’ in publicly disseminated portraits, such as those found on coins and medallions. Within this pictorial tradition certain compositional formats began to emerge – such as the appropriation of the ‘οδηγήτρια’ with the emperor in place of the Virgin mother, and the group court portrait – and it is notable how these remained active over a long period of time, despite a few minor modifications.40

The Christian church did not hesitate to value the immense influence that portraiture had on its viewing public. It built a view of portraiture that was driven by an effort to distinguish and elevate religious subjects for the common public, employing a stylistic treatment that disregarded the material body in favour of the divine soul. In doing so, these subjects served as role models of proper Christian practice by transmitting Christian dogma. By extension, these portraits sought to underline the main opposition between the spirituality of Christianity and the physicality of the pre-existent paganist type of religions.

It was not just the Christian Orthodox Church that employed the honorific aspects of portraiture for promotional purposes. In fact, it can be claimed that Byzantium portraiture did not really manage to step beyond the innovation of a physically reductive treatment of its subjects, within its narrow Christian context. In other words, any claim, or any comment on social and political matters, was confined within and relied upon spirituality’s hypothetical superiority. Within the Catholic tradition the portrait, and especially the papal portrait, functioned more politically. In Raphael’s Portrait of Pope Julius II, 1512, for example, the Pope is sitting in a throne

or cathedra, which clearly is associated with secular power. The cathedra is crowned with two exquisite acorns that are part of the coat of arms of the Pope’s family, della Rovere. This familial identification that was also sought after by the Romans, was incorporated only in the portraits of the late Byzantium emperors. Paradoxically, the Byzantium Orthodox patriarchs, in contrast to the Catholic Popes, refrained from making any familial references, but only because they were satisfied with their involvement in God’s immediate family. This negation should not be seen as a manifestation of an opposition to an active involvement in politics. On the contrary, during the Byzantium era religious influence shaped and often determined state affairs.

This presentation of the Pope, as an enthroned royal caught in a moment of divine contemplation, would haunt future portraits, such as Velasquez’s Portrait of Pope Innocent X, 1650. Raphael reworked the papal portrait with more inventiveness, incorporating familial references, in the Portrait of Pope Leo X with Cardinals Luigi de’ Rossi and Giulio de’ Medici, 1517-19. In this work the Pope wished to present himself next to his cousins, Luigi de’ Rossi and Giulio de’ Medici, who he saw as his successors (the demand for two candidates was a matter of caution in case one of the two men were to die). A demonstration of the political power of the papal portrait is clear in Cardinal Innocenzo Cibo’s commission of a copy of the portrait from Guiliano Burgiardon following the death of de’ Rossi in 1519. Being also one of the Pope’s nephews, therefore, a possible successor, he decided to assert his ambition in public. In the re-worked portrait he stood where the deceased de’ Rossi once stood. On the whole, this reconstructed commission is a visualisation of Innocenzo Cibo’s career aspirations. Eventually, Giulio de Medici became Pope Clement VII.

Within the Protestant tradition, Martin Luther treated the portrait as “an effective strategy for political success”. Lucas Cranach painted most of the almost five hundred portraits that visually supported Luther’s and the Wittenberg Court’s religious war. Initially it was Dürer - an excellent engraver - who wished to capture Luther in his preferred medium of printmaking, being fully aware of its opportunities for religious dissemination. Cranach, inspired by Dürer’s unsatisfied desire, engraved

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41 Beyer, Portraits, p. 150.
42 Ibid, p. 118.
Luther’s first portrait in 1520, which was the beginning of a tradition that formulated his image according to certain roles for propagandist purposes. He carried on painting Luther, mostly with his wife Katharina van Bora, as well as contributing book illustrations that, along with the paintings, were distributed to as many churches as possible. In these images, the ideal couple is depicted as half-length figures in three-quarter view. However, in his own portraits Luther is seen in various roles, such as a preacher or a monk, but he also appears in classical allegorical roles, such as Hercules. In line with the revivalist spirit of the times, Cranach nurtured a certain fondness for classicism, which is also apparent in the application of the antiquity profile in a few of Luther’s engravings. On the whole, the religious portrait gradually distanced itself from the physical reductiveness of its primary Byzantium abstract formulation (via the Catholic physiognomic attention to the contemplating gaze and the Protestant use of contemporary and historical styles), but it always prioritised a superiority of spirituality over the materiality of the body.

Aristocratic courts have never ceased to employ portraiture’s promotional virtues since antiquity, as rulers and nobles always regarded it as the most important medium in the art of court politics. In the early modern period rulers made full use of the services of specialists, and their creative relationships were often compared with that of Alexander and Apelles’s. Following an extensive period of the rejection of realism (Byzantium to Middle Ages), when it was restricted to a generic abstract genre-type, the court portrait reincorporated classicism by reintroducing individual likeness. This visual identification of rulers, which was enforced by the growing importance of their public personality, was located on facial features that could be composed in order to present a desired character, or allegorically suggest common virtues with those of mythological or historical figures. So, “by silently assimilating the real to the ideal...[naturalistic court portraiture]...enabled a particular human being to personify the majesty of the kingdom or the courage of a military leader”.

Yet, the genre-type formulation was not disregarded altogether. Instead its content was infused with a broad variety of types to suit any demand, leading to new kind of ideological compromise. Where the Hellenic portrait was seen as a balance between “individual character” and “nature”, the early-modern court portrait becomes a

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“balance between personal individuality and universal canon.” Thus, an acceptable degree of idealisation of subject and style is permitted, so it can satisfy the demands of a constructed individuality and its subsequent universal identification and application, leaving the divine, and hereditary origin of those virtues as the “ultimate, permanent reality.” Alberti was the first to identify a similar idealisation in the practice of the ancients as told by Plutarch, who describes how they corrected physical defects of kings while still maintaining their likeness. The length to which a painter would go to satisfy his commissioner, on these terms, is reflected in Titian’s relationship with Charles V, who repeatedly reworked the king’s portraits until the king was satisfied. A distinctive and consistent portrait model is just another benefit that is associated with the long-term employment by royalty of a prestigious painter for the means of public image making. Such distinctions are demonstrated in the luxurious intimacy of Velazquez’s images of the Spanish Royal family, as well as van Dyck’s insistence on the outdoor setting of most portraits of Charles I of England, and of course in Titian’s grand full-length portraits Charles V, who often called him his Apelles. These luxurious settings set the standards for the court portrait.

After centuries of conscious neglect, ‘individualised’ depiction was revived in the period between the late Middle Ages and the seventeenth century, which has come to be known as the Renaissance. Italian artists, such as Leonardo da Vinci and Michelangelo, sought to align themselves with the ancient spirit by rediscovering the particularities of nature. They treated nature with utmost realism and rejected the mimetic restrictions imposed by the iconographic traditions stemming from the Middle Ages. As a result, portraiture became more realistic and fuller with the assistance of the newly invented ‘perspective’, while the body was given back its rightful pictorial value. In contrast with the ancient and the Middle Ages tradition, the sculpted, three-dimensional freestanding portraiture now stood unbound by its architectural context.

This reawakening of the individual not only manifested itself in court or religious portraits, but also re-defined, in a classical manner, the prerequisites for portrayal, since the virtues of individualism were becoming more evident amongst

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45 Woodall, Portraiture, p. 3.
46 See above fn. 11. Leon Batista Alberti, De Pictura, book 2, chap. 40
highly esteemed members of the court and of leading social groups. Hence, successful merchants, craftsmen, artists and humanist scholars sat for portraits, which tended to focus on their non-noble virtues. According to Woodall, the difference between noble and non-noble virtue was located in “content” and not in “kind”.\(^{47}\) In other words, hereditary nobility rendered their identity inseparable from the body, since it relied upon family genealogy, whereas, the emerging bourgeoisie class of merchants and scholars sought to distinguish themselves from the nobility by detaching their virtues from the body, and asserting the mind over the body. Yet, despite their effort to become ideologically independent from the aristocracy, they failed to overcome the noble contexts of historical association – though they rejected the familial, they promoted the ‘exemplary’ through pictorial references to the great intellectuals of the past. Of these portraits, the ones of scholars are the most distinct. Unlike the nobles’ insistence on physically justifying the continuation of a dynasty or of a family, the humanists’ main interest was focused on establishing their own intellectual self-image. They articulated their personalities by referring to their practice and work, which was an immediate result of superior intellect, spiritual values and ethical independence. But as Norbert Schneider carefully identifies, “counterfeits of humanist scholars, however subtle or discrete, were also displays of power and social prestige”, since they were “competing for status with the rich merchant class and nobility.”\(^{48}\) Indeed, they were particularly fond of the print medium as a means of disseminating their honorific portraits - perhaps learning from Luther’s strategies. Dürer’s comment on painting’s inability to capture the ‘mind’ (as inscribed in his engraving of Philip Melanchthon, 1526 demonstrated the increasing dissatisfaction with, and opposition to, contemporary aristocratic concepts of identity, and the subsequent failed incorporation of spiritual individualism into the arts through an idealised form of realism.

\(^{47}\)Woodall, *Portraiture*, p. 16.
Dualism and the Portrait:
Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Augustine, Aquinas

The distinction between a divine intellect located in the mind, and a material, ‘mechanical’ body - that has come to be known as ‘dualism’ - reached its definitive formulation in the seventeenth-century in the writings of René Descartes.\textsuperscript{49} Prior to \textit{Meditations}, Descartes reached the conclusion that the soul, or thinking self, must be entirely distinct from anything material, since it was possible to doubt the existence of his body, but not his own existence as a conscious, thinking being.\textsuperscript{50} In the Second Meditation he applies the systematic method of doubt to demonstrate that thought is inseparable from himself.\textsuperscript{51} He then carries on to the Sixth Meditation to define, not just the distinct but also, the opposing nature of body and soul, according to the divisibility of the body, in various parts, and the indivisibility of the soul.\textsuperscript{52}

Dualism did not just appear in Descartes’ writings. Its origins lie in Plato, in his reconstruction of a conversation that takes place in Socrates’ condemned cell.\textsuperscript{53} Socrates embarks on a distinction between a changing world of senses and an unchanging realm of knowledge and understanding. He follows by defining the act of death in dualist terms:

«Ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἡ τήν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγήν; καὶ εἶναι τοῦτο τὸ τεθνάναι, χωρὶς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπαλλαγέων αὐτὸ καθ’ αὐτό τὸ σῶμα γεγονέναι, χωρὶς δὲ τὴν ψυχήν [ἀπὸ] τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλαγείαν αὐτὴν καθ’ αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα μὴ ἄλλο τι ἢ ὁ θάνατος ἢ τοῦτο;»\textsuperscript{54}

Could this (death) be anything else but the separation of soul and body? Is it not being dead when the body is to exist separately and autonomously from the soul, and the soul is to exist separately and autonomously from the body? Is death something other than this? (\textit{my translation})

\textsuperscript{51} Descartes, \textit{Meditations on First Philosophy}, pp. 17-19.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid, pp. 51- 59.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid, 64c.
Socrates then embarks on a discussion regarding enquiry into knowledge, where the role of the body is somewhat problematic. He is critical of the powers of vision and hearing, concluding that the body and its desires can easily be deceived in the search for truth:

«Τί δὲ δὴ περὶ αὐτὴν τὴν τῆς φρονήσεως κτήσιν; πότερον ἐμπόδιον τὸ σῶμα ἢ οὐ, εἰ τις αὐτὸ ἐν τῇ ζητήσει κοινωνῶν συμπαραλαμβάνει; οἴον τὸ τοιόν τε λέγω· ἄρα ἔχει ἀλήθειαν τινα ὡς τε καὶ ἀκοή τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἢ τά γε τοιαῦτα καὶ οἱ πουταὶ ἡμῖν ἀεὶ θρυλοῦσιν, ὅτι οὔτε ἀκούμεν ἀκριβὲς οὐδὲ ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἢ μήτε ὑπὸ τῆς ἀληθείας ἀπτεταῖται; ἤταν μὲν γὰρ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος ἔπιχειρή τι σκοπεῖν, δῆλον ὅτι τότε ἐξαπατᾶται ὁπ' αὐτοῦ. Λογίζεται δὲ γε ποι τότε κάλλιστα, ὅταν αὐτὴν τούτων μηδὲν παραλυηθῆ, μήτε ἀκοὴ μήτε όψις μήτε ἀλγηδὼν μηδὲ τῆς ἡδονῆς, ἀλλ' ὅτι μάλιστα αὐτή καθ' αὐτὴν γίγνεται ἐῶσα χαίρειν τὸ σῶμα, καὶ καθ' ὅσον δύναται μὴ κοινωνοῦσα αὐτῷ μηδ' ἀπομένῃ ὀρέγηται τοῦ ὄντος.»

What shall we say is your opinion of the actual acquirement of knowledge? Is the body, if invited to share in the enquiry, a hinderer or a helper? For instance, I mean to say, have sight and hearing any truth in them, or are they not, as the poets are always telling us, inaccurate witnesses? And yet, if even these are inaccurate and indistinct, what is to be said of other senses? For you will allow that these are the best of them...Then when does the soul attain truth? For in attempting to consider anything when the soul is interfering then she is obviously deceived...And thought is best when the soul is gathered into herself and none of these things trouble her, neither sounds nor sights nor pain nor any pleasure; when she takes leave of the body, and has as little as possible to do with it; when she has no bodily sense or desire, but is aspiring after true being. (my translation)

55 Ibid, 65α-κ.
56 In many translations of this text we find that there is a consistent misinterpretation of 'ψυχὴ' as 'mind' as opposed to 'soul', which is the immediate meaning of the term. In ancient and modern Greek these terms have significant differences. For instance, whereas 'soul' refers to a totally subjective entity, 'mind' refers to a subjective entity that is to a certain extent reliant to its physical/objective constituents (i.e. how the mind is interrelated with the brain).

Moreover, my translation is consistent with the female gender of the word 'ψυχὴ', which is more of a side effect of the female gender of the muse Psyche, a key figure in Greek mythology whose
Socrates proposes a conception of the immaterial soul’s superiority over the material body. His distinction of the two is informed by defining the divine, immortal, and unchangeable essence of the soul, as opposed to the material, mortal, and changeable body:

«Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τῆδε ὅτι ἐπειδὰν ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ὡσι ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα, τῷ μὲν δουλεύειν καὶ ἄρχεσθαι ἡ φύσις προστάτει, τῇ δὲ ἄρχειν καὶ δεσπόζειν- καὶ κατὰ ταύτα αὖ πότερον σοι δοκεῖ ὁμοιον τῷ θείῳ εἶναι καὶ πότερον τῷ θνητῷ; ἢ ὥσπερ δοκεῖ σοι τὸ μὲν θεῖον οἶον ἄρχειν τε καὶ ἱγειμονεῖν περικέναι, τὸ δὲ θνητὸν ἄρχεσθαι τε καὶ δουλεύειν;...Σκόπει δή, ἔφη, ὑ Ἐκέμης, εἰ ἐκ πάντων τῶν εἰρημένων τάδε ἡμῖν συμβαίνει, τῷ μὲν θείῳ καὶ ἅθανάτῳ καὶ νοητῷ καὶ μονοειδεῖ καὶ ἀδιλύτῳ καὶ ἅθανάτῳ καὶ ἰδίως ἀταῖνῳ κατὰ ταύτα ἔχοντι ἐχοντι διὰ ποιότητον εἶναι ψυχή, τῷ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνῳ καὶ θνητῷ καὶ πολυειδεῖ καὶ ἀνανήφῳ καὶ διαλυτῷ καὶ μηδὲποτε κατὰ ταύτα ἐχοντι ἐαυτῷ Ὠσιοτάτου αὖ εἶναι σῶμα.»

Now consider the matter in another light: when the soul and the body are united, then nature orders the soul to rule and govern, and the body to obey and serve. Accordingly, which of these two functions is akin to the divine and which to the mortal? Does not the divine appear to you to be that which naturally orders and rules, and the mortal to be that which is subject and servant?...Then, reflect Cebes on all of which has been said on whether we reach conclusion that the soul is in the very likeness of the divine, and immortal, and intellectual, and uniform, and dissoluble, and unchangeable, and that the body is in the very likeness of the human, and mortal, and unintellectual, and multiform, and dissoluble, and changeable. (my translation)

At some point Simmias, one of the participants in the dialogue, objects to this separation by asserting the soul’s dependence on the organisation of the body’s materials, refering to a musical instrument’s tuned harmony, which is dependent on the arrangement and existence of strings. Socrates, then, resolves the argument by stressing the lack of harmony that occasionally exists between the appetites and the

cultural influence extends to the realm of philosophy. Hence, the use of female pronoun acts more as a sustained link between mythology and philosophy, rather than an indication of how philosophical thinking is infused by sexual stereotypes.

57 Ibid, 79e-80b.
urges of the body and the desires of the soul. Plato’s, and Socrates’, distinction is based on the view that the good life is achieved through a mastery of self, which presupposes the dominance of reason, located in the soul, over bodily desires. Plato’s oppositions are not formulated in terms of inner/outer and the prioritization of the former against the latter, as much as on the immateriality and eternality of the soul, which is aligned against the materiality and ephemerality of the body. But, in crucial contrast with the Cartesian view, rationality is to be achieved by connecting the self to the larger cosmic order, and not to a personal world that is internally explored through contemplation.

Aristotle, a pupil of Plato, rejects the connection between an awareness of the order in our lives and of the cosmic order, since the latter is a type of a science in the strong sense of a knowledge of the unchanging and eternal, and the former is an understanding of the ever-changing, in which particularities can never be captured in detail under general rules. Therefore, to behave under ‘practical wisdom’ requires the encompassing of all goals and desires into a unified order, where reason provides the ability to balance and order a unified whole in order to live a good life. However, even though he distinguishes these two forms of knowledge, he clarifies that knowledge of the eternal order, in the form of science, is as essential to a rational good life as is the awareness of the right order of our lives. 58 Aristotle also challenges the framework that treats the soul as something separable and capable of existing apart from the body:

«Φαίνεται δὲ τῶν μὲν πλείστων οὐθὲν ἀνεθ τοῦ σώματος πάσχειν οὐδὲ ποιεῖν, οἷον ὀργιζεσθαι, θαρρεῖν, ἐπιθυμεῖν, ὀλως αἰσθάνεσθαι...ἔοικε δὲ καὶ τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς πάθη πάντα εἶναι μετά σώματος, θυμός, πραότης, φόβος, ἐλεος, θάρσος, ἐπιθυμεῖν...καὶ τὸ φιλεῖν τε καὶ μισεῖν· ἄμα γὰρ τούτοις πάσχει τι τὸ σῶμα...εἰ δ’ οὔτως ἔχει, δὴδον δὴτα πάθη λόγοι ἐνυλοὶ εἴσιν...»

In most cases the soul is not affected nor does it act apart from the body – for example in being angry, being confident, wanting and perceiving in general...It seems that all the affections of the soul involve the body – passion gentleness, fear, pity,

59 Ibid., Book I, 403a 5-7, 16-19, 24-25.
confidence, and also joy and both loving and hating. For at the same time as these occur, the body is affected in a certain way...If this is so, it is clear that the affections of the soul are principles involving matter. (my translation)

For Aristotle, all living things have a soul, but instead of being separable, it supplies the *form* and organisation to the *matter* out of which it is composed. In other words, soul stands to body in the same way as form stands to matter:

«Δέγομεν δὴ γένος ἐν τί τῶν ὄντων τὴν οὕσιαν, ταύτης δὲ τὸ μέν, ὡς ὅλην, ὅ καθ’ αὐτὸ οὐκ ἔστι τόδε τι, ἔτερον δὲ μορφήν καὶ εἶδος, καθ’ ἥν ἡδή λέγεται τόδε τι, καὶ τρίτον τὸ ἐκ τούτων.» 60

We speak of one of the kinds of things that there are as *substance*, and under this heading we speak of one aspect as *matter* (which in itself is not a particular), and an other as shape and form (in virtue of which it is then spoken of as a particular [being]), and a third as the product of the two. (my translation)

Aristotle’s ‘hylemorphism’ account of the body-soul relationship – from the Hellenic words for matter (*hyle*) and form (*morphē*) – offers a middle way between radical materialism and dualism, since in his view these are simply two aspects of one and the same biological being:

«ἐπεὶ δ’ ἐστὶ καὶ σῶμα καὶ τοιόντε, ζωὴν γὰρ ἔχον, οὐκ ἂν εἰς σῶμα ἢ ψυχή· οὐ γὰρ ἐστὶ τῶν καθ’ ὑποκειμένου τὸ σῶμα, μᾶλλον δ’ ὡς ὑποκείμενον καὶ ὕλη. ἀναγκαίον ἄρα τὴν ψυχήν οὕσιαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος...καθόλου μὲν οὖν εἰρήται τί ἐστιν ἡ ψυχή· οὕσια γὰρ ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον.» 61

Since substance is indeed a body of such a kind (for it is one having life), the soul will not be body. For the body is not predicated of a subject, but exists rather as subject and matter. Therefore, the soul must then be substance as *form* of a natural body which has life potentially...It has been stated in general what the soul is: it is substance corresponding to the principle of a thing. (my translation)

As for the special case of the ‘intellect’, he allows that it may be separable from the body, but he strongly resists a concept of the soul being an immaterial autonomous entity. Thus, he opens the way for the integration of psychology into the quest for understanding human nature:

«...μάλιστα δ’ ἐοικεν ἰδιω τὸ νοεῖν· εἰ δ’ ἐστί καὶ τούτο φαντασία τις ἡ μὴ ἄνευ φαντασίας, οὐκ ἐνδέχοιτ’ ἀν οὐδὲ τοῦτ ἄνευ σώματος εἶναι...ο δὲ νοὺς ἐοικεν ἐγγίνεσθαι οὐσία τις οὕσα, καὶ οὐ φθείρεσθαι...ο δὲ νοὺς ἰσως θειότερόν τι καὶ ἀπαθές ἐστιν...περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοο καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδέν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ’ ἐοικε ψυχῆς γένος ἐτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεσθαι χορίζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ άδιον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ. τὰ δὲ λοιπὰ μόρια τῆς ψυχῆς φανερὸν ἐκ τούτων ὅτι οὐκ ἐστὶ χωριστά, καθάπερ τινές φασιν...»

Thinking, however, looks most special to the soul; but if this too is a form of imagination, or does not exist without imagination, it would not be possible for it to exist apart from the body...The intellect seems to be born in us as a kind of substance, and it seems not to be destroyed/decayed...But the intellect is surely something more divine and is unaffected (by decay)...Concerning the intellect and the potentiality for contemplation, the situation is not far clear, but it seems to be a different kind of soul, and this alone can exist separately, as the everlasting can from the perishable. But the remaining parts of the soul are not separable as some like to claim... (my translation)

Aristotle’s uncertainty about the intellect’s independent existence influenced Thomas Aquinas who, among other Christian philosopher-theologicians of the Middle Ages, set himself the task of reconciling the great thinker’s principles with the doctrines of the Church. In resolving the problems imposed by ‘hylemorphism’s’ unity of soul and body, Aquinas picked up Aristotle’s hesitation, to argue that the intellectual soul is capable of existing on its own. It was Aquinas’ special treatment of intellect and will that laid the foundations for Descartes’ formulation of the radical

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62 Ibid, Book I, 403a 7-10, 408b 18-19, 28-29; Book II, 413b 24-29.

body and mind dualism, hence the famous cogito quote, “I think, therefore, I am.” Christianity’s contribution to the formulation of dualism was the establishment of soul’s supremacy over the body, as well as advocating the Platonic belief of the immortality of the soul. The scholar who is more responsible than any other for the modification of the Platonic notion of self-mastery according to Christian ideals is Augustine of Hippo. He employed the Platonic distinction between the bodily and the non-bodily to expand the Christian opposition between the soul and the body in terms of the temporal and the eternal, and, most importantly, of the inner and the outer.\(^{64}\) Plato’s notions of Ideas and of cosmic order are still viewed as eternal but only because they are now perceived as God’s own, directed by His eternal law.\(^{65}\) Hence, we are in a quest to find God, who will show us our place in His cosmic order. In explaining the means to do so, and in preparing the ground for Descartes, he went against Plato’s ‘engagement’ with an objectified world to suggest a turn \textit{inwards}.\(^{66}\) God is not to be found just in the world but most essentially within us, in the form of ultimate Truth, which is more important than Reason since it is instrumentally crucial to it.\(^{67}\)

\textit{Descartes, Locke, Spinoza, Hobbes, Hume}

As we have seen Descartes’ dualist formulation was informed by Augustine’s turn inwards and Aquinas’ ‘special’ treatment of the intellect. Augustine’s radical opposition to Platonic dualism was the rejection that Ideas are embodied in the cosmic order; Ideas, rather are to be found within us. Descartes’ turn inwards was driven by his desire to interpret the world scientifically, in Galilean mechanistic terms. Following the representational account of the Galilean view, Descartes declared that to know reality we must have a correct representation of things.\(^{68}\) Here lies Descartes’ main contrasting difference with the Platonic notion of self-mastery, where he calls

\(^{64}\) Augustine of Hippo, \textit{Selected Writings}, trans. and intr. by Mary T. Clark (Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1984), \textit{de Trinitate}, XII.i.
\(^{65}\) Ibid, \textit{On Free Will}, I. VI.15
\(^{66}\) Ibid, \textit{De Vera Religione}, XXXIX.72
\(^{67}\) Ibid, \textit{On Free Will}, II. III. 7.
for an objectification of, and disengagement from, the material world, including the body, so that it can be understood mechanistically, and thus scientifically.\textsuperscript{69} It is through this objectification of the body that Descartes manages to affirm an immaterial inner nature, and transform the Platonic notion of self-mastery. Self-mastery now is not seen in terms of a correct vision of the cosmic order, but in terms of our capacity to internally construct an order according to the appropriate standards required for reason’s dominance, and therefore establish control over the material body and its bestial passions and desires.

Driven by a spirit of independent and scientific thought, John Locke rejects both the Platonic notion of the world as the embodiment of Ideas, and Descartes’ doctrine of innate ideas. He views the first as problematic since it goes against a ‘mechanical’ universe as it is interlinked with assumptions regarding a ‘meaningful’ order, and the second as restrictive and unexamined. By extension, Locke disagrees with a ‘self’ being either naturally driven towards or responsive to the truth, asserting from a proto-empirical stance that our conception of the world is the result of our receptive, sensory and reflective engagement with it. He then takes up the classicist position on the negative effects of unruled passions and desires, stressing the importance of custom and education in guiding our thoughts.\textsuperscript{70} Thus, the path for this independent, self-responsible ‘self’ strengthens our disengagement from our passions and beliefs in order that we are able to critically and constructively reflect on them, and reach true scientific knowledge. In his discussion of personal identity he espouses what seems to be a Cartesian dualist distinction, but this time in the name of ‘consciousness’.\textsuperscript{71} Through a series of thought experiments Locke regards the self as solely dependent on consciousness, and he completely discounts any importance of it being material or immaterial. However, through these experiments it seems that consciousness, or self-awareness, could be separated from its embodiment, as it is allowed to separate and recombine. Nevertheless, consciousness is what assists the ‘self’ to remain an enduring entity, by depending on psychological links enjoined by

\textsuperscript{69} Descartes, \textit{Meditations}, III, p. 34, & IV, p. 66.
\textsuperscript{71} \textit{Ibid}, Book II, ch. 2.
memory. Despite its empirical nature Locke’s view still subordinates our physiological nature in favour of the inner awareness that each of us has as a conscious being.

A more materialist line and eventual rejection of Descartes’ dualism has been the practice of mainly twentieth-century thinkers, though similar approaches have been expressed even before Plato’s dualist views. Democritus (b. 460 BC), for example, argues that the ephemerality of the soul is justified on the grounds of its explicable physical nature. He believes that human consciousness, or soul, consists of atoms, therefore, it is bound to cease to exist when the rest of the body does so. Even Descartes’ seventeenth-century contemporaries, such as Thomas Hobbes and Benedict Spinoza, subjected Cartesian views to criticism. Hobbes claims that all mental faculties and activities of human beings are located in the nervous system and are nothing more than the result of moving particles.

Like Hobbes, Spinoza rejects the idea of an autonomous, immaterial, and eternal soul. He replies to the confused dualist solutions of the Aristotelian uncertainty on the intellect, by simply reflecting on the lack of scientific knowledge of how the brain actually works. Therefore, we should not account a separate soul responsible for the complexities of human behaviour, simply because we presently fail to understand how it functions neurologically. In order to study human behaviour Spinoza proposes the employment of two languages: a mental one for understanding actions and decisions, and a physical one for describing the function of the body and nervous system. To escape falling into a dualist trap Spinoza clarifies that at any given time there is only one set of events going on, which may be conceived under the characteristic, or perspective, of either ‘thought’ or ‘extension’.

Building on Hobbes and Spinoza’s rejection of Cartesian views David Hume produced a radical account of personal identity. He went as far as to assert that the

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72 See for instance Democritus, Great World System (Μέγας Διάκοσμος), and Lesser World System (Μικρός Διάκοσμος); an overview of Democritus' position can be found in Thomas Cole, Democritus and the Sources of Greek Anthropology (Cleveland: Western Reserve University, 1967), and also in Geoffrey Stephen Kirk, John Earle Raven, Malcolm Schofield, The Presocratic Philosophers, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1984); Aristotle also discusses Democritus’ views in Περὶ Ψυχῆς, Book V, 409a 31-409b 18.


idea of the ‘self’ is an illusion, or a kind of fiction, as it is not the cognitive outcome of any experience or internal impression. In an endorsement of Locke’s empiricism, Hume’s ‘self’ is nothing but a state of confusion derived from multiple perceptions and impressions of the mind, which are conceived incessantly and trick us into attributing to it an unreal, metaphysical identity. Hence, Hume’s groundbreaking notion that the self is not an enduring entity has provided the foundations for the emergence of the contemporary Reductionist views of consciousness and the self.

*Ryle, Parfit, Taylor*

It was the twentieth-century philosopher Gilbert Ryle, however, who systematically challenged the Cartesian framework. Ryle argues that describing the mind as a separate realm existing alongside the bodily is a confusion that is rooted in a category mistake. Mental events and properties are not separate and superior to physical ones, just as the identity of an institution consists of, and is not separable from, its buildings, administration, employees and customers, etc. Regarding ‘mental states’, Ryle claims that these are modes of behaviour and reactions in response to special circumstances, and not statements of private, inaccessible activities that take place in the subjective theatre of the mind. Though Ryle’s approach to the mind may be seen as kind of ‘behaviourism’, it did influence subsequent philosophical work on the concept of mind. In an anti-dualist manner, some philosophers have proposed a radically materialist reduction of mental states to brain states. More recently the dominant theory has come to be known as “functionalism”, which given that it draws heavily on Aristotle, regards mental states as formal or organisational states. In other words, such states should be identified by their casual links to one another and to sensory inputs and behavioural outputs, and not by some hidden inner property. Under this view, mental attributes are in fact intrinsically dependent upon brain states, that is, brain states and activities determine the nature of mental states.

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77 See for example Daniel Dennett’s, *Consciousness Explained* (London: Penguin, 1993)
The contemporary philosopher Derek Parfit joins Ryle in rejecting the existence of a hidden, deep inner self. Parfit sets off by expanding Locke and Hume’s understanding of human identity, and dismisses the view that personal identity can only be defined in terms of a whole life.\textsuperscript{78} For Parfit, it seems impeccably natural to distinguish between different persons in one’s life, according to, let us say, different time periods, i.e. childhood, and adulthood. He then claims that there is nothing beyond physical and psychological continuity, regarding the endurance and survival of the self, under what he calls a “Reductionist View”.\textsuperscript{79} In proving his point he discusses the case of tele-transportation, where a machine digitally fragments, scans, records, and transmits a body to Mars, only to be rejoined by a similar electronic machine back on earth.\textsuperscript{80} Parfit then argues that as soon as we liberate ourselves from the belief that there is a metaphysical entity, perceived either as self or soul that could be ‘left behind’, then such an uncommon ‘journey’ would seem perfectly normal and safe. And as soon as we let go of the idea of a single, identical, and enduring self we might then feel less guilty of our pasts, and less anxious about our futures.

In a straightforward opposition to such ‘reductionist’ and ‘naturalist’ views Charles Taylor places immense value on the importance of morals in the formation of modern selfhood.\textsuperscript{81} Locke’s perception of ‘identity’ being the result of a neutral ‘self-awareness’ is challenged by Taylor on the grounds that the ‘self’ is: “…something which can exist only in a space of moral issues.”\textsuperscript{82} For Taylor the making of the self is a subjective process that is located in everyday ordinary life, not in the Platonic rational cosmic order or in the Cartesian internal order of divine origin. Bearing this in mind, in his attempt to demonstrate that the modern turn to introversion is the outcome of efforts to search and define the Good, he incorporates what initially seems to be a combination of aspects of both Platonic and Cartesian notions. However, he refines his position when he clarifies that morals vary according to historical and cultural ‘frameworks’ – which is in sharp contrast to Plato, Descartes, and Locke, who all reject the place of ‘custom’. In addition, Taylor argues that Plato’s concept of

\textsuperscript{79} \textit{Ibid}, chaps 95 & 96.
\textsuperscript{80} \textit{Ibid}, chap 95.
\textsuperscript{82} \textit{Ibid}, p. 49
‘virtue’ is particularly problematic because it is not to be “…found in public life.” Accordingly, the notion of cultural and spiritual ‘frameworks’ as determinates of ‘self’ are crucial as they “…provide the background of our moral judgements, intuitions or reactions in any of the three dimensions of our moral life (respect, integrity, dignity).” He then links the modern importance of these ‘frameworks’ with the post-Romantic understanding of universality. Universal terms do not exclude, but are predicated on difference, on the particularities of cultural or national backgrounds. Therefore, it is through ‘qualitative distinctions’ based on these ‘frameworks’ that the self is produced. As such these frameworks presuppose the formation of ‘self’ in the social and communal context of ordinary life “[O]ne is a self only among other selves. A self can never be described without reference to those who surround it”. As Taylor argues, the self only exists, in “webs of interlocution”. Concomitantly he regards ‘language’ and conversational exchange as fundamental to achieving this process self-definition, and to the “continuing grasp of languages of self-understanding.” In a final rejection of a Cartesian model of self and consciousness that calls for worldly disengagement for the sake of inner contemplation, Taylor insists that “the drive to original vision will be hampered, will ultimately be lost in inner confusion, unless it can be placed in some way in relation to the language and vision of others.”

Taylor doubts Parfit’s thesis that human life is not the expression of a prior unity or that personal identity doesn’t have to be defined in terms of a whole life and its ‘narrative’. According to his notion of ‘frameworks’ a ‘self’ exists only in a certain space of questioning, “…which touch[es] on the nature of the Good that I orient myself by and on the way I am placed in relation to it.” It is because of the fact that the direction of our lives is determined by our constantly reconsidered place in relation to the Good that we “…must inescapably understand our lives in narrative form, as a quest.” In other words “the sense of Good has to be woven into my understanding of my life as an unfolding story…our lives exist also in this space of questions, which

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83 Ibid, p. 20.  
85 Ibid, pp. 28-29.  
86 Ibid, p. 30  
87 Ibid, p. 35  
88 Ibid, p. 36  
89 Ibid, pp. 36-37.  
90 Ibid, p. 50  
91 Ibid, pp. 51-52
only a ‘narrative’ can answer...in order to have a sense of who we are, we have to have a notion of how we have become, and of where we are going.”

He then takes on the reductive Naturalist perspective by claiming that under this view ‘frameworks’ are classed as human inventions, and “…not answers to questions which inescapably pre-exist for us, independent of our answer or inability to answer.” By extension, “[g]oods or ‘values’ are understood as projections of ours onto a world which is neutral, but most importantly that “morality is conceived purely as a guide to action” and that “…the task of moral theory is identified as defining what the content of obligation is rather than the nature of the good life.” He then argues that it is because “thinkers of a naturalist temper, when considering ethics, naturally tend to think in terms of action...[that] this temper has helped contribute to the dominance of moral theories of obligatory action in our intellectual culture.”

Although Taylor is critical of the Cartesian disengaged self, his overall views do not reflect a clear anti-dualist position, bearing in mind his dismissal of Parfit’s materialism and reductionism. In addition, due to the moralist nature of his argument his writing often resides within deistic approaches to the subject. In particular, he highly values the influence of the Judaeo-Christian tradition on the formation of the self. As a result, Taylor’s reference to this religious tradition as a means for the emancipation of virtue is a sly insertion of the notion that religion is the guarantor or regulator of moral order. Whereas Augustine and Aquinas replace the platonic cosmic order with divine order, Taylor is doing something similar with society by resorting to a specific religious doctrine as the basis for his moralist model. However, it is due to Taylor’s social reading of the embedded self, as opposed to the Cartesian introspective self, that his views are deemed important here.

92 Ibid, p. 47
93 Ibid, p. 30
94 Ibid, p. 53
95 Ibid, p. 79
96 Ibid, p. 81
From the mid-20th century onwards the fields of philosophy of the mind and cognitive sciences have been primarily concerned with resolving the problematic dualist nature of the Cartesian subject. In addition to the positions of Ryle, Parfit, Taylor, and Dennett, scholars such as John Searle and W. Teed Rockwell have produced additional alternatives to Cartesian dualism and vulgar materialism. Searle rejects both dualism and materialism in favour of a neurobiological account of the mind. His objections to reductionist materialism (behaviorism, functionalism, physicalism) can be summed up in his claims that, an “objective account cannot explain the subjective character of consciousness”, thus, “any account of the mind that leaves out…qualitative experiences is inadequate”.\(^\text{97}\) According to Searle the rise of materialist accounts of the mind is the direct outcome of the failures of dualism (which often leads to irreducible mental phenomena being treated as “indigestible”\(^\text{98}\)) and the successes of the physical sciences. For Searle the basis of all mental phenomena is biological and related to specific organs. Although he rejects dualist distinctions between natural and mental, and natural and cultural phenomena (“culture is the form that biology takes in different communities”\(^\text{99}\)), his distinction between low bodily and high brain features remains loyal, at one level to the Cartesian prioritization of the mind over body.

On numerous occasions Searle enforces his distinction between the “different phenomena of the third-person behavioral, functional, neurobiological structures and the first-person conscious experience”.\(^\text{100}\) Consciousness and intentionality for instance, are unique for Searle in that they have a first-person ontological subjectivity. At the core of Searle’s argument lies his perception of consciousness as a product of neurobiological processes in the brain, which exist as “the biological features of the brain system”.\(^\text{101}\) By extension and contrary to Romantic views, Searle argues that subjective states can exist in human or animal organisms. In order to resolve the mind-body problem Searle suggests the use of a “topic-neutral vocabulary”, a move


\(^{98}\) *Ibid*, p. 104.


\(^{100}\) *Ibid*, pp. 97, 103, 120-121, 134-135.

\(^{101}\) *Ibid*, p. 113.
that poses no threat to mental features. A revision of the Cartesian definitions of the ‘mental’ and the ‘physical’ would allow the recognition of the mental qua mental as physical qua physical. Thus consciousness for Searle is a “qualitative, subjective, first person process” of the brain that can be reduced causally, but not ontologically. Instead of accepting the existence of ‘physical’ and mental’ phenomena, Searle suggests that some brain processes are simply conscious experiences. Finally, in a compromising and almost dualist manner Searle surprisingly characterizes consciousness as “indivisible” and “a unified structure”.

Searle concludes that consciousness is caused by neurobiological mental “microlevel processes” that are realised in the brain as a “high-level or system feature”, and best summarised by his claim that consciousness is the “essence of the mind”. However, consciousness for Searle is not a separate entity from the brain, “but the state that the brain is in”. To argue his point about the inter-relation of low and high level processes Searle draws parallels between consciousness/ the brain, and the liquid body of water and its molecular behaviour of the H₂O molecules. Searle’s suggested reconfiguration of Cartesian vocabulary here, however, is not that much different from Descartes prioritisation of the subjective over the objective. In other words, Searle replaces the Cartesian dualism of mind/body with that of the brain/body. The concept of the self thus remains enigmatic for Searle, who seems to agree with Hume that we should not confuse personal experiences with the actual existence of a self.

Rockwell is very accurate in identifying the survival of Cartesian principles in recent philosophical attempts to resolve dualism under the heading of ‘Cartesian materialism’. In this respect the mind-body distinction characteristic of dualism is replaced wholesale by the brain-body distinction, which by treating the mind as the brain is not far from Descartes’ claim that the mind lives in the brain. Rockwell argues that the mind is not solely dependent on the interaction of cranial neurons, but

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102 Ibid, pp. 58, 118.
104 Ibid, pp. 136-137.
105 Ibid, p. 158.
on the interactions between a brain, a body, and a material world. Drawing from recent research that demonstrates that the brain is in fact, more hormonal than neural, Rockwell is skeptical about treating the brain as equivalent to the mind (on the basis of neural interactions).\textsuperscript{109} By considering the mind as a biological concept Rockwell aims at producing a functional definition in addition to a causal one. Like Charles Taylor, Rockwell attempts to re-introduce the mind to the cultural and social particularities of the world, avoiding the mistakes of a world-independent Cartesian materialism. Surprisingly, and even though he discusses a significant number of key texts, he fails to acknowledge the Platonic origins of the notion of being-in-the-world.

Rockwell is particularly critical of Searle’s claims that consciousness is just a biological property, disregarding its functional properties altogether.\textsuperscript{110} He is also critical of Searle’s demand for a physical study of the intrinsic nature of consciousness since for Rockwell consciousness is a relational property and not an intrinsic physical one.\textsuperscript{111} From this perspective the self is regarded as an evental continuum of subjective qualities, which is the outcome of the collaboration between the objective items of the nexus brain/body/world. He is also sceptical of the functionalist notion in Searle of the “ontological independence of mental events...that frees them not only from behaviour, but also from brains”.\textsuperscript{112} This fails to perceive the mind as a “dependent pattern that gets its cognitive and biological significance from the context in which it dwells”.\textsuperscript{113} As such, he disagrees with Searle’s assumption that the brain alone is the headquarters of consciousness.\textsuperscript{114}

According to Rockwell, neuroscience considers brain events to be the cause of mental events and, in this, it seems to follow Descartes’ model of a central CPU (brain) that receives information from message cables (neurons). The view of the mind as a biological computer is put to the test by the fact that neural networks around the body are not structurally different from the ones located in the cranium; and importantly most neurons are not receptors. Furthermore, the brain’s process of

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{109 Ibid, p. 39.}
\footnote{110 Ibid, p. 6.}
\footnote{111 Ibid, pp. 142-143.}
\footnote{112 Ibid, p. 4.}
\footnote{113 Ibid, pp. 5-10.}
\footnote{114 Ibid, pp. 32-33.}
\end{footnotes}
cognitive description actually seems to appear in other organs too, which gives Rockwell the right to ask whether we should call this bodily processes ‘thinking’ too. Indeed, Rockwell proposes that consciousness is not the sole product of a centralised mind located in the brain at all, but it is instead the product of the entire nervous system. Contrary to neuroscience, and artificial intelligence theory, this approach therefore does not focus on the brain’s intrinsic qualities, but relates brain activity to behaviour, language, etc.; in short it perceives brain activity as a part of a “nexus of relations between brain-body-world”. Therefore, the brain should not be seen as a “separate organ distinct from the rest of the nervous system” as this leads inevitably to materialist claims regarding unidentified brain activities, and also to the metaphysical claim that some sort of ‘psychic’ power is involved in channeling information from body-neurons to the brain. If, instead, consciousness is a property of the brain and the rest of the body then there is no need to talk of the internal channeling of information.

Rockwell does not doubt that some experiences, in their entirety, might be caused by the brain, but he argues that such experiences are still causally dependent on the brain’s interactions with the rest of the body and on the body’s interaction with the world. Hence he is somewhat skeptical of the broad use of the concept of ‘supervenience’ – which has allowed the mind–brain identity theory to avoid a variety of philosophical problems – in so far as that, without disputing that the mind supervenes on something physical, he doubts that the brain provides the complete supervenience-base for consciousness. In addition, the employment of the concept of supervenience implies a notion of dualist prioritisation and hierarchy. If we consider an identity or causal relationship as purely supervenient, the supervenient depends on what it supervenes. Therefore, Rockwell insists that a variable level or type of brain activity is “necessary” for mental states, but he refuses to accept that brain activity is “sufficient to account for every mental state, and sufficiency is what defines supervenience”. What he offers instead is a notion of a ‘relational supervenience’, where the mind supervenes on the causal relations that hold the brain-body-world.

116 Ibid, p. 54.
117 Ibid, pp. 36, 39.
118 Ibid, p. 65.
nexus together, simply because the brain is dependent on these relations, and not just on the ones between the skull and its neurons. For Rockwell, the application of relational supervenience stretches beyond ‘thought’ to include ‘feelings’ and ‘sensations’ as they too rely on the same nexus.

Thus, Rockwell is allocating an equal importance to all parts of the brain-body-world network by rejecting the false perception of a hierarchical order with an independent brain sitting on the top. However, he does not claim that all parts of the nexus are self-conscious, but that, consciousness is a collective product and an emergent property of the interactions between the nexus’ parts. The outcome is that the central dualist image of a conflictual relationship between mind and body is replaced by one of distribution and collaboration.\(^{120}\) Finally, Rockwell divides this system into subsystems: one for logical processes such as linguistic affairs, and one for experiences and sensations.\(^{121}\)

There are obvious similarities between Rockwell’s network theory and recent ‘relational’ and discursive models and attitudes in art, where collective collaboration is combined with site and/or situation specificity.\(^ {122}\) However, quite often, hierarchical models of collaboration remain consciously or unconsciously active in relational and discursive artistic practices. In this case the brain-body-world network develops in the form of brain/artist – body/public collaborators – world/public domain of production and/or exhibition of work. As such, this limited understanding of network theory falls back into an old dualist hierarchical structure, in which the artist acts as a manager who directs a body of assistants disguised as collaborators (in this respect the collaborators are often are not attributed any authorship or copyright access to the work that they have co-produced). The question pending, therefore, is whether Rockwell’s co-operative brain-body-world network model could assist in resolving the semiotic rupture that is produced by the traditional artistic network for portraiture (artist-sitter-portrait) and its inherent clash of subjectivities? More importantly can the collaborative nature of Rockwell’s network theory replace the competitive nature of the creative processes of dualist portraiture?

\(^{120}\) Ibid, p. 104.

\(^{121}\) Ibid, p. 129.

\(^{122}\) See for example Nicholas Bourriaud, *Relational Aesthetics* (Les Presses du Réel, 2002).
Heads & Bodies: Dualism & Physiognomy

As already outlined, the main dualist positions are those of Plato and Descartes. However, the crucial difference between them is that Plato’s self is vitally connected with an objectified world and Descartes’ is disengaged from it. Therefore, prior to an analysis of anti-dualist perspectives in portraiture, a thorough understanding of the distinct visualisation of both dualist perspectives is necessary. The common dualist outlook in art, and especially in portraiture, presupposes that the body is incapable of representing the sitter’s inner identity, since it is perceived as an independent entity. Therefore, an acute realistic full-size treatment of the sitter accounts for half of his re-presentation, that is, for the objective, material part. The other half, that is, the subjective, non-material requires an autonomous pictorial handling. This is the Cartesian viewpoint, whose extremeness is rooted in the demand to visually represent or construct something that has no substance, therefore, no image. By extension, the constructed visualisation of a sitter’s subjectivity is derivatively analogous to his or hers inner ‘construction of orders’. Modernist abstraction of the body (as a manifestation of the soul’s prioritisation that stretches so far as to deform the figure), is the moment the Cartesian perspective achieves its ultimate formal expression, but the origin of this gradual formal abstraction, like dualism, is Platonic.

In dualist portraiture, physiognomy (the inference of personality traits from facial characteristics) set out to close the divisible gap between body and inner self, by employing facial expressions in order to read the self. Platonic dualist ideas informed its theoretical development in antiquity, and Aristotle frequently incorporated such theories in his philosophical discussions, but always within a unified model of the self.123 The oldest surviving treatise on physiognomy Physiognomica is ascribed to Aristotle, but it is thought that it is a product of his ‘school’. Aristotle is also responsible for declaring the face and bodily gestures as the means for expressing emotions in poetry, acting, and the arts:

«ὅσα δὲ δυνατὸν καὶ τοῖς σχῆμασιν συναπεργαζόμενον· πιθανῶτατοι γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς αὐτῆς φύσεως οἱ ἐν τοῖς πάθεσιν εἰσιν, καὶ χειμαίνει οἱ χειμαζόμενος καὶ χαλεπαίνει ὁ ὄργιζόμενος ἀληθινῶτατα.»

The poet [as creator] should enliven his/hers work with appropriate gestures. The most convincing are those who adopt and act with similar emotions with those of the character they represent; accordingly, the anxious demonstrates anxiety, and the angry demonstrates anger with the most lifelike reality. (my translation)

In addition, there is a curious analogy in the Egyptian sarcophagus, as a material host contains the deceased pharaoh. However, there are no indications of physiognomic notions until Hellenic classicism. Physiognomy is attuned with Plato’s dualism, since its vision of an inner ‘order’ is parallel to his notion of a correct vision of the cosmic order revealed by reason. In art, the viewer’s reading or vision of the subject’s inner character is aided by the artist’s rational vision of his subject, which he or she communicates with his or her audience through the employment of physiognomy.

At the same time, physiognomic readings of the self are of the body, and their visualisation is again located on the body, which is yet another justification of its Platonic foundation, as it remains engaged with the worldly. In this respect, Harry Berger Jr. proposes a more accurate definition of physiognomy: “the face is the index of the mind’s ability to make the face (appear to be) the index of the mind”.

During the Classical period physiognomic idealisation was not ‘allowed’ by contemporary theories of balanced representation. Eventually, the idealisation trend of the

124 Aristotle, Περὶ Ποιητικῆς, [Aristotle, Poetics], 17.1455a 29-32.

125 According to Plato artists are capable of applying a pure truth-seeking vision to their subjects, which is possible given the divine origin of the soul. Plato also associates the concept of Truth with aesthetic notions of Beauty, in that the artist is employing Truth to identify worldly instances of divine Beauty (Πλάτων, Φαίδρος (ἡ περὶ Ἐρωτος) (Athens: Κάκτος, 1996) [Plato, Phaedrus (Athens: Kaktos, 1996)], 248c-249c).

Plato is drawing a different image of the artist in the Πολιτεία (Republic). This time the artist is perceived as a deceiver whose creations stand far from true representations, since he/she is preoccupied with the individual specifics of subjects, rather than emphasising their universal and eternal aspects (Πλάτων, Πολιτεία (ἡ περὶ Δικαίου) (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1992) [Plato, Republic (Athens: Kaktos, 1992)], 595b-608b. Yet, we should be careful in our understanding of the crucial dualist methodological distinction that Plato draws in these two texts. Whereas in Φαίδρος (Phaedrus) Plato is praising the conceptual process of an artist as the outcome of divine vision, in the Πολιτεία (Republic) he stresses the ‘imperfections’ located in the process of mimesis, which in focusing on the specific and unique properties of an object, overlooks the universal.

Hellenistic and Roman periods permitted just enough reconstruction of physiognomic features to define a general type of character. However, its application remained determined within limits, set by, yet another form of idealisation: the demand for familial reference.

The main advocate of the pseudoscience of physiognomy in the modern period was the Swiss pastor Johann Kaspar Lavater.\textsuperscript{127} Lavater built his argument as to the importance of the indexical reading of one’s inner self through facial characteristics, on the writings of the Giambatista della Porta and Sir Thomas Browne. In 1586, Della Porta was the first to illustrate the comparisons between human types and animal species, made since antiquity.\textsuperscript{128} Browne, who possessed several of della Porta's studies, revisited the subject from a religious perspective.\textsuperscript{129} Lavater’s essays were first published in German, but, they achieved great popularity when they were translated into French and English, and even gave life to the practices of silhouette and caricatural drawing.

