2.50
Hdl Handle:
http://hdl.handle.net/2436/29441
Title:
Conditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals.
Authors:
Over, D.E.; Manktelow, Ken I.; Hadjichristidis, C.
Abstract:
Recent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed.
Citation:
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2004, 58 (2): 96-105
Publisher:
American Psychological Association
Journal:
Canadian Journal of Experimental Psychology
Issue Date:
2004
URI:
http://hdl.handle.net/2436/29441
DOI:
10.1037/h0085800
PubMed ID:
15285599
Additional Links:
http://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/h0085800
Type:
Article
Language:
en
ISSN:
1196-1961
Appears in Collections:
Psychology of Health Research Group

Full metadata record

DC FieldValue Language
dc.contributor.authorOver, D.E.-
dc.contributor.authorManktelow, Ken I.-
dc.contributor.authorHadjichristidis, C.-
dc.date.accessioned2008-06-04T09:50:10Z-
dc.date.available2008-06-04T09:50:10Z-
dc.date.issued2004-
dc.identifier.citationCanadian Journal of Experimental Psychology, 2004, 58 (2): 96-105en
dc.identifier.issn1196-1961-
dc.identifier.pmid15285599-
dc.identifier.doi10.1037/h0085800-
dc.identifier.urihttp://hdl.handle.net/2436/29441-
dc.description.abstractRecent psychological research has investigated how people assess the probability of an indicative conditional. Most people give the conditional probability of q given p as the probability of if p then q. Asking about the probability of an indicative conditional, one is in effect asking about its acceptability. But on what basis are deontic conditionals judged to be acceptable or unacceptable? Using a decision theoretic analysis, we argue that a deontic conditional, of the form if p then must q or if p then may q, will be judged acceptable to the extent that the p & q possibility is preferred to the p & not-q possibility. Two experiments are reported in which this prediction was upheld. There was also evidence that the pragmatic suitability of permission rules is partly determined by evaluations of the not-p & q possibility. Implications of these results for theories of deontic reasoning are discussed.en
dc.language.isoenen
dc.publisherAmerican Psychological Associationen
dc.relation.urlhttp://psycnet.apa.org/?fa=main.doiLanding&doi=10.1037/h0085800en
dc.subject.meshAdolescenten
dc.subject.meshAdulten
dc.subject.meshDecision Makingen
dc.subject.meshFemaleen
dc.subject.meshHumansen
dc.subject.meshJudgmenten
dc.subject.meshLogicen
dc.subject.meshMaleen
dc.subject.meshProbabilityen
dc.subject.meshStatistics, Nonparametricen
dc.titleConditions for the acceptance of deontic conditionals.en
dc.typeArticleen
dc.identifier.journalCanadian Journal of Experimental Psychologyen

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