Dualist pictorial interests of a physiognomic nature produced certain side effects that played a dramatic part, not only in the stylistic treatment of the sitter, but also, in the final composition of the portrait. Dualism’s divine-bestial association, asserts a hierarchy that favours the subjective self, or soul. This supremacy of soul over body presupposes the prioritisation of the \textit{visualisation} of the soul, leading to an emphasis on the head, or face at the expense of the neglected body. The reduction, for example, of the figure to three-quarter, half-length, or even bust sizes, is a result of physiognomic attention to the face, in addition to the notion that the soul rests in the mind. Another manifestation of such a prioritisation is through the actual illumination of the face, as opposed to the darker rendering of the body, which contributed to the immense sense of interiority developed in Dutch seventeenth-century bourgeois portraiture. As Woodall points out, this was the result of the fact that the emerging bourgeoisie located virtue in the ‘contemplating soul’ and not in the

\textsuperscript{128} Giambattista della Porta, \textit{De Humana Physiognomia}, (Naples: Suor Orsola Benincasa, 1986; reprint of 1586 edition)
body, in their effort to distinguish themselves from nobility. Dualism, then, is best exemplified in portraiture, as an imbalance created by an emphasised face at the expense of an (overlooked) body.

This insistence upon the head at the expense of the body was the result of a Roman obsession with physiognomy, even though it was subsequently abandoned until the revival of individualism in western European portraits in the 16th century. Roman artists were the first ones to reduce the classical full size statuesque marble carved portraits to busts. Following the reduction of size, Roman nobility were also the first to discover and implement the commanding ‘distance’ imposed by the profile pose, which was mostly employed for the depiction of rulers on coins and medallions. Both politicians and artists held it in great respect as it was in full compliance with the demand of physiognomic depiction, since it showed characteristic features of the face in distinct clarity. The reliance of the 18th-century practice of silhouette drawing on the profile pose verifies its close relationship with physiognomic practices. Christian art, especially during the Byzantium era, gradually returned to the classical formats of full life size depictions, however the bust format remained marginally active. As for the head’s pose, early Christian art abstained from a utilization of the ‘distant’ profile, given Christian art’s emphasis on the spiritual. Hence, the reductive, often dematerialising treatment of the body asserted the rule of the soul when the full frontal head pose was presented openly to the viewer. As for the in-between pose, the _contraposto_ three-quarter view, Beyer believes that it is “…a torsion that represents the separation of body and mind, that is, sensuality and spirit.” Even though this pose is mostly popular in Renaissance portraiture, it does remain active in the subsequent development and formation of the Cartesian dualist portrait. This attention to the head carried on well into the 20th century, despite the weakening of the idea that human character may be inferred from external, and especially facial, characteristics.

In noble portraiture, from 16th century and onwards, the construction of ‘inner virtue’ was composed from the employment of characteristic poses that derived from classic models of physiognomy. Giovanni Lomazzo’s mannerist theory of portraiture, underlines the rising significance of symbolism here, as he advises painters to “[first]
take into account the rank of the person being portrayed and give the portrait a symbol appropriate to that rank." Lomazzo is not neglecting the importance of physiognomy as he also describes how various body postures could be employed to indicate the subject’s personality. The constructive role of physiognomy in achieving ideal likeness, is clearly reflected in his advice for the painter to "emphasise the dignity and grandeur of the human being, suppressing Nature's irregularities."

The contrasting differences between Classicist and Cartesian dualist perspectives in portraiture are evident through these two examples from the same historical period. The Cartesian portraits of the emerging bourgeoisie treat their subjects as positioned on their own, in neutral indoor environments, usually domestic (‘inner’), void of any objects or props, and with a clear attention to their heads at the expense of their body. Even though the contemplating self of the sitters is still located on their body, these subjects are depicted in solitude, and disengaged from the world, as there are no indications of their profession, social rank, etc. In contrast, noble indoor portraits are not just full of references to a worldly life, but their subjects, are for at least half of the time, even seen in outdoor contexts, which is in full agreement with Platonic notions of the self. The composition of the classicist noble full-size indoor portraits is produced from royal ornaments and coats of arms that signify rule of land, objects that refer to talents, or achievements in battle or civic rule; whatever the case, these figures are always seen in relation to a public life.

Despite their differences both of these types still place massive importance on physiognomy, which demonstrates that the Cartesian model had still to reach its full development. However, the importance that they both allocate to this pictorial device is for opposite reasons. The classicist model employs physiognomy primarily to modify facial characteristic according to a flattering ideal, thereby, to visually construct the impression of a given character according to a given ideology or tradition. Such a possibility was identified as soon as it was realised that facial expressions reflected emotional states. Yet the distinctiveness of emotional and mental states was not as

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133 Ibid.

crystal clear in antiquity as it is today. The ultimate result of the employment of the classicist model is mirrored in the 17th- and 18th-century idealised portraits of nobility, which so many contemporary critics dismissed as pure flattery.\textsuperscript{135} In contrast, the dualist model (both Platonic and Cartesian) employed physiognomy – in a Hegelian sense\textsuperscript{136} – in order to read the inner state of the subject by focusing on facial imperfections; like Narcissus gazing at his reflection in the pool. In opposition to the idealising demands of the aristocracy it abolished flattery, in so far as it prevented a truthful inner reading of the soul. Such a difference is defined on the one hand by the classicist (Aristotelian) belief in the self as mutable, and on the other by the dualist claim of the self as immutable.

Even though both of these notions tend towards (Platonic) abstraction, they do so by fundamentally different means. Classicist idealisation, in fact, remained realist in the painted or sculpted treatment of its subjects, both in size, format, and style, but the impact of flattery surely denied its subjects a meticulous and acute representation. Similarly, despite the ‘true’ likeness employed by Cartesian-type portraits, the compositional cropping and reduction of the body, along with the atmospheric effects of chiaroscuro, lent the works a particular artificiality. Furthermore, Rembrandt’s proto-impressionist brushstrokes could be seen as laying the foundations for the modernist abstract formulation of the dualist portrait, whose practice is the focus of the upcoming chapter.


\textsuperscript{136} In his \textit{Aesthetics}, Hegel proposes that a work of art is completed and reaches its final form only when it is apprehended by a viewer: “By displaying what is subjective, the work, in its whole presentation, reveals its purpose as existing for the subject, for the spectator, and not on its own account. The Spectator is, as it were, in it from the beginning, is counted in with it, and the work exists only for this point, i.e., for the individual apprehending it.” G. W. F. Hegel, \textit{Aesthetics: Lectures on Fine Art}, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 806.
Rembrandt’s Dilemma:

The Introduction of Cartesianism in 17th-Century Dutch Portraiture

One could put Rembrandt’s representation of himself into words:

I paint (or I am painting), therefore I am.\textsuperscript{137}

It is widely believed that the emergence of the modern dualist portrait took place in the newly formed Dutch Republic in the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. During this century Dutch citizens, particularly merchants, traders, renowned preachers, painters and humanist scholars commissioned portraits to establish their new social identity, infused as it was by a sense of individualism and independence that followed the revolt against the Spanish court and the separation from the Catholic church. This tendency brought about a spirit of innovation, invoked by such canonic names as Rembrandt, Franz Hals, Vermeer, and many more. Three distinct artistic trends are evident in Dutch painting of that time: Caravaggism at Utrecht, realism at Haarlem, and classicism at Amsterdam.\textsuperscript{138} Besides this plurality of trends, there were variations in size and format of portraits, ranging from life-size to miniature, from full-length to just faces, and in between, from knee-length to half length to busts (with or without hands).\textsuperscript{139} Moreover, not all of these portraits reflected the interests and values of the


\textsuperscript{138} See for example Jean Leymarie, Dutch Painting (Switzerland: Skira, 1956), p. 125

emergent bourgeois state. Recent research shows that members of the emerging Dutch middle class often adopted pictorial styles that suited their interests best, which even included aristocratic formats of portrayal.\(^\text{140}\)

In my introduction I outlined a comparative analysis of the two philosophical dualist tendencies of Platonism and Cartesianism in relation to classical and Christian portraiture. This chapter will examine the early stages of the formation of the modern dualist portrait, and question the level of success of these positions in relation to surviving classicist tendencies within the Dutch Republic. Recent research in this area will allow me to examine the influence of dualism on the Dutch burghers’ attempts at self-definition through portraiture, enabling me to define two key areas: under what social and cultural circumstances were such attempts at self-definition made? These circumstances will assist towards an understanding of the reasons behind portraiture’s popularisation in the 17\(^{th}\)-century Netherlands, as well as shed light on the conditions that influenced the formation of the Dutch portrait format, for example: to what extent did classicist models remain active in the culture, either in opposition to, or ‘combined’ with, dualist notions?

As I have argued, there are strong connections between Platonic dualism and its subsequent Cartesian formation, yet, there is also a fundamental difference. Although Plato and Descartes share a distrust of the senses and call for reason’s dominance and control over bodily passions, Descartes’ substitution of Reason with divine Truth is a clear distancing from Plato’s notion of self-mastery through active being in the world; relying, instead, on a methodological disengagement from the material as the means for understanding a subject scientifically. Descartes’ extension of Plato’s dualism is the result of an elaborate effort to modify already existent notions of an immaterial and eternal soul in Christian dogma, where such notions are at its core. Aristotle, on the other hand, rejected any metaphysical claims of the soul’s inseparability from the body and emphasised the importance of lived experience, and eventually his philosophy became the most popular classicist position. As such Aristotle’s writings were targeted by the Church. Christian thinkers such as Augustine of Hippo and Thomas Aquinas used Aristotle’s notion of the immateriality

of the intellect (regardless of how much he stressed his opposition to a separable soul throughout his writings) in order to reconcile Aristotle's philosophy with the Christian dogma of the autonomous soul. To a large extent Descartes formed his cogito argument on the basis of Augustine and Aquinas' work.\textsuperscript{141}

Classicist models of representation remained truthful to a full-figure treatment of the subject, as both Platonic and Aristotelian notions of self-mastery emphasised a mode of active being in the world. In addition, the Aristotelian idealisation of external appearance provides an opportunity for the portrait to be employed for the communication of the sitters or patrons’ interests. The exemplary function of portraiture and contemporary physiognomic treatises introduced forms of idealisation that stood side by side with realistic trends of representation. The classicist (Aristotelian) model has traditionally been associated with aristocratic courts since the days of Alexander the Great and the heirs to his empire, as it served the dominant interest of verifying a hereditary right to rule. Accordingly, facial and bodily characteristics are idealised in order to bear witness to acknowledged predecessors, and in some cases to claim a non-familial, divine link to mythological heroes. At the opposing end, the early formation of Cartesian dualist portraiture built extensively on the cogito argument and directed all its attention towards the representation of the head, where the intellect was supposedly housed and expressed itself; hence, its distancing from the constructed effects of idealisation, since they interfered with the true representation of the subject. Accordingly, the proposed supremacy of soul over body prioritised the artistic visualisation of a singular head or face at the expense of a neglected body. As a result, the figure and format of the portrait are reduced to three-quarter, half-length, or even bust sizes. In brief, this process of compositional abstraction reflects the fact that dualism is produced, as I have stressed, in the last chapter, as an imbalance between body and face, instantly establishing a dual relationship between head and body.

Dualism’s profound effect on portraiture is mirrored today in the common conception of the portrait as being nothing but the head. In the case of the Dutch 17\textsuperscript{th} century portrait, such prioritisation is further enforced through the direct illumination of the face, in opposition to a shadowy or ‘fading’ body, heightening a sense of

\textsuperscript{141} See Chapter 1, pp. 22-25.
interiority. The Cartesian, or dualist format was preferable among members of the middle class as it drew attention to inner virtues that were free of hereditary connotations. Furthermore, emphasis on realistic representation of external appearance (verisimilitude) limited the works’ reliance on idealised rendering.\(^{143}\)

In this chapter this analysis will be employed in an enquiry into Rembrandt’s self-portraits, single portraits, and group portraits, in order to search for a clarification of the inter-relation of dualist and classicist tendencies in his work. Most traditional scholarship on Rembrandt treats the notion of self in his portraits from a highly subjective and interiorised position, leading Rembrandt to be treated as the foremost painter in prioritising portraiture as a visualisation of ‘inner states of being’. Consequently the majority of studies of Rembrandt’s work, especially of his self-portraits, approach issues of the self and representation from a conventionally Cartesian dualist perspective. For example, Jakob Rosenberg elaborates on Rembrandt’s “strong urge to go deeper than the average patron expected, and to describe not only man’s outward appearance but to express his inner life, his spiritual existence”.\(^{144}\) In another instance, Jean Leymarie argues that “whereas Rembrandt’s compatriots depicted the world and life of their day as seen from the outside, he examined the world within himself, observed and faithfully recorded what he saw there; thus his vision was at once intensely personal and universal”.\(^{145}\) Rosenberg adopts a traditional notion of the split between the body and the soul, and Leymarie carefully distinguishes between the Platonic notion of being in the world and Cartesian self-examination. Suffice it to say, that the views of such authors as Leymarie, Rosenberg, and Joseph-Emile Muller are discussed in order to highlight the problems that arise from romanticist approaches to the work of Rembrandt, and not for their intrinsic critical value.

Rembrandt’s portraits have been traditionally divided into three periods, according to his transformed and altered pictorial interests. In his early period, Rembrandt explored the representation of facial expressions; in the middle period he experimented with poses, gestures, dress and devices; and finally, in his late period he

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142 Ibid, pp. 31-36.
145 Leymarie, Dutch Painting, p. 127.
implemented the knowledge gained from all the years of practice, with a clear focal attention to the face. Rosenberg’s view encompasses the general perception, which assumes that whereas Rembrandt’s self-portraits “emphasise the blend of the subjective with the universal”, his single portraits “strongly reflect Rembrandt’s susceptibility to the spiritual side of man and show both his breadth and profundity in the interpretation of human character”; and finally, his group portraits “manifest, in addition to these basic qualities, the artist’s ability to relate individual figures in common activity or in co-operative situations”. In this respect, Rembrandt’s self-portraits are discussed from a dualist perspective, based on claims that they assert the subjective aspects of being as universal. As we will see, there are identifiable aspects of Platonism in Rembrandt’s ability to ‘interpret’ human character through physiognomy, and in the belief in the artist’s pure vision. Yet, this vision is not turned towards the world or ‘cosmic order’, but, rather, in a Cartesian manner, directed within. Combined with his talent to unite individuals under a ‘common activity’, this early clarification certainly forces into question much of the Cartesian aspects that historically have been attributed to his approach to human nature. This, and further uncertainties of a similar sort regarding Rembrandt’s work will be examined with the assistance of the writing of Harry Jr. Berger, Christopher White, Quentin Buvelot, and Svetlana Alpers, following a clarification of the Dutch portrait’s dualist tendencies, based on Joanna Woodall’s classifications.

1566 Riots

The 1566 Protestant (Calvinist) riots against the Catholic Church is the historical moment that brought into being the subsequent Dutch state and social reforms, which in turn, provided the foundations for the emergence of an early bourgeois culture. These events developed into a full-scale revolt against the authority of the Catholic monarch, Philip II of Spain. Philip the II’s rule of the Netherlands combined bloodthirsty extirpation of heresy and penal taxation (the wealth of the powerful Flemish merchants was subject to taxation, unlike the wealth of the Spanish

nobles and clergy), yet, he reacted moderately towards a petition signed by four hundred nobles requesting the proclamations against Protestants to be alleviated and the inquisition to be discontinued. Unfortunately, the Spanish King’s reply reached the Netherlands two days late, and failed to prevent the revolt and subsequent iconoclasm.\footnote{For a detailed historical account of the formation of the Republic of Netherlands see Jonathan Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic: It’s Rise, Greatness, an Fall 1477-1806} (Oxford: Claredon Press, 1995), pp. 137-154, 179-232, 328-360; see also Haak, \textit{The Golden Age}, pp. 21-26, 162-165, 176-178, and 226-228.} Living conditions were poor for the majority, and unemployment was high among the peasants and dockworkers. As a result, the revolt of August 10, 1566 was directed towards the outward symbolic source of personal and social repression and exploitation: the Catholic Church. Prior to the iconoclasm, the combination of persecutions roused both Calvinists and Catholics alike, and they soon found a leader in William the Silent, Prince of Orange. But the destruction of religious decorations and heathen icons was detrimental to William of Orange’s public approval, as it cost him those Catholic supporters that were originally opposed to the royal policies and practices.

In 1609 hostilities with the Spanish court ceased with the proclamation of the Twelve Years' Truce.\footnote{Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, pp. 399-410.} The lack of religious reference in the official documents allowed for the Calvinists to secure their power and as a result to limit the public worship of other sects. The Truce was beneficial in terms of trade too, as there was no mention of the Spanish demand to restrain Dutch trade in the Far East as well as in the Atlantic Ocean. So, by the turn of the century, the once Spanish-ruled region had become a complex, Protestant-dominated polity: the United Provinces of the Netherlands. Lacking a monarch, the noble estate was led by the Princes of Orange. Members of this family monopolised the office of Stadholder, previously occupied by the king’s lieutenant in each province, which now became the highest office in the land. The Stadholder established a court in The Hague and his influence was based on command of the army – the traditional preserve of the aristocracy. The Stadholder’s power was, however, limited by the representative assemblies of the seven provinces, in which the voice of the cities had been significantly strengthened. In 1581, for example, the province of Holland decided to increase the cities' representation from six to eighteen, while the noble estate retained its single vote. The
political power of these cities was supported by their economic success, built upon the opportunities provided by war, immigration, religious toleration and colonial expansion. Following the end of the twelve-year truce with Spain hostilities resumed. Only this time, the defeat of Philip II’s great-grandson, Philip IV, improved the Republic’s diplomatic position, when it achieved official and international recognition as a sovereign state through the Treaty of Munster in 1648.

The Remonstrant Crisis and Cartesianism

The central religious debate of the Reformation revolved around issues of salvation, God’s election, and predestination. The Remonstrants, under the guidance of Arminius (1560-1609) and Gomarus’ (1563-1641) four-point declaration of 1610, situated the problem of predestination in the context of grace and redemption. By extension, the main difference between the Remonstrants and the Orthodox Calvinists is based on whether the Bible and the Holy Scriptures were open to interpretation. Where the former supported this view, the latter feared that such a position allowed for possible revisions of the Scriptures, an act that could potentially lead to scepticism and atheism. Most importantly, they blamed the Remonstrants for attempting to manipulate the meanings of passages that they disagreed with. The debate with the Orthodox Calvinists expanded through the public and political role of the Church, due to the immense social importance of religion. In fear of the national detrimental effects of a possible religious schism among Protestants (between Remonstrants and Calvinists) on the unity of the nation, the States of Holland agreed with the Arminians in their view of the Church as a political institution. The Orthodox Calvinists, without denying the above, clarified that the Church should not be subservient to political pressures, as this would imply a reversal of hierarchical order, particularly if it involved toleration of heresy. As religion was the only unifying force of this new nation, in order to prevent the isolation of the Low Countries, such matters became an issue of the States General. This decision proved to be unfortunate
for the Remonstrants; even though they were the majority in the Province of Holland, they were not so in the whole of the United Provinces.149

In a way, the Remonstrant crisis prepared the ground for the early reception of Descartes’ philosophy (due to the similarity of issues under debate). Descartes lived in the Netherlands from 1628 until 1649. In some cases the furore around Descartes was conceived as being even worse than Armenianism (in the words of Jacobus Revius (1586-1658) one of Descartes’ biggest adversaries). To add to the general tenor of controversy, the translation of Descartes’ *Discours* into Latin were carried out by the Remonstrant theologian Ètienne de Courcelles (1586-1659). However, we should not thereby, draw a simplistic connection between the two positions, as most Cartesians’ religious orientation was arguably Orthodox. There were important doctrinal differences between Cartesianism and Remonstrantism, for example, the latter’s hesitation in accepting the existence of an innate idea of God. However, they shared common ground concerning issues and questions on the relationship between reason and faith, the dispute about the truth of the Bible, the debate on the freedom of the will, and the problematic relationship between body and soul.150 The overlapping of debates is evident in *Thersites Heautontimorumenos* (1635), a satire against the Remonstrants written by the Orthodox Gysbert Voetius (1589-1676) and Martin Schoock (1614-1669), which subsequently fed into Schoock’s *Ardmiranda Methodus* (1643), one of the most important works written against Descartes.

Besides the Remonstrant Crisis, the early reception of Cartesianism was also influenced by the fact that most of the debates took place primarily in an academic context, where Cartesianism stood as the exact opposite of Aristotelianism. Until Cartesianism’s emergence Dutch Universities’ philosophical orientation was overwhelmingly Aristotelian. For instance, at Leiden’s University foundation (the Netherlands’ oldest university), it was declared that its teaching must at all times remain Aristotelian. Descartes’ ideas were faced with strong opposition not just from university-based Aristotelians, but by clerics, who were largely supporters of Aristotle. Most of the debates took place in academic meetings in the form of disputations, although the strongest polemics were expressed in published books and pamphlets.

The largest academic support of Descartes centred on his method of doubt, which is rooted in the controversial rejection of the senses. Apparently, his metaphysics did not receive much support, not even from his followers. This is perhaps because the academic Cartesians’ intention was to separate philosophical issues from theological ones in order to neutralise religious objections. Eventually Cartesianism gained significant ground during the second half of the 17th century, following the death of Descartes. Nevertheless, Aristotelianism remained the dominant philosophical position, which is reflected in painting and culture in the Dutch return to classicism in the Baroque period.  

In September 1649 Descartes left the Netherlands to spend a year at the Court of Christina, Queen of Sweden. From the outset it was intended to be a relatively short visit, as he announced that he would only stay for a year. However, he never managed to leave, dying of pneumonia on 11 February 1650. Following Descartes’ death, in 1651 the Count Louis Henry of Nassau, the sovereign ruler of the principality of Hesse-Nassau, addressed Dutch Universities with a letter enquiring about their position regarding Cartesianism, and whether it could be adopted without posing a risk for Orthodox religion. The University of Leiden decided to reply by forwarding the 1647 decree, which forbade the mention of Descartes’ name. The Cartesians consented because they were at least satisfied by the fact that the decree did not contain any doctrinal commitment. Utrecht forwarded the 1642 judgement and 1644 university law, condemning Cartesianism and denouncing it as threatening to the higher faculties, such as Theology. The reply also emphasised that the University’s philosophical teachings remained Aristotelian, which posed no threat to Orthodox doctrine. The University of Groningen defined Descartes as a Catholic nobleman, whose work, however, had been the basis of significant public and academic conflicts. Yet, they underlined that despite the importance and impact of these conflicts, in Leiden and Utrecht there still were professors teaching Cartesian philosophy. Characteristically, they concluded by stating that Aristotle’s reign should not be turned into a tyranny, and by extension become the suppression of truth.


152 Verbek, Descartes and the Dutch, pp. 82-86.
During his last years, Descartes seemed to be unaware of the increasing academic support that his followers were receiving from university administrators. Descartes’ Dutch students sought to resolve two problems. First, they tried to accommodate Cartesianism within an academic context, a goal to which Descartes seemed to be indifferent. Therefore, it was scholars such as Adriaan Heereboord (1614-1661), Johannes de Raey (1622-1702), and Johannes Clauberg (1622-1665), and not Descartes himself, who assisted in transforming his philosophy into an academic system. Second, the Cartesians focused their efforts in neutralising theological and religious objections raised by Orthodox doctrine. On this, Descartes had misjudged the situation and believed that the evidence of his arguments was so strong that they would compensate in the case of protestation. The obvious solution for the Cartesians was to separate philosophy and theology, hoping that such clarification would grant theological objections as irrelevant to philosophical debates. Despite his academic followers’ efforts, Descartes was still disappointed by the fact that university administrators, some of whom were his friends, signed their names on decrees forbidding the teaching and discussion of his work. He repeatedly failed to acknowledge that by the enforcement of these decrees the administrators really intended to prevent, or even neutralise, prospective attacks on his philosophy. As a result, after 1650 Cartesianism was almost as eminent as Aristotelianism, possibly because for a few years it was no longer the target of vicious attacks. This allowed for Cartesianism’s wider public acceptance and for selective academic credence. In addition, Cartesian method was acquiring respectability because most of the Dutch Cartesians were hesitant in endorsing Cartesian metaphysics, which the Orthodox regarded as its most objectionable aspect.\footnote{Ibid, p. 88.}

The university administrators’ policy of control was in fact in line with the regents’ public intentions that aimed at control rather than reform. The Cartesian academic debate provided regents with the opportunity to assert control over the Church in a field they regarded as their own, that is, public teaching. Moreover, the Cartesians’ insistence on the distinction between theology and philosophy was ideally parallel to the regents’ intentions of separating public life from religion. According to Theo Verbeek, the attempt to transform Cartesianism into an academic philosophy
had a serious impact on public and academic life. In public life it gave regents the opportunity to reinforce their idea of pluralist republicanism, by gaining control of public teaching from the Church. By extension, in the field of religion Cartesianism instigated new debates on theological rationalism, and posed an enquiring threat to authoritarian theological dogmatism. Finally, in a philosophical context it generated a renewed interest in the problem of the transcendental conditions of knowledge.\textsuperscript{154}

Crucially, the political aspect of Cartesianism is what attracted governmental support and protection, which in turn assisted Descartes’ successes in Leiden and Utrecht, even though it went against the 1656 States’ legislation prohibiting Cartesian philosophising. The political opposition was located in the Orthodox belief that the magistrate should obey the Church, since he too was one of its members. Naturally, most rulers objected to this view and claimed an independence from politics that the Orthodox were unhappy with. Descartes too supported the view that Church officials and ministers should be involved with religious issues, such as enlightening and educating their subjects, and should not get involved with governing. From this perspective, it would be easy to assume a close connection between the regents’ ideology and Cartesian philosophy, as it further supports a disconnection of philosophy from theology, which lay at the root of the Dutch ruling class’ conservatism. For example, the foremost regent Johan de Witt, who was fascinated by Descartes’ mathematical studies, yet accepted the States’ decree of condemnation of Cartesianism, questioned a particular connection between Descartes’ philosophy and regent ideology. Furthermore, Descartes’ several governmental friends in Utrecht were perplexed by his claims for protection on the ground that his philosophy was ‘simply true’. What is quite clear from the behaviour and philosophical preferences of government officials in the debates and crises with clergymen and theologicians is that they adapted to, and parted from, the position that could best serve their own intentions.\textsuperscript{155}

\textsuperscript{154} Ibid, p. 90.
\textsuperscript{155} Ibid, pp. 9-12.
The Reformation’s impact on portraiture was also significant, as it provided the socioeconomic background for a rising interest in self-representation. As Mariet Westermann argues the significant 17th-century commercial demand for portraits of individuals needs to be seen against the lack of religious commissions by the state and the Church, as a result of the rise of Calvinism and the iconoclastic opposition against Catholicism. Until the historical moment of this rupture, the Christian Church had been the sole patron of the arts, besides aristocratic courts, for approximately twelve centuries. During the early Christian years the Orthodox Church of the Byzantium Empire did not just commission art with religious themes, but actually strove to channel all art production within these prerequisites. Artists were employed to decorate churches, royal palaces, and public spaces according to the prevailing religion, as well as executing portraits of heads of state and religious subjects (from heads of the Church to Saints and Patrons). The Catholic Church built on this pre-existent tradition, and did not alter the religious character of its commissions, even after the spread of classical ideas in by the Renaissance. In fact, the revived classical tendency offered the opportunity for religious projects of bigger scale and grandeur, as reflected in the work of Michelangelo, and his fellow artists of the time.

Calvinism, on the other hand, rejected both the sculpted Catholic and the painted Orthodox temple decorations of religious imagery. As a result, demand for religious paintings in Holland from official bodies diminished, and was restricted to private individuals’ commissions, destined for domestic interiors. The gap created by the lack of religious commissions was filled by the emerging bourgeoisie’s desire to represent their newly emergent social identity. Their favourite subjects were drawn from everyday life, specifically domestic and familial activities: from cleaning, and taking care of children, to social moments of elaborate dining and drinking sessions. According to Jonathan Israel, the flourishing of the arts in the Netherlands, and the Dutch bourgeoisie’s desire to be represented in the form of the portrait, was the outcome of three principal factors: firstly, a recognition of the courage and

determination by which they sought their independence as a class (reflected in the rise of public art commissions illustrating battles taken from the Revolt); secondly, a sign of their nation’s increasing power and wealth, given its reliance upon the commercial and trade successes of its burghers; and, thirdly, as a consequence of this increase in national wealth, the rapid emergence of private collections.\footnote{Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, pp. 548-552; see also Westermann, \textit{The Art of the Dutch Republic}, pp. 35-40.}

Calvinist iconoclasm, however, did not force out religious images altogether, as the Catholic faith was still prominent in Utrecht, which, along with Haarlem and Amsterdam, was one of the three major economic and artistic centres of the 17th-century Netherlands. However, whereas Utrecht and Haarlem were by now Remonstrant cities, Amsterdam remained counter-Remonstrant. As a result, the classicist themes (often drawn from Greek mythology and infused with eroticism) that were accommodated in the artistic production of Remonstrant cities were criticised in counter-Remonstrant cities after 1609; so for instance Pieter Lastman (Rembrandt’s teacher) toned down the eroticism of the themes in his work.\footnote{Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, p. 557.} Episcopal power may have been diminished as a result of the Reformation, but Catholicism was still active, laying claim to thirty-five percent of the city’s population. Utrecht’s strong Catholic heritage was due to the fact that in the Middle Ages the city was the Northern Netherlands’ main religious centre.\footnote{Judikje Kiers and Fieke Tissink, \textit{The Golden Age of Dutch Art: Painting, Sculpture, Decorative Art} (London: Thames & Hudson, 2000), p. 47.} Because of Catholicism the city’s artists drew strongly on religious subjects and often embarked on educational trips to Italy, with Rome being the most popular destination. The artist that they particularly admired, and whose ideas they brought back, was Caravaggio. Utrecht’s ‘Caravaggisti’ incorporated the master’s careful direction of light and chiaroscuro in Dutch painting.\footnote{Israel, \textit{The Dutch Republic}, pp. 558-559.} Consequently, at the beginning of the 17th century Utrecht became a leading national and international art centre. Besides the employment of light and chiaroscuro, Utrecht’s Caravaggism put an end to Mannerism’s artificiality, and remained true to a realist life-size, and lifelike treatment of its subjects.\footnote{Westermann, \textit{The Art of the Dutch Republic}, p. 96.} Ordinary representations of religious subjects, such as saints, transmit this new realism. Moreover, human figures were abruptly cropped, which, in addition to a focusing on
the head or face through the rigorous direction of artificial light, represents one of the first manifestations of Cartesianism in portraiture in this period.

Another city with an Italian connection was Haarlem, which in the first part of the 17th century was among the largest cities in the Netherlands. Flemish immigrants stimulated the cultural and economic prosperity of Haarlem, and, remarkably, in 1634 the city’s guild numbered among its members fifty-eight painters, six etchers, seven glass-engravers, and six sculptors. It is no surprise, then, that Haarlem’s thriving artistic and commercial society attracted flattering parallelisms to the Italian Renaissance, indeed at the time it was known as the Florence of the North. In tune with the stylistic preferences of the rest of Netherlands, the realist rendering of subjects was the main concern of Haarlem-based artists, although these paintings were void of the fabricated atmosphere generated by chiaroscuro and the focal direction of light evident in Utrecht works. In Rudolf Hermann Fuchs’ view Frans Hals and his contemporaries were approaching their portrait subjects with a “closer approximation to the living person” by emphasising their “vitality and actuality.” Moreover, Westermann argues that this vitality is achieved by the “quick and decisive look of each stroke [that] suggests spontaneity, the recording of one specific instant in the life of the sitter”. The rendering of these works, especially Hals’, is certainly ‘expressionist’ in tone, and their composition is far more audacious than the preceding relatively inactive poses – existing formulas that had persisted since the middle of the 16th century constrained such stylistic inventions. Dutch burghers’ expectations of true, detailed representation of both bodily and dress characteristics, void of any sense of idealisation or fabrication, remained the foremost priority of their commissioning concerns.

After the first quarter of the 17th century Haarlem’s lead in the development of painting and graphic arts was overshadowed by Amsterdam’s development as a cultural centre and increasing attraction to artists from elsewhere, particularly

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164 Ibid, p. 53; see also Israel, The Dutch Republic, pp. 557-558.
166 Ibid, p. 81.
168 Fuchs, Dutch Painting, p. 83.
Haarlem. The main reason it became the key artistic centre of the Netherlands, was that it took over Antwerp's role as the world's trading centre, as a consequence of the Republic's naval blockade during the war, resulting in the Netherlands' dominion of the seven seas. This naval superiority, which resulted in the flourishing of trade and thus of the State itself, was due to the increasing successes of both the East and the West India Companies. Inevitably, the city's thriving financial prospects allowed its population to increase astonishingly from fifty thousand at the beginning of the century to two hundred thousand in the 1650s. The cosmopolitan air of the city was at the same time analogous to the new Republic’s advanced cultural developments, which allowed the individual to attend to personal concerns with the appropriate amount of freedom and seclusion. One of the many celebrated visitors to the city of Amsterdam was in fact Descartes. Writing to Guez de Balzac in 1631, he praised the plethora of commodities that could be found in the city. Comforts of everyday life only added to its suitability for a peaceful, solemn retirement, which in his view surpassed the Capuchin and Carthusian monasteries.

Art production in Amsterdam is characterised as classicist and historicist, but with a strong infusion of Caravaggism. It is generally perceived that whereas Haarlem painters “focused on the physical aspects of the problem”, Amsterdam artists focus on the “psychological aspects”. For example, the work of Pieter Lastman, Rembrandt’s master for six month in 1624, prior to Rembrandt’s move to Amsterdam, treats historical and mostly biblical subjects with a certain theatricality and expressivity. After spending four years in Italy studying the great masters, Lastman became Amsterdam’s leading history painter upon his return in 1607. Lastman’s appreciation of Italian art, especially Caravaggio, was passed on to his pupil, who intensified the spiritual effect of his biblical paintings by amplifying the effects of chiaroscuro. His early works still reflect Lastman’s classicist influence in

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172 Israel, *The Dutch Republic*, pp. 559-564.
174 Lastman’s fascination with Italian art is also reflected in his tendency to sign the paintings produced after his return to Amsterdam as ‘Pietro Lastman’. Westermann, *The Art of the Dutch Republic*, p. 95.
terms of composition, and gestural theatricality. However, Rembrandt’s later concentrated use of light along with a broader use of chiaroscuro, and the gradual negation of vigorous contrasts of colour, indicate a distinct move away from Lastman’s manner.

Following this short outline of the three major 17th century Dutch styles we can point to their various association with dualist notions. Thus although they share a common insistence on naturalistic bodily representation and realistic depiction of dress – as a truthful illustration of bourgeois class values – these styles reflect a few contrasting differences. Utrecht Caravaggism is the style that stands closest to dualism, particularly in terms of composition. The prioritisation of the ‘inner self’ is established by a focal attention to the head through a reduction of the body, in terms of the size and portrait-format, which creates a classical compositional imbalance between head and body. In addition, chiaroscuro is employed as a means of creating an artificial sense of atmosphere; and the direction of light is focused clearly upon the head.

Haarlem’s realism, on the other hand, has all the characteristics of Aristotelian classicism. The majority of these works incorporate sitters in their full figure, and life size, instantly cancelling out a possible imbalance in the head’s favour. Furthermore, there is no impression of fabricated atmosphere or of chiaroscuro. Certainly, there are half-length portraits, such as those of Hals, but despite this reduction the face is not highlighted, either by illumination, or by a more abstract treatment of the rest of the figure. Finally, what enforces these works’ classicist nature is their immense sense of vitality and gestural activity, especially in Hals’ group portraits, which are in full harmony with the Aristotelian and Platonic notion of achieving self-mastery through being active in the world.

Amsterdam’s combination of classicism and chiaroscuro has all the signs of an amalgamation of both Utrecht’s Cartesian Caravaggism and Haarlem’s classicist realism. In these works, portrait subjects are treated with a heightened realism, but often in knee-length format. Only the very wealthy were painted in full-figure, life-size format – a type that originated in court circles. Yet, all formats incorporated

175 Ibid, pp. 43-45.
176 Haak, The Golden Age, p. 100.
ephemeral gestural activity, either through the turn of the head in a three-quarter pose, or by the positioning of hands. Finally, the purpose of both the application of chiaroscuro and the employment of light were to direct enough attention upon the face. However, these effects are somewhat constrained in the Amsterdam works, when compared to portraits painted in Utrecht.

Joanna Woodall: Aristocratic and Bourgeois Formats

Amsterdam burghers did not blindly adhere to a specific type of portraiture. As Woodall argues they tended to choose one format or another, depending on the intentions behind each commission. More importantly, in her view “there was no immediate sense of an irreconcilable division between established aristocratic identity and the complex of values which ultimately came to be defined as distinctively bourgeois.” She maintains that in the 17th-century Netherlands a bourgeois identity did not, in fact, fully form, drawing on H. F. K. Van Nierop’s identification of a distinct continuity between the aristocratic values that preceded the Revolt and those of the following century. Her position is reinforced by the distinction Louis Althusser makes between the Dutch burgerlijk – derivative of the word burger meaning citizen – and the more familiar concept of the French bourgeois – a term that indicates a fully formed class and its ideology.

Woodall appears to share Fuchs’ position on the un-changeability of existing realist formulas, suggesting “that [the Dutch burghers’] portraits were initially conceived and comprehended with reference to traditional concepts of portraiture, inherited and adapted from the aristocratic ideology, which predominated before the

177 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 79.
178 Ibid, p. 76.
181 Fuchs, Dutch Painting, p. 83.
Revolt.”182 By this, she refers to a right-of-portrayal that was based upon concepts of nobility, as outlined in the work of the humanist scholar and painter Francisco de Hollanda183 and in Giovanni P. Lomazzo’s treatise Trattato dell’Arte della Pittura, Scultura, ed Architettura di Gio184. In 1550, de Hollanda asserted that only royal rulers and their immediate family, and personalities famous for military, literary, and artistic achievements were worthy of honorary commemoration, due to their virtue and wisdom. According to Woodall, the qualities of wisdom, fame, and virtue that form the basis for de Hollanda’s classification “were conventionally associated with respected roles in society and formally recognised by conferment of a noble title.”185 The noble nature of these qualities is in full agreement with the 1588 Haarlem humanist Hadrianus Junius’ distinction of three sorts of nobility: of birth, or the hereditary right of rule, of virtue, or exemplary service for the state, and of skill, or humanist scholarship and artistic practices.186

A very good example of how notions of virtue were adopted by artistic practices is represented by Anthony van Dyck’s Iconography, which was first published in Antwerp by Maerten van den Enden between 1632 and 1641. In it van Dyck includes eighty engraved portraits of famous men of his time such as princes, diplomats, and scholars, but most of which are southern Dutch artists and connoisseurs.187 Van Dyck’s major project was fundamentally based on the aristocratic notion of a virtue, that is, artistic and intellectual activities, which are governed by a virtuous way of life. By extension, classicism is at play here in representing each sitter’s character through active posing, and gestural depiction of his appearance. What is crucial in van Dyck’s publication is that he attributes the same aristocratic status to artists, by applying similar criteria, and artistic rendering. The importance of this

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182 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 78.
185 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 78.
Aristocratisation of artists gains more significance through the fact that this profession, even though it was clearly not socially denigrated, was, however, of lesser standing than that of a tradesman or a ship owner.

Woodall asserts that aspects of nobility justified a right-to-portrayal in 17th century Netherlands “because the political and economic hegemony of the aristocratic order had been definitively challenged.” Yet, there were those who did not hesitate to claim a position in the pantheon of portraiture through the ‘established portals’. For instance, the Stadholder and the remaining nobles continued to be depicted in aristocratic modes of portraiture that treated the figure in its full form, in addition to a visual identification with court etiquette, rule of land and military command. To emphasise the extent to which such modes were adopted, Woodall analyses Thomas de Keyser’s 1627 portrait of the Stadholder’s secretary, Constantijn Huygens. In this portrait Huygens is presented seated by a desk decorated with a globe, mathematical instruments, and paperwork, only to be interrupted by the receipt of a document. Besides the immense sense of activity here, this theatrical appropriation serves the purpose of characterising him as a man of virtue based on skill, while his dress alludes to hunting – a strictly noble activity.

Woodall sensibly brings into question the portraits of the Amsterdam elite, whose members had every reason to abandon this type of court portrayal that espoused the aristocratic values associated with de Hollanda and Junius. In her view, portraiture in this period retained its social function of identifying and exemplifying noble attributes of esteemed virtue and wisdom, and for this reason it continued to be the means by which the claims of elevated social autonomous individuals where established. The content of the burghers’ identity was based on aspects of nobility that drew on skill and not on hereditary rights of birth, but it was still defined within aristocratic notions of value. However, this change of content certainly altered the form of the portrait by encouraging the production of private and personal images. Drawing from portraits of the Amsterdam elite Woodall identifies three strategies of portrayal: noble emulation, burgerlijk distinction, and a harmonious marriage of the two. As we will see, these distinctions seem to have a lot in common with the styles

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188 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 78. For an additional discussion on the relationship between ‘nobility’ and the ‘right of portrayal’ see also Westermann, The Art of the Dutch Republic, pp. 132-133.

189 Ibid, pp. 79-90.
of the three main Dutch artistic centres of the period. At the same time, each one reflects, accordingly, the classicist and dualist positions, and a combination of the two. Yet the fact that they are all developed in Amsterdam should be of no surprise, since the city’s metropolitan character allowed for its dominant artistic style to take shape through a combination of realist Classicism and Caravaggist dualism.

Noble emulation incorporated a form of self-representation that “articulated a claim to immortality in terms of the prerogatives of the hereditary nobility.” For her case studies Woodall picks Cornelis van de Voort’s portrait of Laurens Reael (1583 – 1637) (c. 1620), and the 1629 portrait of his wife Suzanna Moor (1608 – 1657) by an unknown artist. Reael was a highly ranked officer of the East India Company from 1611 until 1619, serving first as a military commander and afterwards as governor-general of the Indies. Upon his return to Holland he remained involved within military and political circles, and as a result in 1625 he was appointed vice-admiral of the Netherlandish naval force and director of the East India Company. The peak of Reael’s career was the moment of his ennoblement in 1626, when he was given the title of ‘Golden Knight’.

According to Woodall, what associates the nature of Reael’s claims with Junius’ hereditary sort of nobility is its use of compositional devices implying sovereign authority, and engagement with military activities. The full length, life-size format, is instantly identifiable with traditional aristocratic, and classicist modes of portraiture. Moreover, it accommodates a typical sovereign pose with legs astride and left hand on hip, usually – as in this case – resting on a sword. The bearing of arms, and the implication of military ability signified by the helmet resting on a covered table on the left are further indications of aristocratic etiquette, which are complimented with a pedestal and a curtain at the other end. Finally, the cane that Reael is holding with his right arm denotes exercise of sovereign rule in the form of judicial authority. The treatment of the whole of the painting is conventionally realist, with a natural flow of light, yet there is a fundamental idealisation at work.

As Woodall identifies, Reael’s portrait does not produce a realistic account of his current social position. In actual fact, this work incorporates a combination of

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190 Ibid, p. 79.
191 Ibid, p. 79.
192 Ibid, p. 79.
his achievements up until 1620, the year of the commission, and of his attainment of a noble title, which was not awarded until 1626. The gold chains, for instance, were probably distributed to him by the sovereign, upon his return to the Netherlands in 1619. But the emphasis on the military and the judicial aspects, through an aristocratic manner, is certainly an idealisation driven by the recognition of his ambition. However, there are certain aspects of the work that are in tune with the contemporary emphasis on exact reproduction of appearances. The attentive treatment of Reael’s dress is driven by the burghers’ insistence on emphasising the difference of their appearance from court fashion. Furthermore, Reael’s subsequent decision to pair his portrait with his partner Suzanna Moor, whom he married in 1629, altered the character of portrait works insofar as they became marital pendants, a tradition that was fundamentally linked with burghers and not with royals. Despite traces of burgher visual tradition, aristocratic elements of composition and treatment are dominant in these portraits as the means of promoting a desirable social position. Yet, if the emerging middle class was to seek full independence from the hereditary nobility, it had to do so also in terms of its visual representation. Because, as Woodall identifies “if imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, emulation implied the superiority of the hereditary elite, at least in war and international politics.”

Bob Haak claims that only a few of the very wealthy of Amsterdam’s elite commissioned full-length portraits, perhaps because they were the only ones who could afford to do so. The subjects of Bartholomeus van der Helst’s portraits of Andries Bicker (1586-1652) and of his wife Catarina Gasneb Tengnagel (1595-1652) of 1642, which according to Woodall “epitomise bourgeois values,” clearly could afford to commission the grand format. Yet they chose to go with the one that could establish a visual distinction from court tradition. A liberal protestant, Bicker was the leading figure in Amsterdam’s politics and trade between 1627 and 1650. Apart from being ten times burgomaster and the leader of the dominant anti-court faction, he and his two brothers were major world traders, with Andries specialising on exotic spices and Russian furs.

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193 Ibid, p. 82.
194 Haak, The Golden Age, p. 100.
195 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 82.
The most striking difference between these works and van der Helst’s portraits of Reael and his wife is the compositional reduction of format to half size, a choice that was certainly not based on lack of funds. Despite Bicker’s involvement in politics, both of these works are void of any objects or props, which might stand as visual attributes of office. In contrast, leisure activity, and not sovereign power, is implied by the book that Bicker is holding, as well as by the pair of gloves held by his wife. In addition to the reticent composition, these portraits are also more private than van der Helst’ paintings. Set against a neutral background of an unidentified interior, most probably a domestic space, the works’ sense of intimacy is complimented by the figures’ close proximity. The atmosphere and the restrained employment of chiaroscuro reflect a state of solitude, appropriate for self-contemplation. Light, this time, plays a role in gently directing attention to the sitters’ faces and hands, the sole purpose of which is to establish a difference in type of nobility. The figures’ reduction in size stands for a visual rejection of hereditary nobility, who validated the ancestral origin of right of rule through forms of physical resemblance (idealisation). As a result, the highlighting of the sitters’ face and hands asserts inner virtue and skill as the types of nobility of their preference, as opposed to the aristocratic hereditary type.196

For the last strategy of portrayal – a harmonious marriage of aristocratic and burgher formats – Woodall brings into discussion Nicolaes Eliasz’s (generally known as Pickenoy), c. 1635 portraits of Cornelis de Graeff (1599-1664) and of his wife Katarina Hooft (d. 1691), which skilfully combine aristocratic courtly values with a burgerlijk social position.197 Being Andries Bicker’s brother in law did not seem to prevent him from engaging in political rivalry with his relative, regarding the

196 The perception of hands as the physical counterpart of human reason was discussed by Anaxagoras, and recorded by Aristotle. According to Aristotle, the hand is not a specialised instrument, as a claw for example, but allows for the possibility of many skills. Aristotle’s appraisal of the human hand, in relation to animal parts allowed the emerging bourgeois to refer to the hands as part of an effort to promote the noble virtue of their choice, that is, skill. The full passage reads: «Ο γάρ φρονιμώτατος πληίστος ἀν ὄργανος ἔχεται καλῶς, ἢ δὲ χεῖρ ἐσεικτῇ εἶναι ὑπὸ ὕδαν άλλα πολλά. Εἰς τι γάρ ὄστερει ὄργανον πρὸ ὄργανον...Η γάρ χεῖρ καὶ ὄνος καὶ χηλῆ καὶ κέρας χεινεῖται καὶ δόρο καὶ ἕφος καὶ ἀλλο ὄσπονον ὅπλον καὶ ὄργανον-πάντα γάρ ἐσται ταῦτα διὰ τὸ πάντα δύνασθαι λαμβάνειν καὶ ἔχειν.» (For the intelligent person would put the most organs to use in the best possible way, and the hand is not one organ but many; for it is, as it were, an instrument for further instruments...For the hand can be a talon, a claw, a horn or even a spear, and a sword, or any other weapon or tool; it can be all those due to its ability to grasp and hold.) (my translation) Αριστοτέλης, Περὶ Ζώων Μορίων (Αθήνα: Κάκτος, 1994) (Aristotle, Parts of Animals (Athens: Kaktos, 1994)), τόμος IV, 687α 18-21 & 687β 3-6.

197 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 86.
dominion of Amsterdam. De Graeff’s family involvement with Amsterdam’s governing elite is partly responsible for his lenient stance towards court politics, especially if compared to Bicker’s source of popularity, which was due to his success in trade. Remnants of aristocratic behaviour can be traced in de Graeff’s passion for hunting, his frequent leisure trips abroad, and his eagerness for learned pursuits. De Graeff’s family was officially introduced into the nobility, when his father bought the title to Zuid Polsbroek from the Count of Aremberg in 1610.

The balance of this ‘harmonious marriage’ is tilted towards the aristocratic format, since Van der Voort’s and Pickenoy’s portraits are far more alike than Woodall suggests. Despite some slight differences, such as the lack of, or juxtaposition, of objects, both works are based on typical aristocratic-type composition. For example, in de Graeff’s portrait there is no indication of the pedestal and curtain found in Reael’s, yet, these props seem to have been moved into Hooft’s. The depiction of dress in all four of these portraits is closely rendered and reflects their true social status, which is a demonstration of independence from the monarchy. The full-length format, though, is clearly aristocratic and classicist, as is also the even application of light. In addition Haak, regards the portraits of the wealthy Amsterdam merchant Cornelis de Graeff and of his wife Catherina Hooft as appearing “almost in regal finery”, although without elaborating on why.\footnote{Haak, \textit{The Golden Age}, pp. 196-197.} For Woodall, the lack of de Graeff’s full regality, in contrast to Reael’s, is demonstrated in the latter’s bearing and decoration of arms, which are completely absent from the former’s.

Crucially, de Graeff’s involvement in politics was in terms of civic service and not of military achievements. Drawing from two poems by Jan Vos (1610-1670), composed in response to these portraits of the couple, Woodall reads a contrast between a male (based on ‘reason’) and a female (based on the ‘arts’) type of portraiture, which are respectively evident in Pickenoy’s portraits of de Graeff and Hooft. However, Woodall seems too hasty to accommodate the meaning of Vos’ poems in her reading of these portraits and, therefore, claims that a genderisation of virtue is taking place here: “although virtue remains close to the traditional \textit{concept} of nobility as a personal yet eternal quality, its \textit{content} is altered and moulded to justify
ideal, gendered citizens.” Woodall’s comparison of the portraits according to gender stereotypes (which are the outcome of Vos’ themed poems), is based on a few details that are not strong enough to carry her argument forward. For instance, claims of ‘reason’ are attributed to de Graeff’s “precise placement of his feet upon the regularly ordered tiles”, disregarding the fact that we cannot see whether Hooft’s feet are placed in an orderly fashion or not, due to the length of her dress. Moreover, the claim that Hooft’s “figure seems to move imperceptibly through conceptual space, brushing the air with her fan” is easily refuted once we notice that Hooft’s hand is extended in the same angle as de Graeff’s, establishing a certain harmonious, and thus, classicist compositional balance between the pendant portraits. Whereas, de Graeff holds an ‘invisible’ sword – another aristocratic indication – Hooft holds her fan. The same positioning of their other arms, both graciously holding onto the fabric of their attire, strengthens this balance.

Besides the lack of martial references, the change of content within notions of nobility is reflected through Pickenoy’s rendering of de Graeff as an aristocrat in a domestic environment, and not in sovereign interiors or exterior settings. Furthermore, there are similar syntheses within this luxurious interior, visualised in the combination of courtly columns and furnishings with the black and white tiles, typical of Dutch interiors of the time. Finally, what is definitely aristocratic, and classicist is the pictorial idealisation of de Graeff’s chin to conceal a deformation due to childhood injury, which is only mentioned in passing by Woodall in the caption of the portrait’s illustration. It is precisely these forms of fabrication that bourgeois realism rejected.

Overall, these portraits are classicist, but they cannot account for the popular format of choice of Amsterdam’s burghers, since these two marital portraits are the only examples of courtly portraits that Haak refers to as instances of expensive full-

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199 Woodall, ‘Sovereign Bodies’, p. 90.
201 *Ibid*, p. 87.
length commissions. The majority of portraits of the time incorporate the Cartesian, solitary setting of the Bicker pendants, in order to declare their possession and preference of inner virtues over hereditary aristocratic, bodily ones. But for those few who preferred the traditional visual codes - that is, the classicist-aristocratic format – these type of portraits provided the opportunity for innovative embellishment, and had the potential for expressing claims of elevated status by reference to social hierarchies. Despite the similarities of the de Graeff and the Reael pair of works, Pickenoy's reference to noble virtue is emphasised through the same inner charisma evident in van der Helst's portraits of Bicker and his wife (namely qualities of intelligence and acumen) and not through the martial indicators noticeable in van der Voort's portrait of Reael. In this context of burgerlijk distinction it seems that the early Cartesian format was capable of accommodating bourgeois values more successfully than the classicist one. De Graeff's portrait might incorporate similar positions, but their manifestation is relatively weaker and more uncertain, compared to the clear differentiation conveyed by the common burgher format of the time.

Black & White: The Significance of Attire

The black and white attire and rigid poses of 17th-century Dutch citizen portraiture is commonly perceived as a clear opposition to the colourful, relaxed and gestural poses of noble self-presentation. Woodall argues, however, that through this choice of aesthetic Amsterdam regents were not refusing to acknowledge nobility, especially since black and white attire has been the characteristic choice of members of Spanish court for over a century. In fact, despite the mature citizens' loyalty to this attire, younger members of the elite wore the colourful court fashion on numerous occasions. 

204 Haak, The Golden Age, p. 100.

Harry Berger Jr. expands this list of Dutch classicist portraits of burghers outside of Amsterdam by discussing Fran Hals' idealised Portrait of Willem Van Heythuyzen (c.1625). However, this expansion does not negate the fact that these portraits are isolated cases. Moreover, if we take into consideration that fact that Hals' portrait is of a Haarlem burgher then it becomes quite clear that the idealisation at play is in tune with the popular style in Haarlem (classicist), which makes the work even less of an exception. Harry Berger Jr., The Fictions of the Pose: Rembrandt Against the Italian Renaissance (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

205 Woodall, 'Sovereign Bodies', p. 91.
social occasions. Therefore, as Woodall adds, the adoption of black and white “was in fact not opposition to noble values per se, but rather Amsterdam elite’s double claim to authority over its ‘immature’ fellow citizens and independence from the Hague court, which necessitated a distinctive portrayed identity.” The citizens’ desire for visual distinction from the Hague court’s style was a further means by which political independence was asserted, following the citizen elite’s rivalry with the court and the Stadholder. Interestingly, the black and white attire was eventually abandoned following the Peace of Münster (1648), which recognised the Republic of Netherlands as a legitimate sovereign state.

Amsterdam’s regents subsequently overtook the republic’s political arena, when the Stadholder Willem II was defeated, and who died in 1650. At this point, Cornelious de Graeff obtained political leadership of Amsterdam from his rival Andries Bicker, marking the historical moment that the Netherlands became a citizen-run, free republic. Since the court did not any longer pose any threat or claims to power and status, citizens “adopted contemporary courtly modes of representation with impunity”, abandoning the modes that they sought to be identified with during times of political rivalry. Moreover, as Woodall notices the black and white mode of dress was problematic, since it was the preferable fashion of the Hapsburg court that preceded the Revolt. Artists such as Govert Flinck and Bartholomeus van der Helst welcomed the popular re-introduction of contemporary court fashion in citizen portraiture, which was, perhaps, the reason for them taking over from Rembrandt as Amsterdam’s leading portraitists.

Drawing from citizens’ diverse modes of self-representation that often were not in agreement with their true social status, Woodall refuses the identification of Dutch portraiture’s ‘reality’ with bourgeois values. She claims that leading Amsterdam citizens adapted existent noble categories and conventions within a realist mode of painting “to claim positions equal to, but distinct from, both the hereditary nobility and each other.” In doing so, they had to elaborate identities whose aspects were foreign to virtues associated with hereditary nobility. As a result, they drew from

206 Ibid, p. 92.
207 Ibid, p. 94.
Calvinist and contemporary Cartesian notions of the self that emphasised the individual and valued the inner charisma of intelligence and genius, which later became the foundations of bourgeois individuality.

At this point, it needs to be noticed that Woodall’s conclusions on the constructed reality of early 17th century Dutch portraiture are drawn from two pairs of marital pendants, out of the hundreds that were produced at that time. Furthermore, the sitters of these portraits are members of the Dutch elite, if not the elite itself. Therefore, it is impossible to draw sound conclusions from isolated examples, particularly if they are chosen to represent the whole of a social class. Most Dutch burgheers adopted the portrait format similar to Bicker’s, where the possibility of prioritising interior states is far greater. In this context, it is no wonder that Rembrandt’s representational emphasis on this interiorised conception of self was received with a certain admiration. However, when political independence was achieved in the middle of the 17th century, the reconciliation of burgerlijk virtue with aristocratic visual modes – as seen in the work of van der Helst – was more popular among Amsterdam citizens.

But to what extent did Cartesian dualist notions of the self direct the final formation of early 17th century Dutch portraiture? Was dualism a self-conscious and formalised position, or was it a secondary form, restrained by the Amsterdam elite’s adherence to dominant notions of nobility? From Woodall’s analysis, it is quite clear that the emphasis on an ‘inner’ self was temporary, and compromised and melded with aristocratic painterly formats. These formats visualise a conception of the self that derives from Plato and Aristotle’s notion of self, which does equal justice to both ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspects of a person. Most importantly, such a self achieves self-mastery through, as I have stressed, being active in the world. This is reflected in the cosmopolitan character, and indications of worldly activity, of the van der Voort and Pickenoy works. By contrast, Cartesian positions are synthesised through the position of the sitter in solitude and in a neutral, usually, domestic environments, which stands as a metaphor for solemn self-contemplation (as seen, in particular, in the van der Helst portraits). Furthermore, the attention to face, through the use of direct light and the compositional reduction of the body, is employed towards a hierarchical reformation that prioritises subjective, inner, intuitive virtues as opposed
to hereditary, bodily ones. Yet, despite the eventual philosophical acceptance of Cartesianism in the Netherlands, there was a certain academic, and possibly a popular resistance towards Cartesian metaphysics. Thus on the one hand, the sense of seclusion that is derivative of the ‘individualised’ subject represented in a state of solitude can be seen as a visual reference to Descartes’ method of inner contemplation. But, on the other, the lack of a full abstraction of the body could also be seen as a reflection of the popular perception of Cartesian metaphysics as problematic. In other words, the emphasis on the face, in addition to the lack of abstraction, could translate as a form of a compromise between a prevailing Cartesian and an Aristotelian position, given the fact the latter still retains a strong public position.

Consequently, in the same way that Amsterdam’s early bourgeois did not abandon aristocratic values altogether to achieve a solid class formation similar to France’s nineteenth-century middle class, the dualist portrait could not emerge and instantly evolve into a form of abstraction similar to that of modernist practices, because it was fundamentally bound up with contemporary demands for a ‘sincere’ realism. Such a notion of realism presupposed a fundamental rejection of classicist aristocratic idealisation, which went beyond that of facial characteristics. Most importantly, it stood for a ‘true reflection’ of social status through the visual representation of dress appropriate to the sitter’s social standing. Failure to dress according to status was perceived as a threat to the class system, insofar as it would confuse its signs. Reformation clergymen, such as Willem Teelinck, expressed the view in 1620 that the financial well being of a person should not encourage him to dress in a manner that does not reflect his or her social position. Furthermore, an unidentified Amsterdam lawyer, known only by the initials J. van B., argued in 1662 that the authorities should ban the wearing of silk and velvet according to one’s taste, as it blurred class distinctions. By extension, there was criticism of excessive consumption, as lavish costumes and luxurious fabrics had to be imported.\(^{210}\) As a result, the majority of burghers demanded to be represented as worthy citizens of the Calvinist and emerging financial power state of the Netherlands. They did not necessarily ask for pictorial appropriation of emphasised inner states of being, rather

\(^{210}\) The above views are expressed in Marieke de Winkel, ‘Costume in Rembrandt’s Self-Portraits’, in White et al, Rembrandt by Himself, p. 64.
for a humble but sincere justification of their respectability. One that was simply achieved through an honest reflection of their social position through their profession, independent of stylistic choices that would produce associations with the opposing aristocracy. Yet, as we have seen rules were bent, by those who employed the portrait as the means for promoting their social or career aspirations.

In addition to the familial and political relations between the subjects of Woodall’s analysed portraits, there is a possibility that the artists behind these works were associated at a professional level. Before Rembrandt’s arrival in Amsterdam, one of the leading portraitists there was Cornelis van der Voort, the painter of the Reael portrait. Generally, his work is characterised by a natural rendering of facial colour, a competent treatment of light, and highly detailed illustration of dress. Haak suggests that Nicolas Eliasz, or Pickenoy, the painter of the de Graeff portraits, might have studied under der Voort, because his work reflects the same qualities.211 Based on Woodall’s analysis too, the only difference between these two pairs of portraits is their compositional additions of objects or lack of. In spite of this, the stylistic treatment of their subjects is almost identical, with Pickenoy giving equal attention to his sitters in terms of the realist rendering of skin and dress, as well as skilful application of light; the idealisation of de Graeff’s misformed chin could have been an isolated incident.

More interestingly, Haak also refers to suggestions about Bartholomeus van der Helst (the painter of the Bicker pendants), being a pupil of Pickenoy “on the basis of his style.”212 As for the Bicker portraits, he regards them as examples of the moment van der Helst “found his true form”, only to add that this form “would soon make him the most famous portrait painter in Amsterdam and at the same time the antithesis of Rembrandt in the two artists’ concepts of painting.”213 Despite the compositional similarities of the two masters (the cropping of the body set against a domestic interior) Haak identifies a series of technical differences. For a start, van der Helst’s technique is realistic with clear modelling of his sitters’ expressions, as opposed to Rembrandt’s perceptible brushstrokes. Interestingly, Rosenberg claims that Rembrandt’s technique “…never became an end in itself, but always served the

212 Ibid, p. 290.
expression of profound human content." In addition, Van der Helst’s colours are relatively lighter and brighter, even though he employed darker colours in his early career. Chiaroscuro is carefully applied, as van der Helst’s energetic colouring is never allowed to deny the work its even unity. Moreover, Haak regards the treatment of light as the most significant difference between them. Indeed, van der Helst’s application of light is similarly restrained in order to avoid Rembrandt’s strong contrasts, which are the result of his concentrated direction of light, often leaving areas neglected and in almost darkness (Rembrandt’s exaggerated incorporation of chiaroscuro and tensional direction of light). It is due to this approach to the human subject that Rembrandt stood out from his contemporaries and is regarded as the foremost artist engaged in studying and revealing ‘inner states’ of being. But, did Rembrandt abandon existing pictorial styles altogether, in his quest of the mapping of the inner self? In doing so, did he also incorporate Cartesian dualist notions, or remain truthful to classicist, Aristotelian notions? Or did he experiment with both, coming to combine them in a reflection of Amsterdam’s mixing of classicism and Caravaggism? If he did, what pictorial means did he employ to visualise this position? Did he elaborate on contemporary trends, or did he innovate and invent new ones? But, most importantly, were these self-representations, in burgerlijk terms, honest?

*Rembrandt van Rijn*

In contrast to his contemporaries Rembrandt produced a large amount of self-portraits. There is no surviving image of Vermeer, for example, unless we consider the artist’s back in the *Artist’s Studio* (Kunsthistorisches Museum, Vienna) as his own. Frans Hals, on the other hand, left only two representations of himself, in which he appears with the same ordinariness found in most of his portraits of common Haarlem citizens. The motives behind Rembrandt’s tendency to constantly study his physical and psychological aspects throughout his life have left scholars divided. Norbert Schneider, for instance, perceives it as “a sign of his interest in autobiography and as proof of the belief he nurtured, in spite of the many crises and setbacks he

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suffered, in the uniqueness of the individual.” Schneider sees Rembrandt’s interest in autobiography in relation to the rise of the individual in the 17th-century Netherlands, which sparked an interest in various forms of autobiographical literature. Prior to Schneider, Christopher Wright claimed the opposite, and cited “Rembrandt’s ability to analyse his own character...[as] lead[ing] to the grave misconception that it is possible to work out the artist’s biography by looking at the self-portraits.” For Wright, the reason for this impossibility is Rembrandt’s consistency in failing to appear in his work engaged in ordinary activities, or wearing everyday dress – apart from a very few instances.

Of course, there are also the romanticist views, like that of Rosenberg’s, who suggests that “Rembrandt seems to have felt that he had to know himself if he wished to penetrate the problem of man’s inner life.” Andreas Beyer is initially more careful in avoiding a dualist language, asserting that Rembrandt used himself as an instantly available and costless model to “explore the fundamental problem of the character study before applying it effectively to other portraits.” However, Beyer eventually employs a fundamentally dualist language in explaining the means by which Rembrandt explored human character; Rembrandt worked through “penetrating self-analysis and intense self-contemplation.” Here, the Platonic concept of the artist’s ‘pure vision’, capable of seeing the truth in the cosmos, is inverted, insofar as to see the truth is to see it in human beings. In Rembrandt’s case this process is applied through the Cartesian mode of self-mastery, that is, a form of inner self-contemplation determined by a disengagement from worldly and material interests.

Westermann sees a dual condition in self-portraiture, arguing that it is both “confrontational” and “deeply introspective.” However, the term ‘self-portrait’, aligned with concepts of self-examination and self-awareness “with existential connotations,” was only introduced, as such, in the 19th century. Prior to the Romantic literature emphasis on the individual as an introspecting being, in the 17th

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220 Ibid, p. 221.
and first half of 18th centuries the portrait, and even Rembrandt’s self-portraits were referred to as ‘a likeness of’ a given subject. Instead of its modern function, as Ernst van de Wetering proposes, the self-portrait carried a dual function – alternative to Westermann’s – one that can be applied to Rembrandt’s too: first, it was a likeness of an *omo famoso*, and second it stood as proof or reason for that person’s fame. Of course, as the term implies, when a self-portrait was not commissioned it was executed at the desire of the painter/sitter, which often served claims for fame instead of confirming it. Here lies van der Wetering’s answer to Rembrandt’s large production of self-portraits, as he views it, as a call for fame through a visual demonstration of his talent in the genre that he specialised. The same does not account for Rubens or Poussin, for example, simply because they both specialised in history painting, and therefore their portraits could not be considered as characteristic examples of their practice.

Generally, scholars are united in viewing Rembrandt’s intense study of his face in the Leiden era self-portraits as physiognomic experiments. Muller, for example, identifies the artist’s “wish to get to know the resources of expression in his own face” as “the most important motivating factor” behind these works. Schneider goes as far to reject a viewing of these works in light of “his religious introspection”, only to argue that these portrait studies were inspired by contemporary academic art theory based on doctrines of emotional expression. Thus, according to this position Rembrandt acted out various emotional states for the purpose of this study, which demanded that the face becomes the focal point of the painting, as it represents the centre of human expression of feelings and emotions. In doing so, the format of these portraits was reduced to bust-size, and any ornaments were tentatively left out. Rembrandt’s acting, however, instantly negates these works of any sense of truth or originality in the depiction of his own feelings.

Of course, this methodological choice was not driven by the opposite of self-analysis, that is, a desire for self-repression. But as Schneider carefully notices, in these works Rembrandt “was not interested in revealing his ‘innermost being’, but

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223 Ibid, p. 31.
224 Ibid, p. 36.
rather in exploring his own mimic abilities to produce an encyclopedia of the human feelings.” That is, an encyclopedia that the painter could resort to for the needs of his history paintings.\textsuperscript{228} The search for such universal knowledge is what influenced several of Rembrandt’s early self-portraits to become tronies (heads), where the identity of the sitter is of secondary importance. The term itself is of French origin (troigne), and in 17\textsuperscript{th} century it was usually employed to refer to impersonal busts of fictional figures with appropriated expressions and adorned with costumes, which carried specific connotations, such as the depiction of virtues such as courage and faith, mental states, or ages.\textsuperscript{229} A similar visual commentary can be identified in the Hellenic κούρος (kouros, young adult male) and κόρη (kore, young adult female), personifications of divine virtues and muses, and in classicist-inspired monuments such as The Unknown Soldier. A notion of theatricality is central for the means of producing this encyclopedia of tronies, and as Svetlana Alpers notices, “Rembrandt has had to become an actor: to get at the expression he wishes to depict, he must experience or at least play at experiencing it himself.”\textsuperscript{230}

Therefore, Rembrandt’s early portraits were to a certain extent idealised, not objectively but subjectively. They were so because the theatrical appropriations that he forced himself to adopt, for the sake of technical research, were in contrast to the much sought after stylistic realism adopted by the Dutch middle class. In the light of Cartesian dualism, the lack of realism and the implementation of aristocratic ‘idealisation’ here bring these works closer to models that aspire to the classicist Aristotelian notion of the self. Yet, at the same time it is problematic to read these portraits as ‘inner insights’. Rembrandt is representing inner emotions, but feelings alone stand very far from Descartes’ concept of a universal, unchanging self, because regardless of their intensity they are ever changing, ephemeral, and momentary. In fact, Descartes argued that a distinct idea of an autonomous mind does not embrace the operations of imagination, sensation, purposeful movement of body, appetites,
and, crucially to this argument, emotions.\textsuperscript{231} Quite simply, psychology should not be employed for the justification of an autonomous soul, since emotional states originate from bodily experiences, which in return are manifest through the body, and particularly through the face. When emotions are aroused from sole contemplation, it is due to the recollection of lived experiences. Nobody gets anxious, or scared from solving philosophical problems, for example, but various feelings are evoked in everybody when memories from lived events are revisited. Even the act of fantasising takes place in terms of constructing scenarios through specific images, borrowed from and reflecting the material world, and not through abstract or unimaginative means.

What if we were to accept the self-analytical nature of these self-portraits? At first, Rembrandt’s inward turn, as the means for self-exploration, seems in tune with Descartes’ and Augustine’s call for self-reflexivity and disengagement in search for a true, divine, universal being. Yet, his perspective and the methodological documentation that he applied with such tenacity have a lot in common with Michel de Montaigne’s (1533–1592) philosophical quest for self-discovery.\textsuperscript{232} In relation to Augustine and Descartes, Montaigne’s process was in some ways antithetical towards the objectification of our nature, which is central to Cartesian disengagement. He held the view that our own flawed nature is fundamentally relevant to our identity; therefore, it should be thoroughly explored in order to establish this identity.

Even though Montaigne did not travel through the Netherlands during his European journeys to Germany and Italy, the Dutch intelligentsia was certainly aware of Montaigne’s Essays. A renowned admirer and contemporary of Montaigne was the Flemish professor Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), who greatly assisted in the academic endorsement of Montaigne’s work. From 1579 Lipsius taught at the University of Leiden for thirteen years until he accepted the Chair of Latin History at Louvain in 1592. Being an important figure in the Renaissance revival of Stoicism Lipsius commonly addressed Montaigne as “Thales Gallicanus”, due to his influence in the


\textsuperscript{232} The Essays of Montaigne, Florio translation (New York: Modern Library, 1933). Van de Wetering discusses briefly Montaigne in relation to Rembrandt’s notion of the self. However, his reading of Montaigne is somewhat problematic, if not incomplete, as he fails to reflect on Montaigne’s eventual rejection of universality, and subsequent turn to a search of unique individual characteristics in humans. Ernst van de Wetering, ‘The Multiple Functions of Rembrandt’s Self Portraits’, p 19.
reemergence of classical thought.233 Another famous admirer of Montaigne was the Dutch poet Pieter Corneliszoon Hooft, son of a burgomaster, who went as far as to include references to the “divine Gascon” in his work.234

Montaigne’s Self-discovery

When Montaigne embarked on his reflections, he was searching for a classicist-inspired unchanged, universal core of being. Yet, when he commenced on this process of self-examination he recognized the inner instability of being. His reaction was similar to, but in a sense more extensive than Rembrandt’s, as he engaged with this instability by commented on, documenting and cataloguing his disparate thoughts, feelings, and responses.235 Through this process, Montaigne increasingly moved towards a rejection of an inherent universality to being, as he came to acknowledge the possibility of inherent change not only in human beings, but also in all things.236 Following this rejection of a static universalism, he argued for a return to nature’s rule from a personal and an individual perspective.237 In this, he agreed with his philosophical predecessors by distancing himself from the excesses of passion.238 For Montaigne, to live right is to live within limits that are specific to each individual, and not by standards imposed by abstract spiritual aspirations.239 In fact, it is our very nature that could assist us in liberating ourselves from the, often, tyrannical demands of moral perfection, which usually treat our natural being with contempt and depreciation.240 Thus, Montaigne introduces a kind of self-reflection that is essentially individual, rid of dualist universal impersonality, whose purpose is to reach self-knowledge without the restraints and delusions of passion.

236 Ibid, p. 725.
238 Ibid, p. 756.
239 Ibid, p. 896.
Likewise, there are noticeable differences with Cartesian individualism too.\textsuperscript{241} The intention behind Montaigne's self-discovery is to identify the individual through his or her original particularities, and not through a scientific reading of the subject in its general essence. Furthermore, the Cartesian call for responsibility entails a construction of a personal order that is based on universal criteria found in every human being, and not on each person's emergent singularity. In contrast, Montaigne's singularity or originality is to be reached through (Cartesian) self-understanding, but only when it is \textit{free from demands imposed by universal interpretations}. To sum up, and as Charles Taylor puts it, where "Descartes calls for a radical disengagement from ordinary experience; Montaigne requires a deeper engagement in our particularity."\textsuperscript{242} In other words, where Descartes was in search of the universal and the divine, Montaigne was, subsequently, in search of the unique and the humane. Yet, all these differences should not allow the fundamental similarity between these two notions of modern individuality to be overlooked, that is, the importance that both writers attribute to \textit{self-reflexivity}.

Now, the important question here is whether Rembrandt was looking for the unique and the original in \textit{himself}. If this is the case, then we would be forced to accept the autobiographical, self-analytical position that has been widely rejected by Muller, Schneider, and Beyer's claims for Rembrandt's performative enactment. Furthermore, if we agree with Schneider's case for an 'encyclopaedia of human feelings', it seems that Rembrandt combines the Montaignean 'particular' with the dualist 'universal'. This is so, because he studied his own personal facial expressions of feelings commonly found in everyone. To a certain extent, the creation of this encyclopaedia is similar to the dualist accumulation of knowledge through a process of objectification. In this case, Rembrandt's facial expressions might be seen as evidence of a process of documentation, in order to assist in the 'instrumental control' of the pictorial representation of his future subjects. Yet, such an intention presupposes the classical (Aristotelian) act of idealisation, in terms of enlivening the appearance of the character through convincing, often constructed, representations of emotional

\textsuperscript{241} For this discussion I have drawn on Charles Taylor's comparative analysis: 'Exploring "l'Humaine Condition"', \textit{Sources of the Self: The Making of Modern Identity} (Cambridge, University of Cambridge, 1989), pp. 177-184.

\textsuperscript{242} \textit{Ibid}, p. 182.
The fabrications of this tendency stand in contrast with Descartes' emphasis on ‘truth’, and subsequently with the early bourgeois’ adherence to realism, a realism that was inspired by the Cartesian insistence on absolute truth. In other words, what is at play in Rembrandt’s early period is the coexistence of the conflictual ideologies of Aristotelianism, rooted in his pursuit of idealisation, and Cartesianism, through the development of the means for identifying and objectifying universal attributes in human beings.

Rembrandt’s wish to master the representation of expressed emotions is not so much about the idealisation of the facial, material characteristics, but the appropriation of mood, whose purpose is to draw attention to the interior states of the self. As Woodall has clarified, the pictorial emphasis of charisma or inner virtue has a dual function: it is a declaration of the subject’s nobility, which at the same time sidetracks aristocracy’s hereditary, bodily identity. For this, Rembrandt mastered the depiction of facial expression, chiaroscuro, and the handling of light. On the role and importance of chiaroscuro, Leymarie notices that it was “used hitherto for superficial illusionist effects” and goes as far as to poetically assert, “it was for him [Rembrandt] the language of the soul.”

Commenting on The Raising of Lazarus, Muller’s reading of light is similar to Rosenberg’s, though, he is not making any metaphysical claims: “[it] fulfils the sole purpose of illustrating what the artist wishes to say.”

Rosenberg pays close attention to Rembrandt’s chiaroscuro and management of light in his analysis, as would be expected, due to his persistent dualist reading of Rembrandt’s work. For him, “Rembrandt used both light and shadow in a far more subjective fashion, not primarily to define form, but for their suggestive and evocative qualities.” Regarding the early studies, it is the controlled “organisation of lights and darks…[that] gives a striking emphasis to the psychological content.” Further on, the essence of this content is clarified, as Rosenberg talks of how Rembrandt preferred chiaroscuro for “suggesting mood and those intangible things which, for him, belonged to a full characterisation of man.”

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243 See Chapter 1, pp. 47–53.
244 Leymarie, Dutch Painting, p. 123.
245 Muller, Rembrandt, p. 30.
246 Rosenberg, Rembrandt, p. 300.
248 Ibid, p. 57.
'how' of these suggestions, as chiaroscuro is employed to draw attention to the “essentials, such as facial expression and the hands.” These remarks refer to the late 1630's commissioned portraits, but similar use of light is noticed by Rosenberg in Rembrandt's Self-Portrait of 1640 (Castiglione-type); the strongest light is directed on the face, which is almost illuminated. Discussing a group of genre-like portraits and studies of 1645-47, Rosenberg views this attention to the face through compositional arrangement and chiaroscuro as a focus upon, and a revelation of, “the inner life of his subjects.” Of course, such claims do not apply only to this specific group of works, but to his entire production. Rosenberg makes similar remarks about Rembrandt's portraits of his son Titus that he painted between 1655-1660. His position crystallises in his analysis of Rembrandt's portrait of Christ of 1661, where “the light is raised to the forehead, thus enhancing the loftiness and spirituality of the Saviour’s appearance.” Yet, he seems to equate emotional states, specifically melancholic mood, with spirituality. For example, in his discussion of Girl with a Broom, c. 1651, he talks of how the young girls “shadowed eyes…betray the slightly sorrowful mood of a child who bears the burden of heavy daily duties”. Similar comments are advanced in his review of Man with a Gilt Helmet, c. 1650. As we have seen, emphasis on the face produces a compositional dualism; the head is prioritised at the expense of the body, which often leads to reductions in size and format. But, at the same time, a fully-fledged dualist position is limited by the face's ability to represent human feelings. In addition, the inability to represent an immaterial notion of the mind, soul or self separate from the body, or face in this case, restrains the full formation of the dualist position.

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249 Ibid, p. 66; Rosenberg makes this remark drawing on late 1630's commissioned portraits.
250 Ibid, p. 42.
251 Ibid, pp. 89-90.
253 Ibid, p. 118.
254 Ibid, pp. 93-95.
255 Ibid, p. 106. It has to be noted that this work has recently been de-attributed by the Rembrandt Research Project, based in Amsterdam.
Theatricality & the Role of Costume in Rembrandt’s Middle Period

If experiments of facial expression, application of chiaroscuro, and direction of light mark the early period, the middle period witnesses the implementation of these in further experiments with poses and gestures, as well as in the incorporation of ornamental devices and dress. The theatricality of the early self-portraits remains, but now it expands from the appropriation of facial expression to the performative posing in costumes, poses that do not reflect Rembrandt’s social status or even his country of origin – a Caravaggist strategy that was probably passed on to Rembrandt by Lastman. Commenting on Rembrandt’s middle-period self-portraits, Wright offers an interesting remark that contradicts his initial ‘analytical’ view, one that inevitably accepts a notion of theatricality: “…it may well be that many of these self-portraits were demonstrations of his abilities, displayed in order to impress prospective patrons; a kind of showing-off which had nothing to do with self-analysis.” Such a position would presuppose that Rembrandt was driven by the taste of prospective patrons, in as much he allowed his art to be adapted to their exotic or fanciful desires. However, recent research has shown that Rembrandt was becoming increasingly indifferent towards the patronage system, and instead preferred to act freely as a painter on the open market. His relationship with patrons was critical due to the unacceptable long hours he required for sittings of portraits, the habit of delay in finishing works, and the fact that occasionally paintings were returned by the client due to a lack of likeness of the sitter. Therefore, if these works were in fact advertisements of technical skill and of an ability to execute a variety of appearance, then, they were addressed to the open market’s popular taste and not directly to individual patrons’ stylistic preferences.

For Volker Manuth the role of costume in Rembrandt’s self-portraits is to assist the painter in claiming a place among the greats of the Northern European school. Berger adds to this group the Renaissance greats; he claims that a sketch of Titian’s *Portrait of a Man*, c. 1512 lead to Rembrandt’s *Self Portrait*, 1640 (Castiglioni

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259 Ibid, p. 91.
type). Moreover, Berger claims that the link with the Renaissance epoch becomes further established by Rembrandt’s use of a costume that is over a hundred years out of date. With this self-portrait Rembrandt entered a competition with the greats, attempting to “overgo them and attain to their higher status”. Manuth challenges readings similar to those of Berger’s by drawing parallels between Rembrandt’s choice of 16th-century costume and composition, which refer to famous portraits of Albert Dürer and Lucas van Leyden instead. In this process, he challenges the influence of Raphael’s Portrait of Baldassare Castiglione, before 1516, and Titian’s Portrait of a Man, on Rembrandt’s Self Portrait, 1640 (Castiglioni type). The colour of the portrait clearly recalls Raphael, but the placement of the forearm - believed to be inspired by Titian - is now seen as closer to Dürer’s forearm, as depicted in his famous Self Portrait (1498). In focusing on the treatment of the right arm that lies on the ledge Manuth identifies stronger compositional links with Dürer, rather than with Titian, where the subject rests only his elbow. By bringing into the discussion an X-radiograph of the work we realise that Rembrandt initially included his right-arm fingers, a detail that if it were not altered, would have brought this work even closer to Dürer’s.

In relation to Wright’s view of Rembrandt advertising his technical skills and abilities to patrons through portraits, Manuth is, crucially, replacing the notion of market with that of art-history, and by extension history itself. Such a move has more in common with Rembrandt’s indifference to patronage that Alpers suggests, one that is free from individual direct demands from patrons that dictate the outcome of a given work. Owners of important collections of artists’ self-portraits that declared an artist’s greatness by his/her inclusion, like the Uffizi in Florence, did not express demands when it came to new additions, as they tended to purchase already completed portraits, as well as commissioned ones. Indeed they preferred to allocate appropriate freedom to artists in order for them to produce their self-portraits, so that they could freely enter a pantheon of ommeni illustri, and most importantly ommeni

263 The Uffizi collection relied on purchases, inheritance, and gifts as it did not commission new works until 1664; Manuth, ‘Rembrandt and the Artist’s Self Portrait: Tradition and Reception’, pp. 48-49.
famosi. At the same time this creative freedom provided the selected artists with the opportunity to justify the grounds for their selection. However, Wright fails to consider the fact that in the same way that the market consists of individual patrons, historical greatness was realised through the choices of famous collectors. Of course, no direct stylistic demands are imposed, as in the case of commissions, yet artists have a sense of the desirable collectors' tastes.

During his middle period Rembrandt executed a few of the most challenging group portraits in the history of Dutch art. This type of portraiture apparently did not develop in any other European state of the time, which makes it a unique manifestation of Dutch culture. The rise of Calvinism, and the lack of a sovereignty able to generate commissions, are viewed as the reason for the emergence of these grand projects. According to Fuchs, the group portrait was in agreement with the Calvinist “…ethical point of view that it is idle to pride oneself on worldly power”, therefore “it is more discreet to have oneself portrayed in a private capacity, as member of a militia company or as governor of a charitable institution or a guild.”

The elaborate nature of this type posed a significant problem to painters. Every member of the group had to be treated with the same amount of attention, which forced the painter to arrange such compositions so that all characters were facing in the same direction. Thus, painters had to compromise, with compositions that involved a minimum of action. Yet, since the Wars of Independence (1580) and the increasing introduction of hierarchies in corporations, group portraits started to reflect this change leading to the prioritisation of “individual autonomy” over group “unity”. However, this autonomy was implemented with utmost respect for preserving a sense of unity in the group. In other words, the desired pictorial unity was no longer allowed to suppress the distinct representation of individuals. Even though, anatomy portraits differed from civic-guard and regents paintings by having a central motif, artists often failed to break through these static compositions.

The young Rembrandt resolved such restrictions in his Anatomy Lesson of Dr. Nicolaes Tulp, 1632, by emphasizing movement through the arrangement of subjects.

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264 For a discussion on the differences between Dutch group portraiture and Italian family and friendship group portraiture see Riegl, The Group Portraiture of Holland, pp. 61-62.
265 Fuchs, Dutch Painting, p. 92.
around a diagonal axis. The portrait marked the occasion of Tulp’s second public anatomy lesson for the surgeons’ guild, which had at its disposal the body of Adriaan Adriaansz, alias ‘The Kid’, who was hanged the day of the anatomy lesson (31st of January) for committing a robbery. This work differs from previously painted anatomy lessons, in that all previous representations show the dead body lying parallel to the picture plane. Rembrandt broke within this conventional model in order to position the students naturally around the body, with Tulp facing them from one end in dignified pose. But, as Muller claims, “the concentration which can be read in the features of the best-observed characters has the effect of presenting a merely momentary expression, thereby denying us much insight into the workings of their minds.” The work’s tension and action lends it an immense sense of dramatic power, which is diversified by its sense of constructed theatricality, since Rembrandt is not depicting a realistic situation. The arm was the last thing to be dissected; anatomy lessons would begin by dissecting the abdomen. There are also numerous mistakes in the accurate depiction of the corpse’s arm muscles and tendons, yet we can forgive such errors, since such a meticulous subject requires advanced medical knowledge of anatomy, one that only a few artists at the time had acquired.

Rembrandt’s achievement in representing such a complicated and challenging occasion in an active mode is, therefore, unique to the time. Contrary to similar anatomy portraits, he escapes the trap of the static pose that evokes an impression of contemplation, regardless of it being related to the depicted educational event. The models of representation that involves motion and action are typical examples of classicist practice as they propose a model of active being in the world. At the same time, motion is easily idealised through the appropriation of gestures and the positioning of subjects; something that Rembrandt did not hesitate to apply. On the other hand, the subject of the portrait is essentially dualist, as we witness the scientific objectification of a dead body by a group of living people. This process of objectification is a lot closer to Descartes’ model of understanding nature that it might

269 Muller, *Rembrandt*, p. 54.
271 William Schupbach, *The Paradox of Rembrandt’s ‘Anatomy of Dr. Tulp’*, Medical History Supplement no. 2 (London, Wellcome Institute for the History of Medicine, 1982) pp. 7-8, & Appendix I, pp. 52-56; Schupbach makes the same remark as Kiers et al in identifying the wrong order of dissected organs in Tulp’s anatomy, p. 28.
seem, as the body is perceived as part of nature that acts as the host of the soul. So, understanding the logics and functions of a body void of a soul is just another examination of natural phenomena. Yet, what we are viewing is the sole examination of the function of hands, which apparently, were perceived to be the means by which inner virtues or even the soul expressed itself in the material world. But, should not a scientific analysis of the mechanics of the body reject metaphysical explanations?

The answer to this question lies in the function or purpose of anatomy in the 16th- and 17th-century Netherlands, and on the focus of Dr. Tulp’s anatomy in Rembrandt’s painting. In the early 16th century the Hellenic proverb γνῶθι σεαυτόν (know thyself) came to rationalise the practice of anatomy. As we have seen in the introduction, this notion of self-reflexivity is what underlines dualist conceptions of self-mastery. By knowing one’s self one can discern the sources of one’s passions, master them and clear the path for truth in order to find one’s role in the cosmic order (Plato) or find God (Christianity/Cartesianism), and thus, achieve self-mastery. Descartes was a huge supporter of anatomical studies, as he frequently attended such events between 1629-30 while in Amsterdam, and defended the practice in his correspondence.272 The Delphic maxim had two interpretations at this time: cognitio Sui, and, cognitio Dei. The former is an extension of its ancient, but non-Platonic origins, where anatomy serves the purpose of understanding, thus, emphasising the mortality of man. The latter is derivative of the former, as it implies that by ‘knowing thyself’ we gain knowledge of God’s providence, by revealing His presence in the human body, thus, proving His existence through a study of his masterful creation, which is made in His image.273

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272 René Descartes, Oeuvres, ed. Ch. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: J. Vrin, 1974 & 1975), letter to M. Mersenne, vol. 1, p. 137; letter no. CLXXVII, p. 621; La description du corps humain et de toutes ses functions, preface, p. 223. All above sittings, as well as further supportive positions that relate Cognitio Sui with Cognitio Dei are also presented in Schupbach, The Paradox of Rembrandt’s ‘Anatomy of Dr. Tulp’, Appendix III, pp. 66-84; Cognition Sui interpretations of γνῶθι σεαυτόν can be found in Appendix V, pp. 90-102.
273 Schupbach, The Paradox of Rembrandt’s ‘Anatomy of Dr. Tulp’, pp. 31-34.
One of Tulp's influences was his teacher Pieter Paaw (1564-1617), who practiced anatomies in Leiden between 1589 and 1617. For Paaw, 'know thyself' meant to explore the ephemerality of man through a comprehension of his bodily functions. Of course Paaw was not the only one with such views, and medical or anatomy portraits illustrated this position with the addition of a skeleton or a skull being studied, reminding us of the inevitable, which is usually pointed at by the praelector.

Fine examples of what William Schupbach calls ‘pessimistic iconography’ of the proverb, are Thomas de Keyser’s *Anatomy of Dr. Sebastiaen Egbertsz de Vrij*, 1617, and Nicolaes Eliasz’s (Pickenoy) *Anatomy of Dr. Johan Fonteyn*, 1625, where the subjects gather around a skeleton in the former, and a skull in the latter, which is pointed at by the praelector. On the side of the Christian understanding of the proverb lies another major influence on Tulp, Andreas Laurentius (1558-1609), who was initially a professor of anatomy in Montpellier in 1586 and then became Henri the IV and Marie de Mèdicis’ physician. His books on anatomy and medicine were received with great respect and were republished until 1778. Laurentius supported the view that we reach *Cognitio Dei* through *Cognitio Sui*. Under this light, man is viewed as a ‘microcosm’, and by far the most perfect animal. The praelector’s duty was to reveal the complexity and miraculous co-operation of human body organs as well as specific anatomical properties, created in God’s image, which raise humans above animals and prove God’s divine wisdom and creativity. Pictorial examples of this ‘optimistic view’ are Michiel and Pieter van Miereveld’s *Anatomy of Dr. Willem van der Meer*, 1617, Adriaen Backer’s *Anatomy Lesson of Professor Frederik Ruysch*, 1670, and Johan van Neck’s *Anatomy Lesson of Professor Frederik Ruysch*, 1683, where instead of a skull or a skeleton the object under study is a human corpse and the surgeons are viewed while in action, with no of pointing gestures.

Of all the body parts, the hands were perceived as the most important, given that through prehension they were seen as an extension of reason or psyche. This is

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precisely the reason for the reordering of the anatomy’s procedure. As we have seen, Aristotle, after Anaxagoras, praised the hands for this specific faculty, and Galen followed this by specifically admiring the mechanical excellence of the flexor-tendons and muscles’ intersection. Yet, Schupbach fails to notice that Galen, and doctors generally of his time, perceived this design as Nature’s; it was only in the 16th century that Christian doctrines claimed nature’s work as God’s. In this tradition, 16th century anatomists like Andreas Vesalius (1514-1564), Julius Casserius (1552 - 1616) and Laurentius, all influenced by Galen’s views, resorted to the human hand – and specifically to its finger flexor-tendons and muscles – to demonstrate, in Schupbach’s words, “God’s manifestation in the human body”. Rembrandt perhaps also refers to a plate in Julius Casserius’ two anatomical volumes, and to a woodcut portrait of Andreas Vesalius, which was included in his Fabrica and other books. As in Tulp’s portrait, these images depict the muscle flexor digitorum superficialis as it is pulled or lifted away from the muscle flexor digitorum profundus. However, only Tulp recreates the function of these flexor-muscles with his left arm by a gesture that can be mistakenly perceived as a common teaching one.

According to Schupbach, Rembrandt’s Anatomy of Dr. Tulp incorporates a “paradox”. The figure on the top of the external compositional pyramid is the surgeon Frans van Loenen. Schupbach claims that van Loenen’s pointing gesture at the corpse demonstrates the Cognitio Sui in a manner similar to the surgeons in de Keyser and Pickenoy’s group portraits. Tulp’s left hand gesture, by which he recreates the function of the mechanism of the flexor-muscles and tendons in the hand by differentiating the two flexor-muscles of the fingers with his right hand, demonstrates the Cognitio Dei. It is precisely the teleological implication of this anatomy lesson, which affects the expression of Tulp’s face and attracts the absorbed attention from his fellow participating surgeons. Apparently, van Loenen was originally portrayed

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277 Op. cit. fn. 44.
279 For a discussion on adaptation and transformation of classical doctrines into Christian dogmas see Chapter 1, p. 36.
282 Ibid, p. 44.
283 Ibid, p. 44.
with a hat on that was painted out eventually,\textsuperscript{284} resembling and sharing the compositional importance of Tulp, yet not in perfect harmony as Tulp is clearly the centre of attention. In addition, Schupbach’s claim about van Loenen’s \textit{Cognitio Sui} position is not as solid, given that he is pointing at a corpse and not a skeleton or a skull, as fellow surgeons did in similar paintings in support of this doctrine. Yet, when seen in relation to Tulp’s emphasised gesture and anatomical focus, there is a certain contradiction. This lack of balance between these two figures is what forces Schupbach to admit that overall Rembrandt’s group portrait tends to reside within the \textit{Cognitio Dei}. However, the juxtaposition of the two opposing doctrines transforms the subject of the painting from a presentation of the two positions to an “antinomical paradox of their co-existence”.\textsuperscript{285}

So, what is observable here in Rembrandt’s group portrait is the conflicted co-existence of the dualist and non-dualist conception of human nature, with predominance toward the dualist position. And, where we would normally expect a scientific understanding of the body’s mechanics to negate any metaphysical claims concerning its creation or being, instead, God is praised for his wisdom and providence through his ability to create something so complicated yet divinely perfect. Still, it remains unclear whether Rembrandt painted out van Loenen’s hat (or whether another artist was advised to do so). Such a question is of crucial importance, as this alteration changed van Loenen’s position from that of a praelector, like Tulp, to that of a fellow surgeon, like the rest of the participants, thus tilting the balance towards \textit{Cognitio Dei}. In addition, once again we are faced with yet another conflictual co-existence of dualist and non-dualist ideological positions in Rembrandt’s practice, one that lies between the subject and its compositional appropriation and treatment. The movement in the composition carries classicist characteristics, but the subject of the re-touched painting depicts a scientific method for revealing metaphysical properties in man. The Leiden portraits’ conflict between Aristotelian intention and dualist means is inverted in this group portrait into a demonstration of dualist intention through Aristotelian means.

\textsuperscript{284} \textit{Ibid}, p. 1.  
\textsuperscript{285} \textit{Ibid}, p. 48.
Theatricality & Performativity in Rembrandt’s Studio

Of all the portrait-types, the group portrait posed the biggest threat to Rembrandt’s performativity, as the finished product was restricted by the need for Rembrandt to meet the portrait’s numerous subjects’ demands. Single or double portraits, and, of course, self-portraits, were ideal for applying a notion of performative theatricality. But as Alpers has remarked, theatrical gestures, poses and dressing-up are not ‘false’, in the sense of being activities that were never performed by Rembrandt in real life, but were acted out, either by Rembrandt or by “consummate actors” in studio environment.286 Alpers also notices, that this studio practice is without precedent, and that it could well be Rembrandt’s own invention.287 Counter to Alpers, de Winkel claims that it would be impossible for the dresses in Rembrandt’s self-portraits to survive intact or to still be available in Amsterdam a century after they were originally created.288 Instead, she supports the idea that Rembrandt studied their appearance from his huge collection of art-prints and drawings. Originally Rembrandt turned to prints for the production of his history paintings, and eventually he incorporated aspects of them in his self-portraits. Yet, when it came to his self-portraits de Winkel seems to agree with Manuth that it was not so much a case of emulation of previous masters, but an attempt to claim a position in the on-going tradition of Northern European painters through a reference to poses, gestures, and costume of famous self-portraits.289 Neither Alpers nor de Winkel’s positions can be excluded absolutely, just as neither of them can qualify unreservedly as a universal definition of Rembrandt’s practice as a whole. However, whether imaginative, copied, or acted-out a notion of theatricality remains active.

For proving that this acted-out theatrical model of practice expanded beyond his self-portraits and into paintings, and portraits of others Alpers refers to the Jewish Bride, c. 1665–67. The subjects of this painting have been “made to perform”, and they are certainly treated as models, as “they leave behind, outside the studio, their

289 Ibid, p. 70.
social position and are transformed”. As a result the final work has absolutely no characteristics as a portrait, apart from the inclusion of figures. The subject of the painting and the appropriation of the sitters’ appearance have, in fact, a lot more in common with history painting. In another instance, that of the portrait of Jacob Trip, c. 1661, the sitter’s Arabian or oriental attire differs from the actual ones of the time, as represented in a portrait of Jacob Trip by Nicolaes Maes, c. 1660.

This model of practice is extended to a series of biblical drawings that apparently were not intended to be preparatory for his paintings, but for the needs of his teaching. Often, in these drawings a biblical narrative is repeated with slight alterations, which forces them to be seen as documentations of a series of performed scenes. Therefore, quite a few of Rembrandt’s narrative drawings are viewed by Alpers as “…much as rehearsals of enacted scenes as they are meditations on particular stories”. Furthermore, there are occasional comments inscribed on similar drawings, addressed either to a student or to himself, which could be easily perceived as instructions or directions addressed to actors regarding the performance of a scene. There are also occasions where, in the words of Alpers, “Rembrandt effects a compositional change by proposing that we view the same group of actors, with slight alterations in their gestures, from another position: to compose is to replay an enacted scene.” Of course, drawing or painting after models was a popular practice, but as Alpers identifies, in comparison to Raphael’s practice, Rembrandt’s pictorial organisation was influenced by his observation and accumulation of the details of his models’ poses and “attitudes”, instead of appropriating their appearance according to pregiven compositional arrangements. To finalise her point, Alpers compares the role that Saskia, Rembrandt’s wife, is adopting in the numerous paintings that she

290 Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise, pp. 84–87.
291 Ibid., p. 86.
293 Ibid., p. 44.
294 The drawings that Alpers identifies are: The Adulterous Woman before Christ, Ben. 1047, and The Departure of Rebecca, Ben. 147.
295 Ibid., p. 44. The drawings that Alpers identifies are: The Departure of the Angel from the Family of Tobit, Ben. 43 – The Departure of the Angel from the Family of Tobit, Ben. 893.
296 Ibid., p. 46. The drawings that Alpers is drawings he comparative conclusion are: Three Studies for a Disciple at Emmaus, Ben. 87, and Three Studies for a Deposition from the Cross, Ben. 934.
posed for, to that of Victorine Meurend, Manet’s model for *Olympia* and *Victorine in the Costume of an Espada*, concluding that for these two artists “…to serve as a model is to perform.”

Alpers is dismissive of art historical criticism of theatricality on the basis of a distinction between falsehood and truth, because it is derived from the position of the observer. Instead, she proposes an approach based on that of the artist as performer, whose interest lies in acting, and where the level of success is defined according to the adoption of roles and characters. However, taking ‘truth’, and subsequently ‘likeness’, into account in an analysis of dualism is inevitable, since these are notions that are vital to such a philosophical position. Even if we were to adhere to Alpers’ view, a dualist reading of these works is problematic as they stand some distance away from Descartes’ sought-after-realism. On the other hand, one could argue that the subjects of the study drawings are of a religious nature, which falls into line with the dualist conceptual process of proving the existence of God. In addition, the compositional focus of the early and middle periods’ self-and-other-portraits is the head, which could be seen as an early manifestation of dualism. Yet, the cropping of the human figure and the attention given to the face during the early period is driven by a desire to master the representation of emotions. Moreover the experiments of the middle-period are inspired, undoubtedly, by classicist models of practice, insofar as the appropriation of poses and gestures is meant to compliment physiognomic appropriation of facial characteristics. Finally, Rembrandt’s fabrication of or lack of ‘truth’, in terms of likeness, appearance and social status with the use of costumes is not just contrary to the emerging Dutch middle class’ ideals, but also sets the ground for the subsequent allegorical trend that was to follow. Yet again, Rembrandt’s practice is infused with conflictual ideologies, mapped out by the dualist compositional cropping of the figure, and the Aristotelian notion of theatricality and idealised fabrication of truth.

Such a notion of theatricality presupposes that Rembrandt was keen on working from live models, and not on copying from great art of the past. Alpers

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identifies that Rembrandt encouraged his students and assistants to learn how to draw by either working from live models or by copying aspects of his art, instead of following the accepted teaching practice of the time.\footnote{Ibid, p. 69. Alpers discusses Rembrandt’s teaching and working preferences in a subchapter, pp. 69-77.} This practice involved a gradual development of skills that were acquired by initially drawing from prints, then from masters’ drawings, and finally from paintings. Eventually, the student graduated by working from casts of statues and finally from live models.\footnote{For an analysis of teaching methods in 17th century Dutch Workshops see Westermann, \textit{The Art of the Dutch Republic}, pp. 29-31.} Despite his significant collection of prints and other works, Rembrandt insisted on a teaching practice that would allow students to copy from his own art instead, presenting himself in this way as \textit{the} great master. He then disregarded the copying from casts or statues only to substitute this with copying from his drawings of biblical narratives.\footnote{Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise, p. 70.}

This does not exclude the fact that he worked from live models in his studio; he simply worked straight onto the canvas itself. But why did Rembrandt consistently avoided working from the art of the past and discouraged his students from doing so? Alpers claims that this denial was a demonstration of his desire to be ranked among the greats, by “resist[ing]…the authority of tradition”\footnote{Ibid, p. 77.}, in order to create his own. In other words, if he were to incorporate all the key characteristics of Lastman, his early teacher, or any other great artist of his time or before, he would have been consumed by tradition.

The road to Rembrandt’s individual recognition seems to have been paved with dualist inspiration; the method, though, is far from unambiguous here. Adding to Rembrandt’s insistence on working from live models Rosenberg talks of how the great master’s principle was to accept “nature as the only guide.”\footnote{Rosenberg, \textit{Rembrandt}, p. 295.} To support his argument, Rosenberg quotes Rembrandt’s contemporary Joachim von Sandrart’s complaint that Rembrandt “rejected art theories, such as anatomy and proportions of the human body, perspective and the usefulness of classical statues, Raphael’s drawings and judicious pictorial disposition, and the academies which are so essential to our professions”, while remaining critical of Rembrandt’s claims that one should be
“…guided only by nature and by no other rules.”

Such models and pictorial devices are based on a mathematical analysis that is inspired by Descartes’ methodology; hence, their rejection could be perceived as anti-dualist. In addition, Rembrandt’s prioritisation of nature was purposefully diminished by the Christian and dualist hierarchical prioritisation of the spiritual, as foreign to the natural but familial with the divine. Rules are products of human study of nature in order to produce criteria for satisfying the need to control it, or in this case represent it. In this respect, it is problematic to copy from neo-classical statues because they are the products of human mediation of nature. To copy from them is to accept that our study and translation of nature is superior to the original, an assertion of a superior-to-nature human activity. Rembrandt refused to work from, or apply the results of Cartesian-inspired objectification in his own painting, by refusing to work from examples of the human re-creation of nature. Thus, he set out to imitate nature straight from nature, not from existing reproductions, and certainly not through man-made artificial methods.

Rembrandt’s teaching methods were not the only controversial practice of his studio. Alpers refers extensively to the recent de-attribution of a large number of Rembrandt’s paintings (almost two thirds of the original estimate, 600 out of 1,000) that were produced by either his students or by assistants that practiced in his studio. The confusion of the false attribution is rooted in the fact that these paintings carried Rembrandt’s signature; he encouraged his assistants to pass these works off as being his own. As Alpers identifies, there are serious questions about identity and the self that arise from this process of de-attribution, since 19th-century scholars mistakenly treated Rembrandt as the model for a highly introvert and individualistic artistic practice.

Since the Renaissance it was common for an artist to run his studio as a workshop by employing assistants in order to meet professional demands; as such, artists’ specific involvement in the production of their work was variable. Leonardo and Michelangelo employed assistants for preparatory duties but they were not


\[305\] There are numerous occasions that the results of the recent Rembrandt Research Project in Amsterdam are discussed in Alpers, *Rembrandt’s Enterprise*, pp. 4-5, 59, 69,101, 119, 121.


involved in the actual painting or sculptural process. Raphael and Rubens on the other hand were famous for running workshops with big teams under their command. In fact, Rubens had developed a highly organised commercial enterprise with assistants specialising in a variety of skills – from landscapes and animals to figures – that carried out most of the work, with Rubens occasionally adding some final touches. Unlike Rembrandt, Rubens clearly distinguished the paintings produced from his own hands, as he did not sign the ones that were produced in his workshop; he only signed five out of thousands.\textsuperscript{308} Similarly, the Dutch masters would either sign and trade collaborative works as products of their studio or allow their assistants to sell works that they had produced on their own. Rembrandt, however, seems to have taken advantage of the commercial opportunity presented by guild regulations, which allowed masters to sell collaborative works as products of their studios,\textsuperscript{309} since the majority of the de-attributed works were far from collaborations.

\textit{Cartesianism and Rembrandt’s Authorship}

The de-attribution of a large percentage of Rembrandt’s work is in conflict with Descartes notion of the ‘subject’ (or soul) as the sole source of knowledge. Rembrandt seems indifferent to who created works in his name; therefore, his rejection of distinctively individual authorship is, in a way, a rejection of the ‘subject’ as producer. The issue becomes even more complicated by the fact that Rembrandt encouraged participants in his studio to actually replicate his self-portraits.\textsuperscript{310} And, as Alpers asks, does the replicated painting remain a self-portrait, or does it become a portrait by another hand? What this practice certainly does is to question dualist notions of the self as unique and original, as it diffuses the act of self-contemplation by blurring the distinction between whom does the contemplation and who is presenting the results this reflection, or even better, who is re-presenting it.

There is one work that is a product of collaboration between Rembrandt and an anonymous assistant, which at the same time seems to be as constructed as Van de

\textsuperscript{308} \textit{Ibid}, p. 101.
\textsuperscript{309} Westermann, The Art of the Dutch Republic, pp. 31, 45.
\textsuperscript{310} Alpers, \textit{Rembrandt’s Enterprise}, pp. 120-121.
Voort’s portrait of Laurens Reael. This painting, _The Equestrian Portrait of Frederick Rihel_, executed in 1663, was also one of the first disputed paintings in Rembrandt’s practice. A sense of collaboration in this work is evoked by certain inconsistencies and clashing features. For instance, the rider, particularly the top half of the figure, is treated with considerably more care than the horse. Rihel’s face and upper body are painted with thick pigment, yet they are smoothly executed. The rendering of the horse, on the other hand, is bold with long wide brushstrokes. Finally, when looking at the picture as a whole we notice the poor balance in chiaroscuro, which is unexpected given that Rembrandt was clearly good at it.

The question of authorship is not the only issue at stake here, but also the identity and social position of Rembrandt’s subject in this painting. Frederick Rihel was a businessman from Strasbourg who moved to Amsterdam in 1643. While in the Netherlands he specialised in banking and trade, often of arms, on an international scale, as he lent money from the court of Hague to the state of Sweden. When in 1660 the Prince William of Orange visited Amsterdam, Rihel was the leader of one of the three cavalry groups that formed the Prince’s guard of honour. The 1663 portrait was a commission commemorating his participation in this occasion. The style of the portrait, which is clearly in line with aristocratic equestrian types, stands far from representing Rihel’s actual social status, that is, of a merchant. In 1662 Rihel actually bought the title of ‘Poorterrecht’, which is the right to be recognised as a burgher, though it was not necessary for a businessman. Yet, he never stopped aspiring to aristocratic values and social status with which he familiarised himself through his business contacts with the courts. Bearing all this in mind, the intentions behind Rihel’s commission are identical with Reael’s, since they both represent their ambitions and aspirations by imitating an admired style. However, this time the notion of theatricality or of putting on fictive appearances is not imposed by Rembrandt, as was customary in his practice, but dictated by the commissioner.

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In spite of the vast production of self-portraits, the first time Rembrandt painted himself at work or as a painter was in 1660.\textsuperscript{313} Contrary to the common desire of artists at the time to depict themselves in formal dress (even during the act of painting), Rembrandt appears in these late self-portraits in working clothes. De Winkel stresses that apart from being a sign of humility, his true representation of working attire denotes respect for the art of painting, and expresses a rejection of the re-emergence of Classicism.\textsuperscript{314} Here too, the face seems to attract most of the rendering attention, while the half-length format of the portrait further ignores the figure as a whole. In addition, his painting palette, brushes, maulstick, and even his left hand that is holding these instruments are vaguely suggested. Alpers argues that Rembrandt treated his left hand with such abstraction that it appears as if it has become one with his painting instruments, thus, reminding us of Aristotle's concept of the hand\textsuperscript{315} as that which is able to adapt and transform itself into multiple organs or instruments.\textsuperscript{316} In fact, we can assume that Rembrandt is depicting himself at work, as there is no evidence of a canvas and of his right hand, the hand that he painted with, which is hidden. Conversely, in this self-portrait Rembrandt is asserting his social role as painter and not as a ‘gentleman’ or an ‘intellectual’, which was common in artists’ self-portraits of the time.\textsuperscript{317} He does so, in a similar manner to the Dutch burghers’ prevailing dualist representational tendency of the first half of the 17\textsuperscript{th} century. That is, one should present one’s self in an interior setting, as a reference to introversion (with identifiable references to one’s profession), but at the same time one should not get caught in performing aspects of it, since any movement or action would deny the work as an act of self-contemplation.

In the other two paintings in which Rembrandt presents himself as a painter, he portrays himself at work.\textsuperscript{318} In the Louvre portrait his left hand holding his painting utensils is still abstractly rendered, but this time his right hand is shown, holding a maulstick, and there is also an indication of an easel. Of course, the head remains the main focal point, but these modifications are small steps towards the

\begin{flushright}
\textsuperscript{313} Self-Portrait, The Iveagh Bequest, Kenwood (English Heritage), London.
\textsuperscript{314} De Winkel, ‘Costume in Rembrandt’s Self-Portraits’, pp. 66–67
\textsuperscript{315} Op cit fn. 64.
\textsuperscript{316} Alpers, Rembrandt’s Enterprise, p. 28.
\textsuperscript{317} Westermann, The Art of the Dutch Republic, pp.157-158.
\end{flushright}
incorporation of action in the painting, however relaxed Rembrandt might look. In addition, where as in the Kenwood portrait he is shown in full frontal position – facing the viewer – in the Louvre portrait he turns his head towards us as his body is now shown from the side, facing the canvas on the easel on the right side of the painting. In his last self-portrait, the one that is commonly referred to as *Self-Portrait as Zeuxis*, 1669, Rembrandt is finally completing the circle of these three works, by actually depicting himself immersed in the act of painting.

Here, there is no idealisation at play since signs of age are evident from the wrinkled face and the hunched pose; despite his now limited strength he still remains active as an artist. His pose is similar to the Louvre portrait, only reversed with his left side of the body placed at the front plane. Even though his hands are cropped, his maulstick is resting on, or pointing at, the painting – a gesture that qualifies as a final step towards the depiction of his active engagement with the painting on view. Rembrandt’s laughing expression and the indication of the male figure on the painting he is working on, have resulted in two main explanations. The first one sees Rembrandt as taking the role of the ‘laughing’ philosopher Democritus, known for his cheerful mood, painting an image of the ‘weeping’ Heraclitus, known for his unpleasant mood.319 The second view is based on an anecdote about the painter Zeuxis, who is said to have choked on his laughter while painting the likeness of a wrinkled old woman.320 To support that this is the most convincing view of the two, Beyer claims that this story was popular in Rembrandt’s studio, and was in fact taken up by his student Arent de Gelder in the mid-1680s.

Both of these explanations re-introduce the notion of theatricality, and by extension idealisation, as they imply that he was taking up either a known philosopher’s or a great painter’s role, at a point where it appeared he was moving closer to a realistic representation of his appearance and social role. In addition, the

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320 The anecdote was originally reported by Marcus Verrius Flaccus in the first century A.D. in his *De Verbum Significatione*, which was noted by Carel van Mander in his *Schilder-boek*, and was identified by Albert Blanket. For the anecdote’s historical information and academic introduction I draw from Beyer, *Portraits*, p. 222; Schneider, *The Art of the Portrait*, p. 115; and White *et al*, *Rembrandt by Himself*, pp. 216-220.
reference to Zeuxis, who stands as the model for a practice of idealisation[^21], is somewhat contradictory in relation to the level of verisimilitude invested in the treatment of Rembrandt’s facial features. Muller and Schneider propose more realist readings of the work. Muller asks whether Rembrandt is “laughing at a society whose preoccupations seemed to him to be ridiculous, or at life, which had buffeted him so much without ever succeeding in overthrowing him?”[^322] And Schneider claims that Rembrandt is not laughing at anybody, not even at himself as he is “too exhausted even to defy his own frailty”, but instead “it is an expression of the stoic equanimity with which he resigned himself to approaching death.”[^323] But what if in his last self-portrait, Rembrandt finally depicts himself with honesty? Honesty in terms of appearance of facial features and bodily posture, as well as in presenting himself engaged in the activity that he loved the most, the one that defined him and shaped the course of his life. What if he is, as Alpers suggests in the opening quote, defining himself in the act of painting? Then, if this were so, Rembrandt would equate his being with activity, or even better, with active-being in the world.

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The practice of self-representation in the Netherlands during the first half of the 17th century was mainly guided by contemporary dualist tendencies of self-rule, self-contemplation, and verisimilitude, not just as codes of behaviour, but also as models of representation. The great artistic and social centres of the time generated different responses to these aspects: the surviving classicism of Haarlem; Utrecht’s Caravaggisti’s introvert Cartesian tendencies; and Amsterdam’s playful combination of the two. If Cartesianism was intellectually prominent, the uneasiness of Cartesian academics to fully endorse Cartesian metaphysics produced a compromised co-existence of both dualist and classicist elements in portraiture. As Woodall has

[^21]: Zeuxis is known for being able to outdo reality through idealising it. Beyer describes the occasion of painting the portrait of Helen of Troy, where he chose the best features of five beautiful female models in order to paint an ideal portrait. Beyer, *Portraits*, p. 222.
[^322]: Muller, *Rembrandt*, p. 245.
identified the Cartesian issue of truth, was sidetracked by pictorial modifications and alterations that served as a visualisation of the sitters’ social interests and ambitions. But portraiture’s general social function in this period is now separated from the exemplary virtues of the classicist tradition, in favour of the individualist promotional values – either for personal or class reasons – under the guise of universal humanist ideals. Portraiture is now employed in order to support claims of immortality, not for exemplifying the already immortal.

And this is why Rembrandt’s practice stands out from this emergent promotional burgher mentality. His notion of theatricality, forced his self-portraits to remove themselves as far as possible from the true representation of his social status. His attention to, if not obsession with, the face was not inspired by a desire to emphasise a spiritual aspect of being, but instead was informed by his enthusiasm for a studio-based performativity. The means by which he chose to successfully incorporate it in his art appears to reflect Aristotle’s call for the convincing representation of a character by imitating and emphasising his or her emotional states through facial expression and gestural appropriation. As for his portraits of others, he applied his constructive method of performativity (a notion that is bound with action and movement) as far as he was allowed by the demands of his commissioners or sitters.

In this respect Rembrandt allows for conflictual ideologies to manifest themselves in his practice, favouring one or the other according to his artistic needs. For instance, his conscious distancing from the depiction of actual situations, and his strong belief in working straight from nature clearly represents an anti-dualist position that is reinforced by his attack on authorship and his encouragement of assistants in his studio to pass themselves off as him. However, there are formal aspects of his practice that prepared the ground for the subsequent re-formation of a dualist model of self-representation. His proto-impressionist brushstrokes, the focal attention to the head through the employment of chiaroscuro and the careful application of light, as well as the cropping of the figure in half, or three quarter formats, affirm the face and the head as the locus of human spirituality. Such readings assert Rembrandt as an artist who accepts the expression of feelings as a justification of the existence of soul.

324 See Chapter 1, pp. 47-49.
This reading needs to be counterbalanced with the classicist element of gestural performativity and theatrical appropriation. To ignore these tensions, therefore, is to make the same mistake as 19th-century romanticist scholars, who promoted Rembrandt as the exemplary model of an artist who successfully incorporated notions of individuality and introverted contemplation.
Picasso’s Solution:

*The Crisis of the Honorific & the Clash of Subjectivities*

*There is no abstract art. You must always start with something. Afterward you can remove all traces of reality.*

The avant-garde rhetoric of boundless formalist experimentation seemed to be threatened by mimetic demands deriving from the viewing expectations of portraiture. Yet, those who were brave enough to approach this delicate, and at the time controversial, genre from an experimental perspective manage to reposition portraiture within the avant-garde as the means by which breakthroughs can be achieved and not be subject to restraint. One of these artists was Picasso, whose main stylistic innovations were the outcome of his constant desire to reconfigure the representation of the body. Unlike to most modernist painters, Picasso produced more portraits than unidentified figurative works, yet, barely any self-portraits. In spite of the numerous theoretical accounts of his practice, and his portraits in particular, there have been hardly any approaches that seek to analyse classicist or dualist notions of the self in relation to his work.

This chapter will look at the demise of the naturalistic painted portrait at the end of the 19th century (Courbet, Manet) and the rise of modernism (Cézanne,

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Cubism) in relation to an increasing demand for an expressive art of subjective interiority and the re-emergence of notions of Cartesian individualism. Cubism's challenge to the belief that visual resemblance is necessary to the representation of self-identity is seen as the key point of transformation in this process of denaturalisation and 'dehumanisation' of the portrait. In doing so, particular attention will be paid to Picasso's Cubist portraits of his art dealers, Clovis Sagot, Ambroise Vollard, Wilhelm Uhde, and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler in order to question the conflictual co-existence in Picasso, between his commitment to abstract the figure and, conversely, his desire to satisfy the viewing expectations derived from a visual recognition of the portrayed subject. The results of this proposed analysis will then assist us in understanding the intentions behind Picasso's stylistic u-turn to Neoclassicism that immediately followed Cubism. Analyzing Picasso's relationship with his Cubist and post-Cubist subjects will provide insight into the stylistic choice Picasso makes with regard to each work, in turn, allowing their contextualisation according to classicist and dualist positions. In other words, this chapter will argue that Picasso's creative choices and subsequent outcomes during the execution of these relatively abstract Cubist portraits played a large part in his decision to resort to a purely illusionist form of art, especially in the implementation of portraits. What exactly did Picasso realise about the nature of the portrait genre from executing these portraits, and how important was its role in forcing him to compromise his Cubist advancements for the neo-classicism of the following portraits?

To answer these questions, these works will be analysed in the context of early and contemporary theorisations of Cubism – ranging from painters such as Olga Rozanova and Fernand Léger, to Cubist painters Jean Metzinger and Albert Gleizes, and from theorists such as Guillaume Apollinaire and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler to William Rubin, Yves-Alain Bois, Rosalind Krauss, and Michael Fitzgerald, among many – which will then be compared with Picasso and Braque's expressed positions regarding Cubism, and their reactions against critical writings about their invented style. Whereas contemporaneous writings on Cubism tended to adopt dualist perspectives and terminology alike, recent accounts regard the style as mostly concerned with the objective materiality of human nature. For instance, Guillaume Apollinaire attributes the rejection of the realist treatment of external appearances in
Cubism to an emphasis on “the grandeur of metaphysical forms”. Moreover, Apollinaire views a notion of “inner” or “essential reality” to be the driving force behind Cubism. More recently, John Berger regards the organisational fragmentation of the figure in Cubist paintings as a “reaction against excessive talk of the spiritual and soulful”. Likewise, Yves-Alain Bois argues that the “expressionist deformation of the mask [in Cubism] functions as a sign of a refusal of psychological depth”, which implies that Picasso was uninterested in addressing his sitters’ human subjectivity at this stage of his career. Yet, and as we will see, in their effort to argue one position or the other none of the accounts produces a bulletproof argument.

The emergence of modernism is generally attributed to a capital-driven industrialisation of society. As such, according to Charles Taylor, what we witness at the dawn of modern industrial change is a renewed and expanded interest in ‘interiorisation’ and ‘inwardness’; an inward movement aimed at redefining one’s identity in relation to the new social and cultural frameworks. Despite its emphasis on subjectivity, Taylor’s modern self is far from Descartes’, given its ability to adapt to external conditions, and therefore negate monadic and immutable states. For Taylor, the rise of the market and modern political economy are also signified by the simultaneous devaluation of aristocratic military and honorific ethics. By extension, the mid 19th century emergence of analyses of the role and impact of economics in everyday life (e.g. Marx’s *Capital*) suggests, above all, a focus on ordinary modes of human existence; an existence now characterised by ‘individualisation’ and ‘internalisation’.

Plato’s notion of self-mastery – understanding our selves in relation to the world as rational beings – is held no longer to be valid due to the new importance

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331 For an analytic overview of Taylor’s ‘self’ in relation to Cartesian dualism see Chapter 1, pp. 40-43.

accorded to our own personal world, which may exist within collective norms but functions independently from universal rules. Nature is no longer “seen as the order that defines our rationality”, since Plato’s mode of reason set in ontic logos has been replaced by disengaged reason. Thus, modern human nature is defined by “our own inner impulses” and not by “a substantive rational ordering of purposes”. Nature’s modern role in the construction of the self is to force us to understand and encourage us to react against an imposing, ruling reason, which is now perceived also as a subjective and socially active power. Yet, traces of Platonic ontic logos are located in our desire to position ourselves within a whole, despite the fact that the humane whole is now more important than the universal, or natural. For Taylor, the depreciated role of nature in the formation of the self emphasises the predominance of Descartes’ ‘inwardness’ and Locke’s ‘individuality’ in modern times. Descartes’ contribution to the analysis of modern life is touched on in his advocacy of the self’s disengagement from everyday life in order to contemplate lived experiences. However, the occasional redefinition of our identities through the particularities of emerging social circumstances is far from Descartes’ notion of the ‘inner divine’ source of truth, and immutable self.

Modernity & Individuality

Individuality lies at the core of modernist art practices, the celebration of which influenced formalist abstraction through a search for a unique style that would justify the existence of a distinctive personality through the appraisal of its products. Yet, abstraction was not purely driven by vain self-indulgent explorations of expression, but was shaped by the experimental ‘research programmes’ of modernism and the avant-garde. Such experimentation relied on a deep longing for artistic expressive freedom. The early years of modernism are laden with artistic examples of this challenge to the past and tradition. In terms of portraiture, one has only to think of Manet’s Olympia, 1863. Intended as a critical deflation of salon taste through its ironic appropriation of the classicist format of the reclining nude, Olympia was heavily

333 Ibid, p. 301.
criticised by Salon critics on the grounds of the work’s lack of an exemplary function (the fact that its nudity did not transcend social class, but signified it). The Impressionists’ distancing from conventional naturalism marked the beginning of the rejection of the illusionist tradition in painting that Manet adumbrates. Arthur C. Danto views this aesthetic change as “the history of traditional painting put into reverse”, whereby artists were looking to non-Western art for the purpose of finding alternative ways to address the spiritual.334 Hence, Gauguin resorted to Asian models in order to reconstitute aesthetic criteria and standards through a staged primitivism; Van Gogh turned to Japanese models, despite his early training in Dutch realism, aiming for the production of poetically expressive results that drew on the non-conventional employment of form and colour, albeit based on traditional compositional models; Picasso also rediscovered his roots through non-Western forms, such as African art, and Braque sought inspiration from Egyptian types of representation.335

There is a significant difference between pre-modernist and modernist studio practices and modes of production. In the pre-modernist studio the artist was the head of a creative workshop, employing various assistants and training numerous apprentices. The obvious metaphor of the master artist as the head of a creative ‘body’ (of assistants) controlling and instructing the members of his workshop or ‘body parts’ accordingly does not negate the fact that the head artist is not the sole producer and often not the true one (see Rembrandt), in spite of the fact that he retains all authorship of the work. Conversely, in modernist times the artist takes pride in being the sole producer of an artwork from start to finish. It is as if the amateur apprentice – that could have been at the service of a master artist – inverts his struggle to achieve verisimilitude in order to critique academic realist standards through a practice of failure (in terms of realist representation).

Modernism and the Critique of Resemblance: Expressiveness, ‘Transcendentalism’, and Automatism

Commissioned portraiture posed a huge threat to artistic freedom, stemming from the demands of the sitter, or commissioner of the work, which up to early modernism were still bound to a certain extent to a model of classicist realism. In this respect, the prevailing demand of naturalism in portraiture held back the very idea of modernist portraiture. Writing on pre-modern portraiture Harry Berger Jr. labels this form of practice “mimetic idealism”, based on the fact that “it privileges both the increased naturalism or realism…and the idealisation demanded by the portrait’s social and political functions”.336 Modernism’s response to this situation is reflected in the lack of commissioned portraits, and the substitutive introduction of family, friends, partners, and associates as ‘new’ portrait subjects: Matisse painted his wife and Derain; Derain painted Matisse; Kokoschka painted his friends, the actress Else Kupfer, the architect Adolf Loos, and the artist William Wauer; Picasso painted outsiders (from beggars to cabaret performers and prostitutes), his partners (from Madeleine to Jacqueline), his supporters (from Apollinaire to Uhde), his patrons (from Stein to Errazuriz), and his dealers (from Vollard to Rosenberg).337 Another reason for the modernist artists’ turn to familial subjects, is the rise of the importance of close human relationships’ as “safe haven[s]”, as Taylor puts it, in the face of industrialisation’s threatening, alienating effects and the mass transit of populations, usually to urban centres, generating a loss of, or reduced levels of, contact with family members.338

The invention of photography highlighted the act of mimesis in art, and at the same time satisfied commissioned portraiture’s need for naturalistic rendering. In fact, photography further liberated painting from the demands of past representational traditions by adopting the use of conventional poses.339 Nevertheless, in spite of painting’s liberation from mimesis, painters employed photography as a new tool for

338 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 292-293.
339 For more on this view see Shearer West, Portraiture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 189-191.
diminishing lengthy sittings and as a replacement for the mirror in the production of self-portraits; the expressionists Edvard Munch, Ernst Ludwig Kirchner, and Egon Schiele are among a number of modernists who employed photography for their self-portraits. There is a common misconception that photography provides a momentary impression of a subject, as opposed to painting’s supposed ability to present a view of the sitter as extended in time. But, if portraiture’s role, according to Roger Scruton, is to provide a representation of ‘inner being’ based on artistic insight as against expressive technique, then photography should be equally capable of doing so given its inherent realism. Yet, contrary to this photography is invariably perceived as being unable to capture a subject’s ‘inner essence’ due to the camera’s mechanical functionality, which negates the supposed “semantic” abilities of the artist’s power of expression.

There is an obvious similarity between photography and 17th century Dutch dualist portraiture’s realism and emphasis on compositional balance, pose and facial expression in their distance from and opposition to forms of idealisation. In Dutch realism and photography the artist as photographer prepares the ground for the viewer to retrieve a reading of the subject’s ‘inner being’ from external appearance, which is depicted acutely and ‘unaltered’. The modernist artist, however, becomes the prime ‘mediator’, the link between the subject’s inner being and the viewer’s reading of it, by presenting his own independent reading of the subject. We are faced, therefore, with a representation of the artist’s impression of the subject’s interiority, which we are then invited to unravel.

Accompanying and shaping the emergence of the expressive interiority in portraiture is the development of psychotherapy and psychoanalysis. The widespread impact of Sigmund Freud in early 20th-century European culture, inspired a renewed interest in explorations of individuality and personality in art. The work of Austrian Expressionists, such as Oskar Kokoschka, Gustav Klimt, and Egon Schiele, for instance, participated in an emerging culture of confessional portraiture that owed a great deal to the subjective permissibility inherent to psychoanalytic treatment. In this light, Klimt’s portraits are particularly intriguing due to their conflictual form: the face

of the sitter, as well as various body parts are rendered in realist classicism, but the majority of clothing, props, and other parts of the canvas reveal an intense interest in formal abstract experimentation. Klimt’s example underlines perfectly the problem of modernist portraiture: on the one hand, a necessary rejection of classicist mimesis, but on the other, a reliance on traditional compositional formats as extensions of the dualism-inspired compositional advances of 17th-century Dutch portraiture.

Modernism’s attention to the ‘inner’ can also be traced in the ‘non-objective’ work of Wassily Kandinsky, Piet Mondrian, and Kasimir Malevich, who were all displayed in the collection of the Guggenheim Museum in New York. Originally called The Museum of Non-Objective Painting, its goal was set out by its founder in 1939, the Baroness Hilla Rebay, as to collect and show abstract painting that addresses the spiritual by seeking to express inner states and feelings. Rebay believed that the difference between objective and non-objective art lay in the fundamental difference between modernism and traditional painting. That is, where traditional painting transcribes objects drawn from life, non-objective painting creates its objects, which it does not show, thus allowing them to become realities rather than illusions. Non-objectivity is almost synonymous with ‘subjectivity’, in that the paintings instead of representing a reality simply present a reality, an inner reality; if it is an outer reality, it is one that shares “the same spiritual identity as inner reality”.

Of course, not all modernist art practices were driven by the spiritual. For instance, during the early days of Dada artists turned to the mechanical and impersonal as the means to produce art. They did so either by reciting repetitive poetry during performances or by extending Marcel Duchamp’s ‘logic of the readymade’, which criticised notions of uniqueness and inimitable creation in art. The Dadaists expanded their critical perspective on portraiture with works that, at the very least, questioned physical resemblance as a prerequisite of meaning. Francis Picabia produced various portraits that substitute the human form with machine parts. For instance, in the 1915 Portrait of a Young American Girl in the State of Nudity, we see nothing more than a graphic drawing of a sparkplug. In a similar manner, in 1917, Picabia re-introduced the ‘machine’ in the Portrait of Marie Laurencin, a striking

342 West, Portraiture, p. 203.
refusal to acknowledge the portrait as a primary source of interiority on material form as a stand in for the self (in dualist accounts the body is usually attacked for being functionalist and mechanical). Marcel Duchamp, likewise, criticised the notions of expressive interiority and unique individuality by posing as a female alter-ego Rrose Sélavy and in the 1923, in *Wanted, $2000 Reward* by presenting himself as a fictional character (George W. Welch) in the stereotypical format of ‘Wanted’ posters. The only referentially true element of this work are the two passport size photographs of Duchamp, which, conversely, refuse artistic interpretation as a convincing means of producing portraits. Overall, Duchamp’s employment of fiction and adoption of multiple personas in his self-portraits are anti-dualist statements, given the fact that they criticise the Cartesian view of a single, unaltered identity. Yet, the majority of modernist practice – expressive, transcendental – chose the opposite path; it took almost forty years for Dadaist strategies to be reemployed as critical strategies in Pop Art and Conceptual Art.

Thus, the dominant modernist mode from 1900 is a shift from an attention to a subject’s ‘inner being’ (achieved by compositional cropping of the body and focal direction towards the head) to a celebration of expressive interiority through artistic modes of production that identify a rejection of resemblance with a rejection of the mechanical. Indeed, a rejection of mechanised mimesis is seen as a standing against the de-individualisation and industrial uniformity of the self in society; modernist expressiveness celebrates human individuality through the power of the artist’s non-objective vision. These works are subsequently delivered to the world as exemplary forms of spiritual activity. Thus, dualist content can be discerned in these works’ overall rejection of the industrialised body as functional and opposed to autonomous thought and creativity.

Modernism is the moment when dualist portraiture shifts decisively from compositional reductive abstraction and objection to mimetic idealisation, to formalist abstraction and the objection to naturalism per se. In other words, there is a transition from a form of idealisation that addresses the sitter or client’s demands, to a form of idealisation based on the creative intentions of the artist. In pre-modern artistic practices the painter or sculptor was, as I have stressed, at the service of his or her subject, idealising, through composition, pose, and appearance in order to meet the
demands of the subject or patron, mediated in turn by prevailing social norms/standards. In modernist practices the subject finds itself subordinated by the artist’s creative intentions, who often abstracts forms through a non-realistic model of idealisation that prioritises the subjectivity of the artist himself or herself.

In short, pre-modernist practices prioritised the resemblance of the subject over the creative expression of the artist. Such prioritisation, as artists were perfectly aware, posed certain threats towards artistic freedom, especially as 17th-century realism gradually turned into a form of antiquarian and mimetic idealisation – invariably dictated by the subject, patron, or commissioner – as portraiture advanced towards the Baroque, Romanticism and to Neo-classicism. The popularity of a high level of idealisation is reflected in the eminent revival of the ancient pseudo-science of physiognomy in art, which supplied the “intellectual rationale for social formations legitimised by and dependent on the ascriptive categories – blood, lineage, gender, seniority – that naturalise customary rules and roles” and in turn “serve to redistribute and stabilise power in a system of differential sites of authority that represent exploitation as hierarchy”. As clarified in the introduction, the classicist employment of physiognomy differs from a dualist perspective, in that the former modifies facial characteristics according to a flattering ideal, and the latter seeks to access a subject’s inner being, primarily through focusing on imperfections. Such a difference is defined at the one hand by the classicist (Aristotelian) belief in the self as mutable – various physiognomic idealisations apply to various states and stages of being – and on the other to the dualist claim of the self as immutable – otherwise the single physiognomic reading of the self could be put in question. The very fact that the dualist model still relied on the body for the representation of the spiritual signifies that this model had still to reach its full formation. Even though compositional advances in favour of dualism occurred in the example of Dutch portraiture, formal qualities still depend on the body, which contradict the dualist view of an autonomous soul. In other words, a total abstraction of the body would signify the subservience of the (material) body to the (immaterial) soul more

344 Richard Brilliant, *Portraiture* (London: Reaktion, 1991), p. 11. Brilliant discusses the ways by which representation in portraits is constructed according to social expectations that often suppresses "individual personal idiosyncrasies" in order to impress an audience.


346 For a detailed analysis on these two modes of physiognomy see Introduction, pp. 37-42.
successfully, visualised through an aesthetic hierarchical prioritisation of the latter through a representational disregard of the material qualities of the former.

*Modernism & Dualism*

What forced realism into its critical situation in the 19th century was its incorporation of classicist forms of idealisation. Despite its anti-dualist implications, idealisation was perceived as one of the causes of creative limitation, since it primarily served to support the interests of the patron. The general interest in portraiture derives from its honorific function, which stimulates a desire for individuals to be included in a pantheon of excellence. As a result, state, religion, and prominent individuals have often employed portraiture for their self-inclusion in such a pantheon, a process that is guided by forms of idealisation that hinder the artist’s control over the work – the idealisation of the pantheon is achieved through the idealisation of the subject’s portrait. Berger argues that the aesthetic and ideological effects of commissioned portraiture are in no way inconsequential, since “when the act of commission or donation enters into the content…when the indexical sign becomes an indexical icon of donor power, the traces of that power already emanating from every material inch of the sign are merely redistributed, not concealed”. 347

The artists’ desire, and to a certain extent their success in regaining full control of the work – resisting subservience to sitter/patron by being the sole producers of their work – contributed immensely in the reconfiguration of the honorific aspects of portraiture. Now, the sitter is the one that is being honoured by becoming the artist’s subject, as opposed to the pre-modern acknowledgement of an artist’s value in the form of an awarded commission. In an attempt to avoid subservience to patronage through a form of idealisation on these terms, abstract portraits challenged the importance of physical resemblance as the methodology for the representation of identity. 348 What this new model offers modernists instead is a formal abstraction that is the product of the artist’s interpretative schemas, which we are encouraged to

decode. Modernist abstract portraiture proposes a dual affirmation of dualism in that it represents a metaphysical inner state through the employment of the artist’s equally metaphysical skills of insightful vision. But most importantly it emphasises the co-existence of two subjectivities in portraiture, those of the ‘portraying’ artist and the ‘portrayed’ sitter.349

Therefore, modernism’s additional contribution to the genre was to force us to reconsider our viewing expectations when addressing a portrait: do we, primarily look for traits of resemblance or for convincing manifestations of artistic subjectivity? Traditional viewing expectations of portraiture incorporate a further duality, one that primarily concerns the portrayed subject’s material form and inner quality. The artist, particularly in the modern period, is called upon to resolve the issue of representing an identity by projecting the sitter’s ‘inner state’ through altering or manipulating the sitter’s exterior form. Through this Platonic process the artist aims at the validation of his/her skills by supplying the sitter’s imagined interiority with a convincing expressive visible outer form. Hence, we are presented with a supposed semiotic unity between the artist’s expression (signifier) and the sitter’s interiority (signified). According to Ernst van Alphen, once this semiotic unity is put to the test by questioning the validity of the artist’s ‘pure vision’ the “homogeneity” and “authenticity” of the portrayed subject as represented becomes open to dispute.350

Moreover, Richard Brilliant claims that a portrait might reflect a conflict, a “struggle of dominance between the artist’s conception and the sitter’s will”.351 Such a position puts to the test the accuracy of the artist’s reading of his subject’s inner being and it contests it for being either contrary to, or at the very least different from the subject’s own self-impression. Furthermore, from this view the modernist case for artistic expressive freedom is proposed not only as contrary to the demands of sitter, patron, or commissioner, but also more significant than the representation of the sitter’s subjectivity, hence personal identity. In addition, it is implied that this modernist process disregards the Platonic notion of the artist providing a true reading of his subject’s inner being for the sake of expressive freedom. In fact, what is

proposed here is a clash between the sitter’s true inner state as projected by him or her, and the artist’s will to access it; for which we should be sceptical due to the artist’s personal creative interests that seem to focus primarily on the appropriation of external appearances, demoting the importance of the subject’s interiority to secondary status.

In doing so modernist artists may overcome portraiture’s main function, which is to present an image of a sitter’s outer appearance and inner state. Therefore, the artist either neglects his subject’s interiority (which is perceived as irrelevant to free artistic experimentation) or he or she fails to produce a convincing reading of the subject’s ‘inner state’ (which is not surprising since artists are not necessarily qualified psychiatrists). This interchange seems to resemble a vicious circle: the artist’s process of expression moves towards, and away from the subject in a constant unresolved conflict between the interests of the artist and the interests of the sitter. Thus, we cannot expect the sitter to totally surrender his or herself to the reading of the artist. Indeed we should assume that the subject would try to retain some control over this process by projecting certain preferable elements of self or, elevating aspects of his or her appearance and character at the expense of others. However, what happens when the sitter’s demands for identification actually pose a barrier to experimentation and the implementation of research outcomes? Picasso’s portraits reflect in a heightened manner these dual interests of artist and sitter. For instance, his figurative and portrait works during the period of Cubism appear to disregard the subjective properties of his sitters. Yet, his late expressionist and surrealist portraits of his partners are the products of his psychological impression of his sitters.

Bergson, Golberg, & Hegel

Prior to the discussion of Cubism it is worth revisiting Hegel’s writings on aesthetics due to the similarities between the philosopher’s attention to the spiritual and the modernist art’s desire to embrace it and channel it in the face of rapid

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industrialisation. The connection of Hegelian aesthetics to Cubism is a relatively
under-researched area due to the common acceptance that, if the Cubists were
influenced by philosophical ideas these would more likely be those of Henri
Bergson’s. However, as we will see there are certain historical aspects and aesthetic
compromises, based mostly on the fact that there were two Cubists camps (Salon
Cubists and the band à Picasso), which, although they verify Bergson’s impact on
certain Cubists they also put it in question, particularly in relation to Picasso and his
milieu.

Key to Bergson’s philosophy is his call for a new interpretation and
understanding of reality, with time playing a decisive role in this process. Reality, for
Bergson, is founded on the notion of duration and it is perceived as a continuous and
dynamic process. In this process artists play a key part since they are on top of
Bergson’s list of those who are capable of ‘pure perception’. This concept borrows a lot
from Plato’s notion of pure vision, since according to Timothy Mitchell, “by rejecting
a purely utilitarian interpretation of the world, by trying to open himself up to the
totality of experience, the artist could approach reality through intuition”.

In Bergson’s view the common representation of life through single images
simply follows memory’s way of dealing with lived experiences and sensations.
Thereby, for Bergson the perception of reality as static or divided in singular moments
is false, since it disregards the continuous quality of time. In this respect, the
familiar connection between Bergson’s ideas and Cubism is established – as Mitchell
argues – in the latter’s “combination of several viewpoints of an object [which] force
the viewer to become aware of the passage of time implied through the physical shifts
of perspective”. Yet, as we will see the role and aesthetic function of Cubist
superimposed planes and variable perspective is far from clear – to the point that
Cubist writers and artists stand divided, including Picasso. Moreover, they certainly
do not provide the fluidity and continuity that Bergson was looking for, since they are
aligned with those fragmented functions of memory that Bergson was so critical of.
The Cubist work is the result of various single images, and not a homogenous whole.

Considering the importance of 'change', 'becoming', and 'intuition' in his philosophy, Bergson was strongly criticised by the Catholic intelligentsia – to the point that in 1914 the holy Office included his work in their Index of Prohibited Books – due to the implicit critique of Christian dogmatic notions of the 'immutable' and the 'eternal', in his writing. Likewise, French nationalist circles, such as the Action Française (led by Charles Maurras), attacked Bergsonism from a traditionalist and Cartesian perspective. Yet, we have to bear in mind that the rational Cartesian/Classicist model proposed by Maurras and his ilk is a modified and highly selective version of Cartesianism, one that was suitable for the Greco-Latin aspirations of French nationalism. For this purpose these positions focus solely on Cartesian rationalism in order to counter Bergson's notion of intuition that drove his increasingly popular progressive ideas, and not on Cartesian metaphysics (dualism).

Roger Allard and Jean Metzinger introduced Bergson's ideas to Cubist circles after reading Henry Le Fauconnier's catalogue essay 'L'Oeuvre d'Art', which attempts to explain aesthetics in mathematical terms. By introducing Bergson in art theory Allard attempted to reconcile the modernism of the Salon Cubism and traditionalism inherent to French nationalism, which was contested by Joseph Billiet and Trancede de Visan among many writers. Allard's essay, however, was very successful in praising the work and role of Le Fauconnier (particularly Abandance, 1910-1911) in the avant-garde, attracting the attention of other Salon Cubists such as Gleizes and Metzinger. At this point we need to examine the distinction between the two Cubist groups that were active at the time: the Band à Picasso (also referred to as Gallery Cubism) – consisting of Montmartre based artists and writers such as Apollinaire, Jacob, and Salmon – and the Salon d'Autonome Cubism – consisting of Le Fauconnier, Gleizes, Metzinger, Leger, and Robert and Sonya Delaunay, and writers such as Mercereau, Romain and Allard. According to this distinction, Bergson seems to have been the major influence of the members of the Salon group.

358 Originally published as 'Das Kunstwerk', in *Neue Kunstlervereinigung, Munchen E. V., II Austellung* (Munich: Modern Galerie, 1910).
360 Antliff, *Inventing Bergson*, p. 34.
361 Ibid, p. 57.
and not on the Band à Picasso – who are the focus of this thesis. Members of these groups rarely met or viewed each other’s work, apart from Metzinger who had established links with members of both.362

After reading Metzinger’s theorisation of Cubism in ‘Notes on Painting’,363 Bergson was critical of the way that Cubists adopted his ideas, and particularly of the subordination of the intuitive powers of art to rational illustrative process of philosophical ideas. In other words, Bergson was critical of the act of analysing a form of practice “instead of intuitively performing it” and of the fact that “Cubism was seen as yet another example of invasion of intellectual modes of thought into a field conductive to intuition alone”.364 David Cottington also notes how Allard, in a discussion of Le Fauconnier’s work,365 “developed…a fully fledged fusion of these seemingly incompatible notions, Bergsonian dynamism and classical stasis”.366 This compromise between modernity/dynamism/abstraction and classicism/stasis/naturalism provides another indication why Hegelian aesthetics can be particularly useful in understanding Cubism’s conceptual conflicts and aesthetic compromises that Bergsonism is incapable of accommodating.

Hegelian ideas were not completely foreign to Cubists, mostly due to Mecislas Golberg’s Le Morales de Lignes (1908), which was a “paradigmatic fusion of Nietszchean individualism, Hegelian idealism and neo-Platonic mysticism”.367 Golberg’s aesthetic treatise - which was published posthumously - was widely read and admired by Neo-Symbolists, including Apollinaire and Salmon. The role of aesthetics is central to Golberg’s metaphysics, perceiving beauty as “the most perfect expression of existence, the expression in which all contradictions disappear, giving way to an absolute form.”368 In a truly Hegelian and Platonic (pure vision) manner Golberg argued that “it was the role of the spirit, or mind, to find in things, to detach

364 Antliff, Inventing Bergson, p. 3.
366 Cottington, Cubism and Its Histories, pp. 55-56.
367 Ibid, p. 28.
and express it, but this was not easy, for it was not always apparent...the principal means to this, of course, was art, and the artist was chief among creators, able to reduce the real to its essential lines and colours”. Göteborg’s ideas had an impact even outside Neo-Symbolist literary circles, as it has been claimed that Henry Matisse’s ‘Notes d’un Peintre’ was strongly influenced by Göteborg. In addition, Pierre Aubery claimed in 1965 that “most of the theories that Apollinaire disseminated...notably those concerning the basis for the expressive effect of the distortion and conceptualisation of lines and planes, are in Göteborg’s writings.” The level of Apollinaire’s attachment to Göteborg was made clear by the highly personal obituary delivered by Apollinaire at Göteborg’s funeral ceremony.

Hegel, Dualism & Spirit

To begin with, perhaps it is unnecessary to state that Hegel is a dualist; he distinguishes between two forms of being: the natural and the spiritual, the natural being the external, subordinate existence of the spiritual. Art, for Hegel, is a mental, or a spiritual enterprise, which employs imagination as its “productive activity”. Borrowing from Plato (Phaedrus), Hegel argues that art satisfies spirit’s need for vision, which is restricted by the finitude of “existence” and “external necessity”. In doing so, art escapes finitude by allowing the Concept to dictate the appearance of life. Moreover, fine art achieves ‘reality’ when it conveys “the divine nature”, humanist ideals, and “truths of the mind”. On the subject of artistic expression Hegel argues that it derives from the human urge to “exalt the inner and outer world into a spiritual consciousness for himself, as an object in which he recognises his own

369 Cottington, Cubism in the Shadow of War, pp. 77–79.
370 Ibid, p. 78.
372 Cottington, Cubism in the Shadow of War, pp. 78–79.
375 Ibid, p. 152.
What we notice in this statement is yet another instance of the notion of the ‘artist painting his own self’, which was first attributed to Michelangelo, and was also embraced by Oscar Wilde, among many others. This notion lies at the core of Picasso’s portrait practice, in that Picasso’s high modernism privileges the force of his own impressions of his subjects, in contrast to the artist’s subservience to a realist rendering of their appearances; hence, his preference for painting portraits from his imagination or photographs and not from sittings. Overall, Hegel similarly favours a spiritual mode of creativity over a realist-mechanical one, since, for Hegel the latter stops at the finitude of natural appearances. As Arthur Danto puts it, art for Hegel is the sensuous presentation of mental, or spiritual truth that manifests through a “conscious embodiment of truth” and not as an illustration of it. Ironically, Danto’s reading actually cancels out the dualism in Hegel’s model, insofar as embodiment negates the spirit of its fundamental immaterial essence.

The Ideal in art, in Hegel’s aesthetics, is the fusion of both Idea and Shape: “the Idea identified with its Reality”. The notion of Idea is derivative from Plato, but it varies in that it involves both ‘concept’ and ‘reality’. Modernist figurative abstraction, excluding the historical moment of Abstract Expressionism, could be an adaptation of the Hegelian Ideal, insofar as, the ‘shape’ of the figure is variably abstracted according to an ‘idea’, or an impression of it. Concerning Beauty, Hegel claims Ideal beauty as perfect, since it is the product of a mental process, disregarding natural beauty as imperfect. In a purely dualist manner Hegel elevates the mind by claiming it as the sole producer of truth. Accordingly, the finite imprints of passions and rough living experiences on the body are not in agreement with the infinitude of the ‘inner essence’ and of the Idea. Hegel here is toying with classicist idealism, but as we will see in his discussion of Hellenic art he is relatively critical of realism.

What could be read as an encouragement towards formalist abstraction is Hegel’s notion that Ideal art should “rise above the purely symmetrical”, which he

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380 Ibid, p. 106; Knox, Hegel’s Aesthetics, p. 143, 244.
383 Knox, Hegel’s Aesthetics, p. 151.
rates as “lifeless”. Alternatively, imitation leads to “formally regular and mechanical results”. In the same discussion on ‘externality’, Hegel draws up limits to abstraction, in as much as he is dismissive of the abstraction of colour. To argue this, he draws parallels with the lack of note determinacy in music performances, when strings of instruments are not struck with accuracy. Yet, in a contradictory move, he returns to a dismissal of regularity and symmetry, or “the simple determinacy of the sensuous material” as insufficient. Hegel is critical of the pure imitation of nature for leading to “a mere parody of life instead for a genuine vitality”; however, art should retain “natural shapes”. In a final blow against external realism, Hegel prioritises the spiritual as he argues that objectivity must let go of its “independence” and “inflexibility” in order to verify its homogeneity with its subjectivity. Moreover, he warns of the extreme realist imitations of either nature or spirituality. Hence, what Hegel proposes is a form of abstraction that draws from a visual co-existence of the two sides of man, or an “essential inward harmony”, with the scales tilting in favour of the ‘inner’, however, without a complete dismissal of the ‘external’: “the external should achieve appearance only in connection with the inner”. A harmony that ‘imagination’ alone is unable to provide as “firmly” and “definitely” as reality can.

Hegel distinguishes between three main historical types of art: symbolic, classical, and romantic. By symbolic art Hegel means Egyptian, Mesopotamic, and Asian art, where we witness a symbolic abstraction of figure commanded by the Idea. Hegel is critical of this process as the import of Idea results in a violent “coercion” of nature. Care should be taken at this point, since Hegel is critical of symbolic abstraction and not formalist. With regard to Classicism, Hegel at first praises its “anthropomorphism”, since in his opinion it serves the purpose of being the natural counterpart of the soul or mind: “the human form is employed…not as a mere physical existence, but exclusively as the existence and physical form corresponding to mind”. But, in clear dualist terms, Hegel is somewhat disappointed by the

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386 Knox, Hegel’s Aesthetics, p. 252.
388 Knox, Hegel’s Aesthetics, p. 253.
391 Ibid, pp. 112-114.
conceptual restriction of the Mind as purely human and not “as simply absolute and eternal...intellectual being”.

Hegel’s dualist perspective is expanded in his analysis of romantic art, where he celebrates the dissolution of the classicist non-dualist union of Idea and its reality. Thus, in a dualist-inspired opposition to classicism romanticist reality is not “the sensuous immediate existence of the spiritual”, that is, the human body, but “self-conscious inward intelligence”. Therefore, the Romantic object of art is an intellectual product, which by addressing the mind and emotions functions as a revelation of spirituality. The Romantic treatment of sensuous formal externality is similar to that of symbolic art, insofar as it accepts human form as “transient” and “fugitive”. Since externality loses the significance which it enjoys in classicism, it resorts in Romanticism for the expression of feelings “in themselves, instead of being in the external and its form of reality”. Hegel clarifies this difference between symbolic abstraction and romantic formalism by claiming that the former is essentially defective. Romantic art, on the other hand, imposes a separation of the spiritual from the external in order to achieve an autonomous revelation of the Idea in its own form of reality, and not through the finite, and particular form of the human body.

Another example of Hegel’s dualist perspective on art is his careful distinction that the spiritual “infinite and absolutely universal content is the absolute negation of everything particular”. Hegel continues by claiming art’s task to not be an “immersion” of the inner in “external corporeality”, but “the withdrawal of the inner into itself, the spiritual consciousness of God in the individual”. Conversely, Hellenic classicist sculptures of the Gods do not express adequately spirituality, because they lack – a Cartesian – “self-aware” subjectivity. Instead, Romantic art seeks to address the spiritual by focusing on ‘inner life’, since aspects of nature no longer symbolically contain or act as representations of the absolute and divine. Kant’s notion of a priori empirical knowledge is inverted into an a priori of spiritual understanding – which carries with it all the characteristics of the Cartesian ‘method’s’ aimed results – in Hegel’s claims that the content of Romantic art is “already present explicitly to

392 Ibid, p. 115.
393 Ibid, pp. 116-117.
395 Ibid, p. 520.
mind and feeling outside the sphere of art”. In another attack on realism (which could be read as yet another call for abstraction) the external is deliberately degraded as an “empirical reality by the shape of which the soul is untroubled”, simply because, for Hegel, the external no longer expresses inner life. Thus, we can conclude that Hegel celebrates an emphasis on the spiritual within romantic art. However, the level of abstraction should be limited to the extent that the human in the work remains recognisable. In this way, Hegelian aesthetics will help us understand the conflict between realism and abstraction in Cubism, a conflict between mimetic expectations and the prioritisation of the spiritual visualised through a form of intuitive abstraction.

Early Cubist Writing: Metzinger, Apollinaire, Rivière, Gleizes, Léger, Rozanova, Kahnweiler

The early Cubist writings map out the style’s theoretical development from the initial objection to mimesis to a justification of the reasons driving the proposed abstraction. For instance, the Cubist painter Jean Metzinger (1888-1957) verifies a rejection of classicist realism – an outcome of the modernist abolition of mimesis. He then follows with a famous quote by Picasso (“It is useless to paint where it is possible to describe”), which is at once an extension of the rejection of classicist realism and an indication of a turn towards Hegelian abstraction. Metzinger’s focus on Picasso’s methodology, which, in the view of the author has all the characteristics of Cartesian objectification (framed as it is, by Bergson’s notion of intuition) is based on a reworking of the Platonic notion of ‘pure artistic vision’: “Picasso does not deny the object, he illuminates it with his intelligence and feeling. With visual perceptions he combines tactile perceptions.”

Guillaume Apollinaire (1880-1918) reaffirms the negation of descriptivism, while in ‘On the Subject of Modern Painting’ he joins Gertrude Stein’s preceding...

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396 Ibid, p. 526-7. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
397 Jean Metzinger, ‘Notes on Painting’, originally published in Pan (Paris, October/November 1910), pp. 649-51. The present translation is taken from Fry, Cubism, pp. 59-60. Following quotes are from the same source unless otherwise stated.
reading of the subject's depreciation in figurative Cubist paintings as the cost of boundless formal experimentation; both authors' reading reflects the then current disdain towards commissioned portraiture and the reconfiguration of the honorific strategies in portraiture, and, thus, should not be misinterpreted as a fully-fledged anti-dualist declaration. In this respect, I propose that Picasso's relative apathy towards the subjects in his work is mainly the result of his decision to prioritise his own creative concerns over the conventional representational requirements of a portrait. In the same essay Apollinaire, adopts a Cartesian perspective for the first time in describing the Cubists' artistic skills and processes as mathematical and medical. Furthermore, Apollinaire identifies the 'perfection'-driven Hellenic conception of beauty as the locus of the opposition to classicist mimesis. He then follows, in ‘The New Painting’, with the first expressed alternative to the classicist ideal of human perfection: the dualist ‘infinite universe’, emphasised in metaphysical forms. Finally, Apollinaire underlines the importance of a ‘reality of insight’, rather than a reality of sight, as the methodology for addressing the universal ideal. Such a position seems to employ a methodology that seeks to resolve the Cartesian quest for the identification of universality through the Hegelian focus on spirituality (which in turn is implemented by the Platonic notion of pure artistic vision).

The critic Jacques Rivière expands Apollinaire’s notion of ‘reality of insight’ in what he calls ‘sensible essence’ through which he justifies a distancing from realistic representation in painting. In a 1912 essay, Metzinger and Albert Gleizes (1881-1953) also speak of an alternative realism, which they refer to as ‘profound’, as opposed to classicist ‘superficial reality’ – as they attribute greater validity to mental perception over sensual. Following Apollinaire’s initial introduction of mathematics

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197-198.
401 Regarding the fourth dimension, Josep Pla, who met Picasso at *Els Quatre Gats*, claims that the cubist painter was quite fond of the work of Henri Pincaré on non-Euclidean geometry in Josep Pla, *vida de Manolo contada por el mismo*, Miquel Sobré (trans.), (Madrid: Ediciones Destino, 1930), p. 161.
into Cubist discourse, Metzinger and Gleizes elaborate this in terms of non-Euclidean geometry. Superficial reality refers to the illusionistic effects of realism, or, in other words, classicism. Profound realism, in contrast, is the kind of alternative, inner realism that Hegel and Bergson encouraged artists to prioritise; a form of realism that Plato claims can be revealed by artistic vision. For the authors, superficial realism lies at the core of Impressionist painting, which, contrary to Rivière’s appraisal, they blame for being more obedient to the “retina” than to the “mind”.

In yet another indication of the Platonic notion of pure artistic vision, Olga Rozanova (1886-1916), a prominent figure in the Russian avant-garde, claims that the path to such ‘realism’ is only open to “receptive souls” through the “intuitive principle”. Rozanova follows this with an unravelling of the modern process leading to the creation of pictures, which she attributes to the “Abstract Principle”. There are three stages to this process: “Intuitive Principle, individual transformation of the visible, and abstract creation”. In a discussion on photography’s mimetic, “servile” nature, Rozanova agrees with Oscar Wilde in stating that “the artist of artistic individuality, in depicting them [nature’s images], will reflect himself”, unlike the photographer or the “servile” artist. By criticising photography, Rozanova is praising the other arts – painting and sculpture – for providing the possibility for the artist’s subjectivity to prevail over the work’s subject. Particularly, Rozanova, and Wilde, view this as a process where the artist projects an image of himself in the representation of his or her sitter. It is very likely that Cubism was the moment that Picasso became aware of this conflict of subjectivities in portraiture. This, somewhat shamanic, model of artistic creativity reaches its full manifestation in Picasso’s late surrealist portraits of his partners, where Picasso does not transfer aspects of his self.

403 Although the authors do not clearly refer to Hegel, they were influenced by Mecislas Golberg’s Le Morales de Lignes, which was an extension of Hegelian idealist aesthetics. Cottington claims that Golberg’s ideas can be particularly traced in this essay by the authors’ “preoccupation with geometry and numbers”. Cottington, Cubism in the Shadow of War, pp. 79, 155.


405 Ibid, p. 103.

406 Oscar Wilde, The Picture of Dorian Gray (London, 1891), ch. 1. pp. 26: “…Every portrait that is painted with feeling is a portrait of the artist, not of the sitter. The sitter is merely an accident, the occasion. It is not he who is revealed by the painter; it is rather the painter who, on the coloured canvas, reveals himself.”

on canvas but rather his impression of his subjects. In this respect, Rozanova provides a model for understanding Picasso’s tendency to work from memory, and occasionally from photographs: this is done in order to avoid mimicking nature, thus allowing for ‘profound realism’, or ‘realism of conception’, or ‘reality of insight’ to emerge.

Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1884–1976), the leading dealer and close friend of both Picasso and Braque, reaffirms the Platonic notion (pure vision) in his discussion of the ‘piercing of closed form’ that took place during Picasso’s stay at Cadaqués. Kahnweiler defines ‘closed form’ in dualist terms: the acceptance of objects “as contained by their own surfaces, viz., the skin”. The ‘Closed form’ method is problematic for Kahnweiler, as he views it as responsible for the emergence of illusionist representational techniques of Renaissance artists, that is chiaroscuro and perspective that drew from ‘surface’ distribution of paint. Yet, it seems that Kahnweiler is claiming a formal realism for Cubism that has been mostly exorcised by other writers of the period. It is, however, quite true, since Picasso’s Cubist portraiture – as we will see – never manages to escape the demands of even the most minimum formal reference to an object or human subject.

Dualism seems to be Kahnweiler’s adopted perspective as he underlines universalism in his examination of the conflictual, yet, creative relationship between the artist’s ‘constructive’ tendencies and the sitter’s ‘representational’ expectations in Cubism’s process of revelation of the foundation of all forms. What Kahnweiler proposes is that the conflict is resolved by satisfying representational demands, which in traditional painting are dealt with through the employment of chiaroscuro, within a radical compositional structure. Thus, Picasso resolves the conflict of subjectivities, between his own and his sitters’, by channelling his drive for experimentation towards the satisfaction of representational requirements. But, whose representational requirements exactly? Picasso’s own – deriving from his experimental intentions – or those of his sitters’ – based on their expectations of resemblance?

The Kantian notion of a priori knowledge emerges in Kahnweiler’s analysis of Braque’s method of introducing realistic objects into his painting. These “real details”

evoke memories, which in turn combine with abstract schemes of forms to mentally recreate the represented object in the viewer’s mind. Kahnweiler claims that once the object is identified through an integration of a priori knowledge of it stimulated by “real details”, the ‘viewing’ experience of Cubism becomes far more critically perspicuous than conventional illusionistic art. In this way, Cubism’s primary strengths lay in “the object’s form, and its position in space”; colour and “tactile quality” are secondary, “leaving their incorporation into the object to the mind of the spectator”. Accordingly, multiple viewing points serve a more exacting interrogation, or “analytical” presentation of the object, which the viewer then reproduces in his or her mind. For Kahnweiler, here lies the breakthrough achieved in Cadaqués: “instead of an analytical description, the painter can, if he prefers, also create in this way a synthesis of the object, or in the words of Kant, ‘put together the various conceptions and comprehend their variety in one perception’.” ‘Analytical’ description here seems to be incorporating the dualist method of objectification; ‘synthesis’, on the other hand, allows for a classicist type of idealisation, albeit filtered through modernist ideals.

**Picasso & Braque’s Cubism**

But where do Picasso and Braque stand in relation to Cubism’s theorisation? In 1917 Pierre Reverdy collected and published twenty aphorisms that Braque used to note down in the margins of his drawings. In these, Braque expands the depreciation of the subject in figurative paintings, only to add that painting’s primary concerns are objective and formal, which deal with the “unity” and “lyricism” of the new techniques and aesthetic attitudes. Elements of Platonic aesthetics are reflected in Braque’s clarification of artistic aims as an attempt to “constitute …pictorial fact[s]” and not to “reconstitute… anecdotal facts”. In the same spirit, Braque agrees with Metzinger and Apollinaire’s dismissal of imitative creativity by adding that “[external]

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411 Ibid, p. 11.
413 George Braque, ‘Thoughts on Painting’, originally published by Pierre Reverdy in Nord-Sud, Paris, December 1917. The present translation is taken from Fry, Cubism, pp. 147-8. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
appearance is the result” and not the focus of imitation. In the last section of his aphorisms Braque adopts a ‘dualist voice’ in his view of the function of the senses as deformative as opposed to being a formative function of the mind. In his encouragement of work that aims at “perfect[ing] the mind” Braque claims, from a dualist position, that “there is no certainty except in what the mind conceives”. Braque’s dualist mistrust of the senses is further expressed in the concluding part of the collection where he is demanding a “containment” of emotions, further emphasised by his final aphorism: “I love the rule which corrects emotion”.

Picasso expressed his views on Cubism in an interview with Marius de Zayas in 1923.\(^{414}\) What is easily discernable from the interview is that Picasso is somewhat critical of attempts to theorise Cubism through mathematical (e.g. fourth dimension), of psychoanalytical (e.g. Freudian) literature and so forth, mostly due to their focus on the process of research rather than on found disclosure. Accordingly, in order to emphasise the importance of action in painting over and above abstract intention, Picasso refers to a Spanish saying in which “facts” rather than “reasons” matter in love. Moreover, he defines art as a lie “that helps us realise truth”.\(^{415}\) By extension, then, artists should employ their skills to produce truthful lies. For Picasso, what makes artistic research on the lines of the new science problematic is its misleading “attempt to paint the invisible and, therefore, the unpaintable”.\(^{416}\) In other words, one cannot paint, describe, or represent what has not been found yet or exists as a theoretical category; on the contrary painting is the outcome of formal research into painting itself.

For Picasso, nature and art are antithetical. The only relationship between them that he accepts is based on the premise that “through art we express our conception of what nature is not”.\(^{417}\) Accordingly, Picasso redefines the work of great realists such as David and Ingres as autonomous artistic products and not as attempts to paint nature. In this, Picasso argues that the identity of categories such as “concrete” and “abstract” are inaccurate; such forms should be discussed as “more or less convincing lies” which are “necessary to our mental selves” since through them

\(^{415}\) Ibid, p. 315.
\(^{416}\) Ibid, p. 316.
\(^{417}\) Ibid, p. 317.
“we form our aesthetic point of view of life”.

Towards the closing part of his comments Picasso touches upon the matter of stylistic variation. Perhaps he was inclined to do so in order to justify his recent turn to Neo-classicism, which took place around the time of the interview (1923). Variation, for Picasso, should be seen as nothing more than a change in “thinking” that leads to change in the manner of expression. Picasso justifies expressive change according to the requirements of different motives. Yet, he is quite thorough in rejecting a sense of “evolution” or “progress” as derivative from stylistic change. Rather, it is nothing more than choosing the right means for doing justice to a variety of subjects and ideas.

The nature of Picasso and Braque’s creative relationship has been the subject of discussion by almost all main writers on Cubism. Apollinaire, who knew Picasso and visited his studio frequently prior to his creative association with Braque, regarded Picasso’s contribution to the development of Cubism as far more significant than Braque’s. It is true that Apollinaire occasionally wrote favourably of Braque, yet he views Braque’s role in the Cubist enterprise as secondary. Writing on Cubism in 1912 Apollinaire reads Braque’s work as a “corroboration” of Picasso’s “inventions.” In the following year, Apollinaire repeated his claims in a similar, but pseudo-flattering tone. Praising Braque as a “serious craftsman” whose work is aesthetically pleasing, Apollinaire reasserts Braque’s role as a “verifier” of “new innovations in modern art”.

Apollinaire was far more critical of Braque in private. As William Rubin reveals, in a letter to Ardengo Soffici, who regarded both painters as founders of Cubism, Apollinaire degrades Braque’s role once again. In the letter, Apollinaire argues that the cubist painters showing at the Salon were in fact more original, since Braque’s work is indebted to Picasso’s to a higher degree. In addition, Apollinaire excluded Braque from a list that he gave to Soffici of the five most important painters, which included Derain, Raoul Dufy, Marie Laurencin, Matisse, and Picasso. In reply, Soffici seems to succumb to the demeaning of Braque by Apollinaire and agrees to the

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418 Ibid, p. 320.
421 Apollinaire, The Cubist Painters, p. 42.
latter’s choice of five painters. More importantly, Soffici admits that in the light of Apollinaire’s remarks he had overestimated Braque. Responding to Soffici, Apollinaire deals his final blow to Braque’s status in his clarification that he is only prepared to support Braque and the other Cubists, because the imposition of a new style requires the creation and comparative theoretical discussion of artworks of a variable aesthetic value. Therefore, Apollinaire endorses the “mediocre” work of Braque and of the other Cubists in support of “a great artist like Picasso”, so that a comparison between their work and Picasso’s can underline Picasso’s superior value. In other words, Apollinaire regarded the similarities in Picasso and Braque’s work as an outcome of Braque corroborating or verifying Picasso’s achievements and not as the result of co-authorship, which in painters’ circles was a foreign concept to the ruling modernist notion of supreme individuality.

The most vicious attacks on Braque came from Stein, who, by treating Cubism as an entirely Spanish art, completely disregarded Braque’s role in it. Although Stein establishes herself as an eyewitness to Cubism’s development, she did not visit Picasso’s studio as much as Apollinaire or Kahnweiler; and never visited Braque’s studio. Moreover, when Stein ‘honoured’ Braque with a reference in her writing (in the 1913 essay ‘Braque’) she was extremely malicious and insulting in her description of his work process in his studio, dismissing his paintings in demeaning craft terms, as being reminiscent of his family profession (house painting and decorating). Overall, Stein had little to say about Cubism’s conceptual or pictorial problems, and nothing whatsoever about Braque and Picasso’s close working relationship. It took Braque twelve years to formally respond to Stein, whom he regarded as a “tourist” rather than as the “authority of the epoch” as she described herself. Besides criticising Stein’s ability to comprehend contemporary issues, Braque attributes Stein’s misunderstanding of Cubism to her perception of it in “terms of personalities”. Braque’s accurate point is evocative of both his and Picasso’s declarations of Cubist works as attempts to blur the boundaries of personal,

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distinctively individual authorship. Similar notions played an important part in my analysis of Rembrandt's practice. There is, however, an underlying difference between the two cases: Rembrandt encouraged the signing of his work by his students, which were of inferior artistic status, thus, suggesting a weakening of or disregard for the hierarchy of the masters’ studio; Braque and Picasso differ from this, in that, their impersonal working relationship shares more with post-conceptual collaborative practices, in which equal participation is the basis of authorship.

On this subject, T. J. Clark defends the significance of their collaborative practice, which he relates to the 1920’s post-war Parisian model of nationalism as collectivism, for the purpose of rebuilding the country. By revisiting the painters’ remarks on how a painting had to be declared finished by both of them, Clark emphasises that the lack of signing the work should be viewed as the outcome of “laboratorial research” based on a new, mental rather than visual understanding of the world. However, with this conclusion Clark follows Stein and others, by asserting that the role of Picasso in this collaborative “dyad” is more significant than Braque’s.

Kahnweiler was sceptical of Apollinaire’s book on Cubism; in fact he thought that it was “without interest”. His own book, on the other hand, describes Braque and Picasso’s contribution to Cubism as equally important, in their respective ways. Kahnweiler argues that Cubism’s driving force lies in the shared methodology of its two founders, which took the form of an “exchange of ideas” through expressive studio conversation. However, despite this sense of equality, Kahnweiler views the two painters’ work from opposite perspectives: Braque is the “gentle moon” – whose art is feminine, and “tranquil” – and Picasso is the “radiant sun” – whose art is masculine, and “nervous and turbulent”. Nevertheless, Kahnweiler is quite clear that Picasso and Braque both “deserve the credit” for Cubism. Kahnweiler’s remarks that Picasso’s engagement in a process of “fanatic[…] searching” is probably what provoked Picasso into proclaiming his devaluation of ‘research’, as expressed in his interview with De Zayas in 1923.

426 Ibid: “Picasso and I were engaged in what we felt was a search for the anonymous personality. We were prepared to efface our personalities in order to find originality.”
Wilhelm Uhde extends Kahnweiler’s view of Cubism as a combined effort in his 1928 work on Picasso. Uhde was a frequent visitor to Picasso’s studio (and one of the first) and it was his enthusiastic comments to Kahnweiler about the *Demoiselles* that encouraged Kahnweiler to visit the painter’s studio for the first time in 1907. While Uhde argues for Braque’s equally important contribution in the solution of problems, he rejects the view that their work is “indistinguishable”. In a similar way to Kahnweiler, Uhde presents two contrasting attitudes: Braque is “limpid, controlled, bourgeois” and Picasso is “sober, excessive, and revolutionary”.

Rubin attributes Apollinaire and Salmon’s false assumption that Picasso was the sole author of Cubism as being the result of the painter’s higher market prices. Prior to the moment of Cubism Picasso had already achieved an established position in the art market, having gone through five different styles - as such his paintings were selling for higher prices than Braque’s Fauvist work. During the Cubist years Picasso received approximately four times the amount that Braque did for a picture. In addition to this fact, Rubin considers the possibility of the critics not being present enough in the artists’ studios in order for them to understand the development of Cubism and the collaboration between the two painters. Picasso and Braque’s resentment at attempts to theorise Cubism derived from false readings of their methodology, which did not do justice to Braque’s position either. The specificities of their collaboration were hidden in the face of these inquires and reports.

Nevertheless, Rubin presents a series of statements that clearly demonstrate the painters’ dissatisfaction with this state of affairs. For example, in a letter to Braque, Picasso is outraged about Apollinaire and Salmon’s “unjust” depreciation of Braque. In another instance, Picasso expresses his criticism of Apollinaire’s book in a letter to Kahnweiler, and Braque cites its “bamboozling” effects.

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Picasso articulated concerns about writings on Cubism from as early as 1911, when he joked about newspaper articles to Kahnweiler.434 Despite Picasso’s apparent disagreement with accounts of Cubism favouring his contribution, Françoise Gilot describes Picasso’s competitiveness towards his fellow artists, which she witnessed during the painters’ meetings, of which there is no trace in Picasso’s correspondence with Braque or Kahnweiler. Competitiveness is often the case when artists work closely together, but separately, and in most cases it is the reason for astonishing advances. Yet, Gilot talks of how fellow artists were cautious of showing work in progress to Picasso, fearing that he would rework their advances in a better way and eventually everyone would think of their work as a copy of Picasso’s, instead of vice versa. After all, Gilot states that Picasso quite often proclaimed, “When there is anything to steal, I steal”.435 But when it came to his working relationship with Braque, Picasso saw it as more collaborative than competitive, confessing to Gilot that “a canvas wasn’t finished unless both of us felt it was”.436

Rubin’s recent attempt to define Braque and Picasso’s artistic relationship – formed after Kahnweiler’s model of comparative opposition – is by far the most insightful. To start with, Rubin draws a crucial distinction between Picasso’s employment of the figure and Braque’s preference for “inanimate” objects, and landscape. Rubin attributes the centrality of the figure and of the portrait in Picasso’s Cubism to the painter’s “interest in the particulars of the human situation”.437 Braque did not paint any figure works until 1911, but only because the Cubist Analytic fragmentation blurred the visual identification of either a figure or a still life, let alone a specific individual. In spite of the fact that Braque eventually incorporated the figure into his work, he did not title any of his figure works as portraits. Picasso, on the other hand, painted a series of portraits of his dealers. Perhaps Braque chose not to portray specific individuals because he foresaw how the representational complexities involved in the demand for resemblance by a portrait’s subject would pose serious limitations to his expressive and experimental intentions. In other words, how can one

434 Letter of August 17, 1911, from Picasso in Céret to Kahnweiler in Paris (Leiris Archives). Quoted by Rubin.
436 Ibid, p. 76
437 Rubin, Picasso and Braque: Pioneering Cubism, p. 21.
successfully represent a specific person through a visual style that fundamentally challenges the demand for acute naturalistic representation?

The seemingly dualist objectification of the body – as the result of the representation of the subject through a multiplicity of viewing points – stops at the representation of physicality and does not attempt to produce an account of the subject's 'inner self'. So the pending question is: to what ends does Picasso develop the category of the portrait? Rubin argues that Picasso resorted to his gifts as a caricaturist, to overcome Analytic Cubism's limiting fragmentation in the creation of a verifiable portrait. Picasso did this, by being able to isolate facial characteristics and introduce them sporadically in the portraits of his dealers.438 However, as we have seen, the practice of caricature drawing is in fact derived from dualist physiognomic treatises. By contrast, an examination of Braque's figurative Cubist works, with their lack of distinct physiognomic characteristics, indicates Braque's scepticism towards portraiture's mimetic demands. Of course, it could be argued that Picasso resolved such issues through physiognomy; however, Picasso's solution draws on a pre-modernist realism.

The additional remnants of traditional aesthetics in Picasso's practice can be inferred from Rubin's following argument about Braque. Drawing on two 1912 figurative paintings (Man with a Violin and Soda) Rubin concludes that Braque's level of “anti-hierarchical” fragmented abstraction is a result of his concern with the nature of painting itself, as opposed to Picasso's “will to represent directly the human drama”.439 Thus, Rubin views Braque's reservation about dealing with the subject as an outcome of his “reverence for the language and craft of painting”, and his preoccupation with the dissolution of a “sign into a mark”. Rubin's account seems to follow Apollinaire's reading of the role of the subject as insignificant. Conversely, Picasso bypasses any 'obstacles' in the “the direct expression of his feelings about people”, and transforms a mark “into a sign for a face or figure” – a metamorphosis that drives Picasso's late period.440 Where Braque reductively derives signs from texture, or “surface qualities”, Picasso inventively draws from the “physiognomy” of

439 Ibid, p. 22.
440 Ibid, p. 23.
shapes or objects. Finally, Picasso’s devotion to the “morphological” and “conceptual” definition of his subjects – in contrast to Braque’s preoccupation with compositional issues – encourages Rubin to call Picasso “an utterly representational painter in an increasingly abstract art”, a view that proposes an aesthetic clash in Picasso’s practice.

More recent accounts of Cubism seem to negate the metaphysical readings of the early theorisations. For John Berger, Cubism successfully combines Courbet’s materialism (attention to physical properties of objects) and Cézanne’s dialectic (multiple view points). Cubism’s approach to representation, Berger writes, is based fundamentally on the attempt to produce a visual account of a subject from multiple viewing points, which above all, stresses “the physical complexity of the structure of [the] figure”. The treatment of the body is described by Berger as an organisation, parallel to that of a city, asserting “the unmetaphysical character of man”. Further on Berger adopts a ‘functionalist’ language in declaring that Cubist figurative paintings “infer that consciousness is a property of highly organised matter”. What Berger ignores, however, in his argument is the presupposition of the pictorial device of ‘perspective’ in the process of visually composing multiple viewing points, which is foreign to the modernist ethos. Certainly, cubists did not employ perspective as Poussin did, for example, yet a total negation of perspective would result in an abstract chaos void of all indications of space. Yet, the possibility of this outcome is prevented by Synthetic Cubism’s abstract reduction of shapes to signs.

Concerning perspective, Taylor argues that the Renaissance pictorial invention visually prepared the ground for the new Dualist self insofar as it encompasses a process of objectification of, and disengagement from, the subject or object: “the artist is looking at what he depicts from a determinate point of view. With the achievement of perspective, the depicted reality is laid out as it appears from a particular situation.” In addition, the Renaissance desire to imitate nature free from stylistic burdens of previous iconographic traditions, led to a more naturalistic portraiture. Taylor claims that in its temporal isolation of subjects from architectural or worldly

441 Ibid, pp. 24-27.
442 Berger, The Success and Failure of Picasso, pp. 52-56, 58-59.
443 Ibid, p. 59. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
444 Taylor, Sources of the Self, p. 201.

149
contexts, Renaissance portraiture asserts a rejection of the Platonic mode of being as part of a cosmic order; yet Taylor views the liberation of nature’s depiction – including the human – from iconographic traditions, as the first visual manifestation of dualist objectification:

So the "freeing" of the object also carries with it a “freeing” of the subject, in the form of a greater self-consciousness, a new distance and separation from the object, a sense of standing over and against and no longer being englobed by what is depicted... Didn’t this in its way prepare the ground for the more radical break, in which the subject frees himself decisively by objectifying the world? The separation by which I stand over against the world perhaps helps prepare for the deeper rupture where I no longer recognise it as the matrix in which my life’s ends are set. The stance of separation helps overcome that profound sense of involvement in the cosmos, that absence of a clear boundary between self and world, which was generated by and contributed to sustaining the premodern notions of cosmic order.445

Despite Taylor’s convincing association of perspective with dualism, Berger’s reading of the effects of Cubism’s multiple viewing points manages to remain anti-dualist. In doing so, Berger argues, that the Cubist system, which is indebted to Cézanne, refuses to present a “static view of nature”.446 Through a simplification of forms, Cubism aims to disclose interactions between objects and subjects, thus focusing on exposing processes “of interlocking phenomena” rather than “static states of being”.

The proposed associations of Cubism’s methodology with traditional pictorial devices should not be misinterpreted as a frail claim against the style’s achieved level of abstraction. Semiotic accounts of Cubism discuss its abstraction in terms of a reduction of shapes into signs; in this view semiotic signification replaces illusionist realism, and traditional notions of likeness. From such a perspective, Rosalind Krauss identifies and unravels the importance of ‘naming’ in the construction of a Cubist work’s meaning.447 In doing so, Krauss talks of how the process of ‘naming’ is driven by our constant search for the ultimate mode of signification “beyond which there can

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446 Berger, The Success and Failure of Picasso, p. 59. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
be no further reading or interpretation”. Likewise, the meaning, as well as the signification of the naming of a subject is limited by the “the boundaries of identity”. The problem of misleading, or invented naming of a painting’s subject lies in the production of numerous failed readings by scholars, which is the result of variable identification.

The issue of naming gains seriousness when a painting does not represent a specific, or even existing person or object. Yves-Alain Bois talks of how Kahnweiler named most of Picasso and Braque’s Cubist work based on the painters’ descriptions. But Bois also identifies instances of Picasso disapproving of Kahnweiler’s titles. A specialised study of Picasso’s Cubist portraiture could be easily derailed if the discussion allocates equal value to the paintings that were initially intended as abstract figurative explorations of unidentified subjects as well as to those that were eventually falsely titled by Kahnweiler as portraits – perhaps, as Bois claims “to prevent their erroneous interpretation as pure abstraction”. Kahnweiler’s intent behind his titling – that is, to limit the perceived level of abstraction of the works in their viewing – raises two issues: firstly, it is an act that resembles Hegel’s call for limited abstraction – the limit being the moment that the figure ceases to be identified – and secondly, in underlining the traditional portraiture’s mimetic requirements it invokes the imposition of such limits.

The main focus of semiotic analyses lies in late Synthetic Cubism given the reading of collage as a technique that explicates a concept of the sign in a representational context. Krauss praises collage for challenging modernism’s intention to “objectify the formal constituents of a given medium” by “setting up discourse in place of presence”. Accordingly, Krauss claims Cubism as a ‘postmodernist’ art due to the fact that its identification and exploration of representational concerns, “to name (represent) an object may not necessarily be to call it forth, for there may be no (original) object”. By extension, and in crucial relation to the focus of this chapter,

\[448\] *Ibid*, p. 28. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.

\[449\] For Picasso’s disapproving see commentary in Bois, ‘Kahnweiler’s Lesson’, fn. 3, p. 280.

\[450\] For the importance of the act of naming on ‘identity’ statements’, and names’ function as ‘rigid designators’ through intentional referencing see Saul A. Kripke, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Blakwell, 1980).


\[452\] Krauss, ‘In the Name of Picasso’, pp. 38. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
collage is seen as the crystallisation of Analytic Cubism’s exploration of impersonal subjectivity in a work, and in authorship; only this time we also witness the addition of language to the artists’ palette, in the form of print or text.

_Krauss & Bois on Cubism_

Language, particularly the means by which it is employed by Picasso in his collage in the form of newspaper clips, or painted inscriptions is the focus of another essay on Cubism by Krauss. Krauss views the role of the newspaper in Picasso’s collages as an intention to concurrently represent and employ a procedural process of unfolding meaning that addresses the contextual conditions of the system that it is a part of. In preparing the ground for a semiotic analysis of the role of language, Krauss touches upon traditionalist issues that lie at the heart of Cubist experimentation. For instance, collage is now read as a formal resolution of Renaissance illusionism, in that it proposes alternatives to the sensual perception of a work: touching, instead of, or in addition to, seeing. But more importantly, collage rules out the possibility of illusionism through its flat representation of objects, given that an emphasised two-dimensionality prevents the illusionary evocation of three-dimensions. In her discussion, Krauss unravels the function of language in Picasso acting in “the absence of [its] referents”. That is, we witness the transition of painting from an iconic representational system to a symbolic system, a system that Hegel claims to be highly problematic in its distortion of meaning. However, Krauss tends to describe Picasso’s Analytic stage in Hegelian terms of limited abstraction. In fact, Krauss suggests that the prominence of the figure in Picasso’s Analytic painting was a result of Picasso’s effort to prevent it from totally dissolving into abstraction, thus saving some remaining traces of humanism in portraiture.

When Krauss discusses the issue of vision she returns to Platonic dualist positions. Krauss claims that Picasso refused to accept that our inability to perceive depth visually, should prevent it from being dealt with in painting. Furthermore, Picasso was a true believer in the romantic notion of ‘artistic genius’, which draws exclusively on Plato’s concept of an artistic vision capable of penetrating appearances (depth) and systems (cosmic order) in search for truth. In this context, Krauss views Braque’s Analytic works as driven by an effort to merge touch and sight; Picasso on the other hand, sought to keep these sensory functions separate. In Krauss’ analysis there is a suspicious parallelism between the physicality of touch and metaphysicality (or the immaterially of vision), which stems from the lack of need to physically engage with what our eyes are directed to.\footnote{Ibid, p. 269-70.} As a result, Braque comes across as anti-dualist in his effort to unite the two senses, and Picasso appears as a dualist who insists in keeping them apart.

In the influential essay ‘Kahnweiler’s Lesson’, Bois aims to validate a semiotic reading of Cubism by an exploration of the role of African art, particularly of the Grebo Mask.\footnote{Bois, ‘Kahnweiler’s Lesson’, pp. 65-97.} Bois draws heavily from Kahnweiler’s writing, where he identifies the only attempt in early writing on Cubism to identify the function of the sign in Cubism. The first issue Bois touches on is the role of the mask, which he regards as the inspirational force behind Cubism’s exploration of representational modes. In doing so, Bois argues that the mask’s formal influence can be divided in two categories: “morphological” and “structural”.\footnote{Ibid, p. 72. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.} Picasso’s initial interest in African art, Bois writes, was of a “morphological-expressionist” nature: what Picasso found in their “deform[ed] anatomical proportions” was inspiration for advancing the figurative abstraction in his own work. Moreover, Bois distinguishes between “psychological inexpressiveness” and “antiexpressionism”, to argue in an anti-dualist manner, that Picasso’s experimental “deformation” of the mask signifies “a refusal of psychological depth”.\footnote{Ibid, see footnote 30, p. 284.} Indeed, Bois argues that Picasso was uninterested in addressing human subjectivity at this stage of his career.
Bois claims that Picasso’s interest in African art reflects the drive to “plastic metaphorisation” at the core of Cubism, elsewhere seen in the employment of texture-giving decorative tools. Elaborating his argument in Saussurian terms, Bois maintains that Cubism’s abstract methodology – revived from the ‘hermetism’ of the late Analytic stage through Picasso’s rediscovery of African art in 1912 – focuses on the sign’s “arbitrary” nature. Furthermore, Bois revisits Saussure's clarification that “the arbitrary involves not the link between the sign and its referent but that between the signifier and the signified in the interior stage”, a position that helped Saussure to distinguish ‘referentiality’ from ‘signification’. By extension, Bois explains how, in semiotic and linguistic terms, the notion of a “linguistic sign’s relative motivation” should not be misinterpreted as a negation of the arbitrariness of the sign. Conversely, what relative motivation does is to explicate limitations in a system of values. When Bois applies this model to a reading of Picasso’s work he views his *papier collés*’s “reduction of his plastic system to a handful of signs” as the source of “multiple readings”. Alternatively put, reductively abstracted forms that are often seen as noses can, at other times, be seen as mouths; or syntheses of forms can be viewed either as a face or a guitar.

To sum up, Bois views the process of synthesis of late Cubism as the extension of painting into real space, as the result of the incorporation of *real* materials such as newspaper cuttings into the space of art. Notions of co-existence extend in the “infinite” combination of arbitrary and non-substantial signs, as found in African art. It is this that underlines Picasso’s interest in abstract reductiveness. However, as Bois crucially identifies, what the *Grebo* mask did above all was to help Picasso realise that what matters is not a sign’s “morphology” but its “function, its value within a system”. From Bois’ analysis we can surmise that where Analytic Cubism was devoted to an exploration of the sign’s function, Synthetic Cubism sought to employ it constructively. In addition, the transition from compositional exploration (function of sign in system) to inventive abstraction (employment of sign in system) is parallel to the evolution of the dualist portrait from pre-modern representational concerns with compositional issues (location of sign/subject within pictorial whole), to modernist formal abstraction (inventive and often reductive employment of sign/subject).

462 *Ibid*, pp. 86–90. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
The most important breakthrough of this abstract methodology – initially deformative and eventually reductive – is that acute imitation is no longer the driving force behind painting’s discourse. With regard to the sensitive, illusionist issue of chiaroscuro, Bois argues that Picasso’s employment of it is the exact opposite to Rembrandt’s: Picasso amplifies contrasts, instead of harmoniously reducing them. Picasso’s gradual desire to diminish any traces of illusionism is also reflected in his application of multiple lighting sources, and viewing points. According to Bois, Kahnweiler’s notion of ‘piercing of the closed form’, which took place in Cadaqués, is the moment that Picasso discovered an alternative purpose for chiaroscuro, other than defining the shape of objects or figures. Yet, Picasso did not manage to fully escape the remnants of traditionalism. As he stated in a conversation with Kahnweiler, Cubism is laden with indications of objects in perspective; and all that the superimposed planes ever did was to replace this. Ironically, Picasso holds the multiple representation of objects responsible for misleading readings of the works as void of perspective. If this is the case, then we can assume that Picasso was largely sceptical of the overbearing critical implications of Cubism, in light of its failure to fully escape all the conventions of realism.

Picasso expressed further second thoughts about Analytic Cubism in another conversation he had with Kahnweiler in 1933 in his studio at Rue de la Boétie. This time Picasso is dismissive of Analytic Cubism’s “materialism”, by which he refers to the retaining of the traditionalist “imitation of material form”. It could also be argued that the representation of an object from multiple viewing points emphasises such imitative intent. Picasso’s demeaning of descriptive materialism is not a prioritisation of the immaterial (as in the soulful), but rather a preference for “intellectual means of expression”. Moreover, it has been recently revealed that Braque, and also Gris were responsible for the early defences of Analytic Cubism as a form of expressing

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463 Ibid, p. 81-82.
‘essential’ and ‘conceptual’ realities through the variable presentation of an object’s sides, and not Picasso.\(^{466}\)

This reading of Cubism’s methodology is undermined by yet another conflictual co-existence of the forces of classicism and dualism. The pictorial devices of the perspective and static viewing points are maximised for the sake of an essential reality, which fail by being limited to material appearances; the result might be abstract, but it is only due to the visually confusing outcome of ‘variable viewing’. In Hegelian terms, classicism’s influence in Analytic Cubism is to limit abstraction through mimesis. As Bois successfully argues, Picasso was to disapprove of Analytic Cubism due to its inability to fully escape mimetic structures. Yet, Picasso did not detest illusionism per se, but “the condition of illusionism”.\(^{467}\) That is, a perception of signs that disregards their material reality, in favour of their transparency. Contrary to his later thoughts on Analytic Cubism, Picasso was particularly pleased with the achievements of the Synthetic stage. In fact, Picasso revealed to Kahnweiler in 1948 how much he regretted abandoning the Synthetic creative period to return to oil painting.\(^{468}\) Perhaps, Picasso’s approval of the Synthetic stage is driven, in Krauss’ terms, by collage’s substitution of “luminosity”, “transparency”, and “obliquity” for the illusionist chiaroscuro and light of Analytic Cubism.\(^{469}\) But are not these universal, and transparent aesthetic qualities the very same that Bois claims that Picasso disliked in the condition of illusionism?

Bois returns to the *Grebo Mask* to unravel the reasons behind his recent claims for the mask’s explicative role in revealing the function of the sign within a system. Drawing once more from the writings of Kahnweiler, Bois argues that the mask’s morphology elucidates a semiotic/scriptural path towards a “liberation” from illusionism. Moreover, Kahnweiler adopts a process of thought similar to that of ‘non-objective’ art to maintain that such signs act as “emblems for the external world, not


\(^{468}\) Kahnweiler, ‘Entretiens avec Picasso’, p. 76. Towards the end of his discussion on Picasso’s statements Bois makes sure that he notes the painter’s intention to confuse his interviewers by contradicting previously expressed positions, Bois, ‘The Semiology of Cubism’, p. 172.

However, Bois argues that there are limits to the use of signs, particularly in their function within a given system: in order for them to remain readable they need to be inventive within boundaries set by the system’s rules. Once again we are faced with an indication of limited abstraction that seems to follow Hegelian aesthetic thought. In fact, Bois takes the initiative to set the limits himself by claiming that it was never the Cubists’ intention to achieve full abstraction, therefore they could not afford to fully abstract the figure.

What is at question in this chapter is not figurative painting per se but portraiture, hence, the earlier distinction between paintings titled as portraits and those simply as figure of x or y. Moreover, the focus of our discussion should be directed towards the limits to abstraction imposed by the humanist, mimetic demands of portraiture, appropriate for the visual identification of a subject, in spite of a process of naming. If we approach the issue from a semiotic perspective we should examine the role of the dualist physiognomy, which as Rubin identified, assisted Picasso in isolating shapes (Analytic) in the process of turning them into signs (Synthetic). The advanced semiotic experimentation of Synthetic Cubism underlines the distorting effects of partial physiognomic signification, which results in a multiple reading of a sign. Overall, Bois’ understanding of Cubism is as a form of a structural methodology that seeks to “dissect” signs from systems only to come to “re-associate”, or “articulate” them according to certain rules that would prevent random results. In dualist terms, the early stage of this semiotic methodology seems to mirror the Cartesian notion of objectification. And once a ‘scientific’ understanding of the objectified sign in this case is achieved, then it can be rationally, and instrumentally controlled.

An issue that is largely overseen by semiotic analyses, is the requirement of rules as integral to the nature and function of a system. Despite the fact that we are unaware of whether Braque and Picasso were keen on a painting practice dictated by rules, and limited within a system, it is clearly the case that the avant-garde was opposed to modes of restrained creative exploration. Hence, the avant-garde’s disdain

472 Bois makes a similar claim, Ibid, p. 191.
towards traditional aesthetics, and commissioned portraiture, as a result, as I have explained, of the imposed limits of the mimetic demands. Bearing in mind Picasso’s scepticism about the employment of multiple viewing points and light sources – he disregarded them as alternatives to single-point perspective – it seems unlikely that he would resort to a strategy of ‘replacing’ again – that is, replacing traditional rules for semiotic ones. Supporters of semiotics could possibly argue for the existence of a system as integral to any structural phenomenon, yet, they only have to approach the moment of Abstract Expressionism to understand that in art everything is possible. Perhaps Picasso was sympathetic towards structural rules, but if he was then he shared the same passion that drove Descartes to compromise his Method. Semiotic readings of Cubism are laden with basic dualist characteristics. First, they presuppose the existence of a system compiled by signs with specific roles, which mirrors Plato’s notion of rationally locating our place in the cosmic order. Secondly, the view of Cubism’s internal development as an exploration of the function of the sign within a pictorial system (Analytic), followed by its creative employment (Synthetic) within the same system, resembles the Cartesian method of scientific objectification for the purpose of instrumental control.

Clark & Rubin’s Cubism

For Clark, the problem with semiotic accounts of Cubism lies in their concentration on “particulars”.\(^{474}\) By extension, a semiotic approach is seen to be inaccurate as a consequence of the way a selection of pictorial features might not be the focus of the creator.\(^{475}\) Clark is also sceptical of a reading of Cubism as a ‘language’, although he admits that “it looks as one”.\(^{476}\) Yet, Clark detects and accepts the existence of a “totality”, whose act of organisation is seen as Cubism’s heritage to modernism.\(^{477}\) Contrary to semiotic claims, Clark challenges the view of a “non-imitative whole” as created by “local acts of illusionism” (interplay of light and

\(^{475}\) Ibid, p. 183.
\(^{476}\) Ibid, p. 223.
\(^{477}\) Ibid, p. 175.
multiple viewing points). Instead, Clark values the role of the grid, which by functioning as a compositional device “becomes a guarantor of totality”. In doing so, the grid fails to become part of the “perception it totalises”, by acting as a “membrane” torn between the compositional ‘outside’ and the formalist ‘inside’. Yet, the diagramming and “geometricisation”, integral to the fabrication of the grid gradually replaced illusionist techniques.

As we have seen an additional problem of semiotic accounts lies in the presupposed imposition of rules, which encourages a Hegelian reading of Cubism’s abstract intentions as self-limited. Clark, on the other hand views Cubism’s constant drive towards “ambiguity” and “ambition for obscurity” as testimony of a modern art that “found its subject-matter in itself”. That is, through a critical, and unlimited exploration of representational issues, firstly by demonstrating the failures of illusionism, and as such the subsequent downgrading of depiction or “reference” as no longer as important. Thus, Clark’s understanding of Cubism implies the suppression of the work’s subject, whose only purpose is to serve as a means of critical reflection on the art’s own structures. Accordingly, Clark agrees with Bois and Krauss in viewing the role of African art in the early stages of Cubism as a form of methodological objectification: “an aid to understanding illusionism, not disposing it”. Yet, Clark distances his account from dualist notions when he unravels the breakthroughs achieved in Horta, during the summer of 1909. In doing so, he claims that the pictorial exploration of forms from multiple viewing points is an attempt to address illusionism through a resolution of the question of presence associated with ‘salience’ by replacing it with ‘convexity’. Accordingly, the illusion of presence, for Clark, depends on the absence of the non-visible, that is, the formal aspects that are not visible from a static viewpoint. By treating the body as map, Clark claims that Picasso implies that “things have no other [metaphysical] sides”.

Surprisingly, Rubin opens his analysis of Picasso’s portrait practice with claims of an anti-dualist nature. Drawing on the whole of Picasso’s portraiture, Rubin

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479 *Ibid*, pp. 186, 211, 219-220. Following quotes are from the same source, unless otherwise stated.
482 *Idid*, p. 194.
483 *Ibid*, pp. 201-204.
identifies a “passion of [figurative] metamorphosis”, viewed as rejection of a notion of the self as immutable. However, the methodology behind the model of representation that Rubin proposes, consists of a combination of Plato’s notion of artistic vision and the Renaissance concept of the artist projecting his or her self onto their art: “he [Picasso] would distribute different aspects of their personalities and his own changing feelings toward them”. In line with the general view, Cubist portraiture is regarded as “objective” as opposed to the more “subjective” late surrealist and expressionist works. This is so, Rubin writes, because Picasso was fundamentally concerned with personal issues of formalist self-expression and not with the representation of his subjects’ physical image or character. Self-expression is used here in its literal sense; Rubin refers to Marius de Zayas’ reflections on a 1910 interview by Picasso, particularly his claim that “the picture [for Picasso] should be the pictorial equivalent of the emotion produced by the subject”. Thus, Rubin’s position differs from Clark’s, in that where the latter argues for an aesthetic exploration internal to Cubism that reduced the subject to the means of an experiment, the former claims that Picasso was still concerned with the subject, but instead of incorporating the subject’s own self-projection he communicated his own.

Such pictorial emphasis on psychological content – in terms of the artist’s representation of his own subjectivity as well as that of his subjects’ – is for the first time concretised in modernism as a consequence of the artists’ freedom to choose their subjects. In doing so, in Picasso’s works we witness the emergence of friends, family, and lovers in place of the familiar patrons and commissioners. Hence, the painters’ personal familiarity with their subjects is what enables this psychological reading; familiarity in a sense provides the conditions for formalist experimentation and the release of the artists’ responsive feelings. To sum up, Picasso’s portrait methodology is an amalgamation of artistic and personal concerns, which result in the abstract transformation of his subjects. Moreover, the very fact that such portraits were not commissioned reconfigures the right-to-honour from the exemplary to the everyday.

486 Ibid, pp. 16-18.
Rubin claims in agreement with most of the early Cubist theory that the critical moment in Picasso’s work involves a shift from representational to the conceptual. Touching upon the issue of ‘naming’, previously discussed by Krauss, Rubin regards the Portrait of Gertrude Stein (1905-06) as posing an important question concerning the centrality of mimetic representation (in this instance substituted by a process of naming) in the identification of a portrait’s subject.\(^{487}\) Brilliant seems to contest such a view by arguing that the lack of faithful resemblance in Stein’s portrait should not be perceived as Picasso’s disinterest in addressing her subjectivity. Instead, Brilliant argues that this portrait’s rigid rendering of Stein’s facial features, which is the result of more than eighty sittings and a study of Iberian sculpture, derives from Picasso’s intention to represent Stein’s “psyche…concretely.”\(^{488}\) What follows from this view is that Picasso finds the means for manipulating the representation of Stein’s physical appearance in order to satisfactorily incorporate an impression of her character. Thus, for the creation of this portrait Picasso’s subjectivity was at the service of communicating Stein’s.

Discussing the Analytic portraits of Picasso’s dealers as an “anomaly” in the course of Cubism’s development, (Clovis Sagot, Wilhelm Uhde, Ambroise Vollard, and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler) Rubin raises two important questions: firstly, it is peculiar that Picasso turned to portraiture – a genre with the burden of mimesis – at a moment that he was reaching pure abstraction, and secondly, it is surprising that all these subjects are men – considering the painter’s desire to paint women, usually his lovers. Admittedly, the second question is answered with certain naivety simply because Rubin associates the “impersonal”, “conceptual” and “speculative character” of Cubism with Spanish male qualities.\(^{489}\) Answering the first question, however, will require a more extensive discussion. Rubin is quick to rule out professional, career-driven motives as the only ones behind the execution of these portraits, yet as we will see, they played a far bigger role, with detrimental aesthetic side effects. What he proposes in return is that Picasso needed sitters that would be patient and understanding enough to endure lengthy sittings, as well as subjects distinct enough.

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\(^{487}\) Ibid, pp. 26-29.

\(^{488}\) Brilliant, Portraiture, pp. 149-152.

that their identities would not dissolve into a process of generalisation of forms and colours.\footnote{Rubin repeats this claim in Rubin, \textit{Picasso and Braque}, p. 50 \& fn. 152.}

Astonishingly, Rubin neglects the fact that in the same volume Pierre Daix successfully proves that Picasso painted these portraits from memory and photographs, and not from actual sittings.\footnote{Pierre Daix, ‘Portraiture in Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism’, in Rubin, \textit{Picasso and Portraiture}, pp. 278; Daix founds his argument on the lack of references in literature to Vollard frequently visiting Picasso’s studio at the time, in addition to known photographs that Kahnweiler’s portrait was based on. For Picasso’s employment of photographs see Anne Baldassari, ‘Heads and Bodies: Picasso’s Uses of Portrait Photographs’, in Rubin, \textit{Picasso and Portraiture}, pp. 202-223; For a full account of see Anne Baldassari, \textit{Picasso Photographe, 1901-1916} (Paris: Editions de la Réunion des Musées Nationaux, 1994), pp. 117, 119-122, 124-125.}

This is a very significant point, as Picasso’s preference to execute portraits from photographs shows a level of disinterest in human exchange, since Picasso is not employing sittings in order to familiarise himself with his subjects. Moreover, such a choice would suggest that Picasso was primarily concerned with issues internal to his art and not with the mimetic interests of his sitters. Regarding, the distinctiveness of these individuals, we simply have to wonder how many people outside the early 20\textsuperscript{th}-century Parisian art-world would recognise these dealers. In this respect, perhaps it would be more appropriate to choose a more popular figure. Let us say for example, the 1920’s equivalent of Marilyn Monroe, or Jackie O. Furthermore, Rubin attributes the variable level of abstraction of these portraits – with Vollard’s being the most realistic, followed by the more abstract portraits of Uhde and Kahnweiler – to the professional status of each dealer. Accordingly, Rubin builds on the false claim of lengthy sittings to argue that Picasso could demand more sittings from Uhde and Kahnweiler because they depended on him, and not \textit{vice versa}, as was the case with Vollard.\footnote{Rubin, ‘Reflections on Picasso and Portraiture’, pp. 33-34.}

Contrary to Rubin, Michael C. Fitzgerald attributes more value to economic and professional motives in Picasso’s choice of portrait subjects. In fact, as Fitzgerald reveals, from the beginning of his career Picasso was aware of the importance of art-world figures and he often employed his art for “the cultivation of those who might develop his reputation”.\footnote{Michael C. Fitzgerald, \textit{Making Modernism: Picasso and the Creation of the Market for Twentieth-Century Art} (Berkeley, London: University of California Press, 1996), pp. 28-29.} Prior to the Cubist portraits, Picasso had executed, and donated to the sitters, portraits of Pedro Manach (his early agent), Gustave Coquiot
(a critic that praised Picasso), and Ambroise Vollard (who hosted a show of Picasso’s post-impressionist work). And let us not forget the portraits that he painted of the Steins: besides Gertrude, Picasso painted the portraits of Leo Stein and Michael Stein’s son, Allan in 1906.

Furthermore, Picasso was in constant competition with his contemporaries, especially with Matisse. In the same month that Matisse achieved financial security by signing an advantageous contract with Bernheim-June (September 1909), Picasso moved from Bateau Lavoir to a more prestigious apartment with a separate studio on the boulevard de Clichy, a move that was probably driven by an effort to upgrade his public and artistic image, since he was still lacking a regular dealer. What followed in the new premises was the execution of the famous portraits of art dealers: Clovis Sagot (1909), Ambroise Vollard (1910), Wilhelm Uhde (1910), and Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler (1910).

494

The Portraits of Sagot, Vollard, Uhde and Kahnweiler

Let us examine each portrait individually in terms of a level of progressive abstraction and a reduction of realism, and in relation to Picasso’s professional relationship with each of his sitters. As we will see the gestural motivation behind each work can be roughly divided in two categories: rewarding – thanking a dealer for the staging of a show, or a successful sale – and promoting – luring a dealer into a potential professional collaboration.

The Portrait of Clovis Sagot is the most realist of all, however without negating abstraction altogether. According to Daix, Picasso intentions behind this portrait were to produce a “combination” of realist and abstract tendencies. In doing so, the ‘organic’ curves of Sagot’s figure are contradicted by straight lines of clothing. Picasso sought to achieve a certain level of Cubist “descriptive analysis” and a level of pictorial

494 As Fitzgerald points out Daix initially dated the portrait of Sagot to the spring of 1909, the portraits of Vollard and Uhde to winter 1909-10 or spring 1910, and the portrait of Kahnweiler to autumn 1910 (Daix and Rosselet, 240, 253, 259). However, in Rubin’s, *Picasso and Braque*, the portraits of Vollard and Uhde are dated spring-autumn 1910 (173 and 175) and the Kahnweiler autumn-winter 1910 (181). Since seeing the exhibition, Daix has accepted this revision of the chronology (see *Picasso: Life an Art*, 102). Fitzgerald, *Making Modernism*, p. 33.
realism, by resorting to a Cézannesque treatment of the figure. The influence of Cézanne in this early Cubist work is reflected in the treatment of Sagot’s jacket and particularly his face, in addition to the portrait’s overall impression of a 19th-century figure.\(^{495}\) Bearing in mind that Sagot was Picasso’s most consistent dealer at the time helps explain why this is the first portrait of the series. Picasso’s decision to paint Sagot’s portrait following successful deals grants to the execution of the work a rewarding gestural attribute.\(^{496}\) If this is the case, its level of realism is not necessarily driven by a desire to please Sagot’s mimetic expectations. It could simply be the outcome of Cubism’s development. Yet, when we view Sagot’s portrait next to that of Manuel Pallarés (late spring 1909) it is quite obvious that where Pallarés’ portrait is overtaken by abstraction – a careful geometric and fragmented rendering – Sagot’s portrait is a clear return to realism – mimetic identification – in spite of traces of Cubist abstraction.

As a dealer, Vollard was more successful than Sagot, and all the other dealers in Picasso’s Cubist portraits. Despite the fact he had acquired a significant number of paintings, Picasso had not managed to achieve a commitment from him, similar to the one that Matisse attained from his recent contract with Bernheim-Jeune.\(^{497}\) Therefore, it is conceivable that the character of this work is an attempt at self-promotion through a demonstration of skills and as such his work’s commercial prospects. The Portrait of Ambroise Vollard shares the level of realism found in Sagot’s, and as Vollard has stated, his resemblance in the portrait was even identified by children.\(^{498}\) Rubin detects a conflictual co-existence in Vollard’s portrait visualised by an effect of illusionistic realism within Cubism’s fragmentally abstract rendering.\(^{499}\) Illusionism functions in this portrait, as well as in the others, as a force that produces a Hegelian limited abstraction; one that aspires to prevent the total abolition of the sitter’s subjectivity by retaining a satisfactory level of physiognomic identification.

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\(^{495}\) Daix, ‘Portraiture in Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism’, p. 272.

\(^{496}\) Fitzgerald, Making Modernism, p. 33.

\(^{497}\) Fitzgerald, Making Modernism, p. 33.


The resemblance between Vollard and Sagot’s portraits is due to the compromised level of abstraction for the sake of visual identification. Daix argues that in executing this portrait Picasso intended to justify to Vollard “the validity of the progress of his Cubism...by emphasising its ability to characterise”, as he did with the portrait of Stein.500 Yet, it could be argued that Stein’s portrait achieved characterisation through her pose, and by Stein’s choice of attire. Conversely, the sense of realism in Vollard’s portrait is located in the treatment of his face. The treatment of Stein’s face, inspired by the aesthetics of primitive masks (which has been the subject of numerous discussions) is by no means realistic. In fact, even Daix recognises in the same text that “the sudden, unexpected painting-out of Gertrude’s face no doubt had to do with Picasso’s decision to distance his portrait from that first illusionistic and somewhat idealising conception of it”.501 Then, why would Picasso take steps backwards? Was Picasso’s desire to impress Vollard stronger than what it was four years previously with Stein, or a few months ago with Sagot? Or, does the variable limited level of abstraction in each of these portraits correspond to the professional status of each dealer, and the nature of Picasso’s expectations of them?

Vollard’s portrait was almost immediately followed by the Portrait of Wilhelm Uhde. For this work Picasso saw fit to resort to a Cézannesque treatment of the face once again, a fragmentation manifested by the interplay of planes, which is stronger here than in Vollard’s portrait. Despite its realist similarities with the portraits of Sagot and Vollard, Uhde’s portrait is the first to host a pictorial innovation that was to haunt the rest of Picasso’s portraiture, especially his post-World War II production: where as one eye is in frontal view, the other is in profile.502 When compared to Sagot and Vollard’s portraits this attribute, as well as the stronger fragmentation of Uhde’s face, produces a stronger sense of abstraction; yet, one that does not rule out the level of realism that is required for the visual identification of Uhde. The series of events that preceded and followed its execution suggest that with this portrait Picasso was aiming both to reward Uhde for numerous dealings, and possibly attract more

500 Daix, ‘Portraiture in Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism’, p. 278.
502 Ibid, p. 278. It has to be noted that Robert Rosenblum identified that the split between profile and frontal facial view was firstly employed on a 1908-1909 work called the Bathers. Robert Rosenblum, ‘Picasso’s Blond Muse: The Reign of Marie-Thérése Walter’, in Rubin, Picasso and Portraiture, pp. 336-383. Uhde’s portrait is the first work of this genre to accommodate this pictorial device.
professional gains. Even though Uhde had been purchasing Picasso’s art since 1905, a short while after the completion of his portrait he organised a show of Picasso’s work at the Galerie Notre Dame des Champs. Another coincidence?

By far, the most abstract and innovative work of this series is the Portrait of Daniel-Henry Kahnweiler. Once again, the levels of abstraction and realism in this portrait seem to be parallel with the subject’s professional status, and to Picasso’s expectations of, or reliance on, Kahnweiler. Compared to the other three Kahnweiler had far less experience and range of trading activities. Uhde introduced him to Picasso in the summer of 1907, and apparently his purchases from Picasso had peaked around the time of his portrayal in 1910. Hasty to justify the motives behind the production of Kahnweiler’s portrait, and of the rest, as financial, Fitzgerald ignores the abundant evidence that proves that they were not painted from life. So, he suggests that Picasso used the sittings to “interview” these dealers in search for the one that would provide him with a contract similar to the one that Matisse had recently signed with Bernheim-Jeune. Perhaps, Kahnweiler’s lack of significant professional experience, and status in the art-world is what allowed Picasso to expand the limits of Cubist abstraction. The almost illusionist treatment of the faces in the previous portraits is now largely absent. Instead the impression of the subject is provided by a combination of structural fragmentation and peripheral references, acting as signs, which Daix regards as the outcome of the exploration of figurative representation that took place a few months earlier in Cadaqués. Or, as Cottington argues, what happened in Cadaqués was that Picasso set the limits of formal abstraction with the intention of preventing a total abandoning of iconicity altogether in order to avoid “risking complete indecipherability”, a certain compromise that was proven to be ideal for his Cubist portraiture.

What stops these signs from dissolving into the generic and the universal is the fact Picasso was careful to construct them as much as possible from Kahnweiler’s own features; his quif, his nose, his eyes, his clothes, and even his characteristic sitting pose with crossed legs are all clearly recognisable. In this respect, the employment of

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503 Fitzgerald, *Making Modernism*, p. 33. These facts can also be verified by the dated record of events in Rubin’s ‘Documentary Chronology’, in *Picasso and Braque*, p. 365.
505 Daix, ‘Portraiture in Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism’, pp. 278.
506 Cottington, *Cubism and its Histories*, p. 49.
the sign in Kahnweiler’s portrait is an early indication of its discursively dominant role in the Synthetic stage. However, mimetic expectations, despite their minimal status in this case, stop the sign from acting in the arbitrary ways that Bois and Krauss’ describe in their semiotic analyses of late Cubism; even though it does act within a system. For Daix, this system, or rather “aesthetic whole”, is the outcome of a process that in its isolation of “analytic references” seems to rely on a Cartesian mode of objectification of facial features, followed by the instrumental employment of its results. Even Daix finds it difficult to avoid romantic terminology in his reading of the instrumental appropriation of signs within a unified “apparition”, reinforced as it is by the lack of marks that limit the abstraction of the sitter, as is the case in the other portraits.  

If we draw from the opening quote, even Picasso views the process of abstraction as indebted to realism, which, if we are to consider it from a dualist perspective, proposes a subservience of the soul to the body, and not vice versa. Alternatively, we would need a body to state the soul’s predominance over the body, and through this prove its existence – no body, then no representation of the soul at its expense. What is demanded for this level of inter-dependence is the immateriality of the soul, which, caught in an easy preconception of its superiority over the body, materialises at the expense of the physical by instrumentally abstracting it. Moreover, objectification plays a crucial part in the process of viewing too, as the identification of the subject requires a “decoding” of the signs’ references. Finally, the nature of the portrait’s abstraction should not fool us into underemphasising the conventional aspects of this portrait. The sitting pose, the compositional cropping of the body into a three-quarter pose, the focal attention to the face in addition to the inventive isolation of physiognomic characteristics clearly reflect traditional illusionist pictorial tactics, which were also, as I have stressed, the means by which 17th-century Dutch portraiture attempted to visualise dualist concerns.

The level of realism in the portraits of Sagot, Vollard, and Uhde is clearly an outcome of the prevalence, or survival of traditional aesthetics within a modernist art that was driven by abstraction. A prevalence that could be due to the fact that these works were executed during the early days of Cubism, when the style had not managed to resolve or to seriously consider figurative representational issues. Or,

Picasso simply sidetracked already achieved breakthroughs; perhaps, because the moment of their realisation forced Picasso to understand that mimetic demands or expectations cannot co-exist with the avant-garde rhetoric of limitless pictorial experimentation driven by abstraction. Particularly, when the subjects of these portraits relied on a particular form of representation for demonstrating their authenticity and social stature.\(^{508}\) In other words, by executing these portraits Picasso might have become aware that the concerns (artistic) of his own subjectivity interfered with the concerns (resemblance) of his sitter’s subjectivity, with a strong potential to subsume them. There is, however, the possibility that his decisions in favouring the concerns of one subjectivity or the other was both influenced by issues internal to his art and by his business relationship with his subjects.

As I mentioned earlier, the methodology behind the evocation of likeness in Picasso’s Cubist portrait of Kahnweiler has been widely attributed to his caricaturist skills of isolating physiognomic traits. \(^{509}\) Clark goes as far as to praise these “indicators” as Picasso’s best Cubist improvisations.\(^{510}\) As we have seen in chapter 1, caricature is infused with dualism, and is inter-related with physiognomy. In addition, we should not let the theoretical appraisal of Picasso’s employment of a methodology central to physiognomy (isolation of an individual’s characteristic facial features) trick us into overlooking the impact of Picasso’s practical decision to limit the expressive, or abstractive development of his own found breakthroughs. In satisfying the mimetic demands imposed by his subjects’ viewing expectations Picasso resorted to a fundamentally traditional pictorial device, since a total negation of physiognomic identification would strip the works of any remaining humanism. In doing so, the pictorial elements of dualist physiognomy clash with the apparent anti-dualist treatment of the subject, by scrutinising the materiality of the figure.

Daix regards the Cubist portrait as the moment that portraiture ceased being naturalistic. In turn, Picasso’s new methodology regards the portrait as the “sum of all that…[his] plastic imagination can extract and transform from the model”.\(^{511}\) Daix’s account needs to be unravelled. First, the quantity of the portrait’s “sum” is dependant


\(^{509}\) Rubin, ‘Reflections on Picasso and Portraiture’, p. 34; see also fn. 115.

\(^{510}\) Clark, ‘Cubism and Collectivity’, p. 217.

\(^{511}\) Daix, ‘Portraiture in Picasso’s Primitivism and Cubism’, p. 276.
on how much Picasso’s imagination can “extract” from the subject, which could be according to his impression, his reading of the person, and even his mood of the time (all of which presuppose Plato’s notion of artistic pure vision – capable of such functions). Second, if the final creation is a product of his “plastic imagination”, of which the sum is a result of those abilities, then, as his post-World War II portraits of his partners’ show, it is destined to be constructed far from the real. This reality is sensory, as it refers to a naturalistic representation of the figure. In dualist terms, a true representation of reality requires a clear remarking of the soul’s superiority over, and instrumentalisation of, the body. In other words, the means by which an impression of a person’s inner being affects his or her representation (where their body is abstracted at the expense of visualising their superior-to-the-body soul). The soul’s effects and affects on the body are then made universally visible by artists, who record their vision according to their individual mental processing of them.

As it was deduced from the semiotic accounts I discussed the arbitrary and universal nature of the sign limits the possibilities of portrayal. In their effort to prove that Picasso managed to overcome such problems, scholars like Daix, incorporate a discussion of portraiture works that were not intended to be portraits in the first place. In doing so, Daix praises Picasso’s employment of “peripheral information” in works such as *Girl from Arles*, 1912, and *Female Nude*, 1912 – where Daix takes the *Je t’aime Eva* as an extension to the title in order to present it as a portrait and not as a generic figure – thereby achieving a form of ‘real’ portraiture as opposed to illusionist models. Yet, the formalist reduction of Synthetic Cubism did not allow for the creation of portraits, as a result of the universal sign’s inability to represent the specific details needed for the visual identification of a person. Nevertheless, it has to be noted that Picasso did produce a single *papier collé* portrait, that of his close friend and faithful supporter Guillaume Apollinaire. Executed in 1913, it adorned the cover of Apollinaire’s first important book, *Alcools*. What makes this work a portrait is not the sense of illusionism that assists in the visual identification of Apollinaire, but the process of naming that Krauss claims as integral to Synthetic Cubism. Even though,

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513 For a similar argument see Rubin, ‘Reflections on Picasso and Portraiture’, p. 35. Rubin characteristically claims that gender in Synthetic Cubism is schematically marked as “moustaches for men, [and] stylised breasts for women”.

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Krauss discusses this process in her unravelling of the sign’s process of signification, it should not stop us from applying it to the simpler act of perceiving a system of signs – that of the visual representation of specific individuals. The papier collé portrait of Apollinaire is the moment when portraiture negates all traces of naturalism, and with it the framework of humanism, which remained variably present in all the Analytic portraits. Yet, such an unconventional process was not met with general appreciation by critics with the exception of Apollinaire, who supported Picasso’s artistic decisions and directions unquestionably.

It is quite obvious by now that there is good evidence to suggest that Picasso was willing to satisfy the various mimetic expectations, or demands, of the subjects of his Analytic portraits. So, Picasso’s choice of subjects of this period follow the expectations of visual identification. If Rubin claimed that pre-modernist portraiture was “boring” because it was obedient to patronage, then how are these portraits any different in terms of their subjects? In the light of modern social and economic changes the dealer, agent, or gallerist now replaces the patron in providing an income for the artist. If Picasso was to choose his close friends and associates he would not have to compromise the advances of his art, simply because they would respect his artistic freedom, given that they were its strongest advocates. However, these compromises with conventional portraiture were not necessarily the outcome of fulfilled demands, expressed by his sitters, but rather the result of Picasso’s intention to please. So, exactly how independent was Picasso’s creativity when it was dictated by a desire to please expectations that contradicted his experimental intentions?

*Esprit du Commerce: The Turn to Neo-Classicism*

From this perspective it seems that Picasso’s next stylistic move, his turn to Neoclassicism, was driven by a desire to satisfy mimetic demands in his portraiture through a purely illusionist form of art. Of course, the common scholarly position

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514 Berger identifies Picasso’s choice of subjects as his failure, “when this happens, he virtually destroys the nominal subject he has taken, and so makes the whole painting absurd”. Even though Berger draws from a series of cases they all date from 1925 onwards, thus, he totally misses the impact of a wrong choice of subjects in Cubist portraiture. For an analysis of a series of works that share problematic subjectivity in Picasso’s practice see Berger, *The Success and Failure of Picasso*, pp. 142-154.
regarding this unexpected and contradictory stylistic evolution is ambiguous, even though there are extensive accounts of the career benefits of this move. As Daix claims, there are indications of realism in Picasso’s Cubist explorations in the second half of 1913 and early 1914. However, we cannot possibly accept that this move was driven by an intention to introduce classicism into Cubism, since this notion of realism is what compromised Analytic Cubist abstraction in a Hegelian manner; and Picasso was not so keen about it. In other words, to accept Daix’s position is to accept Picasso as a half-hearted avant-gardist, one who prioritises the subjective interests and concerns of figures in the art-world (paralleling the distorting interferences of pre-modern patrons and commissioners). Almost every scholar admits that there is no satisfactory explanation as to why Picasso suddenly abandoned Cubism. First, let us examine the historical conditions under which Picasso made his stylistic turn in.

In 1914, André Level formed a consortium of curators, dealers, and collectors for investing a significant sum of money in purchasing contemporary art, which would then be resold at events that took the form of exhibitions, leading to auctions of the works. The first sale took place at La Peau de l’Ours, which was so successful that the consortium was named after it. This event provided Picasso with the chance to re-familiarise himself with his early works from Blue and Red period. Furthermore, his _Family of Saltimbanques_ achieved the biggest sale (12,650 francs, twelve times what Level had bought it for from Picasso in 1908), which might have encouraged Picasso to see financial benefits from a prospective re-turn to illusionism, be it either his early proto-Impressionism or Neoclassicism. At the same time, Picasso’s re-engagement with 19th-century masters, such as Renoir (through recent retrospective exhibitions in mid-1920s) combined with the recent market achievement of his early work, might have provided him with a workable alternative to Cubism, which was under heavy criticism. Drawing mostly from the work of Metzinger and Gleizes, critics accused Cubism of being outdated, and most pointedly as ahistoric and unpatriotic, since it ignored the current hostile European situation. The recent exhibitions and promotion of French great masters reflected the post-World War I trend of the “call to order” as

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516 Fitzgerald, _Making Modernism_, p. 50-51, 118.
Jean Cocteau put it in 1926,\textsuperscript{517} that turned artistic attention to the revival of previously rejected traditional, mostly Mediterranean 19\textsuperscript{th}-century artists.\textsuperscript{518}  

Kenneth Silver discusses a series of published attacks against Cubism both in the form of essays and cartoons. In those, Cubism and modern art are portrayed as a predominantly Germanic, standing in contrast to the classicism of French patriotism.\textsuperscript{519} French xenophobia and fear that the large numbers of foreign artists now based in Paris would dominate the French art scene is reflected in Deputy Breton’s complaint about the inclusion of Cubists in the Grand Palais exhibition in 1912. As Cottington identifies, Breton ethnic and cultural objections led him to count the exact number of foreign artists’ works in the show as well as to identify any members of the jury that were of foreign descent.\textsuperscript{520} Unfortunately, Breton’s xenophobia was shared by the majority of the press and government officials. Although the Fine Arts minister Léon Bérard would publicly deny any tactics of artistic discrimination he was privately pressuring the president of the Salon d’Autonome, Frantz Jourdain, to modify the rules with the purpose of preventing a future domination of the Salon by foreigners, as a condition for the Salon’s continued access to the Grand Palais.\textsuperscript{521}  

Picasso’s only artistic response to the war was the still-life painting \textit{Still Life with Cards, Glasses, and a Bottle of Rum} (1914-1915), which has come to be known as \textit{Vive la France}. What distinguishes this work from others of this period is the inscription “vive la” accompanied by a pair of French flags on a whitecap at the lower left of the painting. However, as Silver identifies this was not as a significant gesture as Matisse’s \textit{Piano Lesson} (1916), for instance (which signifies a clear impact of the war on Matisse), as there was no thematic change to what Picasso was producing during the previous year.\textsuperscript{522} In addition, Picasso’s combination of French patriotism with Cubism was not well received, considering the French hostility towards the style; perhaps this is the reason why Picasso never attempted this conflation again. The fact

\begin{itemize}
\item[\textsuperscript{517}] Jean Cocteau, \textit{Le rappel à l’ordre} (Paris, 1926).
\item[\textsuperscript{520}] Cottington, \textit{Cubism in the Shadow of War}, p. 35.
\item[\textsuperscript{521}] \textit{Ibid}, p. 13.
\item[\textsuperscript{522}] Silver, \textit{Esprit de Corps}, pp. 34-38.
\end{itemize}
that Picasso refused to take the path of the Salon Cubists – a combination of Cubism and Classicism – implies that there were deeper reasons for his stylistic choices; reasons which are separate from a defence of French patriotism.  

To claim that Picasso resorted to Neoclassicism simply as a result of a revisiting of his early Impressionist work is somewhat off target, then, since Neoclassicism was a significantly older style. Bearing in mind Picasso’s acute business mind, however, it would be hard to deny that the prospective financial opportunities played a part in his adoption of a more realist style, especially when his income was reduced significantly in 1914 (to 15% of the previous year’s). Although, it is quite true that Picasso wanted to distance himself from the declining Salon Cubists (Metzinger, Gleizes, Severini, etc.), he continued to experiment with Cubism, in private, until the end of the 1910s. Until the mid-1920s, when Picasso fully devoted himself to a Neoclassicist practice, he devised the style of each of his works according to their genre. Accordingly, he resorted to Cubism for still-lives and to Neoclassicism for portraits. Is not this a clear indication of Picasso’s realisation of the mimetic demands imposed by portraits executed for the viewing satisfaction of their sitters? Even Picasso rejected in a statement that his variable application of styles reflects distinct stylistic phases. Instead, they act as appropriate choices based on his expressive intentions: Cubism for his expressive concerns and Neoclassicism for satisfying the mimetic expectations of his subjects, and the patriotic references to classicism demanded by the general French public and critics alike.

At the outset of his financial crisis of 1914, Picasso decided to employ his drawing skills to produce sketched portraits of his few remaining supporters; Georges Braque, André Derain, and Guillaume Apollinaire were enlisted; Kahnweiler was not allowed into France due to his German citizenship. The classicism of this period is signified above all by the Aristotelian employment of idealised physiognomy, that is, 


526 A similar argument is implied by Fitzgerald, *ibid*, p. 103. See also Fitzgerald, ‘The Modernists’ Dilemma’, p. 299. However, all these positions do no more than to reflect Picasso’s own statements, ft. 95.
527 Picasso is not as implicit in his statement as implied here.
Picasso corrected the bodily and facial imperfections of his sitters.\(^{529}\) In addition, and in contradiction to the methodology behind early Cubist portraiture these were actually drawn from life, and not from memory or photographs. The first of these is a portrait of his old friend from Bateau Lavoir, Max Jacob, drawn in January 1915. The second sketched portrait is of Vollard, done in August 1915, the third of the dealer, all of which were done in periods of professional ‘crisis’ – this time he crisis being the absence of his devoted dealer and friend Kahnweiler. Vollard’s portrait was followed by Léonce Rosenberg’s (late 1915), who poses in front of *Harlequin*, bought by Rosenberg in November of the same year. By the time of his portrait Rosenberg was on his way to replacing Kahnweiler, since Vollard was not so keen, especially at this point, to become Picasso’s main representative.\(^{530}\) Fitzgerald recognises the fact that this portrait acts as a “celebration” of the sale;\(^{531}\) perhaps the term ‘reward’ would be more appropriate, given Picasso’s instrumental utilisation of his portraiture for professional purposes. It has to be noted, however, that Rosenberg was fond of Cubism and not of realism, and that he compromised his aesthetic taste by commercially supporting Picasso’s recent turn.

In 1914, the commercial success of the *Family of Saltimbaques* in the Peau de l’Ours encouraged Picasso to draw the *Portrait of André Level*.\(^{532}\) Picasso’s commercial ambitions certainly influenced his decision in the same year to send a selection of Neoclassical works to the prominent dealers Paul Rosenberg (specialising in 19th-century French art) and Georges Wildenstein (dedicated to Old Masters), in an effort to present his work in the context of the French tradition. Following their approval of Picasso’s new work, they decided to further test the painter by commissioning portraits of their wives and children, which he executed in 1918 with certain success, and with a debt to Ingres. The results of Picasso’s collaborative relationship with Paul Rosenberg from 1918 to 1939 is responsible for the creation of Picasso’s popular image. Picasso acknowledges Rosenberg’s huge investments in his work by drawing a portrait of the dealer in the winter of 1918-1919. From then on, Rosenberg was quite

\(^{529}\) This position is verified in Rubin, ‘Reflections on Picasso and Portraiture’, pp. 58-59.

\(^{530}\) Fitzgerald, *Making Modernism*, pp. 56.


successful in promoting Picasso on both sides of the Atlantic, leading to the organisation of hugely popular retrospective shows in major institutions, to name a few: Galeries Petit, Paris 1932; Kunsthau, Zurich 1932; Wadsworth Athenaeum, Hartford 1934; Museum of Modern Art, New York 1939-1940; and Art Institute, Chicago 1939-1940. In 1920, Picasso also recognised Berthe Weill's contribution to the avant-garde through showing new talent – it is suggested that she was also the first French dealer to sell Picasso’s work – by drawing a portrait of the dealer.

Picasso and Rosenberg were aware of the press’ influence on public opinion, and made sure to develop good relationships with important writers and critics. Besides gifting artworks and entertaining critics Picasso also drew the portraits of some of them. The first of those is the *Portrait of Jean Cocteau*, 1916, which Picasso drew while Cocteau was at the front, fearing of his survival. In the absence of Apollinaire Picasso developed an especially close relationship with Pierre Reverdy, who Picasso supported publicly – by encouraging the purchase of his manuscripts – and privately – by drawing not one, but at least two portraits of the author during the winter of 1921, and providing illustrations for his *Cravates de Chanvre*. Let us not forget that, as we have seen in the examination of early writings on Cubism, Reverdy was supportive of Cubism during the wartime in his journal *Nord-Sud*. And when Picasso turned to Neoclassicism, Reverdy praised his choice and mastery of tradition despite his previous support of abstract art.

The critic and theorist that studied Apollinaire’s tactics most closely and sought to establish a similar relationship for himself with Picasso, during the 1920’s, was André Breton. Breton first met Picasso in 1918 through Apollinaire, and later in 1921 by arranging significant sales for the couturier Jacques Doucet, while acting as his librarian. A few years later Picasso would accept the opportunity to produce the setting for the theatrical play and ballet *Mercure*, which was to divide the critics, and particularly the Dadaists, who were mostly opposed to Picasso’s traditional Neoclassicism. At the premier of the play, while Picasso was being booed for his participation, Breton took the double opportunity to distinguish his new movement (Surrealism) from Dada and to claim that Picasso was their quintessential artist, by

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534 Ibid, p. 117.
staging such a passionate and vociferous support for the artist that the police had to intervene.\textsuperscript{536} Even though Breton was never keen on Picasso’s Neoclassicism he never disavowed it publicly. His main critical support focused on Picasso’s early ‘surrealist’ work that draws heavily from Manet and Renoir, such as the \textit{Lovers}.

What Breton was really good at was his ability to create scandals. Similar to the \textit{Mercure} incident, in 1923 Picasso was dismissed, along other artists such as André Gilde, Francis Picabia, and Marcel Duchamp, by Pierre Massot during a Dada event, called Soirée du Coeur à barbe. This time Breton excelled himself by resorting to violence, as he walked up onto the stage and broke Massot’s right arm by hitting him with his cane, while Robert Desnos and Benjamin Peret restrained Massot. Judging from Breton’s awareness of artworld affairs, we can assume that his request for a portrait from Picasso was highly calculated. Breton asked Picasso for a portrait for his impending publication \textit{Clair de terre}, following his latest public demonstration of support. In fact, he was so desperate for a portrait that he even stated in a letter to Picasso that he was willing to compromise with anything that could pass as a portrait of him, as long as it did not contain eyes, a nose, a mouth, and ears.\textsuperscript{537} Eventually Picasso drew Breton’s, non-abstract, portrait in 1924, which featured in the opening pages of \textit{Clair de terre}.

Picasso’s willingness to utilize his practice, and skills for the cultivation of patronage reached its peak during his acquaintance with Eugenia Errazuriz, who was the person that introduced Picasso to Paul Rosenberg and Georges Wildenstein, and Diaghilev, \textit{Mercure’s} director.\textsuperscript{538} During the war, in the summer of 1918, Errazuriz invited Picasso and Olga Koklova to spent their honeymoon at her villa, La Mimiseraie, near Biarritz. As a gesture of gratitude towards his host Picasso decorated a room of the villa, but most importantly he drew portraits of Errazuriz’s high-society friends, as well as of their wives and, occasionally children. True to his Neoclassicism, Picasso revisited the Ingresque style of his other drawn portraits of the time, but also made sure to emphasise the social status of his subjects. At the end of their stay Picasso presented Errazuriz with an additional sketchbook filled with similar drawings. All in all, Picasso’s compliance with Errazuriz’s expectations and eagerness

\begin{footnotes}
\item[536] \textit{Ibid}, pp. 137-143.
\item[537] \textit{Ibid}, pp. 146-147.
\item[538] \textit{Ibid}, pp. 68-70.
\end{footnotes}
to loose control over his choice of subjects is identical to the sacrifices that artists had to go through prior to modernism. It is quite extraordinary that Picasso executed these works, especially when he was fully aware of the limitations imposed by commissions, but most importantly, while he was simultaneously initiating the expressive and abstract exploration of the human figure in paintings of his partners.

_Surrealism & Expressionism_

Picasso’s late portraits of his partners are undoubtedly dualist due to their level of abstraction, which proposes a superior inner being that alters the perception of the subject’s body. Rubin associates Picasso’s late portraiture with dualism by reading the employment of the Surrealist invention of biomorphic form (in Jean Arp, Miró, Tanguy, and Masson) as an “indirect” allusion to the “internality of the human body.” Moreover, Rubin argues that the metaphysicality of the biomorphic form is a reaction against the Cubist grid’s apparent anti-dualist “inorganic”, and organisational structural approach that focuses only on the materiality of the body. For instance, biomorphism dominates the portraits of Marie-Thérèse Walter, where we also witness an intensified revisiting of the combined profile and frontal facial view that was first applied in Uhde’s Cubist portrait. In Walter’s portraits this division of the face is expanded through strong light and dark contrasts, which Robert Rosenblum views as a “formula from which Picasso could extract endless variations on the dialogue between external and internal aspects of the human body and mind”. In addition, in _The Mirror_, (1932) and _Girl Before a Mirror_, (1932) Picasso uses a _cheval_ glass mirror, the word for which in both French and Spanish is _psyché_ and _psyquis_, which must have played a role in his choice of this type of mirror.


The split or divided face remains in the portraits of Dora Maar, where the profile view in the late portraits of 1938 evolves into a “spirit” profile, as a way of accommodating Maar’s psychological instability (that is, as perceived by Picasso). The majority of these works are sexually infused with the occasional Surrealist erotic accessories, such as gloves and hats. Picasso’s metaphorical incorporation of symbolism expanded to insects such as spiders (Dora Maar Seated in a Wicker Chair, 1938), which, in addition to backgrounds rendered in prison-bar like stripes (Dora Maar Seated, 1937), refer to Maar’s madness and confinement.542

Even though the dark palette and psychological-double profile of Maar’s portraits extend to those of Françoise Gilot, the level of symbolism in some of these portraits is stronger and shifts from props and objects to a symbolic rendering of the figure, as in the famous treatment of Gilot as a flower in 1946. As Fitzgerald claims most of the works that had Gilot as its subject, but were not titled as portraits, were mostly driven by Picasso’s aesthetic concerns of that period. But those that were portraits combined Picasso’s “conception of the individual…with the personal and aesthetic issues that then drove his art”.543 Finally, the portraits of Jacqueline Roque, which is the largest single group of all Picasso’s portraits, seem to accommodate a combination of Picasso’s various invented styles throughout the whole of his career. For instance, Rubin identifies in the Neoclassical charcoal drawing Jacqueline with Folded Legs, (1954) certain aspects borrowed from the 1906 early Cubist explorative portraits of Fernande Olivier.544 According to Rubin, references to Cubism and particularly to Primitivism are expanded in Jacqueline with Flowers, (1954) where once again Picasso resorts to the combine frontal and profile facial views that relates to those of Les Demoiselles. If there is one stylistic invention in these portraits then it would have to be the development of the facial split. For instance, in Jacqueline Seating with Kabul, (1962) one profile is facing backwards or “inwards”. What could be perceived as a visual preference of inner being is the fact that the inward profile in Jacqueline Seating, (1954) is rendered brighter than the outward one.

Modernism’s impact on the development of portraiture, and specifically of the
dualist model is based on the expansion of the early dualist compositional reductive
abstraction to formalist abstraction. According to recent theorisations, Cubism
achieved abstraction, but not through a methodology derived from metaphysical
corns. Instead, Cubism is unique among avant-garde movements in resolving the
drive for expressive freedom by focusing on the materiality of its depicted subjects
rather than their would-be metaphysical status. It did so, by approaching the human
figure from an organisational perspective that sought to produce a multivalent mode
of representation, achieved from superimposed planes derived from multiple
perspectives. Thus, Analytic Cubism achieved a process of abstraction by magnifying
the outcome of traditional pictorial devices. When it came to the representation of a
portrait sitter, such methodology was found to be problematic due to conventional
expectations of visual identification, limiting the drive to abstraction. Picasso’s Cubist
portraits of his dealers underline this clash between unbounded abstraction and the
expectations of visual identification posed by traditional portraiture. Unfortunately, in
Picasso the outcome of this clash of subjectivities in portraiture, was the suppression
of abstraction. Braque, on the other hand chose not to portray specific individuals, at
all, aware of the mimetic constraints that could potentially limit expressive and
experimental attitudes.

During the period of Analytic Cubism Picasso resolved such concerns by
resorting to his caricature skills. However, as we have seen, the practice of caricature
drawing is derived from illusionist and dualist physiognomic treatises. This is
borrowing from a practice that is bound up with realism; hence, it is no surprise that
the avant-garde regarded it as the most contagious aesthetic position of classicism.
From the modernist perspective, realism produces a notion of the artist who no more
than mechanically reproduces nature, diminishing spirituality. As a result the
compromised and limited level of abstraction of the Analytic Cubist portraits reflect a
Hegelian model of human spirituality by retaining visual indications of the human
figure. This problem is further explored in Synthetic Cubism through the reduction
or transformation of shapes into signs. However, the arbitrariness of the sign limited the possibility for individual identification, which was achieved instead through a process of naming. This was the moment that portraiture was freed from conventional visual perceptual restrictions by substituting pictorial references for indexical ones.

Yet, Picasso must have felt that the public, and particularly his business affiliates were not ready to appreciate such a radical approach to the most conventional of all genres. It was the same fear that forced Picasso to compromise the abstraction of the Analytic portraits, and astonishingly give up his most successful enterprise to turn to an inherently traditional and illusionist mode of portraiture in his Neoclassical period. Elaborating on Picasso’s own statements, Rubin argues, “Picasso evidently considered some form of ‘realism’ to be the appropriate style for…images done as gestures and meant for public consumption”. So, considering the compromises that Picasso entertained in his Cubist and Neoclassical portraiture, why is he still regarded as a painter that pushed the limits of this genre? The critique that I advance in this chapter is that the conventional works (Neoclassical) reduce the overall quality of Picasso’s legacy, since it is quite evident that he refused to stand his ground and support the development and independence of his practice for the sake of professional support. Yet, if we follow his example and separate these two broad creative paths – classicist realism and dualist abstraction – we will perhaps realise that the advances could not have been realised if there were not two choices available. In other words, the moment of Cubism forced Picasso to understand that mimetic demands posed by the common need for visual identification considerably restrain pictorial advances, forcing the artist to decide whether he or she will prioritise the concerns of their subjectivity over the expectations of their sitters’ subjectivity. Hence, Picasso divided his portrait practice into a traditional (neo) classical mode – in order to satisfy the taste and expectations of his supporters – and into an extremely abstract and expressionist type, allowing himself the freedom to experiment. It is quite extraordinary that the would-be champion of modernism did not value his practice enough to consider it capable of achieving commercial success without feeling he had to serve the demands and expectations of his patrons.

The Turning of a Blind (Third) Eye:

*The Critique of the Honorific in Radical Forms of Contemporary Portraiture*

I like to point to situations in which we can see the myths of ideology contradicted by our actual experience.\(^{546}\)

There is a long philosophical tradition aiming at the neutralisation of art’s socio-political effect, starting with the writings of Plato and stretching to those of Kant and Schopenhauer. Accordingly, Plato disregards the arts for their focus on mere appearances and their inability to escape the communication of external ideas; Kant claims that the universal nature of our aesthetic judgments necessarily distances art from everyday concerns and interests; and Schopenhauer argues that art is ineffective on its impact on the causal order of the world due its ability to detach us from everyday life, and help us, more profitably, to contemplate internal states of consciousness. In a straightforward reaction to classicist and romantic notions the modernists consistently address social issues in their work. From the revolution of 1848 to World War 1 and the Russian revolution modernist artistic form opens itself up to the shocks, traumas and reifications of the capitalist reordering of social experience. It is no surprise therefore, that this social/artistic form dialectic undergoes further – and radical – transformations after World War II, in a period when the formal challenges of early modernism, are being rethought under a capitalism now

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dominated by the electronic image. The significance of the political and cultural events that took place during the 1960s, then, did not go unnoticed by artists and intellectuals. The ‘cleansing’ wars of the right in Asia (Vietnam) and colonial struggle generally, were met with social revolts that took on a particular cultural form (the counter-cultural peace movement in the U.S.A. and the extraordinary cultural-political displacements of May ’68 in France). Caught in the midst of these massive changes art adopted various ‘cathartic’ attitudes aiming at a radical reconfiguration of its own nature, in a generalized critique of the intense aestheticism of the preceding high modernism. In other words, on a formal level, what was fought for was a renewed sense of balance between content and appearance, object and subject that seemed to have gotten lost in the intense formalism of Abstract Expressionism and much abstract art of the period. As a result of these social pressures from below, art forced itself into a process of corrective self-criticism. For instance, Pop art redirected the public’s attention to everyday objects as the basis for a re-appreciation of their neglected ‘beauty’, in an attempt to remove high modernist distinctions between high cultural and popular culture; Minimalism stripped art of its modernist obsession with aesthetic judgement in order to highlight the physical and affective relationship between viewer and artwork; and Conceptual art simultaneously prioritised the role of the idea in the production process of art and radically reconfigured conventional notions of art’s appearance and presentation in response to art’s post-war gallery commercialization. By the end of the 1960’s, then, artists began to turn to the social domain, and as such a large group of artists would abandon the gallery and employ their work as the means to engage with feminist, anti-racist, and other political activist strategies.

In this light the 1960’s were an era of theoretical ‘pluralism’, where a linear art-historical model began to appear ineffective as a result of artists’ self-criticism and self-philosophisation.\textsuperscript{547} Such a process adopts a self-reflective method that borrows both from Platonic (external) and Cartesian (internal) self-reflectivity. That is, conventional art reached its end the moment that art became its own philosophy, or rather became self-consciously aware of its own historical, cognitive and ontological

identity. Once this process was established, the development of art became broadly socially conscious in how it positioned itself in the world, while at the same time artists found themselves to be relatively free of the imposture of stylistic constraints. In this turmoil and transformation portraiture seems to be the only traditional genre of art that remained unaffected, although its traditional forms of bourgeois patronage had diminished. It is possible to argue that one of the reasons for its survival, therefore, is the way in which the representation of the self transcends the honorific, as part of a continuous philosophic, scientific, and popular inquiry into human nature. Thus humans inability to resolve the question of being is precisely what allows for the portrait to be constantly reconfigured philosophically and culturally across each era; that is the traditional portrait endures, precisely because its audience wants to see the historicization of being reflected in its most intimate site: the face. Yet, if the mimesis of portraiture continues to endure, since the late sixties portraiture has not been restricted to the familiar conflict between tradition (classicism) and innovation (e.g., abstraction), which has defined modernism and the humanism of the face, but, rather, has attempted to set itself free from this dialectic altogether.

Whereas the first Chapter looked at the emergence of the dualist portrait format (compositional reduction of full figure to bust) and aspects of collaboration in pre-modern workshops and the second chapter examined the stylistic reconfiguration of the dualist portrait (from realism to abstraction) in connection with the clash of subjectivities in portraiture (new modern individualistic artistic subjectivity clashes with the desires of the historically dominant subjectivity of patron and commissioner) this chapter will pay attention to the critique and demise of the dualist portrait and examine the impact of new collaborative practices, and the deflation of singular authorship on the development of portraiture. It will do so by looking at the work of Andy Warhol, Art & Language and Mary Kelly, in particular, all of whose work is united by the use of allegory and its principles of fragmentation, appropriation, superimposition and the openness to meaning. These allegorical principles pose as

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548 Benjamin Buchloh draws a parallel comparison between the course of portraiture and the mythical creature Hydra, which grew two heads each time one of each original seven heads was decapitated by Hercules: Benjamin Buchloh, "Residual Resemblance: Three Notes on the Ends of Portraiture", in Melissa E. Feldman, Face Off: The Portrait in Recent Art, exhibition catalogue with an essay by Benjamin Buchloh (Philadelphia: Institute of Pennsylvania, 1994), p.53.
alternatives to notions of originality, singularity, and immutability that are constitutive of dualist artistic models.

On this basis, the increasing employment of allegorical modes in artistic practices since the late sixties will be traced in order to analyze the increasing importance of non-resemblance in portraiture. As I have explained the sitter’s demand for visual identification is grounded in the classical honorific notion of portraiture, and has been the driving force behind portraiture’s historical (pantheon of exemplars) and the contemporary (mass media) valorization of celebrity. At the same time the tendency of the modernist artist to honour his or her own subjectivity through the articulation of their unique style has produced a clash of subjectivities between artist and sitter. Allegory, however, carries the potential to deflate the notion of the honorific, and resolve the modernist clash of subjectivities, by producing a form of portraiture that actually evades the imposture of resemblance through the subtraction of appearances. Not surprisingly, then, this lack of visual identification with the subject excludes the possibility of idealising external appearance.

Warhol’s practice is widely theorised in anti-dualist terms, mostly due to the fact that he distanced his practice from the expressive individualism of modernist approaches to art. Accordingly, Warhol’s employment of readymade photographic images – mechanically reproduced through screen-printing – and their subsequent presentation in a serial manner adds to the impersonal character of his practice. Indeed, his serial model of portraiture is seen as a response to the genre’s obsession with singularity, inspired by Platonic and Cartesian notions of individuality. Accordingly, the collective character of the Factory’s production rejects high modernist models of artistic labour that take pride in sole authorship. Yet, his (later) desire and success in producing a brand name for himself is at odds with the impersonal character of his work. Likewise, the gradual transformation of the Factory into a modern day office-based business with Warhol acting as the manager (the head of a creative body), questions our perception of the nature of collaboration behind the production of his work.

Conceptual Art expands the critical legacy of the readymade, inherited via, Dada and avant-garde photography. As we discussed earlier, the Dadaists were exploring non-expressive, and often allegorical non-resemblance forms of portraiture
in the 1920’s. Moreover, in parallel, the rise of photography extended this critique of the conventional portrait. For instance, in an essay published in 1928 Alexander Rodchenko rejects the single painted portrait in favour of a sequential photographic format. In this respect Rodchenko is clearly aware of the problems of the modernist formation of the dualist portrait and its clash of subjectivities. Thus, he is particularly critical of the artist’s “individualisation” and the sitter’s “idealisation” of the painted portrait, which he argues can be easily avoided through the neutral character of the photographic snapshot. In an anti-dualist manner, Rodchenko discusses the ability of a sequential and serial portrait to represent the subject in its actual social totality – through the capturing of various moments of the sitter’s life – as opposed to the romantic, ‘eternal’ and, thus, inauthentic single painted image. On this basis, Conceptual art’s attempted dematerialisation of the art object is an attempt to rid art of those expressive materials that reinforce the notion of the autonomous artist and its fusion of humanist and Cartesian ideals.

The various forms of collaborative Conceptual art practices will be reviewed here, therefore, in relation to Cartesian and non-Cartesian notions of authorship, particularly those that arise from recent theories of the mind and the philosophy of consciousness. These collaborative practices are of high importance to portraiture, since they provide an additional critical approach to portraiture’s reflection on the honorific. The foremost collaborative Conceptual art practice is that of Art & Language, whose seminal work Index (1972) poses as a self-portrait of the group. Although portraiture remains active throughout the final days of modernism, the production of discrete portraits is relatively scarce in Conceptual art; this makes Art & Language’s Index particularly interesting. The Index substitutes for figurative signs an archival structure based on the conversations and intellectual proceedings of the group. As a result the work replaces the conventional indexical appropriation of the body as a sign of the soul (a mechanism that draws from dualist hierarchical

550 Ibid., p. 239.
551 For discussion on collaboration in relation to Cartesian subjectivity see John Roberts, The Intangibilities of Form: Skill and Deskilling in Art after the Readymade (London: Verso, 2007).
structures, where the body, as I have explained, serves the soul) with an indexical appropriation of the products of the group’s shared intellectual activities.

These collective intellectual activities substitute for the solitary and introvert character of Cartesian method a process of inter-subjective interaction, thereby, directly acknowledging the significance of the social in the constitution of the self in the form of production and reception of the work itself. Similarly the last study case of this Chapter is Mary Kelly’s *Post Partum Document* (1973-78), which combines the intersubjective qualities and social character of the *Index* with the methodologies of Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalysis, as a means of examining the impact of mothering on the formation of the self. Apart from being a diaristic account of the act of mothering, P.P.D. is at the same time a non-figurative portrait of Kelly’s child, and a non-figurative self-portrait of Kelly herself as mother and domestic labourer.

*Portraiture and Spectacle*

Before we discuss collaborative modes of portraiture, and the turn to allegory in conceptual practices generally, I want to look at those forms of honorific portraiture that reject expressive modernism, yet do not take the non-resemblance route of Conceptual art. In this the honorific undergoes a significant transformation that has a bearing on the wider anti-dualist thrust of art after the 1970s. An additional reason for portraiture’s survival is its continuing popularisation through its commercial application in the mass media, in which the portrait becomes a central part of the society of spectacle. In this respect this new commercial domain for portraiture from the 1960s on has prompted a wave of artistic responses that seek to address the impact of its new public role and forms. Indeed, the expansion of commercial portraiture has lead to the substitution of “stereotypes” for “subjectivities”, where “a heterogeneous selection of masks stands in for individual identities”.552 The impenetrable, yet glamorous subjects in the portraits produced by artists such as Andy Warhol, Alex Katz, and Jeff Koons thus serve as familiar referents to these commercial portrait types

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552 Feldman, *Face Off*, p. 11.
and the transformation of the subjective into trademark smiles and poses. Consequently, the Aristotelian notion of idealisation returns to haunt the portraits of those artists who draw on this new realm of the visual; only this time the artists’ exemplary subjects originate from the glamorous world of show business and not from the mythological confines of religion and royalty.

The mass media’s commodification of the portrait has further fortified the constructed impenetrability of the human subject in portraits intended for public consumption. Throughout history portraitists were competing on the grounds of their ability to represent their subjects’ inner being or character. However, artists such as those mentioned above as well as Chuck Close, Thomas Ruff, and Gerhard Richter deliberately abstain from communicating their impressions of their subjects’ interiority and character. Instead, artistic and individual expression is taken over by conceptual and procedural concerns. Contrary to the media-inspired portraits, these artists choose ordinary subjects depicted in neutral and inexpressive modes that escape idealisation. Moreover, the intense level of realism invested in both painted (Close) and photographed (Ruff) portraits could put to the test claims that photographic realism is truly able to capture a subject’s interiority, since even the highest level of faithful representation does not make the subject any less inaccessible.

Richter’s work is driven by an inquiry into the methodological inter-relationship between painting and photography. In a Cartesian manner, he turns to photography for its “objective” and “credible vision”, as opposed to the “imperfect” and “circumscribed” impression of reality that is the product of our senses. Yet, Richter’s decision to paint after photographs, by copying them, is a rationalised process that eliminates the possibility of the emergence of an expressive personal style that might signify his subjectivity as an artist. In his portraits of others, Richter inverts the indexical character of photography and resorts to its ‘frozen time’ effects in order to transgress the supposed ‘timeless’ character of painted portraits. Indeed, Richter is opposed to anything metaphysical as well as to the sensational character of mass

554 Beyer, Portraits, p. 381.
555 Feldman, Face Off, p. 23.
556 Ibid, p. 27.
media images that is often invoked with Pop art portraiture. In his highly realist portrait of his daughter Betty (1988), Richter expands his critique of the honorific by refusing to depict his subject in a frontal pose, thereby, negating the representation of the face as the key prerequisite of portraiture. The absence of the face in this portrait is often equated with an absence of the sitter’s spirit.558 Thus, in this work, Richter addresses both aspects of the honorific clash of subjectivities: his refusal to visually identify the sitter is combined with an inexpressive realist rendering.

The move away from idealisation is further developed by another group of artists of whom the primary concern is to refrain from conformist and flattering portraits. In this, the regime of the stereotype is challenged by a revelatory and uncomfortable, physical appearance, the result of aging, illness, or distress. The work of Hannah Wilke, Jo Spence, Nan Goldin, and Alice Neel, in this sense, counters conventional and traditional portraiture (grounded in classicist notions of idealisation and the exemplary) though their courageous expression of their personal worlds or those of their subjects.559 In this, this group of artists goes against the vast idealisation of the body in the media, by willingly revealing what is inappropriate, ugly and unassimilable, and thus, emphatically non-exemplary.

Goldin has repeatedly asserted that her intention is to document with unbending realism her life and those of her milieu - which consists mainly of ‘social rejects’ such as transsexuals, drag queens and drug addicts.560 The format of these portraits is far from the conventional all-encompassing single image. Instead, Goldin portrays her subjects through various photographic compilations of her subjects, which are appropriate, according to her, to the complex “representation of a person”.561 Thus, the sequential model of portraiture that Goldin adapts (in addition to her methodological tendency to order and reorder her work in portrait albums), is anti-
dualist, in so far as it adheres to a notion of the self that changes and adapts to social circumstances. This element of ‘change’ is what unites Goldin’s subject matter: changes of sex (male to female), changes in love lives, and change of ‘habits’ (her friends and her own struggle with drug addiction). In spite of the strong connection of her subjects’ identity with their social conditions, what is relatively absent from Goldin’s work are indications of her subjects’ professions; we only learn about them from Goldin’s interviews. The public’s interest in finding out these details of the lives of Goldin’s subjects verifies, then, the survival of the honorific aspect of portraiture. As a result, the honorific is the driving force behind the glamorisation of these subjects. That is, we have to consider the possibility that Goldin’s subjects could often over-perform or dramatise their ‘dysfunctionality’ in order to retain their inclusion in Goldin’s work.

As such, we need to acknowledge that with these artists who return to portraiture through photography the honorific has a dual function. On one hand, there is a drive – through the demands of resemblance – to record appearances and identities, but this is subject to a strong process of idealisation, captured in the subjects’ performative dramatisation of their personal circumstances. The result is that the honorific is characterised by a negation of its traditional affirmative role. This breakdown is further developed in the fragmentary and discursive practices of allegory.

Allegory’s Return

Allegory’s ability to produce multiple and varying meanings allows it to be an ideal mode for artists who wish to draw on the impact of cultural, social, and political circumstances in the formation of the identity of the individual. In many cases, allegorical portraits are void of a human figure, which is substituted by an assemblage of images or objects that act as an index of all those socio-cultural elements that shape

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the formation of the self. The primary function of this model of allegorical portraiture is its confrontation with the dualist conception of the subject as a single immutable self. This is achieved through the introduction of a series of references that expand the possible meaning attached to the sitter. Artists such as Ilya Kabakov, Karen Kilimnik, and David Hammons employ allegory in their portraiture as a means for evoking multiple cultural references.

It is commonly agreed that pre-18th-century allegory was generally used in reference to metaphysical issues, while in the 19th-century and throughout modernism allegory was used to address materialist issues. Classicist influence, particularly the Platonic notion of being-in-the-world can be traced in sacrilegious allegories, which are about the revelatory aspect of language: they reveal our purpose in the cosmos. Conversely, in suprarealist allegories names and nouns are conceived as being as real as the abstract concepts they signify. In this connection Maureen Quilligan argues that the suprarealist attitude toward language is also the one that is often named as the “metaphysical”. The decline of the suprarealist attitude towards language in the 17th century is probably due to the rise of skepticism and scientific rationalism, which posed a serious threat to the continuation of allegorical practices. Moreover, Quilligan argues that “the loss of power in language” can be traced in the religious shift from Catholic to Protestant sacramentalism.

A similar view is shared by Michel Foucault who claims that language changed from being ‘interpretational’ in the 16th century to ‘representational’ in the 17th century. Specifically, Foucault argues that the open system of similitude was replaced by strict symbolism for the needs of science. Foucault bases this shift on the Renaissance sympathy towards resemblance that influenced the development of language as representational and symbolic. As a result, language experienced a loss of spirituality through the loss of an enigmatic element, since it came to be used in a symbolic way as mathematics. In full agreement with Foucault, Quilligan maintains

564 Feldman, Face Off, p. 43.
566 Ibid, p. 182.
that during the Enlightenment “words lost the battle to things and language disappeared as a potent force for shaping man’s sense of his cosmos”. However, during the 20th century language regained “its previous power as the privileged device for discovering truth, be it the truth of an individual’s psyche, or the truth of man’s intellectual and spiritual universe”. Foucault and Quilligan’s distinctions between interpretational and representational forms of language and their relation to metaphysics will play an essential part in my analysis of Art & Language’s Index and Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document.

No discussion on allegory could afford to exclude Walter Benjamin’s views on the subject. Allegory’s fascination with historical reference, the fragmentary and the imperfect encourages Benjamin to identify the ruin as the allegorical emblem par excellence. Benjamin’s theory of allegory and montage is based on Marx’s notion of the commodity fetish infused with a sense of melancholic reminiscence. Accordingly, allegory employs historical and cultural emblems in order to return them as commodities. Duchamp’s readymades, for instance, invert Benjamin’s methodology by reconfiguring commodities as emblems, a tradition that extends into Pop Art. For Benjamin the desire for political practice (through allegory) stems from a form melancholic contemplation. In his view capitalism’s transformation of objects into commodities encourages a perception of the physical world as invalid, which is due to their division between use and exchange value only for the latter to prevail. Once this division is in place and exchange value has overcome use value in importance individuals are perplexed by the social effects of capitalist market values. According to Benjamin Buchloh, Benjamin claims that allegory is employed in the readymade in order to:

…protest against [the object’s] devaluation to the status of commodity by devaluing it a second time in allegorical practice. In the splintering of signifier and signified, the allegorist subjects the sign to the same division of functions that the object has

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571 Ibid, p. 158.
undergone in its transformation into a commodity. The repetition of the original act of depletion and the new attribution of meaning redeems the object.\footnote{Benjamin D. Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures: Appropriation and Montage in Contemporary Art’, \textit{Artforum}, September 1982, p. 44.}

According to Buchloh, Benjamin’s theory of montage outlines a historical critique of perception at the beginning of modernism: the industrial collective mode of production replaces or even rejects the bourgeois individualist model, since even the unique can now be reproduced (readymade). The allegorical gesture of Duchamp’s readymades transforms the commodity into an emblem (Benjamin on Baudelaire), negating the actual construction of the sign (the traditional separation of processes and materials) and reveals the production dynamics of the work while at the same time emphasising the contextual conditions under which it was conceptually conceived.\footnote{Ibid, p. 46.} Duchamp’s \textit{L.H.O.O.Q.}, for instance, brings forth the principle of appropriation through a process of confiscation.

\textit{Allegory \& Anti-Dualism}

For Benjamin, there is an inherently allegorical nature in the practice of montage, which is achieved through the re-contextualisation of familiar images.\footnote{Walter Benjamin, \textit{The Origin Of German Tragic Drama}, trans. John Osborne (London: NLB, 1977), p. 178. See also Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures’, p. 43; and Quilligan, \textit{The Language of Allegory}, p. 41.} Accordingly, all allegorical principles are best exemplified in montage: appropriation and depletion of meaning, dialectical juxtaposition of fragments and separation of signifier and signified.\footnote{Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures’, p. 44.} Allegory’s anti-dualist nature derives, therefore, precisely from its methods of confiscation, superimposition, fragmentation, and decentralisation.\footnote{Craig Owens, ‘The Allegorical Impulse: Toward a Theory of Postmodernism’, \textit{October} no. 12, Spring 1980, p. 69. See also Buchloh, ‘Allegorical Procedures’, pp. 43, 52.} Whereas confiscation and superimposition resist the notion of the Cartesian subject as producer of original knowledge, fragmentation and decentralisation put to the test dualist notions of immutability, subjective unity and hierarchical order. An additional important function of allegory is that of a “reverse
historical mirror”, where extensive use of the sense of the past is stimulated by implicit or explicit allusion to a literary – or to an artistic – earlier period. Hence, the past becomes a source of explanation of a relevant present.

In Buchloh’s view Pop Art is ridden with conflictual coexistences, as it reconciles and masters “the conflict between individual practice and collective production, between the mass-produced imagery of low culture and the icon of individuation that each painting constitutes”. For instance, Rauschenberg’s work is held to be predominantly allegorical in its adoption of the principles of confiscation, appropriation, superimposition, leading to an anti-dualist merging of “production procedure (gesture), expression, and sign (representation) [which] seem to have become materially and semantically congruent”. In Conceptual art allegorical procedures are located in the critical revisiting of the readymade tradition and in the use of text. The works of Michael Asher, Marcel Broodthaers, Daniel Buren, Dan Graham, Hans Haacke, and Lawrence Weiner employ allegorical methods to interrogate the conditions that define and constitute the pictorial sign. For instance, in Broodthaers’ edition of Stéphane Mallarmé’s Un coup dés jamais n’abolira le hazard we witness the application of Benjamin’s notion of allegorical appropriation and montage. Similar to Rauschenberg, Broodthaers “operated in scriptural configurations” by substituting black stripes for Mallarmé’s actual text with the original preface, thus, the original work was “depleted of its semantic and lexical information”. In another instance, the allegorical qualities of Hans Haacke’s work are revealed to be embedded in his constant attempts to reinstate suppressed cultural elements into the domain of cultural institutions. Asher’s work is constructed in the allegorical appropriation of historical contexts and situations in response to cultural issues located in institutional contexts. In this the viewer is forced to become aware of the ideological conditions behind the production of a work of art through his allegorical analysis. In regard to post-conceptual practices Owens claims that the diverse strategies of post-modern art – such as appropriation, site specificity,

581 Ibid, p. 46.
582 Ibid, p. 47.
584 Ibid, p. 51.
impermanence, accumulation, discursivity, and hybridisation – are embedded in allegory.\textsuperscript{585}

A surviving question of portraiture is whether the body can stand as an allegorical metaphor for the soul? If so, can the body be allegorically appropriated, either through classicist idealisation or modernist abstraction, in order to accommodate a successful communication of the soul? To consider such a dualist hypothesis would be to subject allegory to an intense process of generalisation, similar to Heidegger’s claim that all aesthetic thought is driven by allegory: “The work of art is, to be sure, a thing that is made, but it says something other that the mere thing itself is, \textit{allo agoreuei}. The work makes public something other that itself; it manifests something other; it is an allegory.”\textsuperscript{586} Alternatively, to accept such instrumentalisation of the body is to relegate and limit its process of production of meaning to nothing more than that of the symbolic. On a similar note, Owens argues that allegory is not to be subordinated to the symbol, since symbolism presupposes a hermeneutic union between appearance and essence, in so far as the symbol acts as a “synecdoche” (a part representing a whole).\textsuperscript{587}

Owens counters numerous modernist theoretic attempts (Goethe, Heidegger, Boas, Borges) to frame allegorical meaning as ‘added’ meaning. This is an indication, he argues that there is a “permanent strategy of Western art theory which excludes from the work everything which challenges its determination as the unity of ‘form’ and ‘content’.”\textsuperscript{588} Moreover, Owens maintains that the reason that allegory is treated as added-meaning is the fact that it “encodes two meanings in one form”.\textsuperscript{589} In other words, (from a Cartesian perspective) allegory allows for more than one essence to be hosted by a single body, thus it produces a schizophrenic model of meaning (schizo-meaning). Yet, if allegory were to be reduced to a form of symbolism, it would be quite convenient for subscribers to dualism, since the union between appearance and essence is set within a hierarchical structure with meaning or essence at its apex. In

\begin{footnotes}
\item[585] Owens, ‘The Allegorical Impulse’, p. 75.
\item[587] Owens, ‘The Allegorical Impulse’, p. 82.
\item[588] \textit{Ibid}, p. 83.
\item[589] \textit{Ibid}, p. 84.
\end{footnotes}
symbolism it is often the appearance that is instrumentalised by the essence, hence the dualist hierarchical structure.

Allegorical metaphors and structures are particularly important to the genre of portraiture as they derive from a particular “non-mimetic choice of subject matter”, which is imbedded in the etymology of the original Greek term: ἄλλος (allos) = other + ἀγορεύει (agoreuei) = to speak. Considering the problematic, if not subordinate status of the body in the representation of a human being – as we have seen historically the body is often instrumentalised, idealized, appropriated for the sake of representing a human subject’s inner being – the introduction of a non-resemblance based pictorial method frees the body from the soul’s representational control. As we have seen in Chapter 2 Picasso almost achieved this breakthrough in his Cubist figurative works, initially through a form of painterly abstraction that developed thorough the employment of strategies of montage and collage (Analytic to Synthetic Cubism). Yet, Picasso compromised the application of these advances in the portraits of his dealers and associates, through his subordination to the mimetic expectations of his sitters. The employment of methods of allegorical non-resemblance frees the artist, therefore, from the burden of these expectations, since the rejection of mimesis removes the topic of debate altogether (level of abstraction/realism). However, this can only be achieved through a concurrent negation of those forms of artistic expressive that validate the uniqueness of the artist’s authorship. Importantly, then, such forms of allegorical non-resemblance pose ways out of the problems created by portraiture’s honorific norms and standards.

Conversely, allegory seems to abide by dualist ideals as it is usually employed for looking beyond the specific and the particular in order to focus on the general. As Gay Clifford notices, the principal aims of an allegorist cannot be originality and subjectivity but abstractions and universals. In addition, modern allegorical works add to their dualist character by tending to put in place a thematic hierarchy that prioritises characters of “divine or semi-divine natures”. As we have seen in Chapter 1 dualism imposes a strong hierarchical structure with subjective and metaphysical phenomena at the top. On the other hand, the production of meaning in allegory

590 Clifford, The Transformations of Allegory, p. 36-37.
592 Ibid, p. 69.
inverts the conventional hermeneutic structure where the artist presents the public with a closed system, the meaning of which the spectator or reader is then tasked with retrieving. Due to its inherent polysemy an allegorical piece of work is participatory in its production of meaning, inviting viewers to produce their own meaning by utilizing their critical abilities and knowledge, in an attempt to decipher “hieroglyphs” or decode “rebus[es] composed of concrete images”.[593]

It is this multiplicity of meaning, deriving from a multiplicity of perceptions that resists a dualistic static and fixed singular production of original meaning. Quilligan puts forth an interesting argument where the reader’s revisions of meaning are sequential. The sequential revision forces the reader to become aware of the temporal structure involved in the production of meaning: “each work provides a conscious portrait of the reader in the act of reading”.[594] The production of self-consciousness is achieved by “decentering the reader’s interest” from the text to his or her production of meaning.[595] Thus, self-consciousness is achieved through our own production of meaning. In addition, allegorical multiplicity of meaning deriving from variable individual readings further encourages pluralism,[596] and the questioning of the singularity of the Cartesian subject. More importantly, the audience’s participation in the production of meaning adds a third level of subjectivity to this process, in addition to those of the artist and sitter. And this is something that is increasingly apparent in this new generation of work. With the new discursive modes of art, we witness the emergence of a collaborative three-part network that replaces the modernist bipolar antagonism between the subjectivities of the artist and his or her subjects, a network that is analogous to Rockwell’s model: brain (artist) – body (sitter) – world (audience).[597]

[597] For an extensive analysis of Rockwell’s collaborative notion of consciousness see Chapter 1, pp. 44-46.
Looking at the key characteristics of Warhol’s practice, it is possible to see how it stands in close, yet critical, relation to Cartesian subjectivity. The rejection of Abstract Expressionism’s celebratory tone of human spirituality, the intense repetition of the artwork, and the mechanics of collective art production attack the assimilation of Cartesian perspectives on authorship into modernist practice. In this respect Warhol’s principal aesthetic strategies (which combine mechanically reproduced readymade imagery with serial grid composition) derive from allegorical methods of confiscation, fragmentation and seriality. However, a closer examination of these aspects of Warhol’s practice bring to the surface a number of conflictual notions, which, above all, confirm that artistic practices rarely incorporate a single ideological position and theme. Let us examine these issues with the assistance of key writers on Warhol.

Famously in 1963 Warhol adopted a profoundly anti-dualist language to declare his opposition to the New York School’s modernist expressive heroism, proudly declaring that “…everybody should be a machine” and that “somebody should be able to do all [his] paintings for [him]”. According to Buchloh, Warhol would overcome his fellow artists in “challenging the traditional assumptions about the uniqueness, authenticity, and authorship of the pictorial object”. By criticising modernism’s eminent characteristics, Warhol promotes an anti-dualist version of portraiture, ridding art of all those aspects that would celebrate the uniqueness of an individual, both the subject of the portrait and the producer. Warhol’s declaration that his art stops at the surface of things is precisely therefore anti-dualist, in so far as he desires to abolish celebrations of spirituality both in modes of artistic labour (his desire to become a machine) and in modes of interpretation (his denial of the notion of hidden or inner truth, and as such his insistence on meaning lying on the surface of things). His decision to work with readymade impersonal photographic images denies

600 Buchloh, ‘Andy Warhol’s One Dimensional Art’, p. 33.
a place for the clear authorial voice (albeit that later Warhol becomes a revered authorial voice in his attack on authorship).  

The use of readymade imagery is perceived by Buchloh to be a form of “depersonalised mechanism” – with all the non-authorial anti-dualist tendencies that such reading entails - which he traces back to its initial employment in the later stages of Cubism and to a fully developed tradition by New York Neo-Dada (Robert Rauschenberg and Jasper Johns). Even though Warhol at first felt reluctant to fully commit to such forms of production, by 1966 he was unreservedly defending his preference for silkscreen technique against criticisms of such techniques being “inartistic” and “fraudulent”, declaring that, “mechanical means are today”.

In Buchloh’s view “Warhol’s image design…extinguishes all poetic resources and prohibits the viewer's free association of the pictorial elements, instead putting in its place the experience of a confrontational restriction.” As a consequence Warhol’s images become ‘hermetic’, as they no longer produce meaning and narration (like Rauschenberg’s syntactic image assemblages). Could this be an alternative approach to portraiture, where the artist consciously refuses to employ, and subsequently communicate, the ‘freely expressive’ results produced by ‘pure artistic vision’ (Plato-modernism)? If so, what then is the role of the artist-author in producing a portrait based on minimum expressive involvement by the artist? Indeed, the paint that Warhol applies manually on his silkscreen prints in such a ‘vapid’ manner is disconnected from gestural expression and formal depiction, further emphasising the mechanical nature of his practice. The implementation of these two features exemplifies his absolute disinterest in (Platonic) modernist heroic models of portraiture. In these terms it is possible to consider Warhol’s distancing from conventional expressive modes of production as a critique of the honorific strategies of portraiture, particularly those modernist forms of portraiture that involve the subjectivity of the artist.

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603 Andy Warhol, “Underground Films: Art or Naughty Movies”, interview by Douglas Arango, Movie TV Secrets (June 1966), n. 7.; also quoted by Buchloh, ‘Andy Warhol’s One Dimensional Art’, p. 21, (fn.40).
604 Ibid, p. 22.
Another key feature of Warhol's work is seriality, which is attributed to his former employment as a commercial designer. Buchloh relates the serial and grid composition and arrangement display of objects with “the very ‘nature’ of commodity in all its aspects: its object status, its design, and its display”. How does seriality then affect the form of portraiture in Warhol's practice? If we follow Buchloh here, both the portrait – as a cultural form – and the subjects of the portraits (celebrities) are perceived as commodities. This is a significant change of direction for portraiture, as the traditional approach would be to identify the particularities of the subject in order to emphasise their singularity as a subject. Warhol, however, eschews such ‘individuality’, portraying a given subject in a repetitive manner, the multiple colour fields producing an anti-dualist version of multiple selves and personas. These various versions of the same subject underline a non-static understanding of being. Thus through the employment of seriality Warhol's stages an additional critique of conventional portraiture: the single ‘timeless’ painted image, in accordance with the immutable nature of the dualist subject, is dissolved.

Like Richter, Warhol turned to photography, often taking Polaroid stills of his subjects. However, for the portraits of Marilyn Monroe Warhol did not resort to a personal interpretation of his subject by creating new images but instead used a well-established and famous marketing image (a black & white still from film Niagara, 1953). Although this is contrary to the majority of Warhol's portraits, it is typical of his portraits of celebrities of this period, such as those of Elvis Presley, Liz Taylor, and Jackie Onassis. Such a decision is a sign of Warhol's disinterest in his sitters' subjectivities. Thus the lack of the use of sitting sessions equates with a lack of investment in the idealising demands of the honorific, considering the fact that these portraits were initiated by Warhol and were not commissioned by clients nor the subjects' themselves. Warhol's refusal to communicate aspects of these subjects' personalities is in tune with his perception of celebrities as impenetrable public personas. Hence Warhol's 'respect' for Monroe's public image (by using a readymade photograph), was necessary, in Benjamin's terms, in order to reconfigure a commodified image into a cultural emblem.

605 Ibid, p. 10.
606 Buchloh too views Warhol's production of identical images in size and price as a challenge towards “modernism's metaphysical legacy”: Ibid, p. 32.
There is, however, a stark difference between Monroe’s portraits and those of Jackie Onassis: where the portraits of Monroe are of the same public image only rendered in variable colours, the portraits of Jackie Onassis incorporate a mixture of four distinct public and private photographs in the same panel. In this way Warhol attempts to produce an image of Jackie Onassis not based on her impenetrable public personality, but one that attempts to break through her public mask and portray her as an ordinary human being, emotionally shattered by her husband’s assassination.\textsuperscript{607}

Thus, the intense seriality, and the aesthetics of graphic design and advertising, of Marilyn’s portraits aim at revealing the “commercialisation” of the human body in modern western societies, which goes hand in hand with the construction of a social, public mask.\textsuperscript{608}

The allegorical use of ready-made imagery and the insistence on popular image stereotypes has encouraged Richard Brilliant to claim that Warhol’s portraits of Marilyn Monroe are about “image-making rather than portraiture” since the work focuses on the mechanism of “popular representation…and not the person represented”.\textsuperscript{609} Brilliant suggests that, as a result, the merging of Monroe’s ‘artificial’ public personality with the commodification of her public image refuse any insight into her personality. Nevertheless, we are not left without a personality, however ‘artificial’ that personality might be.

As we have seen the problematic nature of the type of portraiture that is intended for public consumption has been in place since the Hellenistic times and remained active up until the early days of modernism (if not until today in many commissioned works). Consequently, we need to view Warhol’s Marilyns in a broader historical context in order to realise that this work does not simply mirror contemporary pictorial trends of popular magazine culture, but does its best to bring to our attention the age-old mechanics of public image-making, and, hence, question the ability of the artist to mirror the ‘true self’ of the portraits’ subject. In other words, Warhol’s portraits distance the viewer from any sense of empathy with the particularities of a given subject; instead, they force the viewer to become aware of the mediating social context from which the subject draws its significance. This sense of

\textsuperscript{608} Beyer, \textit{Portraits}, p. 381.
\textsuperscript{609} Brilliant, \textit{Portraiture}, p. 49.
the absence of Monroe's interiority is the outcome of Warhol’s anti-dualist methodology (serial reproduction of an inexpressively appropriated readymade image). In this way, Warhol advances the one-sided critique of the honorific that is found in Alex Katz’s suppression of his sitters’ subjectivity, by refraining from honouring his own subjectivity as an artist as well, that is, through rejecting a mode of art making that celebrates artistic individuality. Therefore, in these portraits we witness the complete dissolution of the dualist clash of subjectivities in portraiture.610

Conversely, if we are to follow Brilliant’s argument, then the seriality and multiplicity of Warhol’s Marilyn (as proposed by the various renderings of colours) might not be evidence of the anti-dualist proposition of a mutable self that it would seem. On the contrary, the use of the exact picture for every variation, without altering the composition and the scenery, is a sly assertion that the self is actually immutable, and that we only mistake it as the opposite because we exaggerate the importance of appearance. Similarly, Rosalind Krauss argues that Warhol’s employment of seriality differs from that of Carl Andre or Donald Judd in that he does not repeat the same unit in a single form. Instead Warhol insists on “the fact of difference within the same”, stretching from the different flavours of Campbell soup to the various public ‘faces’ of Liz, Marilyn, Jackie O, etc.611 If this is the case, then Warhol is revisiting the old dualist discontent towards the prevalence of appearance (body) over content (soul). By working with a celebrity-subject Warhol focuses on the commercialised “perpetually vanishing Self” by drawing on the dualist divide between a true and often private image of a person and his or her constructed public image.612 Or rather, by working with a ‘public’ image of Monroe, Warhol is subtly creating a dualist distinction between a private and public self.

Warhol’s three portraits of female celebrities in this period all invoke Death. Liz Taylor’s portraits, which seem to borrow from the Marilyns, have their origins in a Daily News story in 1962, reporting a life-threatening illness Taylor contracted during the shooting of Cleopatra. Jackie Onassis’ portraits are taken from the funeral of her first husband (John F. Kennedy). Thomas Crow presents a pseudo-humanist

account of early Warhol focusing on the notion of Death that seems to influence and unite Warhol’s choices of subject matter from 1961 to 1965. Accordingly, Crow claims that during his early work Warhol “dramati[sed] the breakdown of commodity exchange…[since] the mass produced image as the bearer of desires was exposed in its inadequacy by the reality of suffering and death.”\footnote{Crow, ‘Saturday Disasters’, p. 51.} The fact that Warhol decided to start his work on the Monroe portraits only within weeks of the actress’ death in August 1962 allows for an element of mourning in these portraits. Yet, what prevents an anti-dualist reading of all portraits of Monroe is Warhol’s \textit{Gold Marilyn Monroe}, where her face is situated against the golden background of an icon: a pictorial device that since the dawn of Christianity served as the traditional symbol for the demarcation of an eternal non-physical world.

Similar aspects of a somewhat ‘religious’ universality are rooted in Warhol’s fondness of celebrity-subjects, which according to Hal Foster is driven by his desire to capture the mass subject,\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p. 77.} a desire that eventually led Warhol to adopt the skull in his \textit{Skulls} (1976) as the “most economical image” for this purpose.\footnote{\textit{Ibid}, p. 79.} Drawing from Warhol’s own statements Foster argues that Warhol’s primary concern was far from simply representing disaster and death. Rather, these notions are employed in Warhol’s practice by mimicking the way mass media produce mass subjectivity-in-death as an effect of reporting on major catastrophes. This is not the first instance of skulls or skeletons as artistic subjects; as we have seen in the first chapter there is a whole tradition in place that spans the second half of the 16th century to the end of the 17th century, in which we see the depiction of skulls and human skeletons in paintings of anatomy lessons of the time. Accordingly these works where divided under two formats: \textit{cognitio sui} (to know thy self) and \textit{cognitio dei} (to know thy God).

If we are to follow Foster’s position, then Warhol’s employment of the skull seems not only to refer to, but also encourage, a form of \textit{cognitio sui}. However, he does so from a dualist perspective, by claiming that the eroding effects of the constructed mass image stretches beyond our attire and appearance, to affect our actual bodies and its contents too. Thus, the only unaffected aspects of our selves are our skeletons.
Warhol’s practice in the 1960s clearly demonstrates the need for artists to respond to the structures and forms of post-war capitalist reorganisation. His internalisation of mass production and mass consumption, as the terrain on which art defines its modernity, produces a sharp rejection of “romantic notions of heroic resistance and transcendental critique”. In this, Warhol’s work represents a key stage in that coming together of mass culture and high art that took place during the second half of the 20th century, leading to the assimilation of “high art into the sphere of culture industry”. Warhol’s decision to set up a workshop for the mass production of his art (Factory) by mechanical means (silkscreen printmaking, video) reflects his investment ideologically in this new social and cultural dynamic; and, as such, his desire to see his work mass-produced and widely disseminated. But despite the similarities between Warhol’s Factory and the collaborative ethics of Rembrandt’s studio practice, Warhol kept a firm hand over authorship.

As Caroline Jones reveals, in spite of its technological and modern associations, the Factory was based on an early 19th-century workshop model of the factory, where workers were invested with relative freedom of creativity while being under the management and direction of a superior, rather than on the 20th-century factory and its assembly lines, where human labourers were subordinate to, or interchangeable with, machines. Consequently the Factory’s mode of labour and Warhol’s mode of creativity within it were far from mechanistic, as it is mistakenly held to be the case from some of his declarations and his chosen media (silkscreen printing). As Emile de Antonio, one of his assistants, would later state, none of the painting could be produced without the authorial voice of Warhol, who was the “primum mobile...He was the spirit of it”. Warhol had in fact established a creative line of production in which a minimum contribution on his part was counterbalanced with intense management control, which has led Jones to read his machinist declarations as secretly a desire for others to be machines, and as such, do his bidding. The mechanical means that Warhol chose for the production of his work allowed for

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617 Buchloh, ‘Andy Warhol’s One Dimensional Art’, p. 4.
undetected contributions from his assistants, as opposed to the distinguishable stylistic and rendering differences between Rembrandt and his assistants (and it is precisely these differences in style which led to the de-attribution of a significant percentage of Rembrandt’s work). In other words, it is a lot easier to copy or produce original *Marilyns*, as opposed to imitating work produced by Rembrandt’s own hand, or any other great master’s hand. Moreover, the impersonal and inexpressive character of screen-printing is extremely convenient for imposing a modern system of management that is hostile towards the idea of allowing employees to make decisions that would affect the final product. Once the element of decision-making is removed from the process of creation the assistant is nothing more than an artistic surrogate that carries forward orders, nothing more than a technician who does as it is told.

Warhol’s filmmaking further questions his relation to conventional modes of authorship while it reflects his general approach to art making. He would often loosely instruct the participators or actors then set the camera to record and walk off to attend other business. In spite of this lack of participation, or presence, on the set, Warhol was still running things *in absentia*, as he would never leave the Factory during shootings and would frequently return to the set to further instruct participators and actors. Thus Warhol’s role in the Factory’s production system was that of a ‘spirit’, the ‘disembodied’ manager of assistants. Which easily leads to the claim that Warhol was – to paraphrase Gilbert Ryle – the ‘ghost in the machine’, the head that oversees the Factory’s mechanic body. The fact that Warhol refused his assistants payments or royalties reinforced the level of authority that he imposed on the Factory’s creative production; he was keen to let others contribute and participate in the production of his work but not in a truly collaborative manner. In this respect, Warhol missed out on an opportunity to expand his critique of the honorific.

Following Valerie Solanas’ attempt to murder Warhol in 1968 the Factory ceased operating as Jones says as, “a primary source for the performative aspect of the technological sublime”. Post-1974 the Factory shifts from, a premises engaged in physically producing art, to a business centre from which Warhol managed various

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projects. The Factory’s initial loose assembly line gradually turned into a hierarchical structure, with filmmakers Paul Morrissey and Fred Hughes placed at the top of the hierarchy. Inevitably the new layout of the latest Factory was based on a corporeal layout consisting of distinct spatial and power relations. This confirms the argument that Warhol had always intended to be the head of his enterprise, which masqueraded in its earlier phase as a collaborative venture, presenting pseudo-shared activity as freedom to his assistants. The fact that the Factory kept on managing the Warhol industry for two years after his death, also reveals close similarities between Warhol and Rembrandt’s branding of his own name, allowing it to be employed by others after his death.\(^{625}\)

To understand Warhol’s form of management we have to briefly return to Solanas’ shooting, which was the outcome of her growing unease with Warhol’s style of management. This involved gender role manipulation of assistants, and as Solanas claimed, the establishing of legal claims by Warhol over her work and the work of others who worked in the Factory.\(^{626}\) Solanas’ attempt to decapitate the head of the Factory derives from her view of Warhol’s management style as an amplified manifestation of the System,\(^ {627}\) which, for her was exemplary of the general authoritarianism of Warhol towards his assistants. Solanas shooting had a massive impact on Warhol, who from then on refrained from presenting himself as the boss of the Factory, or the head of Andy Warhol Enterprises.\(^ {628}\) As a result, the inexpressive art and modes of labour that occurred during 1962-1968 – crucial to the critical forms of his portraiture – began to fade away.

In contrast to Rembrandt, however, Warhol was not keen on signing his work or work that had been produced by others on his behalf. When he was signing his work he would not ask his assistants to duplicate his signature, as Rembrandt did.\(^ {629}\) Jones reveals that as Kahnweiler did for Picasso, Warhol’s gallerist Ivan Karp titled most of his works for marketing and display purposes, which should allow us to

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\(^{628}\) *Ibid*, p. 263.

\(^{629}\) Andy Warhol, ‘Superpop or a Night at the Factory’, interview by Roger Vaughan, New York Herald Tribune, August 8, 1965; Also quoted in Buchloh, ‘Andy Warhol’s One Dimensional Art’, p. 29, (fn. 52).
allocate Karp a role as one of Warhol’s assistants, and as such, a crucial part in the authorship of the works.\textsuperscript{630} Astonishingly, prior to creating a signature stamp of typeset letters his mother used to hand sign his early work.\textsuperscript{631} Therefore, and in light of the mass consumerist tactics that he employed Warhol was certainly not against the branding that comes along with an artistic signature, but he did detest the humanist characteristics of its expressiveness, derived from the individualistic and unique character of a signature. This form of artistic branding modelled around modern businesses had to be appropriated around a form of impersonal and collective productivity, consisting of a mechanistic body that was guided by a managing head. As a result, collaboration and collectivism in Warhol’s practice was limited to a form of participation within a preset production line. And therefore, in the final analysis, it neither truly deflated notions of singular authorship (given his style of management) and it certainly did not escape the confines of Cartesian subjectivity, since a managing head was still controlling a mechanical body. In this respect, Warhol missed out on an even more radical form of portraiture; one that resists notions of the honorific through the assimilation of singular artistic subjectivities into a genuine collective subjectivity and collaborative practice.

\textit{Conceptual Art & the Cartesian Tradition}

Charles Green identifies a clear difference between “collaborations that are…simply mergers of two [or more] “hands” into one” such as those that took place in Rembrandt’s studio and Warhol’s Factory, and “collaborations that manipulate the concept of signature style itself”, which is often the case in Conceptual Art collaborations.\textsuperscript{632} This is a crucial point, since the latter type is the one that represents an authentic substitute for the Cartesian model of individual artistic subjectivity. Moreover, the majority of conceptual artists’ methodology was based on a form of planning–strategy specific to given artistic and cultural problems, as opposed to relying

\textsuperscript{630} Jones, \textit{Machine In The Studio}, p. 209.
\textsuperscript{631} \textit{Ibid}, p. 213.
\textsuperscript{632} Charles Green, \textit{The Third Hand: Collaboration In Art From Conceptualism To Postmodernism} (Minneapolis & London: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), p. xiii.
on the expressive manipulation of a given medium.\textsuperscript{633} The combination of these concerns with the abandonment of the studio as a platform for making art marks a clear distance on the part of Conceptual artist from the Cartesian model of solitary, ‘introverted’ artistic subjectivity. The Conceptual artists’ methodological preference for research counters the traditional model of artistic labour shaped around expectations of intuition and creative enlightenment.\textsuperscript{634} Suffice it to say, collaboration in Conceptual art reconfigures the subjectivity of artistic identity from individual to multiple. The outcome, would seem therefore, to be a straightforward rejection of the dualist model of knowledge produced by an introvert individual. However, not all collaborative Conceptual Art practices are governed by such intentions.

For instance, Joseph Kosuth’s mode of artistic collaboration is framed around a “delegation of manufacture”, which above all should be seen as “necessary to his defeat of painting” and not as an attempt to dilute individual modes of authorship.\textsuperscript{635} His insistence on creating work with text, particularly in the early works, was driven by his desire to refrain from establishing a personal style in the modernist sense. Instead of intuitive heroic painting Kosuth resorted to impersonal research-based text works that often appeared in newspapers. Therefore, the physical act of producing Kosuth’s text-works was down to the newspapers’ employees. Kosuth, among other Conceptualists is an archetypical case of what Carl Andre refers to as ‘the post-studio artist’.\textsuperscript{636} As Scott Burton explains in the catalogue for \textit{Live in Your Head}:

Carl Andre has used the term “post-studio artist” to describe himself and others who do not actually make their own art but have it fabricated. The phrase is equally applicable to artists like Serra and LeWitt, who make their own pieces though not always in their studios, as well as to Kosuth and Weiner, who may use typewriters and telephones, but eliminate the production of objects entirely.\textsuperscript{637}

\textsuperscript{633} Ibid, p. 30-31.
\textsuperscript{634} Ibid, p. ix-xi.
\textsuperscript{635} Ibid, p. 3.
Carl Andre talks about the fact that his “things are made by machine” and that “they were never hand-worked” apart from the moment that he “handles” them in order to “take them off the stack and put them on the floor”. In summary, Andre, Kosuth and the majority of the early Conceptual artists were highly concerned with the “elimination of a certain type of overinflated subjectivity signified by an artist’s personal touch” by resorting to a type of art “in which the hand does not enter into the production of the materials of which it is made”. Green clarifies that this model of ‘long-distance’ production aimed at the elimination of the individual artistic hand that leads to the establishment of a unique personal style, “rather than [being] a result of technical requirements, convenience or simple indifference to the handmade.” Therefore, Kosuth’s redirection of artistic labour into the management of the labour of assistants and employees was mostly an outcome of his dislike of modernist painting’s inherent demonstration of an individual, personal, and unique style; what Kosuth found particularly problematic was the expression of the conventional artistic “I”. However, like Warhol, Kosuth never credited his assistants or participants as co-authors. Ironically, Kosuth’s preference for, and persistence in, the use of text has played its part in establishing a personal style, despite it being a non-conventional and non-expressive form of making art.

During the early days of Conceptual art there was a conscious negation of definition and categorisation, which goes against the Cartesian obsession with self-knowledge as the means for self-mastery. Yet, certain of Conceptual art’s methods and attitudes are clearly dualistic: the prioritisation of the immaterial concept/idea over the material object, and the preference of the near immaterial language over visuality brings to mind Descartes’ rejection of the senses for verbally articulated thought. For instance, Seth Siegelaub establishes a dualist distinction between primary and secondary information in order to argue that art (and particularly

638 Andre, Cuts, p. 44.
639 Green, The Third Hand, p. 10.
640 Andre, Cuts, p. 44.
641 Green, The Third Hand, p. 11.
642 Ibid, p. 22.
643 Harald Szeeman identifies this phenomenon in his introductory essay in the catalogue of When Attitudes Become Form where he lists a plethora of names and definitions that many attempted to attach to Conceptual art, to name a few: “Anti-Form”, Micro-Emotive Art”, “Possible-Art”, “Impossible-Art”, etc. See, “About the Exhibition”, English translation published in Live in Your Head: When Attitudes Become Form (London: Institute of Contemporary Art, 1969), n.p.
Conceptual) “does not any longer depend upon its physical presence”. On the other hand, there are contrasting views such as those of Robert Morris, who consistently argued against the problematic modernist separation of the physical and the relational. On this subject, Peter Osborne asks whether “the aesthetic [or material] dimension of the object [can] be wholly disregarded in the drive towards ‘propositional’ [immaterial/conceptual] content”, and, more to the point, whether “the philosophical meaning of the work [can] actually be wholly abstracted from its material means”? Conversely, the ephemeral, serial, non-autonomous (participatory), and non-static nature of the majority of Conceptual artworks is anything but loyal to Cartesian notions of eternal and immutable nature.

Let us examine these two strains of Conceptual art. Sol LeWitt’s ‘Paragraphs on Conceptual Art’ are composed in an undisputed dualist tone. First, his effort to advocate a conceptual art practice leads to an extreme and absolute separation between idea and object, where the material is denigrated. Second, he perceives Conceptual art production as “intuitive” and “mystical”, rather than rationalistic and theoretic. Yet, in a surprising turn, LeWitt seems to propose a solution to the (dualist) problem of ‘autonomous minds’ by arguing that “a work of art may be understood as a conductor from the artist’s mind to the viewer’s”. In a similar dualist tone to LeWitt Kosuth argues that in Conceptual art, “objects are conceptually irrelevant to the condition of art”. Accordingly, and as Osborne argues, Kosuth’s early ‘definitional’ works “aim to demonstrate the independence of conceptual content from signifying form”. For Kosuth, when material art objects are presented in an artistic context they become “a kind of proposition” within the framework of “art’s language”, rather than objects of

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648 Ibid, p. 81.
649 Ibid, p. 84.
651 Osborne, ‘Conceptual Art and/as Philosophy’, p. 59.
aesthetic or cultural significance. Yet, Kosuth, like Art & Language, was in favour of linguistic philosophy, which, as the successor to empiricism, is primarily anti-metaphysical. In addition, and despite Kosuth’s immaterial declarations his work never achieves an elimination of the aesthetic, whereas he often attempts to “regulate the play between ‘aesthetic’ and ‘conceptual’ terms”. In other words, although Kosuth fails to escape the reliance of art’s production of meaning on material form, yet he does his best to ensure that the specifics of form/material do not interfere with the production of meaning.

In addition, and as Alison Green notices, Harald Szeeman’s show *When Attitudes Become Form* clearly focuses on process-based art and “on the subjective character” of artworks. Harald Szeeman’s interest in residual modernist artistic ideals stands out even more when we view his reading of Conceptual art in comparison to Benjamin Buchloh’s 1990 seminal essay on Conceptual Art. The topic of contest is the use of language, and where Buchloh views the employment of language in Conceptual art as a direct response and rejection of artistic “transcendence” in modernist terms – “by means of traditional studio skills and privileged modes of experience” – Szeeman, driven by his idealist interest in ‘subjectivity’, attempts to return the use of language to the realm of meditation - that which cannot be articulated but only experienced. As we look more and more at the early days of Conceptual art we witness two opposing strands: one that is filled with residual modernist and dualist ideals, and an analytic and anti-dualist one. Artists such as Sol LeWitt and writers such as Harald Szeeman comprise the first group; the second group consist of artists and writers such as Art & Language. Yet, what

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657 Ibid, p. 112.
659 For a plethora of criticisms of Szeeman as a romantic see Green, ‘When Attitudes Become Form and the Contest over Conceptual Art’s History’, p. 128, and fn. 25.
Szeeman misses out altogether is that for an Idea to live in the head requires a material source of intellectual stimulation, in the same sense that a subject or a self requires a (material) brain, body, and world (network theory) for its emergence and subsequent existence.

Although some Conceptual artists endorsed the notion of revealing mystic truths, others aimed at revealing the truth behind the myth of mystic events in order to question the validity of a belief in metaphysics as such. Robert Barry’s *Gas Piece* – which was first shown in *When Attitudes Become Form*, and emitted from the rooftop of the Kunsthalle in Bern – and Terry Atkinson and Michael Baldwin’s *Air-Conditioning Show*, consist of invisible artworks, which can be traced and explained in scientific terms. To make the gesture more extreme Barry’s piece was not mentioned anywhere in the show apart from the catalogue. Atkinson and Baldwin’s invisible show is an early indication of Art & Language’s intention to strip the process of art making of any expressive conditions that might be perceived as a celebration of human spirituality, (demonstrated by the adoption of a bureaucratic and cartographic means of representation). Barry’s ‘Gas’ and ‘Radiation’ pieces could easily qualify as visually dematerialised artworks, as they were unable to be seen in the manner of traditional art. Yet, they should not be treated or solely “understood as an idea”, as Anne Rorimer argues. Art & Language and Barry’s work are highly successful in demystifying the primal notion that anything ‘invisible’ is immaterial, spiritual, and ethereal. Thus, by creating seemingly immaterial works consisting of a chemical substance such as a gas, Barry employs science to resolve the effects of superstition. In a similar tone, Atkinson and Baldwin’s *Air Conditioning Show* further expose the improbability of dematerialisation in art, as defined by Lucy Lippard and John Chandler.

The fundamental purpose behind the pursuit of dematerialisation was to prevent art, in the form of objects, from undergoing a process of “commodification” and “commercialisation” and eventually enable the production of a form of art that

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would resist the deleterious effects of the art world’s market values.\textsuperscript{662} However, the undeniable commercial success of Conceptual artists has rightfully lead Lippard to accurately describe the subsequent failure of dematerialisation in this respect.\textsuperscript{663} Yet, what Lippard and Chandler miss in their early account of Conceptual Art in \textit{The Dematerialisation of the Art Object} is that through this process of dematerialisation Conceptual Art succeeded in proving the falsity of such a notion in relation to metaphysics. Ironically, Lippard’s reading of Conceptual Art seems to share an awful lot with Cartesianism, particularly in the importance that it allocates to the distrustful senses. As Atkinson clarifies in his response to Lippard’s essay, Conceptual Art’s reconsideration of the visual was in fact both a rejection of modernist artistic ideals and the means for revealing the impossibility of dematerialisation in objective terms, while highlighting that such results were only possible through the creation of situations and events.\textsuperscript{664} In a similar tone, Johanna Drucker argues that the distinction between idea and material and/or object in Conceptual art “emphasises the transformative role for the process by which idea becomes material form.”\textsuperscript{665} Conversely, this collaborative, and not conflictual, process is analogous to Rockwell’s network theory, where the mind is the result of a cooperational process between the brain, the body, and the world. Even Harald Szeemann implies this fact in the title of his curated exhibition \textit{When Attitudes Become Form}, but he fails to expand on the philosophical implications of this phrase in the catalogue essay. Thus, dematerialisation in Conceptual art takes the form of an event, one that relies on a collaborative networking (interactive, participatory, collaborative) and not on conflictual models that were predominantly active in modernist practices (artist vs. subject, form vs. colour, object vs. idea). This analogy between Conceptual art’s methodology and network theory derived from neuroscience can also be traced in Ian Burn’s assertions that the artistic tendencies of the 1960’s gave “more weight to the

\textsuperscript{663} Lippard, \textit{Six Years}, p. 263.
\textsuperscript{664} Terry Atkinson’s, ‘Concerning the Article ‘The Dematerialisation of Art”, which was originally written in a letter essay that subsequently was published in a shorter version in Lippard’s \textit{Six Years}, pp. 43-44.
conception of the work [brain], the process by which it was produced [body], its context of display [world].

To a certain extent, Conceptual art’s renegotiation of the nature of art and the viewers’ relationship, was inherited from Minimalism’s explorations of seriality, physicality, and the engaged viewing experience. The work of Carl Andre and Robert Morris in particular challenged the (modernist and dualist) notion of the autonomous art-object by establishing a participatory relationship between the viewer and the artwork, while highlighting the cultural and contextual significance of institutions in the viewing process. Minimalism’s major contribution to the development of art, as argued by Rosalind Krauss, was to shift the production of meaning from the interior of a work of art (an exemplary dualist conception) to an external, relational process. Such a conception aims at the crux of modernism and dualism, where the viewer is invited to search and reveal a visually concealed meaning such as the artist’s intention or personality; a process that is analogous to Descartes method for understanding being. And as Richard J. Williams notices, in a manner that seems to unintentionally echo Rockwell’s network theory, “if the human world is reinterpreted in terms of relationships between many in public, rather than the recovery of the inner life of individuals, then there is no room for the conventional humanist subject position taken by the artist”.

Art & Language’s Index and Mary Kelly’s Post Partum Document are good examples of how Conceptual art’s relational aspects can be successfully incorporated into radical forms of portraiture. However, the non-authorial, inexpressive, serial, and relational aspects of Conceptual art subjected portraiture to fundamental crisis, since these strategies allowed no space for the honorific conventions of the traditional portrait. A rare example of proto-Conceptual art portraiture is Robert Morris’ I-Box, a wooden box in the shape of the letter T concealing a photograph of Morris. True to old traditions of figurative portraiture the works balances between dualist and anti-dualist models. Despite the strong metaphorical reference to Cartesian dualism, where

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the material box (body) carries the essence of the portrait (picture of Morris), the work renegotiates traditional dualist pictorial forms by showing a full-figured photograph of Morris standing naked with no ornaments, symbols, riddles or metaphors for his inner being. Moreover, Morris wittingly provides the subjective 'I' with material content, which is none other than his body, thereby, suggesting a materialist conception of the self. If Morris’ picture alone were to be viewed in relation to the pictorial formats discussed in the first Chapter – that is, cropped formats, which highlight the head/brain where the mind is believed to be located, and full-figured formats, which attribute equal value to the body and the brain – we could easily surmise that its format is anything but dualist. Morris’ anti-dualist take on art is articulated in his declaration that his work aims at the “rotting sack of humanism”, and the “unity of a subject” both manifested in art primarily through the establishment of a personal style.670

A plethora of analytic Conceptual artists sought to resolve the problem of personal signature or style by resorting to impersonal means for producing art. For instance, Ian Burn and Mel Ramsden’s collaborative methods of writing philosophical texts as a reflection on their works serve as a rejection of “self-expressive, individual artistic identity”.671 In relation to Descartes’ Method, Green argues that in order to “replace customary visual object constructs with arguments about art”672 Ian Burn thought it was necessary to “denigrate the primacy of the visual (and to question its special link with knowledge)”.673 As we have seen, the backbone of Descartes’ method for achieving self-knowledge was, first and foremost, to disassociate the senses, specifically vision, from the production of self-knowledge. However, Burn argues that Conceptual art sought to reconcile the dualist division established by formalism’s abandonment of the “responsibility for ideas”; the artist produces the art and the critic provides the ideas.674 Thus, and in opposition to the misconceived perception of absolute dematerialisation, Conceptual art aimed at the eventual reuniting of material and idea by exploring the relationship of ideas to materials and processes. Modernist

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671 Green, The Third Hand, p. xii.
672 Ian Burn, ‘Conceptual Art as Art’, Art and Australia 8, no. 2 (September 1970), p. 167.
673 Green, The Third Hand, p. 32.
674 Burn, ‘Conceptual Art as Art’, p. 167.
preoccupation with formalist issues tilted the balance in favour of formalist experimentation resulting in a neglect of the intellectual properties of a work of art.\textsuperscript{675} The scholarly and “hybrid” work of Ian Burn’s collaboration with Mel Ramsden – who contrary to Kosuth acknowledged and credited additional participators and collaborators as authors – is a clear indication of the abandonment of an “autonomous” Cartesian subject “in favour of a more heterogeneous conception of the author” through the construction of an “impersonal…neutral authorial voice”.\textsuperscript{676}

If we follow Buchloh’s reading of Conceptual Art as the art of “administration”, which presupposes some form of management in terms of the artist “administering labour and production”,\textsuperscript{677} then the significant question is: how does this form of administration differ from those adopted by Rembrandt and Warhol in their studios? What definitely distinguishes Warhol and Rembrandt from Conceptual art is that the former emphasised a certain aspect of directive control in the management of their works’ production, as opposed to the establishment of a collaborative process with studio assistants. Yet, as we have seen in the case of Kosuth, collaboration in Conceptual art is not in itself a guarantee of collective authorship, when forms of management are employed in order to enforce a “separation of mental or intellectual work from manual work”.\textsuperscript{678} Despite Kosuth’s collaborative practice conventional models of singular authorship remain intact. Moreover, this form of separation puts in place a hierarchy in favour of mental activities, which is reminiscent of dualism’s disregard for the bodily, the material, and the mechanic. This distinction is even evident in those works that are quite open in terms of making and authorship, such as Lawrence Weiner’s conceptualist propositions. Indeed, Weiner’s work risks becoming an illustration of what Burn describes as the ‘commodification of ideas’ in modern society,\textsuperscript{679} and a prime example of what Sarah Charlesworth views as an instance of “ultimate consumerism”, where “ideas become the property of the inventor, and as such are no further use to the community once claimed”;\textsuperscript{680} John

Baldessari’s series of ‘Commissioned Paintings’ proves this very fact. (In 1969 Baldessari commissioned a series of paintings based on polaroids he had taken, from a number of amateur, yet technically proficient painters. Even though Baldessari acknowledged each hired painter with a caption on each of the paintings, he claimed full authorship of the work).

Thus, we can summarise as follows: artist or studio management has developed from a situation best represented by Rembrandt’s workshop, in which the studio master guaranteed a level of artistic autonomy to studio assistants in the production of work, to Warhol’s remodelling, in the Factory, of the modern office business in which the master (manager) restricts individual decision making on the part of assistants through the subordination of artistic creativity to mechanical reproducibility, and to the post-studio studio of Conceptual art where the artistic production is completely external to the activity of the singular, expressive artist, and might take the form of directions or plans given over the phone.

Art & Language

Charles Green views Art & Language as “both a group of artists and an enterprise”, which “defined itself in fluid, contingent terms rather than as a collective with identifiable members working at a particular place and time.” Green draws his argument from Michael Baldwin’s statement in an interview that members of Art & Language did not act as authors of their work but “as agents in a practice that produced it,” thereby, putting in place a truly collaborative practice that removes any trace or attribution of individual authorship. Art & Language’s revision of Cartesian subjectivity does not stop at the substitution of individual artistic subjectivity with a collective subjective agency. Describing his work with Ian Burn, Mel Ramsden notes Art & Language’s indifference towards a model of ‘the subject as producer of original

681 Charles Green, The Third Hand, p. 47.
682 Michael Baldwin, in Michael Baldwin and Mel Ramsden, ‘On Art & Language’, interview by Juan Vicente Aliaga and José Miguel Cortés, Art and Text, no. 35 (Summer 1990), pp. 26–27.
knowledge’ by preferring “community” to “authenticity”.683 Yet, the addition of new members and the development of the group’s dynamics during the early 1970’s led Roger Cutworth’s to comment in 1971 on the “division of roles” in Art & Language, which suggest a corporate structure, where, according to Cutworth, Charles Harrison was the acting manager.684 But how does Art & Language’s collaborative art production relate to Warhol’s managerial model and to the mechanics of the Factory?

Harrison does not hesitate to admit his position as ‘manager’ of Art & Language, even though he attempts to define his role according to his ‘employment’ in the journal, thus preferring the description of “general editor”,685 which needless to say still leaves in place a certain hierarchy that relegates the ethics of equality inherent to the notion of collaboration. Harrison’s clarification of his role in the group comes as a surprise since he is perfectly aware of Art & Language’s deflation of authorship through unattributed collaboration; at one point he is cautious of “an egalitarian attribution of tasks”.686 Thus, his insistence on distinguishing the contribution of several members of Art & Language in the making of the Index – the most collaborative work of the group – is somewhat puzzling. For instance, he names Michael Baldwin as the initiator of the indexing system and Philip Pilkington and David Rushton as the ones that researched the logic of indexes. The rest of the group, according to Harrison’s derogative dismissal, “read texts, pasted paper and talked to curators”.687 This is highly problematic. Harrison’s attempt to reveal the specific contributions of the group’s members is driven by desire to clarify the ‘true’ authors of the Index within modernist terms, which results in the attribution of honorific characteristics to specific individuals. As a result Harrison’s detailed account poses a barrier to Art & Language’s successful critique of the honorific logic of singular authorship through their merging of individual subjectivities into a collective artistic agency.

687 Ibid, p. 66.
The first version of the *Index* was shown in Documenta 5, at Kassel Germany in 1972. The *Index* provided Art & Language with the opportunity to fully assert their position of ‘writing as art’ and thus mark the group’s rejection of the expressive mode of art making. Generally, an index carries all the characteristics of a modernist work of art: it is an autonomous, closed system of references that relate to a source of meaning that is *internal* to it. As Harrison carefully notices, in linguistic terms the “principles of consistency which apply here [*Index*] are rational rather than grammatical”. However, the *Index*’s methodological appropriation substitutes collective intellectual activity in the form of research and discussion for modernist individual expression. Harrison defines this when he asserts that the *Index* refuses to dictate a premeditated meaning decided by its authors. Instead, it exposes the process of an open production of meaning both in terms of what and who is producing it, all of which is dependent on a “network of relations” as opposed to closed modernist systems.

The distance taken from an aesthetic, formalist art through the production of a text-based work, that is perceived as void of stylistic expression (thus void of individualism) risks the danger, as Michael Baldwin has identified, of being aestheticised in ways that would allow the emergence of a style. If this happened then ‘writing as art’ would simply pose as an alternative to expressive forms of art in communicating the individualism and uniqueness of the author(s). As such the critique of individualism becomes identifiable with the Cartesian concept of the subject as the immutable producer of original knowledge. Artists who tend to adhere to, and consistently repeat, their alternative non-individualist method for making art (such as Buren, Kawara, and Kosuth), fall into this category and fail to escape the confines of Cartesian subjectivity. Art & Language’s *Index* though captures something different: the successful incorporation of the viewers in the production of meaning, making it a perfect example for illustrating Quilligan’s argument concerning the emergence of the viewers’ self-consciousness as a result of the process of deciphering meaning from coded language. This particular generation of consciousness – which

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688 Ibid, p. 72.
689 Ibid, p. 74.
690 Baldwin’s views on the danger of an “un-aesthetic art” and of a “suppression of aesthetic readings” being aestheticised eventually were passed on to Harrison in the form of a personal note during the making of the *Index* in the early 1970s. See Harrison, *Essays on Art & Language*, p. 145.
could also pose as an instance of self-portraiture – is achieved through the representational qualities of language, and not through the employment of its interpretational (metaphysical) properties. As we have seen, both Foucault and Quilligian claim that when language becomes mathematics (representational) it becomes inadequate for addressing metaphysical issues due to a lack of spirituality (through a loss of its enigmatic element). Thus, the Index’s employment of language’s representational qualities assists in substituting collective intellectual activity for individual metaphysical exploration as the means by which we reach a state of self-consciousness. By remaining open to unlimited collaboration in the process of the generation of meaning the Index brings forth a relational model that blocks the humanist (and dualist) tone of most modernist art – where the artist dictates his or her view of the world in his own personal way, in turn laying claim to his or her own uniqueness. The Index is particularly successful in this respect by employing the allegorical devices of fragmentation and dialectical juxtaposition, which prevents the work from being a static entity. Moreover, the requirement for the viewers’ participation puts in place a collaborative model for producing art that is analogous to Rockwell’s network theory: the interconnection of brain (artist) + body (physical body of work) + world (audience). It is this adaptability that enables the Index to present its viewers with an intellectual platform for the creation of their own self-portraits, so to speak, in the act of an emerging self-consciousness.

Perhaps the Index is not “the summary work of Conceptual Art” but by being the summary of Art & Language’s immense contribution to Conceptual art it can certainly pose as a self-portrait of the group, a portrait that is produced through the group’s meticulous archiving of their intellectual activities instead of being a fixed picturesque representation of the group’s members. By doing so, the Index-as-a-portrait emphasises the group’s conscious decision to substitute intuitive and expressive methods for making art out of shared research and conversation. In this sense the nature of collaborative practices is fundamentally anti-dualist in its rejection of the sole production of knowledge and authorship, and Art & Language achieve this in the Index in the best possible way by diluting any trace or attribution of its

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691 Ibid, p. 75.
composite authors (despite Harrison’s managerial habit of crediting contributors) and by inviting further collaboration in the act of production of meaning. As a result, the *Index* challenges the dualist model of the heroic, introvert, solitary individual by being a non-figural, non-static, non-expressive portrait of the intellectual (research) and collective means (conversation, debates) by which Art & Language produced art. More importantly the encouragement for viewers to participate in the production of meaning allows for an unlimited expansion of the subjectivities involved in the production of this portrait. In this it opposes itself sharply to the fixed triadic structure involved in modernist portraiture: the sitter, the artist-interpretant, and the observer-interpretant.

Following the completion of the *Index* the members of Art & Language were drawn into an internal debate based on whether the group should return to the studio in order to reengage with the production of art objects or to retain their focus on a philosophical investigation of art through a research-based methodology. At the end of these debates and after the dissolution of the cross Atlantic collaboration, the group consisted of three remaining members (Michael Baldwin, Mel Ramsden, and Charles Harrison). Upon their return to the studio Art & Language engaged directly with the genre of portraiture in the *Portrait of V.I. Lenin in the Style of Jackson Pollock* (1980). Prior to the execution of the work its title was an “ironic proposal for an impossible picture”, a joke infused with allegorical properties.

The portraits produced for this project reflect Art & Language’ attempts to achieve the impossible: to adopt a highly unique modernist style almost impossible to replicate in order to paint Lenin’s portrait: Pollock’s Abstract Expressionism. In this respect the group was also faced with internal ideological conflicts, in their effort to unify the opposing ideological worlds of Pollock and Lenin. Allegorical principles come into play in the work’s demand that the audience be both familiar with Pollock’s signature style and its ideological significance for post-war modernism and Lenin’s political contribution to revolutionary socialism; and, in turn therefore, the incompatibility between Lenin as a familiar icon of socialist realism and Pollock as a hero of modern individualism and formalist abstraction. Accordingly allegorical appropriation functions in *Portrait of Lenin* in a ‘designatory’ manner, analogous to

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the way Michael Asher employs it in his institutional critiques. By bringing these contrasting ideological worlds together the work exposes these ideological dichotomies, in the allegorical form of a ‘collision’: “linear or painterly, Apollonian or Dionysiac, descriptive or expressive, plastic or decorative, figurative or abstract, effective or aesthetic, realist or empiricist, collective or individual, East or West.”

Art & Language’s achievement in *Portrait of Lenin* is the way in which it overcomes the problem of conflictual subjectivities in modernist portraiture. In tune with their general critique of individual authorship Art & Language’s take on portraiture is a radical one. Firstly, the pictorial style of the painting is not the result of the group’s ‘creativity’, but Jackson Pollock’s. By adopting of the signs of a highly ‘expressive’ artistic style (which had to be practiced intensely in order to be perfected) they provide a pointed rejection of the modernist Cartesian subject’s adherence to an unproblematic notion of originality and individual expression. Secondly, like the majority of Richter and Warhol’s subjects, Lenin (obviously) did not sit for the portrait; Lenin’s well-known pose is based on a photograph taken by another artist (Charangovitch). The vividness of Art & Language’s portrait, therefore, is not manifest through expressive gestures based on a consultation with the subject, but through the mediation of ideologically conflictual subjectivities. Where the *Index* deflates sole authorship by inviting external participation in the production of meaning, the *Portrait of Lenin* does so allegorically by appropriating Pollock’s style in order to recreate a kind of displaced, or uncanny version of Charangovitch’s iconic image of Lenin. As a result: brain (Art & Language) + body (artwork after Pollock & Charangovitch) + world (the readers’ understanding of these reference systems) combine to produce the artwork in the form a conjunction of ideas.

Clifford argues that “the idea of transformation…expressed in metamorphosis… indicates a change in function”. What is transformed in this work is the nature of Lenin’s representation rendered through an ideological conflicting style, rather than the formal aspects of the portrait. Retaining the traditional bust format was a necessity rather than a choice, dictated by Charangovitch’s original image. Yet, the seemingly conventional methodological approach to the pictorial

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problem of the *Portrait of Lenin*, which draws from old debates on appearance, stresses the survival of dualist issues. In many ways, the *Portrait of Lenin*'s methodological focus on appearance extends Warhol’s criticism of the social structures that encourage the commodification of the self through an artificial process of image making, to the commercialisation and idolisation of Lenin as a cultural emblem, similar to Warhol's *Mao*. In other words, we witness an example of what Martha Rosler refers to in the opening quote of this Chapter: an artwork whose ideological mythology is put to the test by our experiences.

*Mary Kelly*

Perhaps the alternative and answer to dualism in portraiture might be found in the impersonality of scientific methodology. Mary Kelly’s *Post Partum Document* is a perfect example of the substitution of methodologies (from expressive to theoretic), where the highly emotionally charged act of mothering is detached from emotions and becomes the vehicle for a scientific analysis of early childhood. Kelly initiated the production of *P.P.D* in 1973 with the birth of her child, recording the steps of the child’s growth during its first six years. The whole of the six sections examine the impact of mothering in the formation of Kelly’s, and by extension a woman’s (a mother’s) subjectivity. Instead of engaging in a Cartesian self-reflective process, Kelly turns to intersubjective interaction by focusing on key moments of her child’s development: the various stages of feeding, learning to speak, experiencing independence from the mother, expressing curiosity in sexuality, the gathering of objects which relate to loss (in relation to the mother as well as the child), and finally the child’s entry into broader social conditions through public education.

Overall, the work consists of mounted specimens and labels, scientific diagrams and recorded research, statistical tables and various indexes, which in conjunction with the supporting commentaries “lend to the text the overtones of

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Kelly intentionally employs the allegorical method of fragmentation (all items in the work are referred to as fragments) by juxtaposing extracts of conversations between her and her child with images of samples, diagrams, etc. As a result she purposely minimises the possibility of the attribution of singular authorship, by refusing to independently categorise the items contributed by her child from those of hers. The creation of the diagrams and commentaries would have been impossible for Kelly to produce without the active contribution of her child. The stark contrasts with modernist studio practice are located in Kelly’s refusal to relegate her child’s subjectivity to that of a studio model. Although Kelly does process the gathered information *internally* – as a dualist artist would do – she does so with the impersonal means of science and research, not through intuition and individual expression; expression is replaced by calculation. This vital collaboration of subjectivities (mother and child), necessary for the production of the work provides another alternative model, capable of substituting the conflictual tendencies and hierarchical structures of dualist practices.

Language plays an important role in this work, which is used in a referential and also impersonal scientific tone and form. Kelly, therefore, provides an additional representational use of language to those of the *Index*, one that, similarly, prevents language from becoming a means for metaphysical inquiry. In tune with the indexical character of the work, the mother – or rather the physical image of the mother – is represented textually and allegorically and never visually in terms of a biological body. Helen Molesworth argues that Kelly’s representational strategy was a response against the “prevailing problematic of woman as object of the gaze”.

In doing so, Kelly expanded the somewhat impersonal and institutional application of Conceptual art’s textual approach to the feminine aspect of the domestic environment. Even though Kelly presents mothering as a form of socially denoted labour, she renders childcare outside social conditions. Molesworth notices that the *P.P.D.* “stages the relations between artistic and human creation as analogous, and by doing so interrogates the

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boundaries between public and private realms of experience.” As a result, Kelly tackles the private and introvert nature of the dualist subject by making public one of the most highly private domestic activities, that of raising a child. However, the non-honorific strategies (allegorical non-resemblance) that Kelly employs prevent the glamorisation of the work’s subjects.

Like Art & Language’s *Index*, the *P.P.D.*’s allegorical means of production expands the perception of the work by leaving it open to its viewers. This collaborative model of ‘inventing’ meaning, as opposed to ‘interpreting’, is what Gregory Ulmer terms ‘euretic’. It could be argued, in fact, that euretics is the methodology inherent to the allegorical phenomenon that Quilligan identifies, where readers experience the emergence of their self-consciousness in the process of ‘inventing’ and ‘making’ meaning, as opposed to retrieving one that is already inset and immutable (exegetic hermeneutics). Contrary to hermeneutics, euretics allow for artworks to operate as open systems overcoming the dualist closed nature of the majority of modernist works of art. In the *P.P.D*. Kelly employs a form of art that is produced through the convergence of “general culture” (mothering) and “academic knowledge” (Freudian and Lacanian psychoanalytic theory) for “the making of theory”.

The blending of theory and art in the *P.P.D.* is what makes it a ‘mystory’, where, in the context of euretics and not hermeneutics, the autobiographical is juxtaposed with the theoretical. Accordingly, a mystery is comprised of a combination of private, public, and academic discipline-specific stories. Again we witness a collective artistic methodological structure that is analogous to Rockwell’s network theory. First, brain (private) + body (public) + world (academic) collaborate in the production of an artwork that takes the form of theory; and second, the production of theory is opened up to viewers, therefore, brain (Kelly) + body (*P.P.D.*).

700 Allan Sekula expands Quilligan and Harrison’s views regarding the archives’ openness to a collaborative production of variable meaning: “Archives constitute a territory of images; the unity of an archive is first and foremost that imposed by ownership...Thus, not only are the pictures in archives often literally for sale, but their meanings are up for grabs. New owners are invited, new interpretations are promised.” Allan Sekula, ‘Reading an Archive’, in Brian Wallis (ed.), *Blasted Allegories* (Cambridge & London: MIT Press, 1989), p. 116.
701 Ulmer, *Grammatology In The Age Of Video*, p. xi.
702 *Ibid*, p. 43; p. 20.
+ world (viewers) work collectively in order for the artwork to manifest its euretic content.

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Portraiture in these forms is very different from its ancient origins, and as such, has to be credited with an ability to adapt to both artists’ needs and subjects’ expectations. In this respect, as a category it is in constant negotiation with theories of human subjectivity, often sharing the same explorative drive of philosophy and science. In its historical forms the portrait dealt primarily with the human figure, exploring the various ways by which it could be instrumentally employed for the representation of inner character, be it through realism or abstraction. This inherent hierarchical prioritisation is what has prevented figurative portraiture from producing a truly anti-dualist format. However, the adoption of allegorical modes in the late part of the 20th century provided an alternative pathway for portraiture, one that built on the creative possibilities made available through the displacement or negation of resemblance. In addition, the allegorical techniques of confiscation, fragmentation, superimposition and of collaborative (euretic) production of meaning allow an introduction of non-dualist creative methods into art.

An artist like Warhol adopted the impersonal principles of allegory in order to produce an artistic response to the humanist and dualist ideals of high modernism. At the same time such an approach promised a more adequate depiction of the late modern self. In this world of appearances the Marilyn's focus on surface appearance serves as a reminder of the dualist argument of the eroding effects of public image making. In doing so, we witness the disappearance of both subjectivities: Warhol's through the adoption of non-expressive forms, and Marilyn's through the employment of an image for public consumption (hence its focus on a constructed appearance). Similarly, even though art production in the Factory appeared to be collaborative, Warhol’s obsession with modern forms of business management and his
unwillingness to share copyrights of the work prevent it from becoming the outcome of collective authorship.

Forms of collaboration were picked up by the majority of Conceptual artists during the 1960’s and 1970’s, who expanded early avant-garde forms of artistic surrogacy into socialised forms of collective production, aimed at the dissolution of the humanist and dualist types of art. Even though the intended dematerialisation of the art-object became a contested issue, Conceptual art’s definite success was to reassert the balance between practice & intellect, the balance that was lost due to modernism prioritisation of form, aesthetics and visuality over content, concept, and knowledge. Dematerialisation might serve as an extreme dualist enterprise (in its aim to diminish the materiality of art), yet such extreme measures were needed in order to correct the imbalance put in place by modernism’s formalism; a forced tilting of the scales. One of the things that art does best is to underline the interdependence of form & content, object & subject and stress the functional impossibility of these divisions. In this respect, it could be argued that Conceptual art’s intellectual demystification of art’s aesthetic experience is analogous to the philosophical and scientific demystification of Cartesian dualism. In this process Conceptual Art’s homeopathic approach to capitalism – the adoption of managerial techniques, the appropriation of individual labour into a production line, etc. – was not in fact successful; verified by the quick and easy commercial success of Conceptual artists. Yet, the collaborative forms of Conceptual art provide feasible alternatives to dualism by overcoming modes of sole authorship conveyed through unique and consistent styles. Moreover, the analogy of Conceptual art practices to more recent network theories (Rockwell) verifies the importance of anti-neural social interaction in the construction of the self.

Prior to the Index the production of a non-figural group portrait (let alone self-portrait) was considered almost an impossibility, especially one based on collective intellectual activity rather than on the visual representation of interiority. The Index is particularly successful, therefore, in avoiding modernist heroisms of artistic initiatives based on intuitive inner readings of individual subjects (members of Art & Language). The viewers’ participation in the production of meaning enables the Index to expand

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beyond the restrictions of the modernist closed system by presenting its viewers with an intellectual platform that can provide them with their own self-portraits. Thus, the *Index* does not offer a single, set, immutable meaning, but in opening up the production of meaning to its viewers invites them into the position of collaborators. This point summarises the utmost significance of the *Index* in relation to recent art-making, and by extension to, the critique of the dualist subject; in addition to being the work of a collective group of artists and not of a single individual, it also encourages a further collaboration process by extending the generation of meaning outside the immediate producing group. Art & Language also provide another alternative for expanding the collaboration of subjectivities in their *Portrait of Lenin*, by adopting the unique style of Jackson Pollock in order to rework a photograph of Lenin taken by Charangovitch. The ‘restrained abstraction’ of Art & Language’s *Portrait of Lenin* is another instance of a stylistic compromise, like the ones that are found in Picasso’s Cubist portraits of his dealers. Yet, it is a necessary compromise without which the creation of the pictorial pun would be impossible. It is not a compromise rooted in a clash between their stylistic concerns and their subject’s desires but the staged result of contrasting ideological positions.

Both the *Index* and *P.P.D.* employ art in a process of mutual learning. Where the *Index* focuses on the nature of art by examining its relation to theory, the *P.P.D.* looks at the nature of female subjectivity by analysing the impact of mothering in its formation. They both share the closed structures of archives, yet in their employment of allegorical processes of production of meaning they provide alternatives to the interpretative character of hermeneutics. As a result the works express similar themes to those analysed in contemporary concepts of the self: the portrait is a product of social interaction (as opposed to introversion), it takes the form of an ever-changing subjective event (as opposed to state of immutability), and it acknowledges the vital role of the material and social world in the creation of such phenomena. In this sense the object of inquiry, be it the nature of human being or the meaning of a work of art, is approached from the perspective of ‘making’ rather than ‘finding’ – which goes against the fundamental purpose of Cartesian method. If the self is constructed, constituted, then it could not possibly be static and immutable.
Back in 2003 I was in the city of Manchester for a day, showing my support to a good friend who was giving a lecture at the Cornerhouse. I arrived a couple of hours early in order to take advantage of the day out and see the town. On my way to the Cornerhouse I walked into Manchester Art Gallery coming across a touring show organised by Channel 4 called Self Portrait UK. The exhibition included a number of self-portraits by celebrities as well as up to a hundred works created by amateur or occasional artists for Channel 4’s project. Up to this day I was largely indifferent towards conventional portraits, which I used to consider as being the result of narcissism and self-valorisation, given their aesthetic and ideological subservience to the honorific mechanisms of celebrity. However, while I was skimming through the works with this preset opinion I came across a few portraits that forced me to question my recently acquired pseudo-intellectual arrogance – derived to a certain extent from the immaturity of my research skills.

The most intellectually stimulating self-portraits were the ones created by A. P. Wilkinson, Suzy Mason, and Jenni Setchel. Wilkinson’s portrait was a minimalist
monochrome, nothing more than a framed blank black sheet of paper. The work was accompanied by Wilkinson’s statement:

At your portrait competition I thought I’d have a go. But how to start my painting I really don’t know. The man said anyone can do it. But my paper’s blank, you’ll find as this is how I see myself. Because you see I’m blind.

In its poetic sincerity Wilkinson’s statement conveys a brief account of the current popular perception of what is a portrait: a visual representation of external appearance. Yet, Wilkinson’s drive to overcome the restrictions of his physical impairment enabled him to produce a self-portrait as a form of protest against the visual heritage of modernism, by referring back, perhaps unintentionally, to its key avant-garde moments. Wilkinson’s non-figurative take on portraiture was extended even further by Mason’s contribution to the show, a self-portrait consisting of a framed supermarket receipt. This radical portrait avoided conventional means of representation by disassociating the portrayal of the self from the body through the employment of allegory. In doing so, the work redirected attention to the representation of the self as an active presence in the world, whose importance is largely dismissed by Cartesian method. The substitution of the figure with text was what caught my attention in Setchell’s self-portrait, which consisted of a selection of printed memories tactically organised in discreet envelopes labelled chronologically. Like Mason, Setchell turned to the domain of lived experience (as opposed to private introspection) in order to create her self-portrait, reflected in the act of archiving her most treasured memories. More significantly, Setchell’s self-portrait touches on an important question of consciousness (how the mind’s cognitive functions rely on external information) thereby, rejecting the customary Cartesian view of a competitive relationship between mind-body, inner-outer, subjective-objective.

What these three works demonstrate, first and foremost, is that aspects of radical or alternative forms of portraiture have permeated popular perceptions of selfhood. What is also noteworthy is that this radicalism runs parallel with recent philosophical and medical advances in the theorisation of consciousness, the self and subjectivity. It was around the time of the show that the theory of Cellular Memory
emerged – organ cells bearing memory of personality traits – threatening to shake the very foundations of dualist notions of human nature and biological and medical understandings of the human body. Gary Schwartz, Linda Russek and Paul Pearsall, the leaders in this area of research, interviewed almost three hundred cases between them of transplant recipients who have experienced personality changes as a result of their surgical procedure.\textsuperscript{705} According to Swartz and Pearsall, when patients receive organ transplants often they will inherit traits of the donors’ personalities. This phenomenon is more likely to occur in cases of heart and lung transplants, due to the interconnected nature of these organs cells. The overwhelming endorsement of Cellular Memory by parapsychology, however, has threatened its scientific credibility.\textsuperscript{706} Yet, Candace Pert has approached the subject from a biological-materialist perspective in an effort to clarify the medical and philosophical implication of this phenomenon. Prior to her research amino acid chains were known to exist solely in the brain. As a result of her research, though, she has discovered their existence in various parts of the body, particularly in the major organs such as the lungs and heart.\textsuperscript{707} The discovery of neuropeptides in all body tissues encouraged Pert to suggest that cellular receptors \textit{regulate} the conscious or unconscious status of memories. This finding enforces the possibility of an existing network of physiological connections between memories, the brain and major organs, \textit{all of} which participate in the emergence of consciousness.

The concept of Cellular Memory, then, deals a second significant blow to dualist materialism (mind = brain), adding to recent neurological research that suggests the brain is more hormonal than neural,\textsuperscript{708} that is, both areas of research reject the concept of the brain as the body’s headquarters where all information is

\textsuperscript{705} Gary E. Schwartz, Linda Russek and Paul Pearsall, ‘Changes in Heart Transplant Recipients That Parallel the Personalities of Their Donors,’ \textit{Journal of Near-Death Studies} (vol. 20, No. 3, Spring 2002); there were 10 subjects interviewed in this original study, the numbers of subjects increased in their subsequent research. See also Paul Pearsall, \textit{The Heart’s Code: Tapping the Wisdom and Power of Our Heart Energy} (Portland: Broadway Books, 1998).


directed through neurons to a central processor. Moreover, both of these research programmes support Rockwell’s network theory in so far as they allow for a theory of consciousness and self to emerge out of collaborative relations and not from hierarchical body/mind divisions. As we have seen for Rockwell, it is philosophically ignorant and scientifically impossible for a conscious mind to emerge without the presence and equal participation of the body; without the influence of the body the mind would have very little to reflect on. The majority of the cases recorded for the Cellular Memory research revolve around personal likes and dislikes (music taste, sexual and dietary preferences), all of which also underline Charles Taylor’s notion of the self as grounded in a collection of fluctuating personal preferences formed around social and cultural frameworks (and, therefore, in process, rather than a metaphysical entity with preset features and attributes). This distinction is proven by the physical and mental abilities of these people to adopt and accommodate new aspects of their selves.

The idea of the mind as being dispersed throughout the body still remains quite far-fetched, mostly due to the influence of religious spirituality and Cartesian subjectivity on everyday folk philosophy. To further understand the level of impact of this kind of folk psychology on modern life we only have to look at the etymology of the word *individual*. The word consists of three parts: in-, divide-, and dual, all of which combine to emphasise the introspective and divisional character of dualism. However, this is not to imply that Descartes managed to come up with a devious way to infuse language with his philosophical concepts. Rather, by tracing the development of philosophical inquiry into human nature we are able to see that the dominant philosophical positions of each era are reflected in the prevailing popular terms for describing the human condition. For instance, the popular classicist Hellenic term ἀνθρωπός (anthropos) – a combination of ἀν (up) and θρώσκω (to see, to look, to gaze) – metaphorically encompasses Plato’s methodology for achieving self-mastery by finding our place or role in the cosmic order. The Roman term *persona* – deriving from the Etruscan word phersu (mask) – signifies the general recognition and open acceptance of the tendency to put on appearances or adopt codes that construct or idealise the presentation of character within a social context; a tendency that governs Hellenistic and Roman portraiture destined for public consumption.
Finally, the reasons for the popularisation of the term *human* during the Renaissance is mostly due to the ‘gentile’, ‘refined’, and ‘cultured’ connotations that lay in the original meaning of this Latin word, and to a certain extend its ability to mirror the cultural transition from the preceding dark conditions of the Middle Ages.

During the Platonic era the approach of portraiture to the human subject was analogous to Plato's methodology for achieving self-mastery; both were caught up in a search for universal and immutable values that promised to provide a sense of order to the seemingly chaotic aspects of the material world. The elements of truth and reason that lay at the core of Platonism manifested themselves in portraiture in the form of the realist, naturalist rendering of external appearance. As such, the body acts as a metaphor or the equivalent of the material world, which contains the truth of the person. Therefore, naturalistic rendering is demanded in order to leave the representation of the subject open for the viewer to project his or her feelings and judgements. In other words, the Platonic portrait strives for acute realism in order to allow for viewers to produce their own reading of the subject.

The differences between Platonic and Aristotelian positions are mirrored in their employment of physiognomy. Whereas Aristotelian classicism employs physiognomy in order to idealise character, dualist practices (both Platonic and Cartesian) employ physiognomy to read not just the character of the sitter but also the ‘inner depths’ of their personality. This difference is of fundamental importance, since the construction of character implies a rejection of the self as an immutable entity. This transition in the arts signifies the succession of dualist Platonic thought by Aristotelian materialism. As a result, the inherent realism of Platonism – which applied physiognomy in order to read a subject in an analogous way to how Platonic subject reads the universe in the search for a life role – was enhanced with Aristotelian idealisation. Platonic physiognomy is in tune with the honorific character of classicist portraiture in laying bare the unique properties of the sitter. The resulting pantheon of portraiture would also serve as a collection of exemplary individuals bearing the universal values that would reflect the dominant values of the classical ethos. The classicist portrait’s balance between nature and individuality is, in this sense, a singular that refers to a universal. During the Hellenistic and Roman eras entry into this
pantheon was achieved through the idealisation of physiognomic traits aimed at the visual construction of exemplary charismas.

In spite of Plato and Aristotle’s differences in their understanding of human nature their methodologies for self-mastery share a common ground. They both point to the importance of active being in the world as key to self-knowledge, although Plato treasures the universal values and Logic in the Cosmos whilst Aristotle is more appreciative of the specifics of earthly life. While Plato laid the foundations for the emergence of Christian spiritual dogma by putting forth a conception of the soul as immaterial, independent, eternal, immutable and in conflict with the material body, Aristotle provided the needed rationalism that would distinguish the new religion from its pagan competition. Thomas Aquinas’ reconciliation of Aristotle’s hylemorphism not only enforced a philosophical retraction from non-dualist notions of being – back to the Platonic dichotomy between body and soul – but by manipulating Aristotle’s unresolved question of the intellect Aquinas endowed the soul with a locus, or headquarters, in the biological body.

Prior to Aquinas, it was physiognomic attention to the head alone that led to the compositional reduction of the portrait from life size to bust during the Hellenistic and Roman eras. In spite of this reduction the portrait retained its naturalism until the moment Christianity became the most popular religion. In many respects, Byzantine abstraction of the body is analogous to the modernist abstraction, in so far as it is the result of a dogmatic rejection of mimetic realism and not the outcome of underdeveloped artistic skills similar to Egyptian and Cycladic abstraction. Both of these instances of aesthetic reconfiguration aimed at bringing to the surface the inner truth or essence of human spirituality, and by extension that of nature (landscape) and objects (still life). Moreover, in both instances the search for immaterial truth and the distance from mimesis represent Platonic tendencies that were adopted in order to cleanse art of the mimetic obedience and idealisation of Aristotelian influence, while emphasising the spiritual nature of man. The compositional return to a full-format treatment of the figure signifies the Church’s Platonic foundations, which were augmented by Aquinas’ assignment of the brain as the locus of the soul, represented by the introduction of the pictorial device of halos.
In other words, Byzantine aesthetics is a successful reconsideration of art according to modified Platonic concepts of being, filtered through the criticism of mimesis in art.

At the dawn of the Renaissance with the cultural return to the classicist ethos, the arts abolished the generic abstraction of the Middle Ages only to strive for the astute realism of the ancient masters. Renaissance theorists such as Leon Batista Alberti and Giovanni Lomazzo promoted this return to naturalistic rendering, which they framed in Aristotelian terms. They, in particular, advocated portraiture’s potential for public image-making through physiognomy, by referring back to famous cases of successful collaborations between great leaders and their private artists, such as Alexander the Great and Apelles. The return to realism was accompanied by the gradual compositional reduction of portrait, from life-size to bust. The choice of format was invariably a matter of cost; the ruling and aristocratic classes would opt for life-size while the middle class would prefer the half-size or bust format. This renewed focus on the head, however, was not simply a consequence of physiognomic attention to the head – similar to Roman portraiture – but the result of the impact of Christian dogma, specifically its attribution of the brain as the soul’s bodily habitat. As such the initial development of the modern dualist portrait can be traced back to the work of Caravaggio, with his atmospheric attention to the face and head (chiaroscuro and light contrasts). In this respect, the basis for the dualist portrait did not emerge as an immediate response to Cartesian philosophy but more concretely as the product of Caravaggio’s incorporation of Aquinas’ Christianisation of Platonic dualism and the Aristotelian notion of the intellect.

The socio-political changes that took place in the Netherlands during the 17th century provided the appropriate conditions for the initial development of what would later become a fully-fledged middle class. This is an important point in portraiture’s history since it is the first time that a certain social group or class resorted to art in order to establish itself through visual means. In this respect, the Dutch burgers appropriated the format of the portrait to facilitate various class identity-traits that allowed them to distinguish themselves from the aristocracy. This represented a major alteration to the format of the portrait. The burghers desired an alternative to the life-size, and often outdoor portraits of aristocrats, which signified the rule of land and hereditary rights of birth. In order to emphasise their conception of nobility (nobility
according to intellectual and practical skills) – aspects of the self that are constructed, learned and not inherited – the burgers developed a portrait format that was governed by the desire to produce private and personal images. These represented aspects of their identity in a realist manner, with a clear focus on the subject’s head, the centre of intellectual excellence.

Yet, there were instances where wealthy burgers, and those burghers with aristocratic aspirations, would resort to ideologically contrasting pictorial styles in order to make their aspirations public. For instance, Aristotelian idealisation opens up the path for the visual construction of a subject’s personality through the employment of physiognomy, but it negates the sought-after representation of the burghers’ distinct appearance and ethical adherence to truth. This is best served through Platonic and Cartesian realism, appropriate for a physiognomic reading of the sitters’ inner being. These various options were made available because the 17th century Netherlands became home to a plethora of pictorial styles that were analogous to the active and emerging notions of individuality (Aristotelian and Cartesian). These styles were active in the key urban centres of Utrecht, Haarlem and Amsterdam. Utrecht’s long tradition as a northern religious centre of Catholicism made it possible for the importation of Renaissance Italian masters’ styles, such as Caravaggio’s, that were particularly successful in emphasising the spiritual side of man by focusing on the head, through the use of compositional and atmospheric devices. The style of Haarlem painters shared none of Utrecht’s dualist tendencies, concentrating instead on the realistic depiction of the burgers’ appearance and class-specific attire, as a result of the city’s financial and cultural excellence. The classicist character of Haarlem’s portraiture is defined by the tendency to depict subjects in life-size in all their vitality, indeed often caught in the midst of activities; all of this being in tune with both Platonic and Aristotelian notions of self-mastery through active being in the world. Due to its cosmopolitan character and its equal emphasis on religious and economic matters Amsterdam produced a style that combined the dualist effects of Utrecht and the Aristotelian approach of Haarlem. This choice allowed for the portrait clients of Amsterdam to choose between styles, or even combine aspects of these styles.

Rembrandt’s practice is ideal for understanding the conflictual co-existence of Aristotelian and Cartesian notions in Dutch art. Rembrandt’s preoccupation with the
face, and particularly his own, has prompted scholars to produce overly romantic accounts of Rembrandt as the foremost artist of human subjectivity from a dualist perspective. However, a closer look into his work would suggest the exact opposite. That is, Rembrandt was an astute professional who treated his workshop like a proper business aiming at pleasing the desires of his clients. The production of his self-portraits was developed as a means for studying the performative and expressive possibilities of the human face, gestural appropriation, and attire in order to apply these in his portraits of others, and therefore not as evidence of the artistic equivalent of Cartesian self-explorative method. What has led to romantic readings of Rembrandt’s work is his dualist (compositional) attention to the head and the exaggerated application of Caravaggist chiaroscuro and light. Yet, Rembrandt employed these pictorial devices only to enhance the representation of feelings necessary for the works’ element of performativity; and as Descartes himself has argued feelings are too temporal, too ephemeral to justify the existence of an eternal and immutable soul.

To further understand the level of artificiality invested in Rembrandt’s self-portraits we only have to look at the results of the Rembrandt Research Project. Not only did Rembrandt utilise his self-portraits as the means by which he was to research expression and gesture, but he would encourage his assistants to produce works on his behalf and even portraits of himself that he would then trade as his own, or at least as products of his workshop. Contrary to the Renaissance workshop practices of Rubens and Raphael, Rembrandt would encourage his assistants to sign their work with Rembrandt’s name. In a way, this was Rembrandt’s means for establishing a ‘brand name’ at a time of entrepreneurial frenzy. The philosophical cost of this endeavour was his distance from a form of practice that corresponded to Cartesian notions of singular authorship, originality and uniqueness, based on self-reflection. Although Rembrandt’s studio ethics shatter this Cartesian notion of the subject as sole producer of knowledge, they do, however, conform to the wider role of Cartesianism in the culture, by putting in place a model of practice whose hierarchical structure is identical to the dualist conjunction of mind and soul. That is, Rembrandt was acting as the head of a working body. The signing of his students and assistants’ work as his own verifies that he was claiming authorship for these works, in the same way the
mind claims authorship for the right actions of the body. Moreover, his teaching and
guidance of his pupils is analogous to the course of self-mastery to which the soul
subjects the body, blinded by a desire to control and discipline its servant.

This dualist model of artistic workshop-mechanics remains relatively active
and influential until the moment of modernism. The longing for professional
independence and expressive freedom led the modernist artist into a solitary and
autonomous studio practice in order to protect his or her individualism from the
effects of industrialisation. In this process the pre-modern dualist workshop structure
was replaced by a studio practice that validated the key characteristics of Cartesian
subjectivity (sole authorship, originality, introspection). Up until the moment of
modernism art and portraiture’s reliance on commissions and patronage, restrained
the free exploration of the human subject through portraiture. This professional status
of the artist came with a price; the suppression of the subjectivity of the artist, who
was considered as nothing more than a highly trained technician carrying out the
demands of the state, church, and ruling class. The modernist artist sought to rid his
or her practice of this professional subservience and its conformity with Cartesian
dualism, since the commissioner or patron becomes the ‘mind’ that controls the
artist’s material–’bodily’ production. As such, in the process of gaining creative
independence the modernist artist rejected three dualist structures in order to model
his or her practice around the specifics of the Cartesian subject. Firstly, he sacrificed
his secure position within a historically privileged artisanal culture for the sake of
being the sole maker of his or her work; and secondly, he abolished the restrictive
parameters of commissioned work that relegated the artist to the role of a controlled,
skilled body; and thirdly the artist dissociated himself or herself from the conventional
forms of pictorial resemblance. The modernist portrait may have retained the
compositional form of the pre-modern dualist portrait (attention to the head), but
now, the artist presented his or her reading of the subject (communicating his or her
truth of their subjects’ inner being) often leading to abstraction, as opposed to the pre-
modern realism (‘necessary’ for the viewer’s physiognomic reading of the subject’s
character). Thereby modernist artists sought to abandon realism and mimesis
(perceived as the surviving idealising remnants of Aristotelian idealisation), since the
legacy of realism was considered as deceptive and untrue, given the fact that it was often the idealised outcome of the patrons’ requests.

The primary methodology that contributed to this dissociative process was the Platonic notion of artistic pure vision, which served the demands of modernist individuality by allowing the artist to advertise his or her uniqueness through their work’s production. This employment of an alternative, metaphysical form of vision reveals the dualist character of modernist abstraction, in so far as it is consistent with Descartes’ disbelief or distrust in the senses, particularly that of vision. Furthermore, modernist abstraction, at one level, represents an overblown Platonic realism of inner essence, that is, it represents a form of inner realism that bypasses external appearance for the true essence of the person, object, etc. It is due to this very fact that the modernist portrait stands as close as possible to a ‘pure’ dualism, in that, form is forced into a subservient relationship to essence since its representation is sacrificed for the representation of essence. At the same time, this Cartesian process of the inner filtering of external information emphasises the modernist tendency to find solace in the spiritual in the face of rapid industrialisation and intense urbanisation; to turn ‘inside’ in response to the disappointments of the outside. In spite of its conformity with dualism – the metaphysical abilities of artist are employed in order to re-present the metaphysical qualities of sitter – the pictorial effects are highly subjective and dependent on the personal and artistic predilections of the artist. For this reason, the modernist dualist portrait fails to overcome the constructed effects of Aristotelian idealisation, in so far as the representation of the subject becomes idealized as a result of the creative or professional concerns of the artist.

The process of the artist regaining creative control over his or her production of art has resulted in a clash of subjectivities between the artist and the sitter or commissioner of the work, due to the visual expectations of the sitter. This demand for some degree of resemblance from the sitter is the historically and culturally embedded effect of the classical honorific function of portraiture and the survival of portraiture as a pantheon of exemplary individuals. Such a demand manifests itself in the commissioner or sitter’s expectations to be recognised so as to enable viewers to apply a physiognomic reading, and therefore taken their place within the pantheon of esteemed individuals. Yet, if the honorific survived modernism, the creative and
professional decisions that were produced as a result of artistic independence radically reconfigured the social status of such a pantheon. Artists were now creating their own pantheons free of the ideological pressures of church and state, which eventually reduced this cultural mechanism from a selection of exemplars of humanist universal values to a means for public image making and self-promotion. In other words, by putting in place their pantheons modern artists became critical of how honour was appropriated by the state, religion, and the ruling class. This is another instance of a modernist rejection of Aristotelian values, since it was Hellenistic and Roman physiognomic idealisation that allowed for the universal pantheon to attain such historic power. Thus, the constitution of artist-led pantheons of portraiture guaranteed the abolition of external creative control while at the same time assisted in the formation of new modernist heroic personas, like Picasso. Indeed, the process of attribution of honour shifted from the sitter to the artist, as the sitter was now largely subservient to the artist's approval.

Cubism set out to resolve the problem of visual identification (in the process of achieving creative freedom) through the denaturalisation of the human figure, which began in the Analytic stage of Cubism as an overblown multivalent realism, then eventually moved into abstraction; the issue of the sitter's identification was resolved in the Synthetic stage through the substitution of pictorial reference for the indexical. The abstraction of the figure would, inevitably, leave no room for the identification of the subject, thereby diminishing the possibility of incorporating the desires and interests of the sitter. Consequently, the clash of subjectivities in modernist portraiture is resolved through the suppression of the sitter's subjectivity (resemblance). This suppression produces an obvious disappointment in the sitter, who, nevertheless, is solaced through the honour of being included in the artist's pantheon. Yet, the value of such honour is significantly reduced when the artist is professionally dependent on the given sitter.

Picasso found himself caught in just such a situation with the creation of the Cubist portraits of his dealers at the time. For these portraits Picasso withdrew from the extreme figurative abstraction of his Cubist explorations, pursued with Braque, in order to please the demands of his sitters (visual identification). It could be argued that this was a reasonable demand, especially since it did not incorporate a request for
idealisation. However, this retraction is of grave importance because it limited the application of the experimental potentials of Cubism and the creative independence of Picasso. Thus Picasso subsumed his subjectivity to that of his dealers by willingly assimilating his creative concerns to those of his sitters’ expectations. The fact that Picasso became aware of this problematic class of subjectivities derives from his later decision to stylistically divide the production of his portraits between those destined for promotional consumption (Neoclassic) and those that served his experimental drive (Expressionist). The significance of Picasso’s restriction of Cubism’s potential for the sake of satisfying his dealers becomes even greater when viewed in the broader historical context, and particularly, in relation to the aims of modernism. That is, the fact that this stylistic retraction manifested itself as a prioritisation of the sitter’s subjectivity forced Picasso to fall back into the pre-modern dualist structure of professional and creative subservience to patronage. In this way, the modernist mission of approaching dualism through monadic and independent forms of creativity (and not through structures of productive subservience (patronage / artist as head of workshop)) became impossible to achieve.

The alternative to dualist abstraction and Aristotelian mimesis was provided by the avant-garde practice of the readymade, the emergence and subsequent development of which was contemporary with that of Cubism. The readymade offers artists first and foremost a method for making art that diminishes the Cartesian notion of singular authorship. The expressive, artisanal mode of making is replaced with a model of authorship-as-nomination. In this way, the significance of the readymade lies in its re-introduction of allegory into art following its early modernist abolition. This indexical return of allegory not only presents an escape route out of idealisation, but also provides a non-abstract alternative to mimesis. In this way, allegorical modes of non-resemblance are able to produce a successful critique of the honorific function of portraiture. Moreover, the allegorical principles of fragmentation and decentralisation defy the absolute character of the dualist notions of immutability, subjective unity and hierarchical order. Accordingly, allegory’s fundamental critique of the singularity of the dualist subject lies in its attention to polysemic meaning, which in return not only encourages but also demands the viewers’ participation in the process of meaning production. Once engaged in this process, viewers are compelled
to employ their critical abilities and knowledge beyond the contextual confines of the work. As a result of this independent and euretic process of production of meaning, viewers become aware of their state of consciousness in the production of meaning. Finally this (euretic) process is guided by a cognitive model of a combinative reference (the construction of meaning from disparate sources), which is radically different from hermeneutics and the conflictual tendencies of dualism. Indeed allegory puts in place a network of relations that is analogous to W. Teed Rockwell’s model of consciousness: brain (artist) – body (sitter) – world (audience) all of which participate in the production of meaning. On this basis, the collaborative aspects of the allegorical production of meaning, enable a constructive alternative to the dualist pursuit of oppositional binaries.

Key artists using allegory to work through, and with portraiture, are Andy Warhol, Art & Language and Mary Kelly. Allegory manifests itself in Warhol primarily through his fondness for working with mechanically reproduced readymade imagery. Like many of his Pop art peers Warhol revisited Dadaist strategies in response to the expressive tendencies of high modernist artists. In this light, the portraits of Marilyn Monroe are radical to the extent that he based them on a widely circulated image of Monroe instead of producing an original impression of his subject. At first, the repetitive manner in which Monroe is presented in the panels assert an anti-dualist account of the self, one that is multiple and mutable. However, by addressing the surface-image of Monroe’s appropriated persona for public consumption, Warhol revisits the dualist distrust of the untrue representational properties of public image making, whose origins can be traced back in Aristotelian idealisation. From this perspective the serial character of the work refers to the multiplicity of Monroe’s constructed public femininity, exposing the power of idealisation’s potential. Moreover, Warhol’s decision to work with a public image establishes a division between a private and a public self, which simply adds to the dualist character of the Monroe portrait. As a result we reach a paradoxical dissolution of the modernist clash of subjectivities through the combination of inexpressive means that deflate Warhol’s subjectivity as an artist, and Monroe’s mediated image, which denies the viewer insight into her personality. The difference between Monroe’s

image and pre-modernist commissioned portraiture, then, is that Monroe did not have a say in this process (unlike the majority of Warhol's subjects, Monroe, like the other celebrity subjects of Warhol's portraiture of the time, did not sit for this portrait), thus her subjectivity was not asserted in a competitive dialogue with the author of the work. This distancing process from the subjectivities of both artist and subject assists the viewer in understanding how important the intended context of presentation is in the production of a public portrait.

Warhol formed the Factory as a collaborative venture, where he acted as the head of the business controlling and overseeing a collective line of production. However, his preference for mechanical means in the making of his art forced his assistants' creative interventions to remain invisible and allowed the work to be reproduced in great numbers without drawing on the skills of the individuals he employed; in contrast, Rembrandt's work was based on the very personal and stylistic attributes of his assistants. Truly collaborative works require the unique mark of individuals to become indistinguishable from one another in order for the work to be perceived as a collective outcome or a group effort, preventing the open attribution of certain aspects of the work to specific individuals. Authorship of the work should be attributed equally to all collaborators, implemented through the establishment of artists’ collective agency. Yet, Warhol's restriction of his assistants' creative input through the endorsement of mechanical reproductive methods and his refusal to share authorship and copyright of the work, in the end distanced the labour of the Factory from those of truly collaborative practices. Instead, we have the artistic reification of the ghost in the machine, with Warhol acting as the spirit or mind that controls a mechanical body, all in the name of his great desire to establish a modern day brand name for his practice. In these terms, Warhol's practice remains consistent with Cartesian subjectivity by conforming to what Rockwell terms as dualist materialism, where metaphysics is reduced to a hierarchical network that relies on the instrumental relationship between its ‘parts’ and ‘headquarters’.

The notion of singular authorship was successfully deflated by Conceptual art's collaborative practices, such as those pursued by Art & Language, where authorship is attributed to all members of the group. Moreover, Art & Language's employment of the studio for intellectual debates and research activities explicitly rejects the dualist
and modernist model of solitary studio practice that produces original knowledge based on ‘intuition’ and ‘formal innovation’. Art & Language's seminal work *Index* extends their notion of collaboration into a critique of the clash of subjectivities, through the dissolution of modernist artistic subjectivity. The combination of allegorical principles and euretics encourages further collaboration by opening up the process of production of meaning beyond the immediate members of the group. As a result, this endless extension of meaning attacks both the closed nature of modernist art and of archives. Once the meaning of a work remains open and capable of accommodating a multitude of viewer responses, the dichotomies between object (artwork) and subject (meaning), artist (producer of knowledge) and viewer (perceiver of knowledge) are dissolved by a collective and cooperative approach. The network that is formed as a consequence of the viewers' equal participation in the production of meaning is analogous to Rockwell's network theory: brain (artist) + body (physical body of work) + world (audience) collaborate in the production of the actual work, which takes the form of an intellectual event that adapts to the specifics of each collaborator. As a result, this potential for a limitless number of participating viewers in the production of meaning opens up the range of possible subjectivities involved in the production of portraiture beyond the two involved in pre-modernist and modernist portraiture (artist-sitter).

Art & Language revisited the problem of conflictual subjectivities in their *Portrait of V. I. Lenin in the Style of Jackson Pollock*. Where the *Index* deflates sole authorship by inviting external participation in the production of a ‘group portrait’, the *Portrait of Lenin* does so by allegorically appropriating Pollock's style in order to recreate Charangovitch's iconic image of Lenin. By adapting the subjectivities of Pollock and Charangovitch – manifested in the adoption of Pollock's style and reworking of Charangovitch's image of Lenin – the work proposes a dialogic exchange between the subjectivities of Art & Language and those of Pollock and Charangovitch, thus, providing a way out of the dualistic clash of subjectivities. Of course, such a situation is intrinsically linked to the ironic realms of allegory, where the subjectivity of Lenin is employed for the purpose of creating a visual pun and not to provide a conventional portrait of Lenin.
Mary Kelly's *Post Partum Document* advances the inter-subjective character of Art & Language's work by paying particular importance to the role of the sitter. This is the result of the work's focus on mothering at the early stages of a child's upbringing, which instantly presupposes a dialectic coexistence of mother and child's subjectivities. Hence, the necessary collaboration of subjectivities – without which the work would serve as nothing more than an account of family-based conflicts – establishes another extended model of portraiture, capable of challenging the conflictual tendencies and hierarchical structures of dualist practices. The *P.P.D.* shares the *Index's* euretic approach, now produced out of a combination of autobiography (mothering), academic theory (Lacanian psychoanalysis), and art (Conceptual art). The introduction of theory as an integral methodological aspect of the work puts in place a process where the private emerges through a theoretical filter before it becomes public and shared. This inevitably establishes a certain level of subjective neutrality, preventing Kelly from advertising her individuality through the tropes of unique expression. Again this is strikingly analogous to Rockwell's network theory. Brain (private) + body (public) + world (academic) collaborate in the production of an artwork that takes the form of a theoretical engagement with the impact of mothering on the formation of Kelly's relationship with her son and her son's emerging subjectivity. Consequently, the *P.P.D.* offers a model of portraiture where the subject or sitter is not subordinated to the interests of the artist, and therefore, the artist does not attempt to impose his or her idiosyncrasies on the representation of the sitter.

Commenting on the recent neuronal concepts of the mind that form the basis for the engineering science of Computer AI processing Greg Ulmer rightfully claims that they account only for the left part of brain, due to its “algorithmic features of analysis and linear sequence”.\(^{710}\) The development of dualist portraiture seems to have attempted to test both ‘sides’ of the brain: from the pre-modernist realism (Rational left side/Platonic reading of subject through physiognomy) to modern abstraction (expressive-right side/ Romantic impression of subject accessed through ‘inner vision’). As a result, up until the moment of post-1960’s portraiture the course of aesthetic development for the last four thousand years has been trapped in a vicious

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circle between realism and abstraction. Starting from the abstract representations of Egyptian Pharaohs portraiture was then taken over by Classicist naturalism only to return to abstraction during the Byzantine era and the Middle Ages. At the dawn of the Renaissance and the cultural return to the classicist humanist ethos excellence in portraiture became intrinsically connected with realistic depiction. Yet, the modernist rejection of realism encouraged a full return to abstraction with portraiture offering extra challenges for formalist experimentation. Post-1960’s portraiture abandoned the expressive heroism of high modernism, adopting a research-based approach to the representation of the subject. Yet this realism is not to be identified with aesthetics and formalism, on the contrary it should be seen as a form of practice that is developed in tandem with heuristic demands of extra-artistic research.

The primary aim of this thesis is to dissociate the representation of subjectivity in art from its traditional dualist conceptions. In doing so, whereas the first two Chapters trace the emergence of the dualist portrait, the second chapter looks at the methodological problems that arise from the honorific aspects of this format (clash of subjectivities). Accordingly, the last chapter provides an account of alternative approaches to the representation of human subjectivity, all of which presuppose a fundamental distancing from honorific notions. As a consequence, such forms of portraiture require the artist to refrain from an individualistic promotion of his artistic uniqueness and abstain from dealing with or exploring the sitter’s self. As we have seen, one of the ways this can be achieved is through the employment of allegory, which allows for a non-expressive, non-resemblance-based form of portraiture. Yet, paradoxically, although allegorical portraits prevent the representational subservience of the body to the mind, they risk siding with dualism, in so far as their effects are achieved through a representation of the self independent of the body. On the other hand, the allegorical attributes of the readymade as well as the sequential character of recent forms of portraiture, represent a successful critique of the dualist notion of the subject as unique and immutable (singular, ‘timeless’). In this way, the use of readymade imagery, for instance, offers a middle ground between a certain level of resemblance and a refusal to deal with the representation of the body; the use of a found image frees the artist from a need to produce a ‘reading’ of his subject. Finally, when such tactics are adopted by collaborative practices, then we witness the absolute
dissolution of the dualist portrait through a critique of the honorific and of singular
authorship, since individual subjectivities merge under a collective artistic agency.

In this respect, portraiture has freed itself from its dogmatic restraints in order
to adopt an explorative role equal to that of philosophy and science. It is astonishing
how in the short course of the last fifty or so years portraiture has developed in critical
range. Now that portraiture is also (mostly) free from the dictates of patronage and
the creative vanity of artistic heroism it can focus on the exploration of subjectivity
and the self from a non-dualist, non-humanist perspective. The benefits of this
approach can be found in the radical amateur portraits that were discussed in the early
section of this conclusion, which above all signify the advance and popularisation of
contemporary artistic methodology. In the light of the recent and somewhat parallel
development of the philosophy of mind and portraiture, the general perception of
portraiture’s role should be freed from its historical burden of self-promotion and
elevated into a critical genre of invaluable intellectual importance.
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